Salesforce AgentForce CKG
REMOTE · CKG-AGENTFORCE.ONRENDER.COM · 2 COMPONENTS · SCANNED SEP 20
Salesforce AgentForce knowledge graph — 40 nodes, Einstein Trust Layer, 11x fewer tokens than RAG.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security57
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to connect, but we couldn't read the tool list to see what that exposes. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability0
- Transport check failed: declared streamable-http, but the endpoint returned HTTP 402. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Schema Quality & AI Usability0
- Schema not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's schema.Unverified
Stability & Change Management0
- Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).Unverified
Tool Coverage0
- Tool coverage not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools.Unverified
Tool Safety0
- Tool safety not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools.Unverified
Capabilities0
- Capabilities not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's capabilities.Unverified
Unverified: 5 categories
Categories scored 0 because we could not verify them: authentication we do not have, an unreachable endpoint, or not enough scan history. We only credit what we can confirm.
How do I install the Salesforce AgentForce CKG MCP server?
Salesforce AgentForce CKG is a hosted endpoint at https://ckg-agentforce.onrender.com/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · ckg-agentforce.onrender.com
claude mcp add --transport http yarmoluk-ckg-agentforce 'https://ckg-agentforce.onrender.com/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"yarmoluk-ckg-agentforce": {
"url": "https://ckg-agentforce.onrender.com/mcp"
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"yarmoluk-ckg-agentforce": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://ckg-agentforce.onrender.com/mcp"
}
}
} [mcp_servers.yarmoluk-ckg-agentforce] url = "https://ckg-agentforce.onrender.com/mcp"
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"yarmoluk-ckg-agentforce": {
"type": "remote",
"url": "https://ckg-agentforce.onrender.com/mcp",
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add yarmoluk-ckg-agentforce --url 'https://ckg-agentforce.onrender.com/mcp' --transport streamable-http
mcp_servers:
yarmoluk-ckg-agentforce:
url: "https://ckg-agentforce.onrender.com/mcp" {
"McpServers": {
"yarmoluk-ckg-agentforce": {
"Transport": "http",
"Url": "https://ckg-agentforce.onrender.com/mcp"
}
}
} assistant mcp add yarmoluk-ckg-agentforce -t streamable-http -u 'https://ckg-agentforce.onrender.com/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"yarmoluk-ckg-agentforce": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://ckg-agentforce.onrender.com/mcp"
}
}
} The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 12 Sept 26 −54
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → not serving MCP ▼ security
- Stability: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Transport: pass → fail ▼ security
- Authorization: Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to connect, but we couldn't read the tool list to see what that exposes. security
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- Schema quality: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- Capabilities: pass → unverified ▼ functional
- 10 Sept 26 +54
- Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Stability: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Transport: fail → pass ▲ security
- Authorization: Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 10 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. security
- Endpoint reachability: not serving MCP → reachable ▲ functional
- MCP protocol: unverified → pass ▲ functional
- Schema quality: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- Server version: 1.29.0 → 1.30.0 functional
- 9 Sept 26 −54
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → not serving MCP ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Stability: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Transport: pass → fail ▼ security
- Authorization: Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to connect, but we couldn't read the tool list to see what that exposes. security
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- Capabilities: pass → unverified ▼ functional
- Schema quality: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- 8 Sept 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 7 Sept 26 +54
- Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Transport: fail → pass ▲ security
- Authorization: Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 10 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. security
- Endpoint reachability: not serving MCP → reachable ▲ functional
- Stability: unverified → 0.97 ▲ functional
- MCP protocol: unverified → pass ▲ functional
- Schema quality: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- 6 Sept 26 −53
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → not serving MCP ▼ security
- Stability: 0.90 → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Transport: pass → fail ▼ security
- Authorization: Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to connect, but we couldn't read the tool list to see what that exposes. security
- Schema quality: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- Capabilities: pass → unverified ▼ functional
- 5 Sept 26 −1
- Stability: pass → 0.90 functional
- 4 Sept 26 +54
- Stability: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Transport: fail → pass ▲ security
- Authorization: Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 10 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. security
- Endpoint reachability: not serving MCP → reachable ▲ functional
- MCP protocol: unverified → pass ▲ functional
- Schema quality: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 20 Sept 2026 · Probed https://ckg-agentforce.onrender.com/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=onrender.com | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 24 Jul 2026 | 22 Oct 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | 756bcb97dcf1455f0ebf70e5dbe07256 |
| SANs: onrender.com, *.onrender.com | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of ckg-agentforce.onrender.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | present | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| onrender.com. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 402 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://ckg-agentforce.onrender.com/mcp | HTTP error | 402 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://ckg-agentforce.onrender.com/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://ckg-agentforce.onrender.com/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
evaluate_trust_chain ~205
Return a machine-readable JSON trust chain + ROI analysis + payment recommendation. Designed for autonomous agent consumption. The agent reads the JSON, evaluates the ROI gate, selects the cheapest positive-ROI payment option, and purchases autonomously if budget is pre-authorized. Trust chain closes the audit gap that RAG cannot: source_hashes → SHA-256 of source docs (what was known at extraction time) graph_hash → SHA-256 of the installed graph file (what is declared now) signer_key_id → Ed25519 public key fingerprint (who is attesting) benchmark_receipt → BoundaryAttest-signed F1 claim (cryptographic performance proof) scitt_status → SCITT ledger submission status (public audit anchor) ROI gate: if total_value_per_call_usd > payment_option.price_per_call_usd → autonomous_pay = true. Returns: JSON string (schema: ckg-trust-chain-v1).
