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mcp-x402 — MCP server for agents with autonomous USDC/RLUSD payments

REMOTE · MCP-X402.ONRENDER.COM · 2 COMPONENTS

85+ pay-per-call MCP tools: trading, federal grants/contracts, SEC, FTD. x402 USDC/RLUSD. No keys.

0 this week 69 Trust /100

Last scanned (20 hours ago)

Scores higher than 54% of remote servers

Reachable. Last reached 4 Nov 2026.

Category Finance and Payments

Recent critical change

Authorization (29 Oct 2026). See the changelog before you install this server.

Trust breakdown (7 categories)

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →

Endpoint Security57
Transport & Reachability40
Schema Quality & AI Usability59
  • AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
  • Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 2082 tokens (~231/item across 9 items; 9 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
  • Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
  • No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage100
  • 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
  • 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
  • No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
  • All 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation.Pass
  • An AI judge read all 9 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
  • Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Changelog

Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.

  • 30 Oct 26 0
    • New tool “omnigate_runtime_execute”, which the server declares destructive security
    • Schema quality: 1401 → 2082 ▼ functional
    • Destructive annotations: pass → 100 functional
    • New tool “omnigate_runtime_search” functional
    • New tool “omnigate_runtime_receipt” functional
  • 29 Oct 26 0
    • Authorization: unverified → fail ▼ critical
    • Tool “spend_gate_check” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “spend_gate_check” is now declared destructive security
    • Tool “leviathan_interfere” is now declared destructive security
    • Tool “interfere” is now declared destructive security
  • 26 Oct 26 −9
    • Authorization: partial → unverified ▼ security
    • Schema quality: pass → fail ▼ functional
    • New tool “interfere” functional
    • New tool “leviathan_interfere” functional
    • New tool “spend_gate_check” functional
  • 14 Oct 26 +7
    • Authorization: unverified → partial ▲ security
  • 8 Oct 26 +13
    • Stability: fail → pass ▲ security
  • 28 Sept 26 0
    • We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
  • 25 Sept 26 0
    • We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
  • 13 Sept 26 0
    • Server version: 2.1.10 → 2.1.11 functional
Diagnostics

Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.

Captured 4 Nov 2026 · Probed https://mcp-x402.onrender.com/sse

TLS valid

Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .

Subject Issuer Valid from Valid until Key Signature Serial
CN=onrender.com CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US 21 Sept 2026 20 Dec 2026 ECDSA 256 ECDSA-SHA256 6eb1e3fe7d0631ea1337bfa4a321c137
SANs: onrender.com, *.onrender.com
CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US 13 Dec 2023 20 Feb 2029 ECDSA 256 ECDSA-SHA384 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3
CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE 15 Nov 2023 28 Jan 2028 ECDSA 384 SHA256-RSA 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b

Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →

DNSSEC insecure

Validation of mcp-x402.onrender.com. — Not signed

Zone DS Keys Algorithms Outcome
. trust_anchor 20326, 38696 8, 8 Verified
com. present 19718 13 Verified
onrender.com. absent Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation
Authentication No authorisation required

The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.

Result No authorisation required
HTTP status 200

Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →

Transports 2 probes
Transport URL Outcome Status Location
sse https://mcp-x402.onrender.com/sse Verified 200
http (plaintext) http://mcp-x402.onrender.com/sse HTTPS enforced 301 https://mcp-x402.onrender.com/sse
MCP tools · 9 exposed · ~2,082 tokens

The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →

Tool Tokens
interfere ~369

Coherent Gate (PAID, x402/USDC). Scores whether your trading-signal paths agree: confidence-weighted long/short/flat consensus, coherence 0-1, and a pass/block gate (pass needs a non-flat consensus and coherence at or above the threshold, default 0.6). Tiers by path count: scout ≤4 $0.01, standard ≤8 $0.05, beast ≤32 $0.25 (defaults). The $0.25 max tier is charged upfront; on the x402 rail the unused difference is recorded as owed (not yet auto-refunded); on the Arc escrow rail (arc_auth_id) only the used tier is captured. Optional ticker pulls extra paths from registered sources before charging. Max 32 paths. Not financial advice.

