DropEngine x402 Agent Services
REMOTE · MCP.DROPENGINEHQ.COM
AI Agent Utility Layer for agent safety, web monitoring, crypto research and tool discovery.
Available components
Last scanned (21 hours ago)
Scores higher than 59% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security57
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 24 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability57
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 5485 tokens (~228/item across 24 items; 24 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage71
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 0% of tool parameters carry a description.Fail
- Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 24 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 24 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).Pass
Checks we ran (12)
- TLS certificate
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Checks we could not complete (1)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- Authorization in Endpoint SecurityAuthorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 24 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe.
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 9 Nov 26 +1
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 8 Nov 26 −1
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 7 Nov 26 0
- Endpoint reachability: unreachable → reachable ▲ functional
- 6 Nov 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 5 Nov 26 0
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → unreachable ▼ security
- HSTS header: fail → unverified ▼ security
- Stability: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- TLS certificate: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Transport: pass → fail ▼ security
- Authorization: Authorisation not yet verified: we couldn't confirm whether this endpoint requires it. security
- Capabilities: pass → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- First check of Schema quality: unverified functional
- 1 Nov 26 +1
- Stability: fail → pass ▲ security
- 27 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 88 to 92.
- 25 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 82 to 85.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://mcp.dropenginehq.com/api/agent-services
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=mcp.dropenginehq.com | CN=YR2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 23 Sept 2026 | 22 Dec 2026 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 551b47c0c6d20c3722d3e644c42688aecb4 |
| SANs: mcp.dropenginehq.com | ||||||
| CN=YR2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 4ebd24947e24d394802d84a52fd5b319 |
| CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | RSA 4096 | SHA256-RSA | f24b6d17f9d9ad7cb1c9fea78782699f |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of mcp.dropenginehq.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | DS published | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| dropenginehq.com. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://mcp.dropenginehq.com/api/agent-services | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://mcp.dropenginehq.com/api/agent-services | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://mcp.dropenginehq.com/api/agent-services |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
action_lock ~244
Action Lock ($0.001 USDC): Prevent duplicate side effects across agent retries, crashes, and concurrent workers. If an action has side effects and may be retried or executed concurrently, acquire before execution. Complete after confirmed success; release after confirmed failure. Use before payments, purchases, orders, emails, transactions, writes, and external tool actions. Avoid pure reads or equivalent provider-side idempotency. An expired lease can hide a completed external effect; reconcile first. Agent Action Gate asks whether an action should be performed; Action Lock asks whether it is already running or completed. Agent entry points: risky external action → use Agent Action Gate when a combined action-specific safety assessment is needed; unclear capability/provider → use free /api/discover; constrained comparison between callable alternatives → use paid route_tool; known single capability → call the direct tool; multi-step objective → read the matching workflow recipe and call only relevant steps. Workflows are stateless recipes, not executors; calls are paid separately and are not bundle charged. Agent Action Gate does not approve payment, sign or broadcast transactions, evaluate seller reputation, replace transaction simulation, replace route_tool, or replace human approval.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action_id | string | yes | – |
| agent_ux | object | – | – |
| decision | string | yes | – |
| dedupe_expires_at | string|null | yes | – |
| duplicate | boolean | yes | – |
| error | – | – | – |
| lease_expires_at | string|null | yes | – |
| lease_token | string|null | yes | – |
| meta | object | – | – |
| next | array | – | – |
| payment | object | – | – |
| reason | string | yes | – |
| result | – | – | – |
| retry_after_ms | – | yes | – |
| retry_decision | string | yes | – |
| state | string | yes | – |
| status | string | – | – |
| success | boolean | yes | – |
No examples provided.
agent_outcome_receipt ~183
Create or verify a tamper-evident receipt of an agent-reported outcome. It proves DropEngine recorded a claim, not that the external event independently occurred. Do not send raw payloads or secrets. Price: $0.001 USDC per call. Agent entry points: risky external action → use Agent Action Gate when a combined action-specific safety assessment is needed; unclear capability/provider → use free /api/discover; constrained comparison between callable alternatives → use paid route_tool; known single capability → call the direct tool; multi-step objective → read the matching workflow recipe and call only relevant steps. Workflows are stateless recipes, not executors; calls are paid separately and are not bundle charged. Agent Action Gate does not approve payment, sign or broadcast transactions, evaluate seller reputation, replace transaction simulation, replace route_tool, or replace human approval.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_ux | object | – | – |
| error | – | – | – |
| meta | object | – | – |
| next | array | – | – |
| payment | object | – | – |
| result | – | – | – |
| status | string | – | – |
| success | boolean | yes | – |
No examples provided.
agent_permission_vault ~209
Check whether an owner-configured policy authorizes this capability for the verified caller. Permission check only; agents cannot grant themselves permission. This is authorization, not action safety. Price: $0.001 USDC per call. Agent entry points: risky external action → use Agent Action Gate when a combined action-specific safety assessment is needed; unclear capability/provider → use free /api/discover; constrained comparison between callable alternatives → use paid route_tool; known single capability → call the direct tool; multi-step objective → read the matching workflow recipe and call only relevant steps. Workflows are stateless recipes, not executors; calls are paid separately and are not bundle charged. Agent Action Gate does not approve payment, sign or broadcast transactions, evaluate seller reputation, replace transaction simulation, replace route_tool, or replace human approval.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability | string | yes | – |
| context | object | – | – |
| operation | string | yes | – |
| resource | string | – | – |
| scope | string | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_ux | object | – | – |
| error | – | – | – |
| meta | object | – | – |
| next | array | – | – |
| payment | object | – | – |
| result | – | – | – |
| status | string | – | – |
| success | boolean | yes | – |
No examples provided.