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
export_benchmark_receipt ~119
Generate a signed BoundaryAttest receipt for the agentforce CKG benchmark result. Produces a `ckg.benchmark_result.exported` claim signed with this server's Ed25519 session key. Any party holding the public key can verify the signature over the canonical JSON claim. Implements GuardrailDecisionV1 · experimental-interop-v0.1. Result: F1 0.471 over 30 queries · ckg-benchmark v0.6.2 · 4× over RAG baseline (0.123).
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
get_prerequisites ~72
Return the full ordered prerequisite chain for an AgentForce concept. Shows everything the concept depends on — the complete upstream path. Args: concept: Target concept — e.g. 'Autonomous Resolution', 'Multi-LoRA Serving', 'Custom Actions', 'Semantic Retrieval'.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| concept | string | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
list_concepts ~21
List all 40 AgentForce concepts in this knowledge graph.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
query_ckg ~112
Traverse the AgentForce knowledge graph from any concept. Returns prerequisites (what this concept needs) and dependents (what it enables). Every relationship traces to an authoritative Salesforce doc URL. Args: concept: Concept name — e.g. 'Autonomous Resolution', 'Einstein Trust Layer', 'Service Agent', 'Grounding', 'NVIDIA NIM'. depth: Traversal depth 1–5 (default 3).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| concept | string | yes | – |
| depth | integer | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
query_intersect ~367
Answer a conjunctive query: concepts reachable from EVERY anchor at once (A AND B). query_ckg walks outward from one concept. This intersects the reachable sets of two or more, which is the shape of most real questions — "the component that satisfies A AND applies to B". Neither anchor alone answers it; the answer lives in the overlap. Every branch is an exact set of declared edges, so the intersection is exact. A concept appears only if a declared path reaches it from each anchor. A relation missing from the graph produces an empty result, never a guess. Args: branches: Two or more branches. Either a bare anchor ("TensorRT-LLM"), which takes everything within `depth` hops, or an anchor plus an explicit relation path using '>' ("TensorRT-LLM > REQUIRES > ENABLES"), where each relation replaces the frontier. '*' matches any relation. Mix both forms freely. depth: Hops for bare-anchor branches, 1-5 (default 2). Ignored for explicit paths. direction: 'out' follows dependencies, 'in' follows them backwards, 'both' (default). mode: 'AND' (default) intersects branches; 'OR' unions them. limit: Max concepts listed, 1-200 (default 40). The true count is always shown. Returns: Markdown with the query plan and its per-step set sizes, then the answer set with taxonomy tags. Reports which branch was empty when the intersection is empty.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| branches | array | yes | – |
| depth | integer | – | – |
| direction | string | – | – |
| limit | integer | – | – |
| mode | string | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
resolution_path ~47
Trace the exact path that determines an AgentForce autonomous resolution event. This is the $2/resolution billing path — what the agent must traverse correctly to resolve autonomously without human handoff.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
route_query ~182
Route an AgentForce question to the optimal model and reasoning approach via graph depth. The CKG graph IS the router. AgentForce dependency chains (e.g. Einstein Trust Layer → Data Cloud → NVIDIA NIM → Resolution Criteria) have typed hops that signal reasoning complexity deterministically. No heuristic: the graph decides. Routing table: hop_depth 1 → haiku · direct (simple concept lookup) hop_depth 2 → sonnet · generic_cot (moderate chain) hop_depth 3+ → opus · sparql_cot (deep dependency, structured reasoning) Args: question: Concept name or natural language question about Salesforce AgentForce. Returns: model_tier + reasoning_approach + why + context subgraph to inject before LLM call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| question | string | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
search_concepts ~51
Find AgentForce concepts by keyword. Args: query: Search term — e.g. 'resolution', 'trust', 'grounding', 'action', 'NIM'.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| query | string | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
verify_source ~139
Return the source URL and content hash for an AgentForce concept node. Audit chain: edge answer → graph commit → source_hash → source_url (fetch hint) Verification: curl -s <source_url> | sha256sum # compare output to source_hash Args: concept: Concept label (partial match supported). receipt: If True, also return a signed BoundaryAttest receipt envelope (experimental-interop-v0.1) binding concept_label + source_url + source_hash + timestamp to this server's ed25519 session key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| concept | string | yes | – |
| receipt | boolean | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
What is the Salesforce AgentForce CKG MCP server?
Salesforce AgentForce CKG is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.Yarmoluk/ckg-agentforce. Salesforce AgentForce knowledge graph, 40 nodes, Einstein Trust Layer, 11x fewer tokens than RAG. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://ckg-agentforce.onrender.com/mcp).
Is the Salesforce AgentForce CKG MCP server safe to use?
Salesforce AgentForce CKG scores 23 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Salesforce AgentForce CKG MCP server expose?
Salesforce AgentForce CKG exposes 10 tools: list_concepts, search_concepts, query_ckg, get_prerequisites, resolution_path, and 5 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,315 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Salesforce AgentForce CKG MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to Salesforce AgentForce CKG without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the Salesforce AgentForce CKG MCP server still maintained?
Salesforce AgentForce CKG is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 20 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.