Quiver Risk Brain
REMOTE · QUIVER-PRODUCTION-C3A8.UP.RAILWAY.APP · SCANNED OCT 7
Verifiable, deterministic risk math for autonomous agents; re-runnable proof on every answer.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security57
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not yet verified: we couldn't confirm whether this endpoint requires it. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability0
- Transport check failed: declared streamable-http, but the endpoint returned HTTP 404. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Schema Quality & AI Usability0
- Schema not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's schema, or could read only part of its tool list.Unverified
Stability & Change Management0
- Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).Unverified
Tool Coverage0
- Tool coverage not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.Unverified
Tool Safety0
- Tool safety not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.Unverified
Capabilities0
- Capabilities not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's capabilities.Unverified
Unverified: 5 categories
Categories scored 0 because we could not verify them: authentication we do not have, an unreachable endpoint, or not enough scan history. We only credit what we can confirm.
How do I install the Quiver Risk Brain MCP server?
Quiver Risk Brain is a hosted endpoint at https://quiver-production-c3a8.up.railway.app/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · quiver-production-c3a8.up.railway.app
claude mcp add --transport http tristan-tech-ai-quiver-risk-brain 'https://quiver-production-c3a8.up.railway.app/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"tristan-tech-ai-quiver-risk-brain": {
"url": "https://quiver-production-c3a8.up.railway.app/mcp"
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"tristan-tech-ai-quiver-risk-brain": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://quiver-production-c3a8.up.railway.app/mcp"
}
}
} [mcp_servers.tristan-tech-ai-quiver-risk-brain] url = "https://quiver-production-c3a8.up.railway.app/mcp"
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"tristan-tech-ai-quiver-risk-brain": {
"type": "remote",
"url": "https://quiver-production-c3a8.up.railway.app/mcp",
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add tristan-tech-ai-quiver-risk-brain --url 'https://quiver-production-c3a8.up.railway.app/mcp' --transport streamable-http
mcp_servers:
tristan-tech-ai-quiver-risk-brain:
url: "https://quiver-production-c3a8.up.railway.app/mcp" {
"McpServers": {
"tristan-tech-ai-quiver-risk-brain": {
"Transport": "http",
"Url": "https://quiver-production-c3a8.up.railway.app/mcp"
}
}
} assistant mcp add tristan-tech-ai-quiver-risk-brain -t streamable-http -u 'https://quiver-production-c3a8.up.railway.app/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"tristan-tech-ai-quiver-risk-brain": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://quiver-production-c3a8.up.railway.app/mcp"
}
}
} The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 10 Sept 26 −58
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → not serving MCP ▼ security
- Stability: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Authorization: partial → unverified ▼ security
- Transport: pass → fail ▼ security
- Capabilities: pass → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- First check of Schema quality: unverified functional
- 26 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Aug 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 11 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 31 Jul 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 30 Jul 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 8 Oct 2026 · Probed https://quiver-production-c3a8.up.railway.app/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=*.up.railway.app | CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 27 Sept 2026 | 26 Dec 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 618edc56941aa1165ddb080bf9f799eb7c1 |
| SANs: *.up.railway.app, up.railway.app | ||||||
| CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 4df3b15dd6c0784c507cd37b58e6f115 |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of quiver-production-c3a8.up.railway.app. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| app. | present | 23684 | 8 | Verified |
| railway.app. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication Inconclusive
We could not reach the endpoint well enough to judge its authorisation posture.