agent_spend_governor ~180
Enforce autonomous-agent budgets before paid actions. Call before spending; authorize, commit, release, or inspect an opaque reservation. Do not use for free operations or an equivalent trusted budget system. Price: $0.001 USDC per call. Agent entry points: risky external action → use Agent Action Gate when a combined action-specific safety assessment is needed; unclear capability/provider → use free /api/discover; constrained comparison between callable alternatives → use paid route_tool; known single capability → call the direct tool; multi-step objective → read the matching workflow recipe and call only relevant steps. Workflows are stateless recipes, not executors; calls are paid separately and are not bundle charged. Agent Action Gate does not approve payment, sign or broadcast transactions, evaluate seller reputation, replace transaction simulation, replace route_tool, or replace human approval.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_ux | object | – | – |
| error | – | – | – |
| meta | object | – | – |
| next | array | – | – |
| payment | object | – | – |
| result | – | – | – |
| status | string | – | – |
| success | boolean | yes | – |
No examples provided.
analyze_whale_activity ~220
Paid Whale Intelligence ($0.02 USDC). Summarizes large public GeckoTerminal-indexed DEX trades for a token address on a supported chain. Large-trader labels are size-based heuristics, not verified whale identities; data is not chain-wide. Wallet mode uses Helius (Solana) or Etherscan API V2 (EVM) when configured, returning recent indexed transactions only; it does not claim complete balances or whale labels. Agent entry points: risky external action → use Agent Action Gate when a combined action-specific safety assessment is needed; unclear capability/provider → use free /api/discover; constrained comparison between callable alternatives → use paid route_tool; known single capability → call the direct tool; multi-step objective → read the matching workflow recipe and call only relevant steps. Workflows are stateless recipes, not executors; calls are paid separately and are not bundle charged. Agent Action Gate does not approve payment, sign or broadcast transactions, evaluate seller reputation, replace transaction simulation, replace route_tool, or replace human approval.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_ux | object | – | – |
| data | object | yes | – |
| error | – | – | – |
| meta | object | – | – |
| next | array | – | – |
| payment | object | – | – |
| result | – | – | – |
| status | string | – | – |
| success | boolean | yes | – |
| timestamp | string | yes | – |
| tool | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
backtest_strategy ~254
Paid Strategy Backtest ($0.10 USDC). Tests built-in long-only spot strategies against bounded public Binance OHLCV history. Signals form at candle close and execute at the next candle open. Applies configured fees/slippage; accepts declarative parameters only and never executes user code. Historical results are not predictions. Agent entry points: risky external action → use Agent Action Gate when a combined action-specific safety assessment is needed; unclear capability/provider → use free /api/discover; constrained comparison between callable alternatives → use paid route_tool; known single capability → call the direct tool; multi-step objective → read the matching workflow recipe and call only relevant steps. Workflows are stateless recipes, not executors; calls are paid separately and are not bundle charged. Agent Action Gate does not approve payment, sign or broadcast transactions, evaluate seller reputation, replace transaction simulation, replace route_tool, or replace human approval.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| end | string | yes | – |
| fee_bps | number | – | – |
| initial_capital | number | yes | – |
| market | string | yes | – |
| slippage_bps | number | – | – |
| start | string | yes | – |
| strategy | object | yes | – |
| timeframe | string | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_ux | object | – | – |
| data | object | yes | – |
| error | – | – | – |
| meta | object | – | – |
| next | array | – | – |
| payment | object | – | – |
| result | – | – | – |
| status | string | – | – |
| success | boolean | yes | – |
| timestamp | string | yes | – |
| tool | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
check_change ~181
Paid Change / Diff Check ($0.001 USDC). Checks normalized text on a public HTTPS page against a previous SHA-256 hash, returning a compact diff when a prior snapshot is available. Agent entry points: risky external action → use Agent Action Gate when a combined action-specific safety assessment is needed; unclear capability/provider → use free /api/discover; constrained comparison between callable alternatives → use paid route_tool; known single capability → call the direct tool; multi-step objective → read the matching workflow recipe and call only relevant steps. Workflows are stateless recipes, not executors; calls are paid separately and are not bundle charged. Agent Action Gate does not approve payment, sign or broadcast transactions, evaluate seller reputation, replace transaction simulation, replace route_tool, or replace human approval.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| previous_hash | string | yes | – |
| url | string | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_ux | object | – | – |
| baseline_available | boolean | yes | – |
| cached | boolean | yes | – |
| change_score | number | yes | – |
| change_type | array | yes | – |
| changed | boolean | yes | – |
| checked_at | string | yes | – |
| current_hash | string | yes | – |
| data_age_seconds | number | yes | – |
| diff | – | yes | – |
| error | – | – | – |
| meta | object | – | – |
| next | array | – | – |
| payment | object | – | – |
| previous_hash | string | yes | – |
| result | – | – | – |
| status | string | – | – |
| success | boolean | yes | – |
| summary | object | yes | – |
No examples provided.
