APEX on Arc
REMOTE · APEXFAUCET.XYZ
Arc L1 + x402 router, prepaid passes, perp funding, B2B dossier, wallet DD & USDC faucet.
Available components
Last scanned (19 hours ago)
Scores higher than 60% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category Crypto and Web3
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security63
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 72 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability64
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 19746 tokens (~184/item across 107 items; 107 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 99% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety75
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- 0 of 3 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "room_order_meal" implies "send" and declares no destructiveHint at all, which the MCP spec reads as destructive by default. See how to fix → Fail
- An AI judge read all 108 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities20
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2024-11-05; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Checks we ran (12)
- TLS certificate
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Checks we could not complete (1)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- Authorization in Endpoint SecurityAuthorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 72 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe.
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 21 Nov 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Tool “chat_completions” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “market_search” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “nft_info” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “page_markdown” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “page_snap” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- 20 Nov 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 19 Nov 26 +1
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- New tool “image_generate” functional
- New tool “json_extract” functional
- New tool “llm_messages” functional
- New tool “text_embeddings” functional
- 18 Nov 26 −1
- Tool “page_markdown” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Stability: pass → 0.93 functional
- 15 Nov 26 0
- Tool “address_identify” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “block_at_time” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “evm_token_info” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “gas_all” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “nft_info” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “tx_batch_status” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: 16262 → 18883 ▼ functional
- New tool “agent_swarm_plan” functional
- New tool “arc_creator_history” functional
- New tool “arc_token_compare” functional
- New tool “cross_chain_quote” functional
- New tool “drip_sustainability” functional
- New tool “launchpad_curve_plan” functional
- New tool “mev_sandwich_shield” functional
- New tool “token_exit_matrix” functional
- New tool “tx_bundle_plan” functional
- “block_at_time” reworded the description of “chain” cosmetic
- “evm_token_info” reworded the description of “chain” cosmetic
- “nft_info” reworded the description of “chain” cosmetic
- “tx_batch_status” reworded the description of “txs” cosmetic
- 14 Nov 26 0
- Schema quality: 12951 → 16262 ▼ functional
- New tool “address_identify” functional
- New tool “api_pass_buy” functional
- New tool “api_pass_pro_buy” functional
- New tool “block_at_time” functional
- New tool “chat_completions” functional
- New tool “company_dossier” functional
- New tool “contract_audit” functional
- New tool “delivery_receipt” functional
- New tool “evm_log_decode” functional
- New tool “funding_gap” functional
- New tool “gas_all” functional
- New tool “perp_funding” functional
- New tool “spend_authority” functional
- New tool “tool_finder” functional
- New tool “tx_batch_status” functional
- New tool “wallet_investigate” functional
- New tool “world_brief” functional
- New tool “wrong_pay” functional
- New tool “x402_recommend” functional
- 13 Nov 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- 12 Nov 26 0
- Tool “arc_exit_check_bulk” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://apexfaucet.xyz/api/mcp/arc
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=apexfaucet.xyz | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 15 Nov 2026 | 13 Feb 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | 9f7824a47eb2f61f0ed5f21c631eef3f |
| SANs: apexfaucet.xyz, *.apexfaucet.xyz | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of apexfaucet.xyz. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| xyz. | DS published | 3599, 18130 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| apexfaucet.xyz. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload |
| content-security-policy | frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'; object-src 'none'; upgrade-insecure-requests |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-frame-options | SAMEORIGIN |
| referrer-policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin |
| permissions-policy | camera=(), microphone=(self), geolocation=(self) |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://apexfaucet.xyz/api/mcp/arc | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://apexfaucet.xyz/api/mcp/arc | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://apexfaucet.xyz/api/mcp/arc |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
wallet_investigate Wallet investigate ~234
Multichain counterparty & wallet due diligence for EVM (0x...) or Solana base58 addresses: OFAC SDN list, on-chain USDC/USDT freeze status, native & USDC balances plus nonces across Ethereum, Base, Arbitrum, Optimism, Polygon & Arc, contract vs EOA detection, ERC-8004 reputation, and Arc Testnet ApexServiceEscrow stats. $0.05 per call over x402 (USDC on Arc, Base or Solana, or XNT on X1). Call once without `payment` for the terms, sign them with your own wallet, call again with `payment`.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | 0x EVM or 32-byte base58 Solana/X1 wallet address |