| Result | Inconclusive |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 404 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://quiver-production-c3a8.up.railway.app/mcp | HTTP error | 404 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://quiver-production-c3a8.up.railway.app/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://quiver-production-c3a8.up.railway.app/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
event_vol Event Implied-Move ~306
Options-implied expected move around a scheduled event (FOMC/CPI/earnings/etc.). Given spot, ATM implied vol, and days-to-event, returns the 1σ move, the straddle-implied expected ABSOLUTE move (risk-neutral E|ΔS|), and the probability of exceeding move thresholds. Given the vol term structure across the event (ATM IV of the expiry before vs after), it ISOLATES the event's own priced-in move (the Wright event-day technique). Self-checked: the straddle equals a numerical integral of |S_T−S₀|. This is the magnitude that macro calendars (which give only date + impact label) leave out.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| T | number | – | years (or daysToEvent) |
| atmIv | number | – | ATM IV as a decimal (alternative to atmIvPct) |
| atmIvPct | number | – | ATM IV in % (or atmIv decimal) |
| daysAfter | number | – | days to the after-event expiry |
| daysBefore | number | – | days to the before-event expiry |
| daysToEvent | number | – | days until the event |
| ivAfterPct | number | – | ATM IV (%) of the expiry just AFTER the event |
| ivBeforePct | number | – | ATM IV (%) of the expiry just BEFORE the event |
| spot | number | yes | current spot price |
| thresholdsPct | array | – | move thresholds (%) for probability-of-exceeding |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| atmIvPct | – | – | ATM IV used (%) |
| checks | array | – | Ground-truth self-checks; the result is untrustworthy if any fails. |
| eventIsolation | – | – | the event's own priced-in move, isolated from the term structure (when before/after IVs are given) |
| expectedMove | – | – | 1σ move + straddle-implied expected |ΔS| (risk-neutral) |
| horizonDays | – | – | horizon in days |
| method | – | – | technique + assumptions used |
| ok | boolean | – | false when the engine rejected the input |
| probabilityMoveBeyond | – | – | probability of exceeding each move threshold |
| proof | object | – | Verifiability envelope: echoed inputs, engine codeHash, contentHash of this exact result, self-checks, EIP-712 signature (EAS-ready). Re-run the open engine on `inputs` to reproduce the result byte-f… |
| spot | – | – | spot the computation is anchored on |
No examples provided.
exec_verify Execution-Quality Verifier ~238
Deterministic execution-quality / fair-fill verification. Given a completed swap (amountIn, amountOutRealized) plus either the pre-trade pool reserves+fee (constant-product) or a fair reference price, returns how many basis points the fill lost to ADVERSE execution (sandwich/MEV/stale) beyond the unavoidable fee + own price impact. Proves that a fill "within slippage tolerance" can still have been robbed. Call after a swap to detect being sandwiched.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| amountIn | number | yes | input amount actually sent |
| amountOutRealized | number | yes | output amount actually received |
| fairPrice | number | – | reference mode: fair out-per-in price at submit time |
| feeTier | number | – | pool fee as fraction, e.g. 0.003 |
| reserveIn | number | – | pool reserve of input token, pre-trade (constant-product mode) |
| reserveOut | number | – | pool reserve of output token, pre-trade |
| slippageTolerancePct | number | – | the slippage setting used, to demonstrate within-tolerance-yet-robbed |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| adverseExecutionBps | – | – | bps lost to ADVERSE execution beyond the honest cost |
| adverseValueOut | – | – | value lost to adverse execution, in output-token units |
| checks | array | – | Ground-truth self-checks; the result is untrustworthy if any fails. |
| honestFillPrice | – | – | the fill price an honest execution would have produced |
| honestOut | – | – | output an honest execution would have delivered |
| midPrice | – | – | pre-trade mid price |
| mode | – | – | constant-product or reference-price mode |
| note | – | – | interpretation guidance |
| ok | boolean | – | false when the engine rejected the input |
| proof | object | – | Verifiability envelope: echoed inputs, engine codeHash, contentHash of this exact result, self-checks, EIP-712 signature (EAS-ready). Re-run the open engine on `inputs` to reproduce the result byte-f… |
| realizedFillPrice | – | – | the fill price actually received |
| unavoidableCostBps | – | – | fee + own price impact — the honest, unavoidable cost (bps) |
| verdict | – | – | plain-language verdict |
No examples provided.
lp_risk LP Divergence-Loss Gate ~229
Forward-looking liquidity-provision risk. Given a realized price ratio (for impermanent loss) and/or a volatility + horizon (for expected divergence / LVR), returns the closed-form IL, the expected −σ²T/8 divergence, and — with a fee APR — the net forecast and breakeven volatility (the vol above which fees no longer cover the bleed). Self-checked: the IL closed form is verified at the token level against explicit constant-product amounts. Call before providing liquidity to see whether the fee yield can plausibly beat the divergence loss.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| capitalUsd | number | – | position capital in USD — losses are also reported in USD |
| concentrationFactor | number | – | V3 amplifier ≥1 (default 1) |
| feeAprPct | number | – | annualized fee yield estimate |
| horizonPeriods | number | – | periods (default 1) |
| periodsPerYear | number | – | default 365 |
| priceRatio | number | – | realized P1/P0 for realized IL |
| volatility | number | – | per-period vol (decimal) for expected divergence |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| checks | array | – | Ground-truth self-checks; the result is untrustworthy if any fails. |
| concentrationFactor | – | – | V3 concentration amplifier applied |
| expectedDivergence | – | – | expected divergence loss / LVR over the horizon (−σ²T/8 law) |
| feeVsDivergence | – | – | net forecast and breakeven volatility vs the fee APR |
| model | – | – | model assumptions used |
| ok | boolean | – | false when the engine rejected the input |
| proof | object | – | Verifiability envelope: echoed inputs, engine codeHash, contentHash of this exact result, self-checks, EIP-712 signature (EAS-ready). Re-run the open engine on `inputs` to reproduce the result byte-f… |
| realizedIL | – | – | closed-form impermanent loss at the realized price ratio |
No examples provided.