check_package ~244
Paid Package Safety Gate ($0.005 USDC on Base). Call before a coding agent installs, imports, or adds an unfamiliar npm dependency. Checks resolved package/version, OSV vulnerabilities and malware advisories, popular-name typosquatting, and install lifecycle scripts using static analysis only. Package code is never executed. Checks up to 10 direct dependencies when their versions can be resolved; it does not traverse transitive dependencies or assess maintainer history. Unknown coverage returns caution. Agent entry points: risky external action → use Agent Action Gate when a combined action-specific safety assessment is needed; unclear capability/provider → use free /api/discover; constrained comparison between callable alternatives → use paid route_tool; known single capability → call the direct tool; multi-step objective → read the matching workflow recipe and call only relevant steps. Workflows are stateless recipes, not executors; calls are paid separately and are not bundle charged. Agent Action Gate does not approve payment, sign or broadcast transactions, evaluate seller reputation, replace transaction simulation, replace route_tool, or replace human approval.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ecosystem | string | yes | – |
| package | string | yes | – |
| version | string | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_ux | object | – | – |
| cached | boolean | yes | – |
| checked_at | string | yes | – |
| data_freshness_seconds | number | yes | – |
| degraded | boolean | yes | – |
| dependencies_analyzed | integer | yes | – |
| dependency_count | integer | yes | – |
| dependency_findings | array | yes | – |
| dependency_risk | string | yes | – |
| deprecated | boolean | yes | – |
| ecosystem | string | yes | – |
| error | – | – | – |
| install_script_risk | string | yes | – |
| known_malicious | boolean|null | yes | – |
| known_vulnerabilities | array | yes | – |
| maintainer_count | – | yes | – |
| maintainer_risk | string | yes | – |
| malicious_confidence | – | yes | – |
| meta | object | – | – |
| new_package | boolean|null | yes | – |
| next | array | – | – |
| package | string | yes | – |
| package_age_days | – | yes | – |
| payment | object | – | – |
| recommendation | string | yes | – |
| recommended_next | object | – | – |
| reputation | string | yes | – |
| requested_version | string|null | yes | – |
| resolved_version | string | yes | – |
| result | – | – | – |
| risk_confidence | string | yes | – |
| risk_level | string | yes | – |
| risk_score | integer | yes | – |
| similar_to | string|null | yes | – |
| similarity_score | – | yes | – |
| sources | array | yes | – |
| status | string | – | – |
| success | boolean | yes | – |
| suspicious_scripts | array | yes | – |
| typosquat_risk | string | yes | – |
| warnings | array | yes | – |
No examples provided.
check_url ~210
Paid Agent Preflight URL check ($0.005 USDC on Base). Call before an agent opens, follows, downloads from, or trusts an unknown URL. Performs deterministic checks, safely inspects HTTPS redirects without loading page content, blocks localhost/private addresses, and optionally queries Google Web Risk when configured. No LLM is used. A clean result is not a guarantee of safety. Agent entry points: risky external action → use Agent Action Gate when a combined action-specific safety assessment is needed; unclear capability/provider → use free /api/discover; constrained comparison between callable alternatives → use paid route_tool; known single capability → call the direct tool; multi-step objective → read the matching workflow recipe and call only relevant steps. Workflows are stateless recipes, not executors; calls are paid separately and are not bundle charged. Agent Action Gate does not approve payment, sign or broadcast transactions, evaluate seller reputation, replace transaction simulation, replace route_tool, or replace human approval.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| url | string | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_ux | object | – | – |
| cached | boolean | yes | – |
| checked_at | string | yes | – |
| degraded | boolean | yes | – |
| domain_age_risk | string | yes | – |
| error | – | – | – |
| final_url | string|null | yes | – |
| https | boolean | yes | – |
| malware | boolean | yes | – |
| meta | object | – | – |
| next | array | – | – |
| normalized_url | string | yes | – |
| payment | object | – | – |
| phishing | boolean | yes | – |
| recommendation | string | yes | – |
| recommended_next | object | – | – |
| redirect_count | integer | yes | – |
| result | – | – | – |
| risk_level | string | yes | – |
| risk_score | integer | yes | – |
| safe | boolean | yes | – |
| sources | array | yes | – |
| status | string | – | – |
| success | boolean | yes | – |
| suspicious_domain | boolean | yes | – |
| suspicious_redirect | boolean | yes | – |
| threats | array | yes | – |
| warnings | array | yes | – |
No examples provided.
