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VMware Harden

PYPI · VMWARE-HARDEN · SCANNED SEP 21

VMware compliance scanning (CIS, vSphere SCG, GB/T 22239, PCI-DSS) with drift detection.

Available components

+17 this week 77 Trust /100
Trust breakdown (7 categories)

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →

Supply Chain Security100
  • No malware found by supply-chain analysis.Pass
  • No known CVEs affecting this package version or its production dependencies.Pass
  • Runs hatchling.build at install time, a recognised native-build step with no shell scripting around it. View diagnostics → Pass
  • 5 of 52 dependencies flagged as unhealthy. View diagnostics → Partial
Provenance & Transparency35
Schema Quality & AI Usability67
  • AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
  • Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 2368 tokens (~296/item across 8 items; 8 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
  • Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management73
  • Stability observed for 22 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
  • 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
  • 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
  • Structured output schemas are declared (13% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
  • No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
  • We read all 8 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
  • An AI judge read all 9 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
  • Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Install

How do I install the VMware Harden MCP server?

VMware Harden runs locally as a PyPI package, launched with uvx vmware-harden. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

pypi · vmware-harden

# add to Claude Code
claude mcp add vmware-skills-vmware-harden -- uvx vmware-harden
// .cursor/mcp.json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "vmware-skills-vmware-harden": {
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": [
        "vmware-harden"
      ]
    }
  }
}
// .vscode/mcp.json
{
  "servers": {
    "vmware-skills-vmware-harden": {
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": [
        "vmware-harden"
      ]
    }
  }
}
# add to Codex CLI
codex mcp add vmware-skills-vmware-harden -- uvx vmware-harden
// opencode.json
{
  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
  "mcp": {
    "vmware-skills-vmware-harden": {
      "type": "local",
      "command": [
        "uvx",
        "vmware-harden"
      ],
      "enabled": true
    }
  }
}
# add to OpenClaw
openclaw mcp add vmware-skills-vmware-harden --command uvx --arg vmware-harden
# ~/.hermes/config.yaml
mcp_servers:
  vmware-skills-vmware-harden:
    command: "uvx"
    args: ["vmware-harden"]
// ~/.netclaw/config/netclaw.json
{
  "McpServers": {
    "vmware-skills-vmware-harden": {
      "Transport": "stdio",
      "Command": "uvx",
      "Arguments": [
        "vmware-harden"
      ]
    }
  }
}
# add to Vellum
assistant mcp add vmware-skills-vmware-harden -t stdio -c uvx -a vmware-harden
// mcp.json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "vmware-skills-vmware-harden": {
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": [
        "vmware-harden"
      ]
    }
  }
}
Changelog

Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.

  • 20 Sept 26 +15
    • Tool safety: pass → unverified security
    • Stability: 0.67 → unverified security
    • Malware scan: unverified → pass security
    • Schema quality: 258 → 296 functional
    • Capabilities: pass → unverified functional
    • Tool coverage: 100 → unverified functional
    • Schema quality: Schema quality not yet verified: we do not have a sandbox capture of the MCP schema this version of the package serves yet. functional
    • Package version: 1.10.10 → 1.11.0 functional
  • 19 Sept 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 63 to 67. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 19 days of observed history at the previous scan, 20 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 16 Sept 26 +1
    • Package version: 1.10.9 → 1.10.10 functional
  • 15 Sept 26 0
    • Package version: 1.10.8 → 1.10.9 functional
  • 14 Sept 26 +1
    • Malware scan: unverified → pass security
    • Package version: 1.10.7 → 1.10.8 functional
  • 13 Sept 26 0
    • Package version: 1.10.1 → 1.10.7 functional
  • 12 Sept 26 +1
    • Package version: 1.10.6 → 1.10.7 functional
  • 10 Sept 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 33 to 37. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 10 days of observed history at the previous scan, 11 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

Diagnostics

Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.

Captured 21 Sept 2026 · Analysed pypi/vmware-harden@1.11.0

Provenance No attestation

The registry publishes no build provenance for this version, so there is nothing to verify.

