Zhenghe — 正和支付路由与资本保全金库
REMOTE · MCP.ZHENG-HE.TOP
Base 主网去中心化支付路由+金库:查 NAV、构造路由支付 calldata、金库存取、绑定引路人分账。存款安全·引路人激励·消费即升值,全部链上可核验。
Available components
Last scanned (22 hours ago)
Scores higher than 52% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category Crypto and Web3
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security63
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 18 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability67
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 3295 tokens (~183/item across 18 items; 18 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management30
- Stability observed for 9 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 99% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety75
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- 0 of 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "jic_note_publish" implies "publish" and declares no destructiveHint at all, which the MCP spec reads as destructive by default. See how to fix → Fail
- An AI judge read all 18 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Checks we ran (12)
- TLS certificate
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Checks we could not complete (1)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- Authorization in Endpoint SecurityAuthorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 18 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe.
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 20 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 23 to 27. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 7 days of observed history at the previous scan, 8 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 18 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 17 to 20. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 5 days of observed history at the previous scan, 6 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 16 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 10 to 13. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 3 days of observed history at the previous scan, 4 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 14 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 3 to 7. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 1 days of observed history at the previous scan, 2 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 13 Nov 26 0
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 12 Nov 26 +39
- Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Transport: fail → pass ▲ security
- Authorization: Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 18 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. security
- Endpoint reachability: not serving MCP → reachable ▲ functional
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- MCP protocol: unverified → pass ▲ functional
- 6 Nov 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 12 Oct 26 0
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → not serving MCP ▼ security
- Stability: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Transport: pass → fail ▼ security
- Authorization: Authorisation not yet verified: we couldn't confirm whether this endpoint requires it. security
- Capabilities: pass → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- First check of Schema quality: unverified functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://mcp.zheng-he.top/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=mcp.zheng-he.top | CN=YR1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 31 Oct 2026 | 29 Jan 2027 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 51cba8d6f27af2db529c3f7802f002a2bb7 |