check_wallet ~241
Paid Wallet Risk Check ($0.02 USDC on Base). Call before an agent sends funds to, accepts value from, grants an approval to, or interacts with an unfamiliar address. Checks whether the address is a wallet or contract and reads basic on-chain metadata. Sanctions, scam, drainer, mixer, and malicious-address intelligence are unknown unless a trusted provider is configured; without one, the result is cautious and low-confidence, not a safety certification. Never send private keys or seed phrases. Agent entry points: risky external action → use Agent Action Gate when a combined action-specific safety assessment is needed; unclear capability/provider → use free /api/discover; constrained comparison between callable alternatives → use paid route_tool; known single capability → call the direct tool; multi-step objective → read the matching workflow recipe and call only relevant steps. Workflows are stateless recipes, not executors; calls are paid separately and are not bundle charged. Agent Action Gate does not approve payment, sign or broadcast transactions, evaluate seller reputation, replace transaction simulation, replace route_tool, or replace human approval.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | – |
| chain | string | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | – |
| address_type | string | yes | – |
| agent_ux | object | – | – |
| cached | boolean | yes | – |
| chain | string | yes | – |
| checked_at | string | yes | – |
| contract | object | yes | – |
| data_freshness_seconds | number | yes | – |
| degraded | boolean | yes | – |
| drainer_risk | boolean|null | yes | – |
| error | – | – | – |
| exposures | array | yes | – |
| known_malicious | boolean|null | yes | – |
| meta | object | – | – |
| mixer_exposure | object | yes | – |
| next | array | – | – |
| onchain | object | yes | – |
| payment | object | – | – |
| recommendation | string | yes | – |
| reputation | string | yes | – |
| result | – | – | – |
| risk_confidence | string | yes | – |
| risk_level | string | yes | – |
| risk_score | integer | yes | – |
| sanctions_match | boolean|null | yes | – |
| scam_risk | boolean|null | yes | – |
| sources | array | yes | – |
| status | string | – | – |
| success | boolean | yes | – |
| suspicious_activity | array | yes | – |
| warnings | array | yes | – |
No examples provided.
extract_structured ~192
Paid Fresh Structured Extract ($0.01 USDC). Extracts a fresh webpage into a simple agent-defined typed JSON shape, with validation and per-field provenance. Uses static page data only; never executes page JavaScript and never fabricates missing fields. Agent entry points: risky external action → use Agent Action Gate when a combined action-specific safety assessment is needed; unclear capability/provider → use free /api/discover; constrained comparison between callable alternatives → use paid route_tool; known single capability → call the direct tool; multi-step objective → read the matching workflow recipe and call only relevant steps. Workflows are stateless recipes, not executors; calls are paid separately and are not bundle charged. Agent Action Gate does not approve payment, sign or broadcast transactions, evaluate seller reputation, replace transaction simulation, replace route_tool, or replace human approval.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| schema | object | – | – |
| url | string | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_ux | object | – | – |
| cached | boolean | yes | – |
| confidence | object | yes | – |
| data | object | yes | – |
| data_age_seconds | number | yes | – |
| error | – | – | – |
| extracted_at | string | yes | – |
| final_url | string | yes | – |
| meta | object | – | – |
| next | array | – | – |
| payment | object | – | – |
| provenance | array | yes | – |
| recommended_next | object | – | – |
| result | – | – | – |
| status | string | – | – |
| success | boolean | yes | – |
| url | string | yes | – |
| validation | object | yes | – |
No examples provided.
get_live_quote ~197
Paid Live Product Quote ($0.01 USDC). Retrieves explicitly published product price and stock from a public HTTPS product page before an agent buys; shipping, tax and unknown values remain null. Never purchases. Agent entry points: risky external action → use Agent Action Gate when a combined action-specific safety assessment is needed; unclear capability/provider → use free /api/discover; constrained comparison between callable alternatives → use paid route_tool; known single capability → call the direct tool; multi-step objective → read the matching workflow recipe and call only relevant steps. Workflows are stateless recipes, not executors; calls are paid separately and are not bundle charged. Agent Action Gate does not approve payment, sign or broadcast transactions, evaluate seller reputation, replace transaction simulation, replace route_tool, or replace human approval.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| destination | object | – | – |
| quantity | integer | – | – |
| url | string | yes | – |
| variant | object | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_ux | object | – | – |
| availability | object | yes | – |
| cached | boolean | yes | – |
| confidence | string | yes | – |
| data_age_seconds | number | yes | – |
| delivery | object | yes | – |
| error | – | – | – |
| fetched_at | string | yes | – |
| meta | object | – | – |
| next | array | – | – |
| payment | object | – | – |
| product | object | yes | – |
| quote | object | yes | – |
| result | – | – | – |
| sources | array | yes | – |
| status | string | – | – |
| success | boolean | yes | – |
| variant | object | yes | – |
No examples provided.
invoice_preflight ~226
Paid invoice check ($0.065 USDC on Base): UBL XML or complete PDF/image invoices up to 3 pages. Compares expected purchase fields and line items; returns evidence, amount checks and match/discrepancy/needs_review. No payment or bookkeeping action is taken. Agent entry points: risky external action → use Agent Action Gate when a combined action-specific safety assessment is needed; unclear capability/provider → use free /api/discover; constrained comparison between callable alternatives → use paid route_tool; known single capability → call the direct tool; multi-step objective → read the matching workflow recipe and call only relevant steps. Workflows are stateless recipes, not executors; calls are paid separately and are not bundle charged. Agent Action Gate does not approve payment, sign or broadcast transactions, evaluate seller reputation, replace transaction simulation, replace route_tool, or replace human approval.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| document_base64 | string | – | – |
| document_url | string | – | – |
| document_xml | string | – | – |
| expected | object | – | – |
| mime_type | string | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_ux | object | – | – |
| checks | array | yes | – |
| decision | string | yes | – |
| error | – | – | – |
| evidence | array | yes | – |
| invoice | object | yes | – |
| meta | object | – | – |
| next | array | – | – |
| pages_processed | integer | – | – |
| payment | object | – | – |
| result | – | – | – |
| source_sha256 | string | yes | – |
| status | string | – | – |
| warnings | array | yes | – |
No examples provided.