Result No attestation
Ecosystem pypi

Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →

Install scripts 1 script
Hook Tier Command
build_backend allowlisted hatchling.build

Background: Why install scripts are a supply-chain risk →

Dependencies 52 packages
Packages resolved 52
Stale 4
No linked repository 1
Tree resolution Complete

Background: SBOMs and build attestations, explained →

MCP tools · 8 exposed · ~2,071 tokens

The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →

Tool Tokens
describe_stig_content_sync ~167

[READ] Explain harden's vSphere STIG integration and route continuous enforcement. Takes no parameters. Returns {compliance_api_available (always false — VCF Operations ACC/SPM exposes no public compliance REST API), why_no_api, content_sources (the open-source MITRE InSpec/Cinc STIG repos harden syncs against), mechanism (how upstream controls become harden rules), routing_note (use VCF Operations SPM/ACC UI for fleet-wide continuous enforcement; harden is the API-scriptable point-in-time scanner), importer_status}. Read-only, local static content — no database, network, or API call. Call this before assuming a compliance endpoint exists; use list_stig_controls to see the actual controls.

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

get_baseline_rules ~221

[READ] Return every rule in one compliance baseline. Returns the family list envelope {items, returned, limit, total, truncated, hint}; each item is {id, title, severity, category}, where severity is one of 'critical', 'high', 'medium', 'low', 'info'. The whole baseline is returned, so truncated is always false and total is the exact rule count. Read-only — parses local baseline YAML only, no database or network access. Use after list_baselines to preview what scan_target will check; use list_violations for actual scan findings.

NameTypeReqDescription
baseline_idstringyesA baseline id exactly as returned by list_baselines — e.g. 'cis-vmware-esxi-8.0-subset', 'vsphere-stig-v9-subset' — not the baseline's display name. Unknown ids raise a not-found error; re-run list_b…

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

get_remediation ~187

[READ] Fetch the persisted LLM-generated remediation Suggestion for one violation. Returns {summary, execution_plan.steps, impact_prediction (workload impact, maintenance window, rollback plan), confidence (0.0-1.0), human_review_required}, or None when no advisor suggestion has been generated for that violation yet (generate one via the vmware-harden CLI advisor). Read-only lookup in the local twin DB (~/.vmware-harden/twin.duckdb); no network calls and nothing is executed — suggestions are advisory only.

NameTypeReqDescription
violation_idstringyesThe 'id' field of a row returned by list_violations (the violation's own id, not its rule_id or node_id). An id with no stored suggestion returns None rather than an error, so None means "not generat…
NameTypeReqDescription
resultyes

No examples provided.

list_baselines ~203

[READ] List all available compliance baselines: built-in (CIS ESXi 8.0, vSphere SCG v8, PCI-DSS 4.0, DengBao 2.0 L3, EU NIS2, BSI ITGS) plus any user-imported YAML baselines from ~/.vmware-harden/baselines/. Takes no parameters. Returns the family list envelope {items, returned, limit, total, truncated, hint}; each item is {id, name, version, applies_to (node types covered), rule_count}, and entries that fail to load carry an 'error' field instead. Every baseline is listed, so truncated is always false and total is exact — this is the complete set, not a page of it. Read-only — parses local baseline YAML only, no database or network access. Start here to discover valid baseline ids for get_baseline_rules and scan_target.

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

list_drift_events ~241

[READ] List configuration drift events from the most recent scan snapshot — fields whose values changed since the prior scan of the same target. Returns the family list envelope {items, returned, limit, total, truncated, hint}; each item is {node_id, field, old_value, new_value, detected_at}. total is the snapshot's exact change-event count, so truncated tells you definitively whether rows were left behind — raise limit when it is true. Returns an empty envelope (total 0) when no snapshot exists or there was no prior snapshot to diff against (a target must be scanned at least twice). Read-only query of the local twin DB (~/.vmware-harden/twin.duckdb); no network calls. Use for change tracking; use list_violations for compliance failures.

NameTypeReqDescription
limitintegerMaximum rows returned, ordered by node_id then field (default 50). There is no offset or cursor here — this tool cannot page, so when the envelope's 'truncated' is true the only way to see the rest i…

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

list_stig_controls ~287

[READ] List the built-in vSphere 9 / VCF 9 STIG-aligned host baseline's controls (baseline id 'vsphere-stig-v9-subset'). Returns the family list envelope {items, returned, limit, total, truncated, hint}; each item is {id, title, severity (one of critical/high/medium/low/info), category, advanced_setting} where advanced_setting names the ESXi advanced setting the control governs (e.g. 'Security.AccountLockFailures'). total is the exact catalog size, so truncated tells you definitively whether to raise offset. Read-only — parses local baseline YAML only, no database, network, or compliance API (VCF Operations ACC/SPM has none). Use scan_target with baseline 'vsphere-stig-v9-subset' to evaluate these controls against a target; use describe_stig_content_sync for how this catalog is kept in sync.

