Teppi
REMOTE · API.TEPPI.XYZ
Check what a paid x402 endpoint or MCP server delivered, from probes anyone can repeat.
Available components
Last scanned (23 hours ago)
Scores higher than 79% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 4 Nov 2026.
Category Finance and Payments
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security74
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- No authorisation is required to call this server. Every tool declares its destructiveHint and none is destructive, so open access doesn't expose one. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Partial
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability63
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 473 tokens (~94/item across 5 items; 5 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage72
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 15% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 5 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 6 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities60
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 4 Oct 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 3 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 93 to 97. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 28 days of observed history at the previous scan, 29 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 27 Sept 26 0
- Schema quality: 353 → 473 ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 0% → 15% ▲ functional
- Schema quality: fair → good functional
- New tool “check_exposure” functional
- “check_grade” added an optional parameter “pay_to” cosmetic
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 20 Sept 26 0
- Tool “check_grade” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- “check_grade” added an optional parameter “method” cosmetic
- 9 Sept 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- 6 Sept 26 0
- Tool “search_capabilities” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: 70 → 78 ▼ functional
- Schema quality: good → fair functional
- New tool “plan_route” functional
- “search_capabilities” added an optional parameter “sort” cosmetic
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 4 Nov 2026 · Probed https://api.teppi.xyz/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=teppi.xyz | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 29 Oct 2026 | 27 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | 138991ff54e41a660e92decc6b322094 |
| SANs: teppi.xyz, api.teppi.xyz, *.api.teppi.xyz | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of api.teppi.xyz. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| xyz. | present | 3599, 18130 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| teppi.xyz. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://api.teppi.xyz/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://api.teppi.xyz/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://api.teppi.xyz/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
check_exposure What your paid dependencies deliver ~93
Look up every paid endpoint your agents call in one go, added up by the address each one pays: which are unknown to the record, which took money and returned nothing, which list what they do not serve, and how much monthly spend sits on each. Unknown is reported as unknown, never as bad.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | array | yes | the paid endpoints your agents call, each a url or an object naming one |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
check_grade What has been verified ~122
Return what has been verified about an x402 endpoint or its url: whether it answers, what it charges, and whether that price has moved. Answers unrated rather than guessing when the evidence is thin. Works for endpoints Teppi does not operate, and a url never seen is put in line for a free handshake, so ask again in an hour.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id_or_url | string | yes | – |
| method | string | – | – |
| pay_to | string | – | the payTo address from the 402, to learn what the record knows about who gets paid |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_capability One capability in full ~40
Full detail for one capability: schemas, pricing, networks, the seller behind it, and every observation recorded against it.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
plan_route Plan a route ~80
Turn a goal and a budget into an ordered list of paid endpoints that could reach it, with a cost estimate and what has been verified about each step. Moves no money and buys nothing: it returns the plan for you to run yourself.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| budget_usd | string | yes | – |
| goal | string | yes | – |
| min_grade | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
search_capabilities Search paid capabilities ~106
Search paid agent capabilities by task description. Returns the price, the input and output schemas, the networks each one settles on, and what has been verified about it. Sort by verified to put the ones with the most evidence behind them first. Use before paying an x402 endpoint you have not used.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | integer | – | – |
| max_usd | string | – | – |
| network | string | – | – |
| query | string | yes | – |
| sort | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Teppi MCP server?
Teppi is a hosted endpoint at https://api.teppi.xyz/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · api.teppi.xyz
claude mcp add --transport http xyz-teppi-teppi 'https://api.teppi.xyz/mcp'
What is the Teppi MCP server?
Teppi is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as xyz.teppi/teppi. Check what a paid x402 endpoint or MCP server delivered, from probes anyone can repeat. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://api.teppi.xyz/mcp).
Is the Teppi MCP server safe to use?
Teppi scores 79 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Teppi MCP server expose?
Teppi exposes 5 tools: search_capabilities, get_capability, plan_route, check_grade, check_exposure. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 441 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Teppi MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to Teppi without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the Teppi MCP server still maintained?
Teppi is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 4 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.