io.github.viridis-security/injection-detector
REMOTE · MCP.VIRIDIS-SECURITY.COM · SCANNED AUG 3
Formally-verified injection/exfiltration detector for AI agents (MCP-02).
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score →
Endpoint Security57
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 2 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability39
- AI-judged instruction clarity (poor).Fail
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 344 tokens (~172/item across 2 items; 2 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management27
- Stability observed for 8 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
- Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Add this component to your MCP client. Where a client-specific snippet is available, pick your client below and copy it straight into your config; otherwise use the connection detail shown.
remote · mcp.viridis-security.com
claude mcp add --transport http viridis-security-injection-detector https://mcp.viridis-security.com/mcp
[mcp_servers.viridis-security-injection-detector] url = "https://mcp.viridis-security.com/mcp"
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"viridis-security-injection-detector": {
"type": "remote",
"url": "https://mcp.viridis-security.com/mcp",
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add viridis-security-injection-detector --url https://mcp.viridis-security.com/mcp --transport streamable-http
mcp_servers:
viridis-security-injection-detector:
url: "https://mcp.viridis-security.com/mcp" {
"mcpServers": {
"viridis-security-injection-detector": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://mcp.viridis-security.com/mcp"
}
}
} The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 3 Aug 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 23 to 27. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 7 days of observed history at the previous scan, 8 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 2 Aug 26 −3
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Schema quality: 212 → 172 ▲ functional
- Schema quality: fair → poor functional
- Server version: 0.1.0 → 0.2.0 functional
- New tool “detect_trace_tool_policy” functional
- 31 Jul 26 +1
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 30 Jul 26 +1
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 28 Jul 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 3 to 7. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 1 days of observed history at the previous scan, 2 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 27 Jul 26 +1
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 26 Jul 26 58
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 3 Aug 2026 · Probed https://mcp.viridis-security.com/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=mcp.viridis-security.com | CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 10 Jul 2026 | 8 Oct 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 5514963698c718b4349ffe3c1c9bb9e65ff |
| SANs: mcp.viridis-security.com | ||||||
| CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 4df3b15dd6c0784c507cd37b58e6f115 |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of mcp.viridis-security.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | present | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| viridis-security.com. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://mcp.viridis-security.com/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://mcp.viridis-security.com/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 308 | https://mcp.viridis-security.com/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability.
detect_injection Detect adversarial injection ~171
Screen untrusted input for prompt/tool injection, exfiltration, and obfuscation before an agent consumes it. Returns a verdict (clean|suspicious|attack), probability, bits-at-risk (upper bound on adversarial capture per the Adversarial Landauer bound), matched canon patterns, and a recommended action (allow|sanitize|reject|escalate). Backed by Aristotle-verified theorems T-IB-02/T-IB-06/T-IB-01.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agentId | string | — | Optional: for MCP-01 envelope cross-check. |
| certainty | string | — | Operating point. Default standard. |
| context | string | — | Optional: the agent's role/system prompt; helps calibrate. |
| input | string | yes | The untrusted text/data to screen. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| backedBy | array | — | — |
| bitsAtRisk | number | yes | — |
| explainabilityToken | string | — | — |
| matchedPatterns | array | — | — |
| operatingPoint | object | — | — |
| probability | number | yes | — |
| recommendedAction | string | yes | — |
| signals | object | — | — |
| verdict | string | yes | — |
No examples provided.
detect_trace_tool_policy Detect trace tool-policy violations ~136
Analyze an agent trace for the Gray Swan Wave 16 class: untrusted retrieved/tool output causing a tool call outside the user-declared per-turn allowlist. Returns trace counts, unauthorized tool-call evidence, canon mapping VC-AI-TOOL-0001, and claim-boundary guardrails. Backed by T-IB-25/T-IB-29/T-IB-36.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| targetName | string | — | Optional display name for the assessed target. |
| trace | object | — | Single agent trace with user_prompt, allowed_tools, and events[]. |
| traces | array | — | Optional batch of agent traces. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| canonId | string | — | — |
| claimBoundary | string | — | — |
| customerSystemProved | boolean | — | — |
| explainabilityToken | string | — | — |
| mode | string | yes | — |
| probability | number | — | — |
| recommendedAction | string | yes | — |
| reviewPriority | array | yes | — |
| summary | object | yes | — |
| theoremRefs | array | — | — |
| traces | array | — | — |
| verdict | string | yes | — |
No examples provided.