invoice_preflight_10_pages ~194
Paid invoice OCR ($0.13 USDC on Base): process complete PDF/image invoices up to 10 pages. Oversized PDFs are rejected before OCR. Agent entry points: risky external action → use Agent Action Gate when a combined action-specific safety assessment is needed; unclear capability/provider → use free /api/discover; constrained comparison between callable alternatives → use paid route_tool; known single capability → call the direct tool; multi-step objective → read the matching workflow recipe and call only relevant steps. Workflows are stateless recipes, not executors; calls are paid separately and are not bundle charged. Agent Action Gate does not approve payment, sign or broadcast transactions, evaluate seller reputation, replace transaction simulation, replace route_tool, or replace human approval.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| document_base64 | string | – | – |
| document_url | string | – | – |
| expected | object | – | – |
| mime_type | string | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_ux | object | – | – |
| checks | array | yes | – |
| decision | string | yes | – |
| error | – | – | – |
| evidence | array | yes | – |
| invoice | object | yes | – |
| meta | object | – | – |
| next | array | – | – |
| pages_processed | integer | – | – |
| payment | object | – | – |
| result | – | – | – |
| source_sha256 | string | yes | – |
| status | string | – | – |
| warnings | array | yes | – |
No examples provided.
invoice_preflight_50_pages ~194
Paid invoice OCR ($0.475 USDC on Base): process complete PDF/image invoices up to 50 pages. Oversized PDFs are rejected before OCR. Agent entry points: risky external action → use Agent Action Gate when a combined action-specific safety assessment is needed; unclear capability/provider → use free /api/discover; constrained comparison between callable alternatives → use paid route_tool; known single capability → call the direct tool; multi-step objective → read the matching workflow recipe and call only relevant steps. Workflows are stateless recipes, not executors; calls are paid separately and are not bundle charged. Agent Action Gate does not approve payment, sign or broadcast transactions, evaluate seller reputation, replace transaction simulation, replace route_tool, or replace human approval.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| document_base64 | string | – | – |
| document_url | string | – | – |
| expected | object | – | – |
| mime_type | string | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_ux | object | – | – |
| checks | array | yes | – |
| decision | string | yes | – |
| error | – | – | – |
| evidence | array | yes | – |
| invoice | object | yes | – |
| meta | object | – | – |
| next | array | – | – |
| pages_processed | integer | – | – |
| payment | object | – | – |
| result | – | – | – |
| source_sha256 | string | yes | – |
| status | string | – | – |
| warnings | array | yes | – |
No examples provided.
invoice_preflight_quote ~205
FREE, no wallet or document upload: choose the lowest priced Invoice Preflight tool from document type, PDF page count, and optional byte size. Call this before a paid invoice tool when the tier is uncertain. It does not inspect or validate the document. Agent entry points: risky external action → use Agent Action Gate when a combined action-specific safety assessment is needed; unclear capability/provider → use free /api/discover; constrained comparison between callable alternatives → use paid route_tool; known single capability → call the direct tool; multi-step objective → read the matching workflow recipe and call only relevant steps. Workflows are stateless recipes, not executors; calls are paid separately and are not bundle charged. Agent Action Gate does not approve payment, sign or broadcast transactions, evaluate seller reputation, replace transaction simulation, replace route_tool, or replace human approval.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| document_type | string | yes | – |
| file_size_bytes | integer | – | – |
| page_count | integer | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_ux | object | – | – |
| document_not_inspected | boolean | yes | – |
| error | – | – | – |
| final_validation_on_paid_call | boolean | yes | – |
| meta | object | – | – |
| network | string | yes | – |
| next | array | – | – |
| no_payment_taken | boolean | yes | – |
| payment | object | – | – |
| price_usdc | string|null | yes | – |
| reason | string | yes | – |
| recommended_tool | – | yes | – |
| result | – | – | – |
| status | string | – | – |
No examples provided.
mcp_server_inspect ~234
MCP server health check ($0.01 USDC on Base): connect to any public MCP endpoint over HTTPS, confirm it is reachable, list its tool names and input-schema summaries, compare against expected tool names, and flag risky or misleading tool descriptions. Read-only: inspected tools are never called. Use it before wiring an unknown MCP server into an agent, or to verify your own deployment. Pair with check_url to pre-screen a suspicious endpoint. Agent entry points: risky external action → use Agent Action Gate when a combined action-specific safety assessment is needed; unclear capability/provider → use free /api/discover; constrained comparison between callable alternatives → use paid route_tool; known single capability → call the direct tool; multi-step objective → read the matching workflow recipe and call only relevant steps. Workflows are stateless recipes, not executors; calls are paid separately and are not bundle charged. Agent Action Gate does not approve payment, sign or broadcast transactions, evaluate seller reputation, replace transaction simulation, replace route_tool, or replace human approval.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| endpoint | string | yes | – |
| expected_tools | array | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_ux | object | – | – |
| capabilities | array | yes | – |
| duplicate_tool_names | array | yes | – |
| endpoint_host | string | yes | – |
| error | – | – | – |
| expected_tools | – | yes | – |
| inspected_at | string | yes | – |
| meta | object | – | – |
| metadata_is_untrusted | boolean | yes | – |
| next | array | – | – |
| payment | object | – | – |
| read_only_inspection | boolean | yes | – |
| result | – | – | – |
| server | object | yes | – |
| status | string | – | – |
| tool_count | integer | yes | – |
| tool_list_truncated | boolean | yes | – |
| tools | array | yes | – |
| tools_were_not_called | boolean | yes | – |
No examples provided.