NameTypeReqDescription
arc_auth_idstring–Arc rail: authId from AuthCaptureEscrow.authorize() for at least the max-tier amount to our receiver. Only the used tier is captured; the rest returns via reclaim() after expiry.
pathsarray–Coherent Gate: AI trading signal paths to check for coherence. Priced tiers: scout ≤4, standard ≤8, beast ≤32 (defaults); >32 hard-rejected.
payment_headerstring–Base64 X-PAYMENT EIP-3009 payload (standard rail).
payment_tx_hashstring–Base USDC tx hash (sovereign rail).
sourcesarray–Optional path-source ids; default = all enabled verified sources. Requires ticker.
tickerstring–Optional: pull extra paths for this ticker from registered path sources (see docs/COHERENT_GATE_PATH_SOURCES.md).
wallet_addressstring–Agent wallet address (informational).

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

leviathan_interfere ~341

Coherent Gate + Leviathan (PAID, x402/USDC). Fetches the SML Leviathan signal (squeeze, momentum, or all) for a ticker, adds it as one path with your optional paths and registered sources, then runs the same coherence check as interfere: consensus, coherence 0-1, pass/block gate. Same tiers and billing as interfere ($0.25 max tier charged upfront; x402 difference recorded as owed, Arc rail captures only the used tier). If Leviathan is unavailable it continues on the other paths; with no paths it errors before charging. Max 32 paths. Not financial advice.

NameTypeReqDescription
arc_auth_idstring–Arc rail: authId from AuthCaptureEscrow.authorize() for at least the max-tier amount to our receiver. Only the used tier is captured; the rest returns via reclaim() after expiry.
pathsarray–Coherent Gate: extra signal paths (Leviathan adds one; total ≤ 32).
payment_headerstring–Base64 X-PAYMENT EIP-3009 payload (standard rail).
payment_tx_hashstring–Base USDC tx hash (sovereign rail).
signal_typestringyesWhich Leviathan signal to fetch and add as a path: squeeze, momentum, or all.
sourcesarray–Optional path-source ids added alongside Leviathan; default = all enabled verified sources.
tickerstringyesTicker symbol, 1-10 uppercase letters (e.g. AAPL).
wallet_addressstring–Agent wallet address (informational).

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

omnigate_runtime_execute ~452

OMNIGATE Runtime (PAID, USDC). Run ONE JavaScript script that calls many SML tools, in one round trip, instead of one model turn per tool call. The script is the body of an async function: `const r = await sml.call("<route-id>", { query: {...} }); return r.data;`. Available inside: sml.call, sml.tools.search, sml.tools.get, sml.budget, sml.sleep, sml.log, sml.input. Every call is metered at its live registry price against budget_usdc, charged only on upstream 2xx, and tagged with source + response sha256; a failed upstream throws TruthError (nothing charged, nothing substituted). Unused budget is returned as credit. Returns result, per-call provenance, billing and an Ed25519-signed receipt id. Without payment it returns the x402 challenge (amount = budget). Pay with payment_header (Base USDC, x402 v2), credit_token (smlrt_…), or arc_auth_id (Arc escrow, when enabled). Sandbox: no network except sml.call, no fs, 32MB, 20s CPU, 120s wall (sync).

NameTypeReqDescription
arc_auth_idstring–Arc AuthCaptureEscrow authorization id (maxAmount ≥ budget, expiry ≤ 24h).
budget_usdcstring–Hard spending cap for the whole run in USDC (min 0.01, max 25).
capsule_idstring–Run a published capsule instead of a script (e.g. cap_name@1 or cap_name@latest).
credit_tokenstring–Runtime credit token (smlrt_…) returned by an earlier run.
inputobject–JSON object exposed to the script as sml.input.
modestring–sync waits for the result (120s wall); async returns run_id to poll /runtime/runs/{id}.
payment_headerstring–Base64 x402 v2 payment payload for exactly budget_usdc USDC on Base (from the challenge).
scriptstring–JavaScript async-function body. Use await; return the final result.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

omnigate_runtime_receipt ~106

OMNIGATE Runtime receipt (FREE). Returns a run receipt — script sha256, payer, rail, payment tx, every upstream call with request/response hashes and charges, outcome — signed with Ed25519 and hash-chained to the previous receipt, plus a verification of signature, body hash and chain link. Use it to prove what an agent ran and paid for.

NameTypeReqDescription
receipt_idstringyesReceipt id from a runtime run (rcpt_…).

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

omnigate_runtime_search ~123

OMNIGATE Runtime catalog search (FREE). Finds SML paid routes a runtime script can call with sml.call(id, {query|path|body}), with live per-call USDC prices, plus published capsules (ready-made scripts). Use this before omnigate_runtime_execute to pick route ids. Prices are the live upstream registry amounts; nothing here spends.