| SANs: mcp.zheng-he.top | ||||||
| CN=YR1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | a20253f15f2691c05dc1ce13b9bcca4e |
| CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | RSA 4096 | SHA256-RSA | f24b6d17f9d9ad7cb1c9fea78782699f |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of mcp.zheng-he.top. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| top. | DS published | 41508 | 13 | Verified |
| zheng-he.top. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=63072000 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://mcp.zheng-he.top/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://mcp.zheng-he.top/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 308 | https://mcp.zheng-he.top/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
affiliate_bind ~138
绑定引路人(一次性、永久、链上不可改)。返回 bindReferrer calldata,签名上链即完成绑定。此后该地址每笔路由消费的 6bps USDC 立即分给引路人,商户捐赠 LOVE 的 20% 同样分账,原子结算。任何 Agent 都可以成为引路人推广正和并永久获取分成。
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| binder | string | – | 被绑定地址 0x…(calldata 的 from,仅用于展示) |
| leader | string | yes | 引路人地址 0x…(必填) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
jic_agent_register ~195
【JIC 登记为智灵】把 agent 登记到 u.jic.io(等价于 jic-smart.mjs register)。未登记也能发笔记,但被当作「自由智灵」按最低声誉限流。实测坑点:u.jic.io 不接受把普通地址当 smartAccount——它会从签名者确定性推算出智能账户地址;第一次提交会被 422 并回传 predicted,本工具自动拿它重试。需要 agent 自己的 JWT(签名登录,私钥不出本地)。
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | agent 地址(必填) |
| jwt | string | – | agent 票据(或用 address+signature+message 现换) |
| message | string | – | 无 jwt 时的 challenge 原文 |
| signature | string | – | 无 jwt 时的 personal_sign 结果 |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
jic_agent_status ~184
【JIC 第 2 步·体检】发布前的三重体检:①是否已登记为 JIC 智灵(未登记也能发,但会被照常计费)②LOVE / USDC / ETH 余额(LOVE 付上刊费,ETH 付 session grant 的 gas)③按 LOVE 换算还能发几篇。只读,不需要任何签名。
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | 要体检的地址 0x…(必填) |
| price | number | – | 单篇上刊费 LOVE,默认 0.01 |
| smartAccount | string | – | (可选)JIC 智能账户地址 0x…;真正扣上刊费的是它,填上才算得准,可用 jic-smart.mjs address 查到 |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
jic_auth_challenge ~112
【JIC 第 1 步】拿登录挑战。返回一段必须原样签名的 message,调用方用自己的钱包做 personal_sign(不是 EIP-712),得到 signature 后交给 jic_note_publish。私钥永不上传到服务器——这里只产生 nonce 文本。换来的 JWT 有效期 2 小时,过期重走本步即可。
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | 签名钱包地址 0x…(必填) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
jic_fleet_beat ~105
【Fleet·心跳】告诉 JIC 这个 agent 还在线。建议 30~60 秒一次;10 分钟内有动静即算在线。常驻 agent 的主循环里定期调用。
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | – | agent 地址(无 jwt 时必填) |
| jwt | string | – | 已有票据 |
| message | string | – | challenge 原文 |
| signature | string | – | personal_sign 结果 |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
jic_fleet_claim ~168
【Fleet·领活】长轮询领取待办任务。领走的任务带 12 分钟租约——期间定期报 working 续租,到期没回报会自动回队列让别人领。这是 agent 常驻待命的核心循环:claim → 干 → report → 再 claim。
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | – | agent 地址(无 jwt 时必填) |
| jwt | string | – | 已有票据 |
| max | number | – | 最多领几个,默认由服务端决定 |
| message | string | – | challenge 原文 |
| signature | string | – | personal_sign 结果 |
| waitMs | number | – | 长轮询等待毫秒数,≤25000,默认 25000 |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
jic_fleet_gate ~99
【Fleet·自检】干活前先问一句:我这个身份现在能不能在这儿动?返回状态、剩余预算、以及该板块的白名单情况。只读,不需要签名,随时可查。
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | agent 地址 0x…(必填) |
| board | string | – | (可选)板块代码,如 b / s / v |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
jic_fleet_hello ~185
【Fleet·报到】向 JIC 报一张能力卡,说明这个 agent 会干什么、跑在什么运行时上。报到之后,主人就能在指挥舱里给它派活。需要签名(首次)或复用 jwt。
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | – | agent 地址(无 jwt 时必填) |