options_risk Options Book Risk (Greeks + SPAN) ~215
Portfolio greeks (delta/gamma/vega/theta/vanna/volga) + SPAN-style scenario margin for an options book on Black-76. Given a list of legs {type, strike, expiryDays, iv, quantity(signed)} and a forward, returns aggregate greeks, first-order P&L per underlying move, and the worst-case loss over a price×vol grid. Self-checked: analytic greeks are verified against finite-difference derivatives of the repriced book. Call to size an options book's true net risk and margin — not the sum of per-leg notionals.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| forward | number | – | shared forward price (or set per position) |
| positions | array | yes | option legs of the book |
| r | number | – | discount rate, default 0 |
| scanRangePct | number | – | SPAN price scan range, default 0.15 |
| volShiftVolPts | number | – | SPAN vol shift in vol-points, default 10 |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| checks | array | – | Ground-truth self-checks; the result is untrustworthy if any fails. |
| greeks | – | – | aggregate delta/gamma/vega/theta/vanna/volga — each verified vs finite differences |
| model | – | – | Black-76 assumptions used |
| ok | boolean | – | false when the engine rejected the input |
| pnlPerUnderlyingPctMove | – | – | first-order P&L per % move of the underlying |
| portfolioValue | – | – | mark-to-model value of the book |
| positions | – | – | per-leg pricing breakdown |
| positionsCount | – | – | number of legs priced |
| proof | object | – | Verifiability envelope: echoed inputs, engine codeHash, contentHash of this exact result, self-checks, EIP-712 signature (EAS-ready). Re-run the open engine on `inputs` to reproduce the result byte-f… |
| spanMargin | – | – | worst-case loss over the price×vol scenario grid (SPAN-style margin) |
No examples provided.
perp_gate Perp Liquidation Gate ~427
Deterministic perpetual-futures risk. Given a position (entry, size, margin/leverage, maint-margin/maxLeverage), returns the exact liquidation price, the % adverse move to liquidation, effective leverage, and (if a funding rate is given) the funding drag. Pass a Hyperliquid `symbol` (e.g. BTC) to auto-fill live mark price, funding, and max leverage. Includes a self-check proving the liquidation invariant. Call this BEFORE opening or sizing any leveraged perp position — an agent that knows its true liquidation distance does not get surprise-liquidated.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| entryPrice | number | – | defaults to live mark if a symbol is given |
| fundingRateHourly | number | – | hourly funding rate (Hyperliquid funds hourly) |
| horizonHours | number | – | horizon for the funding-drag estimate, in hours |
| leverage | number | – | position leverage (alternative to margin) |
| maintMarginRate | number | – | e.g. 0.0125; or pass maxLeverage (mmr = 0.5/maxLeverage) |
| margin | number | – | isolated margin posted (or pass leverage) |
| markPrice | number | – | current mark; distance-to-liq measured from here |
| maxLeverage | number | – | venue max leverage for the asset |
| notional | number | – | position notional in quote/USD |
| side | string | – | long | short (buy | sell are accepted synonyms, as is -1 for short); default long |
| size | number | – | position size in base units (or pass notional) |
| symbol | string | – | perp symbol (e.g. BTC) — auto-fills live markPrice, fundingRateHourly, and the margin source (Hyperliquid notional tiers or dYdX maintenance rate); also defaults entryPrice to the live mark |
| venue | string | – | live-data venue (default hyperliquid). The maths is venue-agnostic — for any other venue omit this and pass maxLeverage/markPrice/fundingRateHourly yourself. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| checks | array | – | Ground-truth self-checks; the result is untrustworthy if any fails. |
| effectiveLeverage | – | – | notional / margin actually run |
| funding | – | – | funding drag over the horizon (when a funding rate is given) |
| initialMarginRatePct | – | – | initial margin rate applied (%) |
| liquidationPrice | – | – | exact price at which the position liquidates |
| maintenanceMarginRatePct | – | – | maintenance margin rate applied (%) |
| marginTier | – | – | venue margin tier the notional falls into |
| model | – | – | model assumptions used |
| moveToLiquidationPct | – | – | adverse % move (from mark) that triggers liquidation |
| ok | boolean | – | false when the engine rejected the input |
| proof | object | – | Verifiability envelope: echoed inputs, engine codeHash, contentHash of this exact result, self-checks, EIP-712 signature (EAS-ready). Re-run the open engine on `inputs` to reproduce the result byte-f… |
No examples provided.