NameTypeReqDescription
limitinteger–Max routes to return.
querystring–Keywords, e.g. "short squeeze", "sec filings", "web extract". Empty lists everything (capped).

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

sml_discover ~25

Find the x402 Gateway contract and where to inspect fresh payment requirements. FREE.

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

sml_status ~22

Check the public x402 Gateway identity and canonical payment rail. FREE.

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

spend_gate_check ~604

Spend Gate (PAID $0.005 USDC on Base via x402). Advisory payment assessment — no wallet signing or spending by the buyer: a real Provider Trust approval and price cap are mandatory; explicit package/history rejections block. Four distinct decision inputs vote pay-side/reject-side — provider_trust (Provider Trust verify_provider) and payload_safety (ScriptDocs vulnerability check, only when manifest_url names an npm/PyPI/crates package) — both vote with real verdicts via the fleet operator lane at $0 upstream toll, price_sanity (quote vs caller policy_cap_usdc or the v1 default cap table; cap-only in v1, no historical median), delivery_history (this host's OmniGate settlement/delivery ledger). Coherence = |Σ w·d| / Σ w with d=+1 pay-side, −1 reject-side, w=confidence; gate_pass requires a positive Provider Trust decision, a real within-cap quote, no explicit safety or delivery-history rejection, coherence ≥ 0.6, and a pay-side consensus. The verdict is advisory, not payment authorization. Paths with no data abstain (no_signal) and contribute nothing. Only on a gate pass does Jev review run (noul act probability + pay/reject/quarantine choice, model + token usage returned). Use for: vetting a payee/invoice immediately before an agent wallet pays it. Don't use when: you need an actual payment executed (this is a check, it moves no funds), a trading signal (use interfere), or a free lookup (there is none — unpaid calls return the payment challenge). Settlement to the canonical SML payTo on Base.

NameTypeReqDescription
manifest_urlstring–Optional package page URL (npmjs.com/package/…, pypi.org/project/…, crates.io/crates/…) for the payload_safety path.
payeestringyesPayee domain (e.g. "api.example.com") and/or full endpoint URL the wallet is about to pay.
payment_headerstring–Base64 X-PAYMENT EIP-3009 payload (standard rail) for $0.005 USDC on Base.
payment_tx_hashstring–Base USDC tx hash (sovereign rail) paying $0.005 to the canonical SML receiver.
policy_cap_usdcnumber–Optional caller policy cap in USDC; overrides the v1 default cap table for price_sanity.
quoted_amountnumberyesQuoted amount in USDC the wallet is about to pay.
tool_categorystring–Optional category of the tool/service being bought (e.g. data_lookup, market_data, inference, compute). Selects the v1 default cap when policy_cap_usdc is omitted; when omitted entirely the cap table…
wallet_addressstring–Agent wallet address (informational).

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

x402_contract ~40

Inspect the canonical x402 payment contract. Returns network, USDC asset, payTo, headers, and the rule for resolving fresh target requirements. FREE.

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

Install

How do I install the mcp-x402 — MCP server for agents with autonomous… server?

mcp-x402 — MCP server for agents with autonomous… is a hosted endpoint at https://mcp-x402.onrender.com/sse, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

remote · mcp-x402.onrender.com

# add to Claude Code
claude mcp add --transport http timwal78-mcp-x402 'https://mcp-x402.onrender.com/sse'
Common questions

What is the mcp-x402 — MCP server for agents with autonomous… server?

mcp-x402 — MCP server for agents with autonomous… is listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.Timwal78/mcp-x402. 85+ pay-per-call MCP tools: trading, federal grants/contracts, SEC, FTD. x402 USDC/RLUSD. No keys. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://mcp-x402.onrender.com/sse).

Is the mcp-x402 — MCP server for agents with autonomous… server safe to use?

mcp-x402 — MCP server for agents with autonomous… scores 69 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

What tools does the mcp-x402 — MCP server for agents with autonomous… server expose?

mcp-x402 — MCP server for agents with autonomous… exposes 9 tools: sml_discover, sml_status, x402_contract, interfere, leviathan_interfere, and 4 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 2,082 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

Does the mcp-x402 — MCP server for agents with autonomous… server require authentication?

No. We connected to mcp-x402 — MCP server for agents with autonomous… without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.

Is the mcp-x402 — MCP server for agents with autonomous… server still maintained?

mcp-x402 — MCP server for agents with autonomous… is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 4 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.