preflight_action ~370
Agent Action Gate ($0.02 USDC flat; stable MCP tool name preflight_action). Use before an AI agent performs an external action. Evaluates the required safety, trust, spending and transaction checks and returns ALLOW, REVIEW, REQUIRE_APPROVAL or DENY. Use before opening an untrusted URL, installing a dependency, calling an unfamiliar MCP/tool, spending funds, submitting a transaction, or consuming untrusted external content. Do not use for pure local deterministic computation or when no external action/risk exists. Does not assess seller reputation. Missing or skipped relevant checks cannot produce ALLOW. REQUIRE_APPROVAL is a recommendation only; use /api/financial/authorize-spend separately for actual spend-policy authorization and owner approval. It does not sign, route payment, or broadcast. No private keys, seed phrases, or secrets are accepted. Typical latency depends on selected checks/providers; there is no uniform SLA. Recommended workflows: agent-safety-gate, safe-transaction-preflight, tool-discovery-trust. Agent entry points: risky external action → use Agent Action Gate when a combined action-specific safety assessment is needed; unclear capability/provider → use free /api/discover; constrained comparison between callable alternatives → use paid route_tool; known single capability → call the direct tool; multi-step objective → read the matching workflow recipe and call only relevant steps. Workflows are stateless recipes, not executors; calls are paid separately and are not bundle charged. Agent Action Gate does not approve payment, sign or broadcast transactions, evaluate seller reputation, replace transaction simulation, replace route_tool, or replace human approval.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action_type | string | yes | – |
| context | object | – | – |
| expected_cost | object | – | – |
| intent | string | yes | – |
| target | object | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action_type | string | yes | – |
| agent_ux | object | – | – |
| approval_handoff | object | yes | – |
| attempted_checks | array | yes | – |
| checks | array | yes | – |
| checks_run | array | yes | – |
| completed_checks | array | yes | – |
| confidence | number | yes | – |
| confidence_semantics | string | yes | – |
| decision | string | yes | – |
| decision_scope | object | yes | – |
| error | – | – | – |
| estimated_cost | object | yes | – |
| evidence_status | string | yes | – |
| failed_checks | array | yes | – |
| intent | string | yes | – |
| latency_ms | number | yes | – |
| meta | object | – | – |
| next | array | – | – |
| next_best_tool | string|null | yes | – |
| payment | object | – | – |
| reasons | array | yes | – |
| recommended_action | string | yes | – |
| required_checks | array | yes | – |
| result | – | – | – |
| retryable | boolean | yes | – |
| risk | string | yes | – |
| signing_or_broadcast_performed | boolean | yes | – |
| skip_reason | string|null | yes | – |
| skipped_checks | array | yes | – |
| status | string | – | – |
| success | boolean | yes | – |
No examples provided.
route_tool ~299
Paid Agent Tool Router ($0.002 USDC on Base). Finds and ranks machine-payable MCP services and x402 HTTP endpoints before your agent chooses or pays a provider. Uses structured capability matching, hard constraints, price, observed latency/reliability, and cold-start trust confidence; no LLM call is required. Returns the best tool, confidence, reason, price, relevant workflow, next-best option, and a context-aware recommended_next when useful. This is recommendation metadata only: it never invokes the selected provider or makes a second payment. Without X402_BAZAAR_DISCOVERY_URLS, results come only from this platform's local service registry and are marked degraded. Agent entry points: risky external action → use Agent Action Gate when a combined action-specific safety assessment is needed; unclear capability/provider → use free /api/discover; constrained comparison between callable alternatives → use paid route_tool; known single capability → call the direct tool; multi-step objective → read the matching workflow recipe and call only relevant steps. Workflows are stateless recipes, not executors; calls are paid separately and are not bundle charged. Agent Action Gate does not approve payment, sign or broadcast transactions, evaluate seller reputation, replace transaction simulation, replace route_tool, or replace human approval.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability | string | yes | – |
| completed_tools | array | – | – |
| constraints | object | – | – |
| preferences | object | – | – |
| query | string | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_ux | object | – | – |
| alternatives | array | yes | – |
| best_tool | string|null | – | – |
| cached | boolean | yes | – |
| candidates_after_filters | integer | yes | – |
| candidates_found | integer | yes | – |
| capability | string | yes | – |
| checked_at | string | yes | – |
| confidence | number | – | – |
| confidence_semantics | string | – | – |
| degraded | boolean | yes | – |
| error | – | – | – |
| expected_total_cost_usd | number|null | – | – |
| match_found | boolean | yes | – |
| meta | object | – | – |
| next | array | – | – |
| next_best_tool | string|null | – | – |
| optimize_for | string | yes | – |
| payment | object | – | – |
| provider_availability_observed_at | string|null | – | – |
| provider_availability_source | string | – | – |
| query | string|null | yes | – |
| reason | string | – | – |
| recommended | – | yes | – |
| recommended_action_gate | – | – | – |
| recommended_next | – | – | – |
| recommended_workflow | – | – | – |
| registry_sources | array | yes | – |
| relevance_score | number | – | – |
| result | – | – | – |
| routing_data_age_seconds | number | yes | – |
| routing_reason | array | yes | – |
| status | string | – | – |
| success | boolean | yes | – |
| why | array | – | – |
No examples provided.