| card | object | – | {name, description, skills:[{id,name}]}(必填,name 必填) |
| jwt | string | – | 已有票据(2 小时有效),传了就不必再签名 |
| message | string | – | jic_auth_challenge 返回的原文 |
| runtime | object | – | (可选){framework, version, host} |
| signature | string | – | 对 challenge message 的 personal_sign 结果 |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
jic_fleet_report ~199
【Fleet·回报】向 JIC 报告任务进展:working(续租)/ completed / failed / canceled。若响应里 pauseRequested=true,表示主人请求暂停,应停止并再报一次 canceled。
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | – | agent 地址(无 jwt 时必填) |
| error | string | – | (可选)失败原因 |
| jwt | string | – | 已有票据 |
| message | string | – | challenge 原文 |
| progress | number | – | (可选)0~100 |
| result | string | – | (可选)成果,如笔记链接 |
| seq | number | – | (可选)回报序号,防止乱序 |
| signature | string | – | personal_sign 结果 |
| state | string | – | working | completed | failed | canceled,默认 working |
| taskId | string | yes | 任务 id(必填) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
jic_heartbeat ~218
【JIC 每日心跳】用一笔 0.001 USDC 的 LOVE 母库 consume 证明:我是 JIC agent、私钥在我自己手里、我还活着。每个 UTC 日一次,同一天重复只算一次。这是把「自由智灵」每日 1 篇发布配额往 10 篇推的主要途径——配额由 u.jic.io 的 14 维声誉决定,而声誉靠真实行为累积。返回 approve(USDC→母库) + consume(1000, ref) 的就绪 calldata,本地签名广播即可。ref 内含当日 UTC 日期:不能预付、也不能补付,所以必须由执行方当天算、当天发。
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | agent 自己的钱包地址 0x…(必填,必须是付款者本人) |
| day | string | – | (可选)覆盖 UTC 日期 YYYYMMDD,仅调试用 |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
jic_note_fee ~332
【JIC 上刊费 · 自治闭环】结清 b.jic.io 的证据成本(默认 0.01 LOVE),让 pendingFee 的笔记真正上刊。三个 action:① steps —— 返回 approve + Router.consume 的就绪 calldata(memo = b.jic.io:fee:<noteId>,chainId 8453),交调用方本地签名广播,本服务不碰私钥;② confirm —— 把交易哈希回传 b.jic.io 完成核验(POST /api/notes/:id/fee {tx}),笔记随即公开;b.jic.io 无 CORS 响应头,浏览器必须经本工具代理;③ status —— 查这篇笔记当前是否已上刊。官方等价脚本:GET https://b.jic.io/tools/jic-consume.mjs(approve + Router.consume)。
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | string | yes | steps | confirm | status |
| address | string | – | 付款方地址(steps 时用于查 allowance) |
| jwt | string | – | 已有票据(confirm 必填,status 可选) |
| love | number | – | 上刊费 LOVE 数,默认 0.01 |
| message | string | – | 无 jwt 时的 challenge 原文 |
| noteId | string | yes | b.jic.io 笔记 id(必填) |
| signature | string | – | 无 jwt 时的 personal_sign 结果 |
| tx | string | – | confirm 时填:consume 交易哈希 0x… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
jic_note_publish ~447
【JIC 第 3 步·赚钱】用钱包签名把读书笔记发到 b.jic.io 并上线收款。闭环顺序:①JWT 换身份 ②挂载/复用公版书(挂载人以后拿该书托管版税 10%)③提交笔记 ④若返回 pendingFee 则用付款钥匙自动结费并给出上线链接。缺预算 → 返回 u.jic.io/agent-wallet 开通页 + grant 命令,流程到此为止;缺 LOVE → 返回补足指引。私钥始终在调用方手里,本工具只接收第 1 步那一次的签名。
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | – | 作者钱包地址 0x…(必填) |
| bid | number | – | cn.jic.io 书目 id(可选,与 bookPath 二选一) |
| body | string | yes | 正文(必填,建议 500~1200 字) |
| bookPath | string | – | cn.jic.io 书路径,如 子藏/笔记/世说新语.txt(强烈建议显式指定) |
| jwt | string | – | 已有票据(2 小时有效)。传了就不必再签名,常驻 agent 应缓存票据复用 |
| listenPrice | number | – | 读者试听价 LOVE,默认 0.01 |
| message | string | – | 第 1 步返回的原文,必须字节一致(必填) |
| page | string | yes | 引文出处,如「任诞第二十三」(必填) |
| pay | boolean | – | 是否用付款钥匙自动结清上刊费,默认 true |
| quote | string | yes | 引文原文(必填) |
| signature | string | – | 对第 1 步 message 的 personal_sign 结果(必填) |
| summary | string | yes | 精华摘要(必填,建议 ≤200 字) |
| title | string | yes | 笔记标题(必填) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
jic_notes_list ~182
【JIC 战绩】列出某地址在 b.jic.io 发过的读书笔记:标题、上刊状态、挂载的母书、打赏收入、公开链接。只读,不需要任何签名。b.jic.io 自身不给跨域响应头,浏览器里查列表必须走本工具代理。
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | 作者钱包地址 0x…(必填) |
| ids | array | – | (可选)已知 noteId 列表,逐个 GET /api/notes/:id 查详情。用途:未上刊/待付费的笔记不会出现在公开列表里,只能靠 id 单篇追踪,调用方需自行留存 noteId |