| chains | string | – | optional comma-separated EVM chains (default ethereum,base,arbitrum,optimism,polygon,arc) |
| payment | string | – | a signed x402 payment (the base64 payload you would put in PAYMENT-SIGNATURE). Pass it and the purchase completes inside this tool call. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
web_read Web read ~151
Read up to 10 web pages as clean text in one call: title, description and readable body, with the final URL. A plain fetch (no JavaScript); for a rendered page use page_extract. $0.003 per call over x402 (USDC on Arc, Base or Solana, or XNT on X1). Call once without `payment` for the terms, sign them with your own wallet, call again with `payment`.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| payment | string | – | a signed x402 payment (the base64 payload you would put in PAYMENT-SIGNATURE). Pass it and the purchase completes inside this tool call. |
| urls | string | yes | comma-separated URLs, up to 10 |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
world_brief World brief ~148
Macro & prediction market briefing: Polymarket and Kalshi election/macro odds, biggest 24h movers, tokenized US equities/gold, EUR/USD, and crypto news. $0.01 per call over x402 (USDC on Arc, Base or Solana, or XNT on X1). Call once without `payment` for the terms, sign them with your own wallet, call again with `payment`.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| payment | string | – | a signed x402 payment (the base64 payload you would put in PAYMENT-SIGNATURE). Pass it and the purchase completes inside this tool call. |
| topics | string | – | optional comma-separated topics, up to 5 |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wrong_pay Wrong pay ~147
Check an Arc USDC payment transaction hash for address poisoning lookalikes or OFAC SDN exposure. $0.005 per call over x402 (USDC on Arc, Base or Solana, or XNT on X1). Call once without `payment` for the terms, sign them with your own wallet, call again with `payment`.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| payment | string | – | a signed x402 payment (the base64 payload you would put in PAYMENT-SIGNATURE). Pass it and the purchase completes inside this tool call. |
| to | string | – | optional recipient to evaluate when multiple transfers exist |
| tx | string | yes | Arc transaction hash (0x + 64 hex) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
x402_accept_on_arc_how_to X402 accept on arc how to ~80
How to accept x402 payments on Arc, from what we verified on chain while doing it ourselves: the USDC and EURC signing domains, what a settlement leaves in the logs, what one costs in gas, and your three ways to settle (yourself, Circle Facilitator Service, Circle Gateway nanopayments). Free.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
x402_inspect X402 inspect ~129
How do I pay this URL? Point it at any x402 paywall and get its terms read for you: protocol version, every network and asset it accepts with the real amount, the address it pays, and how to pay each option (EIP-3009 signature, Circle Gateway batch, Solana fee payer). It also lists what is wrong with the paywall, e.g. a missing signing domain. Free, 100 calls a day.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| method | string | – | GET (default) or POST |
| url | string | yes | the https URL of the paid resource |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
x402_recommend X402 recommend ~227
Recommend verified x402 paid APIs, 62k+ MCP servers, and 2.5k+ OpenAPIs for any agent goal, with live 402 payment-term verification. $0.008 per call over x402 (USDC on Arc, Base or Solana, or XNT on X1). Call once without `payment` for the terms, sign them with your own wallet, call again with `payment`.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| chain | string | – | optional network filter (base, arc, solana, ethereum, bnb, x1...) |
| goal | string | yes | task description (3-240 chars) |
| kind | string | – | all (default), x402, mcp or openapi |
| limit | string | – | 1-20 |
| maxPrice | string | – | optional max USD price |
| payment | string | – | a signed x402 payment (the base64 payload you would put in PAYMENT-SIGNATURE). Pass it and the purchase completes inside this tool call. |
| probe | string | – | true (default) or false |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the APEX on Arc MCP server?
APEX on Arc is a hosted endpoint at https://apexfaucet.xyz/api/mcp/arc, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · apexfaucet.xyz
claude mcp add --transport http xyz-apexfaucet-apex-arc 'https://apexfaucet.xyz/api/mcp/arc'
What is the APEX on Arc MCP server?
APEX on Arc is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as xyz.apexfaucet/apex-arc. Arc L1 + x402 router, prepaid passes, perp funding, B2B dossier, wallet DD & USDC faucet. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://apexfaucet.xyz/api/mcp/arc).
Is the APEX on Arc MCP server safe to use?
APEX on Arc scores 74 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the APEX on Arc MCP server expose?
APEX on Arc exposes 107 tools: page_extract, page_markdown, web_read, page_snap, evm_token_info, and 102 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 19,351 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the APEX on Arc MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to APEX on Arc without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the APEX on Arc MCP server still maintained?
APEX on Arc is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the APEX on Arc MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 12 checks on APEX on Arc, covering TLS certificate, HTTPS, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 8 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about APEX on Arc: Authorization. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.