portfolio_gate Cross-Venue Portfolio Gate ~382
Cross-venue portfolio risk. Given positions across venues [{venue, asset|symbol, side, size, entryPrice, margin|leverage, maxLeverage|marginTiers}] — OR just account: a Hyperliquid 0x address, whose FULL live book (positions, margins, account equity, the venue's own liquidation prices) is pulled keylessly — returns TRUE net exposure per underlying, the leg that liquidates FIRST (the binding constraint), concentration (HHI / effective independent bets), and a correlated-crash stress counting how many legs liquidate SIMULTANEOUSLY when the market moves ±X% (correlation→1, the Oct-10-2025 crash regime). Pass Hyperliquid symbols to auto-fill live mark/leverage/margin-tiers. Self-checked (exposure reconciliation, per-leg liquidation invariant, nearest=min, monotone stress, venue-liquidation cross-check). Call to see whether independently-sized bets are secretly ONE bet that blows up together.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| account | string | – | OR: a Hyperliquid account address (0x…) — the full live book (positions, margins, equity, venue liquidation prices) is pulled keylessly; explicit positions take precedence. |
| betaTier | string | – | beta regime for the factor stress: mild | moderate | severe — cross-event validated tiers (pre-registered). Default = worst-case single-event table; explicit betas override. |
| positions | array | – | legs: {venue, asset|symbol, side long|short, size, entryPrice, markPrice?, margin|leverage, maxLeverage|maintMarginRate|marginTiers}. A Hyperliquid symbol auto-fills live mark/leverage/tiers. |
| shockScenariosPct | array | – | correlated market moves (%) to stress; default [5,10,20,30] |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| checks | array | – | Ground-truth self-checks; the result is untrustworthy if any fails. |
| concentration | – | – | HHI + effective number of independent bets |
| correlatedShockStress | – | – | per-scenario: how many legs liquidate simultaneously at a correlated ±X% move |
| model | – | – | model assumptions used |
| nearestLiquidation | – | – | the leg that liquidates FIRST — the binding constraint |
| netExposureByAsset | – | – | TRUE net exposure per underlying (longs netted against shorts) |
| ok | boolean | – | false when the engine rejected the input |
| positions | – | – | per-leg breakdown with each liquidation price |
| positionsCount | – | – | number of legs analyzed |
| proof | object | – | Verifiability envelope: echoed inputs, engine codeHash, contentHash of this exact result, self-checks, EIP-712 signature (EAS-ready). Re-run the open engine on `inputs` to reproduce the result byte-f… |
| totalGrossNotional | – | – | sum of |notional| across legs |
| totalNetNotional | – | – | net notional after long/short netting |
No examples provided.
risk_attest Merkle Batch Attestation ~132
Batch the content-hashes from many Quiver proof envelopes into ONE Merkle root plus per-item inclusion proofs, so a single on-chain anchor (your wallet's tx) attests all of them at once. Self-checked for completeness (every item verifies) and soundness (a non-member does not). Use to make a batch of risk computations cheaply and permanently attestable for audit/liability, without a chain write per computation.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| contentHashes | array | – | alternatively, raw content-hashes |
| items | array | – | proof envelopes (uses proof.contentHash) or raw content-hashes (hex) |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| algorithm | – | – | hash/tree construction used |
| anchor | – | – | EIP-712 (EAS-ready) attestation payload for the single on-chain anchor |
| attestations | – | – | per-item inclusion proofs |
| checks | array | – | Ground-truth self-checks; the result is untrustworthy if any fails. |
| duplicateLeaves | – | – | duplicate content-hashes detected in the batch |
| leafCount | – | – | number of items batched |
| merkleRoot | – | – | the single root that attests every item |
| ok | boolean | – | false when the engine rejected the input |
| proof | object | – | Verifiability envelope: echoed inputs, engine codeHash, contentHash of this exact result, self-checks, EIP-712 signature (EAS-ready). Re-run the open engine on `inputs` to reproduce the result byte-f… |
| verify | – | – | how to verify inclusion against the root |
No examples provided.