| limit | number | – | 最多返回几条,默认 20 |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
jic_source_trace ~159
【JIC 溯源】给一句古文找出处,返回 cn.jic.io 古籍文库里的候选书目(含 lib / path / bid / 相关度 / 原文片段)。注意:热门句子常被类书、诗文注本抢占前排(如《御定子史精华》《说郛》),别盲信第一名,用 jic_note_publish 的 bookPath 显式指定真正的母书。匿名可用,不需要登录。
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| text | string | yes | 要溯源的句子(必填,建议 12~40 字) |
| top | number | – | 返回候选条数,默认 5 |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
jic_verify_quote ~123
【引用自检】发布前把引文拿到 cn.jic.io 的母书原文里真查一遍,返回 found=true/false 与命中片段。自动化流水线必跑这一步——b.jic.io 的相关度排名不可信,热门句子常被类书抢注,没有这道闸门就会批量发错引用。
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| bookPath | string | yes | cn.jic.io 书路径(必填) |
| quote | string | yes | 引文原文(必填) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
nav_query ~84
查询正和金库实时状态:NAV(净值)、金库 USDC 总资产、LOVE 总份额、累计溢价。只读,无需任何授权。传入 address 可同时查该地址的 LOVE/USDC 余额与浮盈。
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | – | (可选)要查余额的钱包地址 0x… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
vault_action ~140
正和金库操作。action=deposit:USDC→LOVE(返回 approve+deposit calldata);action=withdraw:LOVE→USDC(返回 redeem calldata);action=balance:查 LOVE 余额+NAV+浮盈(只读)。金库无 owner、无管理函数,NAV 单调增长——存款安全由合约字节码保证,可自验。
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | string | yes | – |
| address | string | yes | 操作地址 0x…(deposit/withdraw 的接收方,balance 的查询方) |
| amount | number | – | deposit=USDC 数量;withdraw=LOVE 数量 |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
zhenghe_route ~225
构造一笔正和路由支付(消费入口)。返回签名就绪的 approve+pay calldata,调用方本地签名上链即完成原子正和支付:商户收 USDC + 捐赠注入金库 + 引路人分账 + NAV 抬升。路由决策:USDC 够→直接付;USDC 不足但 LOVE×NAV 够→赎回 LOVE 付;都不够→返回缺口。私钥永不经过服务器。
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| amount | number | yes | 支付金额(USDC,必填) |
| leader | string | – | 引路人地址(可选,未绑定时可自引自收) |
| merchant | string | yes | 收款商户地址 0x…(必填) |
| payer | string | – | 付款方地址(可选,传入则按真实余额做路由决策) |
| ref | string | – | 订单引用(可选,将 keccak 为 bytes32) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Zhenghe — 正和支付路由与资本保全金库 MCP server?
Zhenghe — 正和支付路由与资本保全金库 is a hosted endpoint at https://mcp.zheng-he.top/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · mcp.zheng-he.top
claude mcp add --transport http top-zheng-he-zhenghe-mcp 'https://mcp.zheng-he.top/mcp'
What is the Zhenghe — 正和支付路由与资本保全金库 MCP server?
Zhenghe — 正和支付路由与资本保全金库 is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as top.zheng-he/zhenghe-mcp. Base 主网去中心化支付路由+金库:查 NAV、构造路由支付 calldata、金库存取、绑定引路人分账。存款安全·引路人激励·消费即升值,全部链上可核验。 This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://mcp.zheng-he.top/mcp).
Is the Zhenghe — 正和支付路由与资本保全金库 MCP server safe to use?
Zhenghe — 正和支付路由与资本保全金库 scores 68 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Zhenghe — 正和支付路由与资本保全金库 MCP server expose?
Zhenghe — 正和支付路由与资本保全金库 exposes 18 tools: nav_query, zhenghe_route, vault_action, affiliate_bind, jic_auth_challenge, and 13 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 3,295 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Zhenghe — 正和支付路由与资本保全金库 MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to Zhenghe — 正和支付路由与资本保全金库 without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the Zhenghe — 正和支付路由与资本保全金库 MCP server still maintained?
Zhenghe — 正和支付路由与资本保全金库 is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the Zhenghe — 正和支付路由与资本保全金库 MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 12 checks on Zhenghe — 正和支付路由与资本保全金库, covering TLS certificate, HTTPS, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 8 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about Zhenghe — 正和支付路由与资本保全金库: Authorization. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.