NameTypeReqDescription
limitintegerMaximum rows in this page, must be >= 1 (default 50). The whole catalog is loaded and paged locally, so 'total' stays exact whatever you pass.
offsetintegerRows to skip before the page starts, must be >= 0 (default 0 = first page). Raise it by 'limit' while 'truncated' is true.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

list_violations ~436

[READ] List compliance violations recorded by the most recent scan snapshot in the local twin DB (~/.vmware-harden/twin.duckdb). Returns an envelope {violations: [...], total, limit, offset, has_more, coverage, note}; each violation is {id, rule_id, node_id, severity, baseline_id, evidence}, sorted severity-descending then rule_id. `total` is the full matching count (unbounded by limit) so nothing is hidden — page by raising offset while has_more is true. AN EMPTY LIST IS NOT A COMPLIANCE VERDICT: rules whose data no collector gathers are not executed and count as undetermined, never as passing. Read `coverage` {evaluated, undetermined, total, tracked, complete, undetermined_rules} before summarising — when complete is false, say how many rules were evaluated out of how many and do not call the estate compliant or clean; when tracked is false the snapshot predates coverage tracking, so re-scan rather than assume. `note` states the same in one sentence, or null when coverage is complete. Empty envelope (total 0) when no scan exists — run scan_target first. Read-only local DB query, no network calls. Pass a row's 'id' to get_remediation for a fix plan.

NameTypeReqDescription
limitintegerMaximum rows in this page, must be >= 1 (default 50). It bounds the rows serialized, not the 'total' count, so a small limit never hides how much there is.
offsetintegerRows to skip before the page starts, must be >= 0 (default 0 = first page). Page by raising it by 'limit' while the envelope's has_more is true.
severityReturn only violations of exactly this severity. One of 'critical', 'high', 'medium', 'low', 'info' — lowercase, matched exactly; anything else is refused with a ValueError naming the five. Omit to r…

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

scan_target ~329

[READ] Run a compliance scan of a vCenter target against a baseline and persist results locally. Makes read-only vCenter API calls (inventory collection only — never modifies VMware infrastructure) and writes a new snapshot, violations, and drift events (vs the prior scan of the same target) to the local twin DB (~/.vmware-harden/twin.duckdb). Returns summary counts {snapshot_id, target, baseline, hosts, violations, coverage, note}; inspect details via list_violations and list_drift_events. `violations` is meaningful only together with `coverage`: rules whose data no collector gathers are not executed and count as undetermined, never as passing, so violations=0 is not by itself evidence of compliance. When coverage.complete is false, report how many rules were evaluated out of how many instead of calling the estate compliant. May take minutes on large inventories.

NameTypeReqDescription
baselinestringA baseline id from list_baselines (default 'cis-vmware-esxi-8.0-subset'). Which baseline you pick decides which rules can reach a verdict at all: a baseline whose rules need data no collector gathers…
targetstringyesA vCenter target name as configured in vmware-aiops (~/.vmware-aiops/config.yaml) — this skill has no target config of its own and borrows aiops' connection manager. Use the config's target key, not…

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

Common questions

What is the VMware Harden MCP server?

VMware Harden is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.vmware-skills/vmware-harden. VMware compliance scanning (CIS, vSphere SCG, GB/T 22239, PCI-DSS) with drift detection. This page covers its PyPI package (vmware-harden).

Is the VMware Harden MCP server safe to use?

VMware Harden scores 77 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. We found no known CVEs affecting it as of 21 September 2026. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

What tools does the VMware Harden MCP server expose?

VMware Harden exposes 8 tools: list_baselines, list_violations, get_remediation, list_drift_events, get_baseline_rules, and 3 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 2,071 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

Is the VMware Harden MCP server still maintained?

VMware Harden is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.