scan_arbitrage ~246
Paid Arbitrage Intelligence ($0.03 USDC). Compares Binance and Coinbase public spot order books at a requested trade size and applies caller- or server-configured taker fee assumptions. Rejects stale books. Excludes transfers, inventory rebalancing, and guaranteed execution; does not place orders. Agent entry points: risky external action → use Agent Action Gate when a combined action-specific safety assessment is needed; unclear capability/provider → use free /api/discover; constrained comparison between callable alternatives → use paid route_tool; known single capability → call the direct tool; multi-step objective → read the matching workflow recipe and call only relevant steps. Workflows are stateless recipes, not executors; calls are paid separately and are not bundle charged. Agent Action Gate does not approve payment, sign or broadcast transactions, evaluate seller reputation, replace transaction simulation, replace route_tool, or replace human approval.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| asset | string | yes | – |
| fee_bps_by_venue | object | – | – |
| min_net_spread_bps | number | – | – |
| quote_asset | string | – | – |
| trade_size_usd | number | yes | – |
| venues | array | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_ux | object | – | – |
| data | object | yes | – |
| error | – | – | – |
| meta | object | – | – |
| next | array | – | – |
| payment | object | – | – |
| result | – | – | – |
| status | string | – | – |
| success | boolean | yes | – |
| timestamp | string | yes | – |
| tool | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
scan_content ~235
Paid Untrusted Content Security Layer ($0.005 USDC on Base). Scan untrusted text, HTML, Markdown, email, document text, API responses, and tool outputs before your agent adds them to context, follows their instructions, or acts. Returns risk score, risk categories, recommendation, and sanitized plain text when possible. Bounded deterministic local scanning; no external LLM or provider call. Maximum 100000 characters. Agent entry points: risky external action → use Agent Action Gate when a combined action-specific safety assessment is needed; unclear capability/provider → use free /api/discover; constrained comparison between callable alternatives → use paid route_tool; known single capability → call the direct tool; multi-step objective → read the matching workflow recipe and call only relevant steps. Workflows are stateless recipes, not executors; calls are paid separately and are not bundle charged. Agent Action Gate does not approve payment, sign or broadcast transactions, evaluate seller reputation, replace transaction simulation, replace route_tool, or replace human approval.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| content | string | yes | – |
| content_type | string | – | – |
| source | string | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_ux | object | – | – |
| cached | boolean | yes | – |
| credential_theft_risk | boolean | yes | – |
| data_exfiltration_risk | boolean | yes | – |
| degraded | boolean | yes | – |
| detected_patterns | array | yes | – |
| error | – | – | – |
| instruction_override_risk | boolean | yes | – |
| meta | object | – | – |
| next | array | – | – |
| payment | object | – | – |
| prompt_injection_detected | boolean | yes | – |
| recommendation | string | yes | – |
| requested_actions | array | yes | – |
| result | – | – | – |
| risk_level | string | yes | – |
| risk_score | integer | yes | – |
| safe | boolean | yes | – |
| sanitized_content | string | yes | – |
| scanned_at | string | yes | – |
| sources | array | yes | – |
| status | string | – | – |
| tool_manipulation_risk | boolean | yes | – |
No examples provided.
simulate_transaction ~268
Paid Transaction Preflight ($0.02 USDC on Base). Simulates an unsigned Base transaction before an autonomous agent signs or broadcasts it. Returns RPC execution/revert status, gas estimate, known top-level method decoding, direct ERC-20 transfer/approval calldata, unlimited approval warnings, and machine-readable risk. Standard JSON-RPC does not expose full internal token state changes; do not treat calldata decoding as a complete state diff. Never send a private key or seed phrase. This tool never signs, holds keys, or broadcasts. Agent entry points: risky external action → use Agent Action Gate when a combined action-specific safety assessment is needed; unclear capability/provider → use free /api/discover; constrained comparison between callable alternatives → use paid route_tool; known single capability → call the direct tool; multi-step objective → read the matching workflow recipe and call only relevant steps. Workflows are stateless recipes, not executors; calls are paid separately and are not bundle charged. Agent Action Gate does not approve payment, sign or broadcast transactions, evaluate seller reputation, replace transaction simulation, replace route_tool, or replace human approval.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| chain | string | yes | – |
| data | string | yes | – |
| from | string | yes | – |
| to | string | yes | – |
| value | string | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_ux | object | – | – |
| analysis_scope | string | yes | – |
| approvals | array | yes | – |
| cached | boolean | yes | – |
| chain | string | yes | – |
| chain_id | integer | yes | – |
| checked_at | string | yes | – |
| contract_calls | array | yes | – |
| contract_reputation | object | yes | – |
| degraded | boolean | yes | – |
| error | – | – | – |
| estimated_gas | string|null | yes | – |
| estimated_native_cost | string|null | yes | – |
| estimated_usd_cost | null | yes | – |
| gas_price_wei | string|null | yes | – |
| meta | object | – | – |
| native_balance_changes | array | yes | – |
| next | array | – | – |
| payment | object | – | – |
| recommendation | string | yes | – |
| result | – | – | – |
| revert_reason | string|null | yes | – |
| risk_level | string | yes | – |
| risk_score | integer | yes | – |
| simulated_block | – | yes | – |
| simulation_success | boolean | yes | – |
| status | string | – | – |
| success | boolean | yes | – |
| token_transfers | array | yes | – |
| warnings | array | yes | – |
No examples provided.
