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RPCS-1 Agent Tuner & Translation Bridge

REMOTE · RPCS1.DEV

Find your AI agent's likely failure mode, get runtime settings, and clarify ambiguous prompts.

Available components

0 this week 86 Trust /100

Last scanned (13 hours ago)

Scores higher than 93% of remote servers

Reachable. Last reached 5 Nov 2026.

Category AI and Machine Learning

Trust breakdown (7 categories)

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →

Endpoint Security80
  • The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
  • No authorisation is required to call this server. Nothing on it is marked destructive, but we can't show that an anonymous caller can only read: full credit needs the server to list at least one tool and every tool to be verifiably read-only. We use a best-effort check of tool names and descriptions to tell read-only tools from tools that change things, so some genuinely read-only tools may not get full credit. Names that start with a read verb (get, list, read, search and similar) and accurate readOnlyHint annotations help. Meet that to earn full credit, or require authorisation. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Partial
  • HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
  • The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
  • DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
Schema Quality & AI Usability69
  • AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
  • Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1724 tokens (~191/item across 9 items; 9 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
  • Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
  • No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage97
  • 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
  • 90% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
  • Structured output schemas are declared (11% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
  • No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
  • We read all 9 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
  • An AI judge read all 10 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
  • Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
What we tested

Checks we ran (13)

  • TLS certificate
  • Authorization
  • HTTPS
  • HSTS header
  • DNSSEC
  • Transport
  • Schema quality
  • Stability
  • Tool coverage
  • Injection markers
  • Destructive annotations
  • Judged manipulation
  • MCP protocol

Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)

  • Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
  • Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.

The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →

Changelog

Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.

  • 28 Sept 26 0
    • We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
  • 25 Sept 26 0
    • We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
  • 26 Aug 26 0
    • We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
  • 25 Aug 26 0
    • Stability: 0.97 → pass security
  • 18 Aug 26 0
    • Schema quality: 1562 → 1724 ▼ functional
    • New tool “fork” functional
  • 11 Aug 26 0
    • We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
  • 31 Jul 26 0
    • We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
  • 30 Jul 26 0
    • Tool “route_intent” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Server version: 0.4.1 → 0.4.2 functional
Diagnostics

Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.

Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Probed https://rpcs1.dev/mcp

TLS valid

Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .

Subject Issuer Valid from Valid until Key Signature Serial
CN=rpcs1.dev CN=YR2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US 19 Sept 2026 18 Dec 2026 RSA 2048 SHA256-RSA 6c8d06347fee815235c1e2085f44792c1c0
SANs: rpcs1.dev
CN=YR2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US 3 Sept 2025 2 Sept 2028 RSA 2048 SHA256-RSA 4ebd24947e24d394802d84a52fd5b319
CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US 13 May 2026 2 Sept 2032 RSA 4096 SHA256-RSA f24b6d17f9d9ad7cb1c9fea78782699f

Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →

DNSSEC insecure

Validation of rpcs1.dev. — Not signed

Zone DS Keys Algorithms Outcome
. Trust anchor 20326, 38696 8, 8 Verified
dev. DS published 60074 8 Verified
rpcs1.dev. No DS Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation
Authentication No authorisation required

The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.

Result No authorisation required
HTTP status 200
Header Value
strict-transport-security max-age=63072000
x-content-type-options nosniff
x-frame-options DENY
referrer-policy strict-origin-when-cross-origin
permissions-policy camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()

Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →

Transports 2 probes
Transport URL Outcome Status Location
streamable-http https://rpcs1.dev/mcp Verified 200
http (plaintext) http://rpcs1.dev/mcp HTTPS enforced 308 https://rpcs1.dev/mcp
MCP tools · 9 exposed · ~1,392 tokens

The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →

Tool Tokens
calibrate_profile ~147

Build a ReceiverProfile (TI, SG, FT, UE, AR — continuous 0-100, never a category label) from five behavioral forced-choice answers. Call with NO answers to get the five questions to ask the user; call again with their answers (a/b/c per primitive) to get the profile. Store the returned profile JSON in the user’s notes or memory and pass it to render_reply / prepare_prompt on every turn. Deterministic and stateless — nothing is stored server-side. Schema: https://rpcs1.dev/v1/receiver-profile.json

NameTypeReqDescription
answersobject–Chosen option id per primitive. Omit entirely to receive the questions.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

fork ~162

The calibrated ambiguity surface: deterministic structural fork detectors (reference, scope, grouping, compare-vs-choose, polysemy) with character-offset spans, plus per-reading one-line clarifiers the sender can append to lock a reading in. Returns competing readings, an ask-back question, and a forked-answer scaffold. Silent on clean text by contract. Runs the deterministic mirror floor only over MCP (no model). Prefer this over interpret for span-level ambiguity detection: interpret’s entity list is a word-list engine (calibrated 2026-08-15: no discrimination on conversational text) — advisory only.

NameTypeReqDescription
rejectedarray–Reading summaries the user already rejected — never re-offered.
textstringyesThe message to analyze for forks.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

interpret ~89

Detect ambiguity in user messages using the RPCS-1 Signature Ambiguity Framework. Returns AR level (AR0-AR5), confidence, candidate interpretations with scores, clarifying questions, and suggested next step. Use when a user says something vague, passive-aggressive, or underspecified.

NameTypeReqDescription
riskstring–Risk category for ambiguity threshold.
textstringyesThe message to interpret.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

normalize ~50

Clean up text with ellipses, fragments, and run-on thoughts into coherent prose. Use when a user types stream-of-consciousness or fragmented input.