size_gate Kelly Size Gate ~211
Deterministic position sizing (fractional Kelly) + risk-of-ruin. Given an edge — discrete {winProb, winLossRatio} or continuous {expectedReturn, volatility} — and a bankroll, returns the fractional-Kelly size and the probability of ever drawing down to 50/75/90%. The direct antidote to over-betting: full Kelly rides thin edges to ruin; this defaults to quarter-Kelly. Call before sizing ANY position.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| bankroll | number | – | bankroll in account units — recommended sizes are returned in the same units |
| expectedReturn | number | – | continuous mode: excess return per period (mu) |
| kellyFraction | number | – | fraction of full Kelly to bet (default 0.25) |
| volatility | number | – | continuous mode: volatility per period (sigma) |
| winLossRatio | number | – | discrete mode: net win/loss odds b |
| winProb | number | – | discrete mode: win probability in (0,1) |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| checks | array | – | Ground-truth self-checks; the result is untrustworthy if any fails. |
| expectedLogGrowth | – | – | expected log-growth rate at the recommended size |
| fullKellyFraction | – | – | full-Kelly fraction of bankroll (the ruinous ceiling, not the recommendation) |
| hasEdge | – | – | false when the edge is non-positive (bet nothing) |
| impliedPortfolioVolPct | – | – | portfolio volatility implied by the recommended size (%) |
| kellyFractionUsed | – | – | fraction of full Kelly applied (default 0.25) |
| leverage | – | – | implied leverage of the recommended size |
| mode | – | – | discrete or continuous |
| model | – | – | model assumptions used |
| note | – | – | plain-language guidance |
| ok | boolean | – | false when the engine rejected the input |
| proof | object | – | Verifiability envelope: echoed inputs, engine codeHash, contentHash of this exact result, self-checks, EIP-712 signature (EAS-ready). Re-run the open engine on `inputs` to reproduce the result byte-f… |
| recommendedBetFraction | – | – | recommended bet as a fraction of bankroll |
| recommendedSize | – | – | recommended bet size in bankroll units |
| riskOfRuin | – | – | probability of ever drawing down to 50/75/90% of bankroll |
No examples provided.
treasury_risk Treasury Depeg & Concentration ~200
Stablecoin / on-chain treasury risk. Given a book of positions [{asset, amountUsd, apyPct, venue, chain, pegTarget, depegProbAnnual}], returns concentration (Herfindahl by asset/venue/chain + breaches over a limit), depeg stress (explicit scenarios + a worst-single-depeg scan), weighted and risk-adjusted yield. Self-checked: HHI == Σw², weights sum to 1, depeg-loss identity. Call to size a treasury's real risk — issuer/venue/chain concentration and depeg exposure — not just its headline APY.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| concentrationLimitPct | number | – | flag any single exposure above this (default 25) |
| depegFloor | number | – | worst-single-depeg stress floor (default 0.90) |
| depegScenarios | array | – | [{asset, price}] explicit depeg stresses |
| positions | array | yes | treasury holdings |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| checks | array | – | Ground-truth self-checks; the result is untrustworthy if any fails. |
| concentration | – | – | Herfindahl (HHI) by asset/venue/chain + limit breaches |
| depegStress | – | – | explicit depeg scenarios + worst-single-depeg scan |
| expectedAnnualDepegLossUsd | – | – | expected annual loss from depeg probabilities (USD) |
| model | – | – | model assumptions used |
| ok | boolean | – | false when the engine rejected the input |
| proof | object | – | Verifiability envelope: echoed inputs, engine codeHash, contentHash of this exact result, self-checks, EIP-712 signature (EAS-ready). Re-run the open engine on `inputs` to reproduce the result byte-f… |
| riskAdjustedApyPct | – | – | yield after expected depeg loss (%) |
| totalUsd | – | – | total treasury size in USD |
| verdict | – | – | plain-language verdict |
| weightedApyPct | – | – | holdings-weighted headline APY (%) |
No examples provided.
What is the Quiver Risk Brain MCP server?
Quiver Risk Brain is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.Tristan-tech-ai/quiver-risk-brain. Verifiable, deterministic risk math for autonomous agents; re-runnable proof on every answer. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://quiver-production-c3a8.up.railway.app/mcp).
Is the Quiver Risk Brain MCP server safe to use?
Quiver Risk Brain scores 23 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Quiver Risk Brain MCP server expose?
Quiver Risk Brain exposes 9 tools: perp_gate, portfolio_gate, size_gate, exec_verify, options_risk, and 4 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 2,340 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Quiver Risk Brain MCP server require authentication?
Its publisher declares no required credentials for Quiver Risk Brain. We have not been able to confirm that against the live endpoint, and a server can require authorisation without declaring it here.
Is the Quiver Risk Brain MCP server still maintained?
Quiver Risk Brain is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 7 October 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.