token_security_audit ~236
Paid Token Security Audit ($0.01 USDC). Normalizes GoPlus token-security flags and public EVM RPC metadata for supported EVM tokens. Configure GOPLUS_ACCESS_TOKEN or explicitly enable the bounded public API with GOPLUS_PUBLIC_TOKEN_API_ENABLED=1; if neither is available, no payment is requested. Missing provider fields remain unknown and incomplete coverage returns caution. Reports provider findings separately from deterministic internal scoring. Does not trade or guarantee token safety. Agent entry points: risky external action → use Agent Action Gate when a combined action-specific safety assessment is needed; unclear capability/provider → use free /api/discover; constrained comparison between callable alternatives → use paid route_tool; known single capability → call the direct tool; multi-step objective → read the matching workflow recipe and call only relevant steps. Workflows are stateless recipes, not executors; calls are paid separately and are not bundle charged. Agent Action Gate does not approve payment, sign or broadcast transactions, evaluate seller reputation, replace transaction simulation, replace route_tool, or replace human approval.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| chain | string | yes | – |
| token_address | string | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_ux | object | – | – |
| data | object | yes | – |
| error | – | – | – |
| meta | object | – | – |
| next | array | – | – |
| payment | object | – | – |
| result | – | – | – |
| status | string | – | – |
| success | boolean | yes | – |
| timestamp | string | yes | – |
| tool | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
verify_claim ~223
Paid Freshness / Claim Verifier ($0.02 USDC). Checks a factual claim against fresh web search evidence and returns supported/contradicted/mixed/insufficient/stale with sources. Requires TAVILY_API_KEY. If the key is missing, returns a provider-unavailable error before requesting payment. Claim text is sent to the configured search provider. Agent entry points: risky external action → use Agent Action Gate when a combined action-specific safety assessment is needed; unclear capability/provider → use free /api/discover; constrained comparison between callable alternatives → use paid route_tool; known single capability → call the direct tool; multi-step objective → read the matching workflow recipe and call only relevant steps. Workflows are stateless recipes, not executors; calls are paid separately and are not bundle charged. Agent Action Gate does not approve payment, sign or broadcast transactions, evaluate seller reputation, replace transaction simulation, replace route_tool, or replace human approval.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| claim | string | yes | – |
| freshness_days | integer | – | – |
| preferred_domains | array | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_ux | object | – | – |
| cached | boolean | yes | – |
| claim | string | yes | – |
| confidence | number | yes | – |
| conflicting_evidence | array | yes | – |
| degraded | boolean | yes | – |
| error | – | – | – |
| evidence | array | yes | – |
| freshness | object | yes | – |
| meta | object | – | – |
| next | array | – | – |
| payment | object | – | – |
| result | – | – | – |
| sources | array | yes | – |
| status | string | – | – |
| success | boolean | yes | – |
| verdict | string | yes | – |
| verified_at | string | yes | – |
| warnings | array | yes | – |
No examples provided.
How do I install the DropEngine x402 Agent Services MCP server?
DropEngine x402 Agent Services is a hosted endpoint at https://mcp.dropenginehq.com/api/agent-services, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · mcp.dropenginehq.com
claude mcp add --transport http ahmet11159-x402-agent-services 'https://mcp.dropenginehq.com/api/agent-services'
What is the DropEngine x402 Agent Services MCP server?
DropEngine x402 Agent Services is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.Ahmet11159/x402-agent-services. AI Agent Utility Layer for agent safety, web monitoring, crypto research and tool discovery. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://mcp.dropenginehq.com/api/agent-services).
Is the DropEngine x402 Agent Services MCP server safe to use?
DropEngine x402 Agent Services scores 73 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the DropEngine x402 Agent Services MCP server expose?
DropEngine x402 Agent Services exposes 24 tools: action_lock, agent_spend_governor, agent_permission_vault, agent_outcome_receipt, invoice_preflight_quote, and 19 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 5,485 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the DropEngine x402 Agent Services MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to DropEngine x402 Agent Services without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the DropEngine x402 Agent Services MCP server still maintained?
DropEngine x402 Agent Services is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the DropEngine x402 Agent Services MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 12 checks on DropEngine x402 Agent Services, covering TLS certificate, HTTPS, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 8 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about DropEngine x402 Agent Services: Authorization. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.