NameTypeReqDescription
textstringyesFragmented text to normalize.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

prepare_prompt ~177

The inbound half of the Translation Bridge loop. Takes the user’s raw message (possibly ambiguous, fragmented, or underspecified) plus their ReceiverProfile, and returns the recovered intent, a canonical translation to act on, ambiguity level, and — profile-aware — whether to clarify or commit. Call this before acting on any ambiguous user request. Scope note: its detectors are lexical/structural (vague signals, ambiguous references) — for the commit-vs-clarify DECISION, route_intent (with your own proposed readings) is the authority; when they disagree, follow route_intent.

NameTypeReqDescription
profileobject–The user’s ReceiverProfile from calibrate_profile. Shapes clarify-vs-commit behavior.
riskstring–Risk category for the ambiguity threshold.
textstringyesThe user’s raw message.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

recommend_agent_configuration ~234

Diagnose why a deployed AI agent may fail. Takes environmental entropy, predictability, stakes, context horizon, and commitment style, then returns receiver profile values (TI, SG, FT, UE, AR), platform parameters (temperature, top_p, strategy), regime prediction, reasoning, and warnings. Optionally pass target_model (the actual model id) to attach MEASURED per-model receiver posture (E-LIT table): evidence-graded literalness, truth-override boundary, and translation directives. Deterministic, stateless, read-only — does not store past recommendations.

NameTypeReqDescription
environmentobject––
target_modelstring–Optional: the actual model id this agent will run on (e.g. "claude-sonnet-4-6", "deepseek-v4-pro"). When it matches a measured per-model receiver entry (E-LIT table), measured translation directives…
target_platformstring–The platform whose runtime parameters should be recommended.
taskobject––
NameTypeReqDescription
confidencestringyes–
imm_principles_appliedarrayyes–
platform_parametersobjectyes–
predicted_regimestringyes–
reasoningstringyes–
receiver_profileobjectyes–
warningsarrayyes–

No examples provided.

render_reply ~98

The outbound half of the Translation Bridge loop. Takes your draft reply plus the user’s ReceiverProfile and returns deterministic rendering instructions (structure, warmth, explicitness, revision posture, ambiguity handling — each with a why-trace). Apply the instructions to your draft before answering. Call this on every reply to a calibrated user.

NameTypeReqDescription
profileobjectyesThe user’s ReceiverProfile from calibrate_profile.
textstringyesYour draft reply.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

rewrite ~61

Get rewrite instructions for adapting text to a specific style: technical, plain, socially_gentle, concise, detailed, or direct. Use when communication needs tone adjustment.

NameTypeReqDescription
stylestring–Target audience style.
textstringyesText to rewrite.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

route_intent ~374

Entropy routing over competing interpretations — the model proposes, the deterministic core disposes. YOU generate the candidate readings of the user’s message (3–7 short hypotheses covering the plausible interpretations, INCLUDING likely-typo readings, idiom-vs-literal readings, and domain senses) and pass them as hypotheses, ideally with your own likelihoods (0–1 per reading) AND a paraphrase per reading — the user’s message rewritten unambiguously under that interpretation, so the user can VERIFY intent by recognition before anything commits (one misread prompt skews a whole thread). The router computes the posterior and its normalized entropy T̂ and returns the decision: commit (one reading dominates), commit_with_note (close alternative disclosed), present_options (several readings live), or clarify (ask before acting — open-endedly when nothing discriminates). Thresholds adapt to the user’s ReceiverProfile (AR widens/narrows the commit region; high FT discloses near-ties). This tool is the commit-vs-clarify AUTHORITY in the pipeline. Omitting hypotheses falls back to a generic six-intent PRODUCT-ROUTING starter set — do not use the fallback for interpreting arbitrary sentences. Deterministic, stateless, read-only. Benchmarked: RTEB v1.1 (developer-bench grade; see docs/routing.md).

NameTypeReqDescription
hypothesesarray–Candidate interpretations. Omit to use a generic six-intent starter set plus a catch-all.
likelihoodsobject–Optional externally computed likelihood per hypothesis id (e.g. model-derived) — replaces the lexical scorer.
profileobject–The user’s ReceiverProfile from calibrate_profile. Shapes commit-vs-clarify thresholds.
textstringyesThe user’s raw message.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

Install

How do I install the RPCS-1 Agent Tuner & Translation Bridge MCP server?

RPCS-1 Agent Tuner & Translation Bridge is a hosted endpoint at https://rpcs1.dev/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

remote · rpcs1.dev

# add to Claude Code
claude mcp add --transport http travisbergen2-rpcs1-agent-tuner 'https://rpcs1.dev/mcp'
Common questions

What is the RPCS-1 Agent Tuner & Translation Bridge MCP server?

RPCS-1 Agent Tuner & Translation Bridge is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.travisbergen2/rpcs1-agent-tuner. Find your AI agent's likely failure mode, get runtime settings, and clarify ambiguous prompts. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://rpcs1.dev/mcp).

Is the RPCS-1 Agent Tuner & Translation Bridge MCP server safe to use?

RPCS-1 Agent Tuner & Translation Bridge scores 86 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

What tools does the RPCS-1 Agent Tuner & Translation Bridge MCP server expose?

RPCS-1 Agent Tuner & Translation Bridge exposes 9 tools: recommend_agent_configuration, interpret, fork, normalize, rewrite, and 4 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,392 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

Does the RPCS-1 Agent Tuner & Translation Bridge MCP server require authentication?

No. We connected to RPCS-1 Agent Tuner & Translation Bridge without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.

Is the RPCS-1 Agent Tuner & Translation Bridge MCP server still maintained?

RPCS-1 Agent Tuner & Translation Bridge is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.

What did VerifyMCP test on the RPCS-1 Agent Tuner & Translation Bridge MCP server?

VerifyMCP ran 13 checks on RPCS-1 Agent Tuner & Translation Bridge, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HTTPS, HSTS header and 9 more. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.