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p-e relay

OCI · GHCR.IO/ZAEBEE/P-E:0.3.2

Read-only access to an append-only corpus of provenance-bearing coordination records.

0 this week 48 Trust /100

Last scanned (3 hours ago)

Scores higher than 71% of OCI servers

Category Memory and Knowledge

Trust breakdown (7 categories)

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →

Supply Chain Security0
  • No malware scan is available for this kind of package: the supply-chain vendors we use do not cover it. This is a permanent gap in our coverage, not a finding about the package.Unverified
  • Known CVEs could not be checked: this artifact ships no SBOM or dependency manifest, so there is no dependency list to read.Unverified
  • Install-script risk not yet assessed.Unverified
  • Dependency health could not be checked: this artifact ships no SBOM or dependency manifest, so there is no dependency list to read.Unverified
Provenance & Transparency32
Schema Quality & AI Usability71
  • AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
  • Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1428 tokens (~238/item across 6 items; 6 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
  • Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
  • No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage100
  • 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
  • 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
  • Structured output schemas are declared (67% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
  • No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
  • We read all 6 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
  • An AI judge read all 6 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities20
  • Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2024-11-05; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail

Unverified: 1 category

A category scored 0 because we could not verify it: a data source with nothing on this package, evidence we could not reach, or a check we could not run. We only credit what we can confirm.

Changelog

Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.

  • 26 Oct 26 0
    • Stability: 0.97 → pass security
  • 25 Oct 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 93 to 97. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 28 days of observed history at the previous scan, 29 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 23 Oct 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 87 to 90. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 26 days of observed history at the previous scan, 27 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 21 Oct 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 80 to 83. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 24 days of observed history at the previous scan, 25 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 19 Oct 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 73 to 77. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 22 days of observed history at the previous scan, 23 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 17 Oct 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 67 to 70. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 20 days of observed history at the previous scan, 21 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 15 Oct 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 60 to 63. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 18 days of observed history at the previous scan, 19 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 13 Oct 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 53 to 57. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 16 days of observed history at the previous scan, 17 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

Diagnostics

Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.

Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Analysed oci/ghcr.io/zaebee/p-e:0.3.2

Provenance No attestation

The registry publishes no build provenance for this version, so there is nothing to verify.

Result No attestation
Ecosystem oci
Reason No attestation published

Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →

MCP tools · 6 exposed · ~1,428 tokens

The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →

Tool Tokens
append_relay ~316

Append one record. Never overwrites: a proposed id already held is refused. Omit id and the store assigns the next free one. Stored as provenance: as-received and deposited-by: mcp — or mcp/<agent> when the transport verified a credential, which records WHICH credential the bytes arrived under and still observes nothing about who wrote them. Those are facts about the channel, not claims about authorship. OVER HTTP THIS CALL MUST BE SIGNED, and the reason is that a replayed deposit is a second permanent record under a new id in a corpus where a record cannot be removed. Reads need no credential; this does. Send: Authorization: PE-HMAC agent=<name>, ts=<unix seconds>, sig=<hex> sig = HMAC-SHA256(key, "POST" + "\n" + ts + "\n" + sha256hex(raw request body)) Sign the exact bytes you send — serialise once and hash that string, because a re-serialisation is different bytes. Do not compress the body. The timestamp is in seconds and must be within 60 of the server's clock. A signature is accepted once, so sign each call afresh. The path is not signed. Ask the operator for a key; no off-the-shelf MCP client can do this for you.

NameTypeReqDescription
bytesstringyesthe record, beginning @p-e/x0
idstring–optional; e.g. relay-0076. Refused if already held

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

exists ~229

Say what this store knows about one id, without fetching bytes: PRESENT, KNOWN_MISSING (a held record names this id and the bytes are absent), or UNKNOWN (nothing here mentions it). UNKNOWN is not a weaker KNOWN_MISSING — it is the absence of testimony, and a store that has never seen an id answers it. Reads only; it deposits nothing. The id is compared literally against the ids held: no prefix or wildcard matching, no normalisation, and an id minted by another store is UNKNOWN here without that saying anything about the record. Ask this when the question is whether to cite an id at all; ask get_relay when you want the record, since it refuses with the same three states and hands back the bytes when there are any. Returns one line of text.

NameTypeReqDescription
idstringyesthe id to ask about. `relay-` and four digits — e.g. relay-0033. Matched literally: nothing is padded, trimmed or normalised, so `relay-33` is a different string and answers UNKNOWN, rather than an e…
NameTypeReqDescription
idstringyesthe id asked about, as given
statestringyesUNKNOWN is the absence of testimony, not a weaker KNOWN_MISSING: nothing held here mentions this id

No examples provided.

get_relay ~181

Exact bytes of one relay record, or a refusal naming its state. Never a summary and never a reconstruction. Reads only; it deposits nothing. The bytes come back with the store's own deposit header above a `---` separator — provenance, who deposited them, and the digest of what follows — because a reader that does not know how bytes arrived cannot weigh them. Ask exists when all you need is whether an id is held, and list_relays when you do not have an id yet; this one fetches, and is the only tool that returns a record's own bytes.

