Ned Watch
REMOTE · API.NED.WATCH
Wake me when my agent misses its heartbeat. Deadman, overrun, HTTP, TLS, content; US+EU nodes.
Available components
Last scanned (12 hours ago)
Scores higher than 10% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category Monitoring and Observability
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security63
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not yet verified: we couldn't confirm whether this endpoint requires it. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability0
- Transport check failed: declared streamable-http, but the endpoint returned HTTP 410. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Schema Quality & AI Usability0
- Schema not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's schema, or could read only part of its tool list.Unverified
Stability & Change Management0
- Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).Unverified
Tool Coverage0
- Tool coverage not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.Unverified
Tool Safety0
- Tool safety not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.Unverified
Capabilities0
- Capabilities not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's capabilities.Unverified
Unverified: 5 categories
Categories scored 0 because we could not verify them: authentication we do not have, an unreachable endpoint, or not enough scan history. We only credit what we can confirm.
Checks we ran (5)
- TLS certificate
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
Checks we could not complete (6)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- Authorization in Endpoint SecurityAuthorisation not yet verified: we couldn't confirm whether this endpoint requires it.
- Schema quality in Schema Quality & AI Usability (scores 0 for this)Schema not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's schema, or could read only part of its tool list.
- Stability in Stability & Change Management (scores 0 for this)Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).
- Tool coverage in Tool Coverage (scores 0 for this)Tool coverage not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.
- Tool safety in Tool Safety (scores 0 for this)Tool safety not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.
- Capabilities in Capabilities (scores 0 for this)Capabilities not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's capabilities.
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 8 Nov 26 −51
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → not serving MCP ▼ security
- Stability: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Transport: pass → fail ▼ security
- Authorization: Authorisation not yet verified: we couldn't confirm whether this endpoint requires it. security
- Capabilities: pass → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- First check of Schema quality: unverified functional
- 6 Nov 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 5 Nov 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 4 Nov 26 0
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 29 Oct 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 28 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 93 to 97. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 28 days of observed history at the previous scan, 29 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 26 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 87 to 90. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 26 days of observed history at the previous scan, 27 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 24 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 80 to 83. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 24 days of observed history at the previous scan, 25 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://api.ned.watch/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=ned.watch | CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 26 Sept 2026 | 25 Dec 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 65a45f572e6d4c84a4e0a2452a5f7f4d607 |
| SANs: *.ned.watch, ned.watch | ||||||
| CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 4df3b15dd6c0784c507cd37b58e6f115 |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of api.ned.watch. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| watch. | DS published | 55960 | 8 | Verified |
| ned.watch. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication Inconclusive
We could not reach the endpoint well enough to judge its authorisation posture.
| Result | Inconclusive |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 410 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-frame-options | DENY |
| referrer-policy | no-referrer |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://api.ned.watch/mcp | HTTP error | 410 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://api.ned.watch/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 308 | https://api.ned.watch/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
balance ~29
Your balance in cents, free allowance used, burn per day, days left, and the top-up routes.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
content_watch ~190
Fire when a URL answers but says the wrong thing. expect has 1 to 5 conditions: status (int), contains / not_contains (a string or list of strings), json_path (dotted, e.g. "data.items.0.state") with equals (a JSON scalar) or exists (true/false). No regex. Pages over 256 KB fail as 'size'. The callback names the condition that failed, never the page's content. 2c/day at >= 60s, 7c at >= 30s; free within the first 5 at >= 300s. Example: expect={"status": 200, "json_path": "status", "equals": "ok"}
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| callback_url | string | yes | – |
| expect | object | yes | – |
| interval_s | integer | – | – |
| target | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
deadman_checkin ~78
Check in on a deadman watch to keep it from firing. Proves you hold the watch's signing_secret (returned at registration): it is sent as Authorization: Bearer <signing_secret> for this one call. No agent key needed.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| signing_secret | string | yes | – |
| watch_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
is_up ~147
