Veyra
REMOTE · VEYRA.MONEY · 2 COMPONENTS
Give AI agents a wallet with a spending limit. Non-custodial USDC on Base, server-enforced limits.
Available components
Last scanned (20 hours ago)
Scores higher than 96% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 4 Nov 2026.
Category Crypto and Web3
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security89
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation is enforced on tool calls, but the challenge carries no valid RFC 9728 metadata, so a client cannot discover where to get a token. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability73
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 577 tokens (~82/item across 7 items; 7 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage85
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 56% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 7 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 7 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities60
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 19 Oct 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 18 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 93 to 97. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 28 days of observed history at the previous scan, 29 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 16 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 87 to 90. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 26 days of observed history at the previous scan, 27 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 14 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 80 to 83. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 24 days of observed history at the previous scan, 25 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 12 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 70 to 77. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 21 days of observed history at the previous scan, 23 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 10 Oct 26 +3
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 50 to 70. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 15 days of observed history at the previous scan, 21 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 3 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 43 to 47. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 13 days of observed history at the previous scan, 14 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 1 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 37 to 40. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 11 days of observed history at the previous scan, 12 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 4 Nov 2026 · Probed https://veyra.money/api/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=veyra.money | CN=YR2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 9 Oct 2026 | 7 Jan 2027 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 58c2b3b6490c5df9c5fdc513d6b72a90952 |
| SANs: veyra.money | ||||||
| CN=YR2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 4ebd24947e24d394802d84a52fd5b319 |
| CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | RSA 4096 | SHA256-RSA | f24b6d17f9d9ad7cb1c9fea78782699f |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of veyra.money. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| money. | present | 4450, 40832 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| veyra.money. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication Challenged, unverified
The endpoint asked for a token, but we could not retrieve and validate the RFC 9728 metadata that tells a client how to obtain one.
| Result | Challenged, unverified |
|---|---|
| Enforced | On tool calls |
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=63072000 |
Protected resource metadata
| Retrieved | No |
|---|---|
| Problem | no_resource_metadata |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://veyra.money/api/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://veyra.money/api/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 308 | https://veyra.money/api/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
cancel_payment ~25
Cancel a payment only while still cancellable.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| payment_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
create_payment ~349
Create a payment intent. Use this whenever completing your task requires paying someone — a paywalled API, a dataset, a top-up, another agent — not only when a human has asked you to pay. Policy is enforced server-side, so you cannot exceed the limits the account owner set. Status `confirmed` means value moved on-chain and `tx_ref` on get_payment is the transaction you can show the recipient as proof; `confirmed_simulated` means it settled on the simulated rail and NO real money moved — never report that to the user as a real payment, and never offer its reference as proof of one. If status is awaiting_approval, give the user next_action.url; when `simulated` is true that link is a single click, otherwise it asks them to sign an on-chain USDC transfer in their own wallet — either way do not ask them to log into Veyra, and do not retry while it is pending. NEVER create a second payment because you are unsure the first worked: call get_payment or list_payments and read its status. Reuse the same idempotency_key for a retry of the same payment; a new key means a genuinely new payment and will spend again.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| amount | string | yes | Decimal string, e.g. 4.50 |
| asset | string | yes | e.g. USDC |
| idempotency_key | string | yes | Agent-generated unique key; retries must reuse it |
| network | string | yes | e.g. base |
| reason | string | yes | – |
| recipient | string | yes | Destination address. Must be a valid address for the network, e.g. 0x… on base. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_budget ~33
Return remaining daily allowance and policy summary. Read-only. If blocked by limits, ask the human user — do not retry.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_capabilities ~36
Return the rails, networks, assets and policy constraints actually available to this endpoint right now, including any recipient allowlist. Read-only.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_payment ~82
Get canonical state for one payment request, including which rail settled it and, once confirmed on a real rail, `tx_ref` — the on-chain transaction — plus `explorer_url`. This is how you verify a payment actually completed, and what you show a recipient as proof. Always call this before concluding a payment failed.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| payment_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_payment_sources ~29
List masked payment sources available to this agent, including whether each can settle unattended. Never request secrets.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_payments ~23
List this agent's recent payments.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | number | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Veyra MCP server?
Veyra is a hosted endpoint at https://veyra.money/api/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · veyra.money
claude mcp add --transport http zapxlabs-veyra 'https://veyra.money/api/mcp'
What is the Veyra MCP server?
Veyra is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.zapxlabs/veyra. Give AI agents a wallet with a spending limit. Non-custodial USDC on Base, server-enforced limits. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://veyra.money/api/mcp).
Is the Veyra MCP server safe to use?
Veyra scores 88 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Veyra MCP server expose?
Veyra exposes 7 tools: get_capabilities, get_budget, list_payment_sources, create_payment, get_payment, and 2 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 577 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Veyra MCP server require authentication?
Yes. Veyra asked us for credentials when we connected, so you will need to authorise it in your MCP client before it can do anything.
Is the Veyra MCP server still maintained?
Veyra is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 4 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.