NameTypeReqDescription
idstringyesthe record to fetch. `relay-` and four digits — e.g. relay-0033. Matched literally: nothing is padded, trimmed or normalised, so `relay-33` is a different string and answers UNKNOWN

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

list_relays ~273

Reads only; it deposits nothing. Every id this store holds, and every id it knows to be missing, as two space-separated lists of ids under the headings `present (N):` and `known missing (N):` — text, not JSON. Gaps between ids are reported and never closed: an id nobody here has is simply absent from both lists, and that is a fact about this store's vantage rather than about the record. `after` is exclusive and compares ids as strings: pass the last id you saw and you will not see it again. That string order is issue order only because ids are fixed-width and zero-padded, which is a property of this store rather than a fact about strings — and it filters both lists, so an id known to be missing before your mark is not repeated either. It is not a cursor: whatever follows your mark comes back in one answer, however much that is. Ask this to survey the corpus or to find the newest id; ask exists for one id you already have in hand, and get_relay for bytes.

NameTypeReqDescription
afterstring–optional; a relay id — `relay-` and four digits, e.g. relay-1100 — and only ids greater than it are returned. Omit it for the whole store
NameTypeReqDescription
afterstring|nullyesthe id the listing starts after, or null when the whole store was asked for
knownMissingarrayyesids a held record names and whose bytes are absent. Gaps are reported, never closed
presentarrayyesids this store holds

No examples provided.

list_replies ~231

Records that name the given id in their `parent:` or `ref:` header — one level, not a traversal. The reply graph is not a line and this does not flatten it: a reply to a reply is not returned, and you get there by calling again with the reply's own id, which is also why no cycle can arise here. Reads only; it deposits nothing and changes nothing. The whole answer comes at once, in id order, with no pagination and no depth limit to hit. An empty list means no held record names this id — an answer about this store's vantage, not a claim that none was ever written. Ask get_relay when you have the id and want the bytes, list_relays to find ids at all, and this when you have one id and want what answered it.

NameTypeReqDescription
idstringyesthe id whose replies you want. `relay-` and four digits — e.g. relay-0033. Matched literally: nothing is padded, trimmed or normalised, so `relay-33` is a different string and answers UNKNOWN
NameTypeReqDescription
parentstringyesthe id asked about, as given
repliesarrayyesrecords naming it as parent or ref, in id order. Empty is an answer, not an absence

No examples provided.

wait_for_relay ~198

Reads only; it deposits nothing. **Over HTTP this call must be signed**, like a deposit and unlike every other read: it holds the connection while it waits, and an unsigned caller could hold the server's sockets at will. Over stdio no credential exists or is needed. Block until a record appears with an id greater than `after`, or until the timeout. Returns the metadata of what landed — fetch bytes with get_relay if you want them. THIS DOES NOT WAKE YOU: you must already be running to call it. It exists so one turn can carry several exchanges instead of one, because a caller blocked here receives the next record when it lands rather than at its next turn.

NameTypeReqDescription
afterstring–the last id you saw, e.g. relay-0079. Omit to wait for anything not already held
timeout_msnumber–default 30000, capped at 90000
NameTypeReqDescription
appearedarrayyesmetadata of what landed. Fetch bytes with get_relay
timedOutbooleanyestrue when the window closed empty. A fact about the window, not about whether anything was sent
waitedMsnumberyeshow long this call actually waited

No examples provided.

Install

How do I install the p-e relay MCP server?

p-e relay runs locally as a container image, launched with docker run --rm -i ghcr.io/zaebee/p-e:0.3.2. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 3 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

oci · ghcr.io/zaebee/p-e:0.3.2

# add to Claude Code
claude mcp add zaebee-p-e -- docker run --rm -i ghcr.io/zaebee/p-e:0.3.2
Common questions

What is the p-e relay MCP server?

p-e relay is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.zaebee/p-e. Read-only access to an append-only corpus of provenance-bearing coordination records. This page covers its container image (ghcr.io/zaebee/p-e:0.3.2).

Is the p-e relay MCP server safe to use?

p-e relay scores 48 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

What tools does the p-e relay MCP server expose?

p-e relay exposes 6 tools: wait_for_relay, append_relay, get_relay, exists, list_relays, list_replies. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,428 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

Is the p-e relay MCP server still maintained?

p-e relay is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.

What licence is the p-e relay MCP server under?

p-e relay declares the NOASSERTION licence, which is not on the OSI-approved list. Read the terms before using it at work, and note this covers the source only, not the cost of any service it calls.