ZKStamp Proof-100
REMOTE · PROOF.ZKETERNITY.APP
Shielded proof-of-existence timestamps on BitcoinZ (zk-SNARKs). Free trial: 3 proofs.
Available components
Last scanned (1 hour ago)
Scores higher than 54% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 5 Nov 2026.
Category Crypto and Web3
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security57
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 3 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability77
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 461 tokens (~153/item across 3 items; 3 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management30
- Stability observed for 9 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 3 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 3 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 5 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 27 to 30. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 8 days of observed history at the previous scan, 9 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 3 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 20 to 23. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 6 days of observed history at the previous scan, 7 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 1 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 13 to 17. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 4 days of observed history at the previous scan, 5 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 30 Oct 26 0
- Tool “check_balance” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: pass → fail ▼ functional
- 28 Oct 26 +1
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 27 Oct 26 65
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Probed https://proof.zketernity.app/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=proof.zketernity.app | CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 26 Oct 2026 | 24 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 50f17bb47c18d8f408181cdc896aad745aa |
| SANs: proof.zketernity.app | ||||||
| CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 4df3b15dd6c0784c507cd37b58e6f115 |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of proof.zketernity.app. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| app. | present | 23684 | 8 | Verified |
| zketernity.app. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://proof.zketernity.app/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://proof.zketernity.app/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://proof.zketernity.app/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
check_balance ~92
Show how many Proof-100 proofs are left and the two BTCZ deposit addresses for buying more: deposit_address (shielded zs, fully private) and t_deposit_address (transparent, for exchanges and t-only wallets like Coinomi; the payment is visible on the blockchain, the proofs stay shielded). 500,000 BTCZ to either (or both together) = 100 proofs after 2 confirmations.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
timestamp_fingerprint ~279
Create a private, dated proof that a file or data existed, without sending the data. Use this when you already have the SHA-256 fingerprint (hash) of a file; for a short text, use timestamp_text instead. Compute the hash locally over the exact bytes (for example: sha256sum MyFile.pdf) and pass the 64-character hex string. The fingerprint is written into the encrypted memo of a shielded (zk-SNARK) BitcoinZ transaction, sent to a new address made for this proof only; the block timestamp dates it. Takes about 10 to 60 seconds and uses 1 proof from the account (requires the account key in the Authorization header). Returns ok, txid, viewing_key, explorer link and proofs_left. Tell the user to keep the txid and viewing_key: together they let anyone verify this one proof with ZCheck, and reveal nothing else. On error (invalid fingerprint, invalid key, no proofs left, send failed) no proof is used.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| fingerprint | string | yes | SHA-256 hash of the file, as 64 hexadecimal characters (case-insensitive), e.g. 968c796b7f8c9259ee92d7168d882df2f347d9711a51da90182c98d69139cdb7 |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
timestamp_text ~90
Compute the SHA-256 fingerprint of a short text on the Proof-100 server (the text is not stored), then write that fingerprint privately on the BitcoinZ blockchain. Returns the fingerprint, the transaction ID and a viewing key for this one proof. Keep the viewing key: with the txid it reveals this proof only. Uses 1 proof.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| text | string | yes | The exact text to timestamp |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the ZKStamp Proof-100 MCP server?
ZKStamp Proof-100 is a hosted endpoint at https://proof.zketernity.app/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · proof.zketernity.app
claude mcp add --transport http zkstamp-proof100 'https://proof.zketernity.app/mcp'
What is the ZKStamp Proof-100 MCP server?
ZKStamp Proof-100 is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.ZKStamp/proof100. Shielded proof-of-existence timestamps on BitcoinZ (zk-SNARKs). Free trial: 3 proofs. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://proof.zketernity.app/mcp).
Is the ZKStamp Proof-100 MCP server safe to use?
ZKStamp Proof-100 scores 69 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the ZKStamp Proof-100 MCP server expose?
ZKStamp Proof-100 exposes 3 tools: timestamp_fingerprint, timestamp_text, check_balance. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 461 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the ZKStamp Proof-100 MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to ZKStamp Proof-100 without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the ZKStamp Proof-100 MCP server still maintained?
ZKStamp Proof-100 is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.