Ask before you call. No key needed. Returns the state of everything Ned watches publicly on a host (and its subdomains) from two continents: up, degraded (answered, but their own status page reports an incident), down, reachable (answers 401, handshake measured only) or unknown (not on The Watch). Also since when, the last change seen (tool list, version, auth) and how soon to ask again. Try api.openai.com, api.anthropic.com, mcp.context7.com, status.github.com. If unknown, the answer says how to add it (first five watches free).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| host | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
overrun_finish ~119
The run ended. Returns runtime_s and late. If Ned already fired for this run, your callback gets 'clear' with late: true. Finishing with no run open is an error (409). failed=true says the run crashed: Ned fires at once with your short error (up to 200 chars) and clears when a later run finishes ok.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| error | – | – | – |
| failed | boolean | – | – |
| run_id | – | – | – |
| signing_secret | string | yes | – |
| watch_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
overrun_start ~107
A run began on an overrun watch. Returns run_id and deadline. Sends the watch's signing_secret as Authorization: Bearer for this one call; no agent key needed. run_id is optional (your own id, 1-64 chars); pass one and a retried start is safe (it returns the open run instead of superseding it).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| run_id | – | – | – |
| signing_secret | string | yes | – |
| watch_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
overrun_watch ~173
Fire when something is STILL running past its deadline (the other side of a deadman). Register once, then call overrun_start when a run begins and overrun_finish when it ends. If a run isn't finished within max_runtime_s (60 to 86400), Ned POSTs one signed 'fire' (run_id, started_at, deadline); a finish after that sends 'clear' with late: true and the runtime. A start while a run is open closes the old one as superseded (no callback). label: give each job its own watch (the same registration twice returns the same watch). 1c/day; counts toward the free 5.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| callback_url | string | yes | – |
| label | – | – | – |
| max_runtime_s | integer | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
pricing ~93
Ned Watch pricing: 5 free watches at >=300s, then per-day rates (http/tls/content 2c, fast 7c, deadman 1c, overrun 1c) from a prepaid balance topped up over x402 (USDC on Base). Public, no key needed. Paying is done against POST /v1/topup/{5,20,50}, not here.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
quickstart ~161
The fastest way to be watched, in one call. Makes you an agent (if you have no key yet) and a deadman watch that expects a check-in every `every_minutes` (5 to 1440). Miss one and Ned POSTs a signed message to callback_url; check in again and he says it's clear. Returns agent_key (shown once), signing_secret, and the exact check-in line to run on your schedule. The first 5 watches are free. arm=true starts the clock now instead of at your first check-in, so a job that never runs at all still wakes you.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| arm | boolean | – | – |
| callback_url | string | yes | – |
| every_minutes | integer | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
watch_cancel ~29
Cancel a watch you registered. Frees a free-tier slot.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| watch_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
watch_get ~37
Current state of one of your watches: status, fired, fire_count, next_check, last_state.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| watch_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
watch_register ~242
Register a watch. type: deadman | http | tls (for overrun and content use overrun_watch / content_watch). notify: up to 3 Discord/Slack/Teams webhook URLs told on fire, clear and change, so a human hears even if the agent behind callback_url is the thing that died. Your callback should outlive your agent. target: URL (http/tls); omit for deadman. interval_s >= 300 on the free tier. condition: e.g. {"grace_s": 600} for deadman, {"max_ms": 2000} for http latency, {"warn_days": 14} for tls. Ned POSTs a signed test callback to callback_url within 60s, then fires on change. No agent key yet? Call this without one: the response includes agent_key (shown once). Store it and pass it as NED_AGENT_KEY next time.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| callback_url | string | yes | – |
| condition | – | – | – |
| interval_s | integer | – | – |
| notify | – | – | – |
| target | – | – | – |
| type | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Ned Watch MCP server?
Ned Watch is a hosted endpoint at https://api.ned.watch/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · api.ned.watch
claude mcp add --transport http watch-ned-ned-watch 'https://api.ned.watch/mcp'
What is the Ned Watch MCP server?
Ned Watch is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as watch.ned/ned-watch. Wake me when my agent misses its heartbeat. Deadman, overrun, HTTP, TLS, content; US+EU nodes. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://api.ned.watch/mcp).
Is the Ned Watch MCP server safe to use?
Ned Watch scores 25 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Ned Watch MCP server expose?
Ned Watch exposes 12 tools: is_up, watch_register, quickstart, watch_get, watch_cancel, and 7 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,405 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Ned Watch MCP server require authentication?
Its publisher declares no required credentials for Ned Watch. We have not been able to confirm that against the live endpoint, and a server can require authorisation without declaring it here.
Is the Ned Watch MCP server still maintained?
Ned Watch is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the Ned Watch MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 5 checks on Ned Watch, covering TLS certificate, HTTPS, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 1 more. 6 items could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about Ned Watch: Authorization, Schema quality, Stability, Tool coverage and 2 more. 5 categories score 0 for that reason, because we only credit what we can confirm. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.