JFSecure
MCPB · JFS-2.6.3.MCPB
Let AI agents use secrets without seeing them: masked output, every use approved in JFSecure.
Available components
Last scanned (11 hours ago)
Scores higher than 74% of MCPB servers
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Supply Chain Security0
- No malware scan is available for this kind of package: the supply-chain vendors we use do not cover it. This is a permanent gap in our coverage, not a finding about the package.Unverified
- Known CVEs could not be checked: we found no dependency list to check in this bundle: either it runs a compiled binary, whose bundled manifests we do not read, or none of the package.json, requirements.txt, pyproject.toml or uv.lock files it ships for its runtime declares a dependency we can read (a requirements.txt that only points at a setup.py project, a local path, or a nested requirements file we cannot follow counts as none).Unverified
- Install-script risk not yet assessed.Unverified
- Dependency health could not be checked: we found no dependency list to check in this bundle: either it runs a compiled binary, whose bundled manifests we do not read, or none of the package.json, requirements.txt, pyproject.toml or uv.lock files it ships for its runtime declares a dependency we can read (a requirements.txt that only points at a setup.py project, a local path, or a nested requirements file we cannot follow counts as none).Unverified
Provenance & Transparency45
- Source repository is publicly reachable at the declared URL. View diagnostics → Pass
- Provenance check failed: no build-provenance attestation is published. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- Clear OSI-approved license (MIT).Pass
- Actively maintained (last published 3 days ago).Pass
- Disclosure check failed: no security disclosure policy was found in the source repository. See how to fix → Fail
Schema Quality & AI Usability63
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 870 tokens (~290/item across 3 items; 3 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management0
- Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).Unverified
Tool Coverage97
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 91% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 3 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 4 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities60
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Unverified: 2 categories
Categories scored 0 because we could not verify them: a data source with nothing on this package, evidence we could not reach, or a check we could not run. We only credit what we can confirm.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 15 Oct 26 +28
- Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
- First check of Judged manipulation: pass security
- Stability: Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window). security
- MCP protocol: unverified → fail ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- First check of Schema quality: fail functional
- First check of Schema quality: excellent functional
- First check of Destructive annotations: pass functional
- First check of Schema quality: fail functional
- First check of Tool coverage: 91 functional
- 13 Oct 26 0
- Security disclosure: unverified → fail ▼ functional
- 12 Oct 26 9
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 18 Oct 2026 · Analysed mcpb/https://github.com/theone55/jfs/releases/download/v2.6.3/jfs-2.6.3.mcpb
Provenance No attestation
The registry publishes no build provenance for this version, so there is nothing to verify.
| Result | No attestation |
|---|---|
| Ecosystem | mcpb |
| Reason | No attestation published |
Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
list_secrets ~91
Names only (never values): every secret (folder/name), 2FA code and SSH key (name + fingerprint) of the vault open in JFSecure; or one secret's keys, each with the environment variable it becomes in run_with_secrets; or the secrets in a folder.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| path | string | – | optional: a secret ("work/github") to list its keys, or a folder |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
render_template ~142
Write a file from a template, filling in {{Secret:key}}, {{folder/Secret:key}} and {{totp:Name}} from JFSecure (anything else in {{ }} stays as written). The user approves it, seeing the names and the output path. You get the names filled in, never the content — don't read the written file back into the conversation. Use absolute paths.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| answers | object | – | – |
| output | string | yes | path of the file to write, e.g. /project/.env (only the user can read it) |
| template | string | yes | path of the template file, e.g. /project/.env.tpl |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
run_with_secrets ~488
Run a command with the $key:value lines of a JFSecure secret as environment variables (named like the key in upper case: $db-password → DB_PASSWORD, $token → TOKEN; list_secrets shows them) — all of them, or only `keys`. Not needed for ssh / git with a JFSecure SSH key: run those directly. The user approves it in JFSecure, seeing the exact command. The command is NOT run by a shell (on Windows a .cmd / .bat such as npm runs as that file, its arguments quoted for cmd): to use a variable in an argument start a shell yourself, e.g. ["bash", "-c", "curl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" https://api.github.com/user"] (Windows: ["powershell", "-NoProfile", "-Command", "... $env:TOKEN ..."]). stdout / stderr come back with every value replaced by [JFSecure: NAME] — best-effort masking of the exact values, not a guarantee; don't try to print, transform or exfiltrate values. A user's "Allow 15 min" covers re-running exactly this command (also if a script it runs has changed) — nothing else. Calls run one at a time; there is no cancelling one (timeout_seconds bounds it).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| answers | object | – | answers to {{?question}} templates in the values |
| command | array | yes | the program and its arguments |
| cwd | string | – | working directory (default: this server's) |
| keys | array | – | optional: only these keys (or variable names) become variables — pass the ones the command needs (required for a secret of a shared vault) |
| secret | string | yes | the secret's name, with its folder if the name is used twice ("work/github") |
| stdin | string | – | optional: a key of the secret (or its variable name) whose value is written to the command's stdin — exactly the value, no new line added. For programs that read a password from stdin (docker login -… |
| timeout_seconds | integer | – | at the timeout the command and everything it started are killed; a command that ends in time may leave a background process (a server) running |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the JFSecure MCP server?
JFSecure ships as an MCPB bundle, a single file you download and open in an MCP host that supports MCPB bundles, such as Claude Desktop. The host reads the launch command from the bundle's own manifest, so there is no command to copy. Before opening it, check the file's SHA-256 matches the one the MCP registry declares for it, e8b25b92089832c11f6744c3f5ad9196be6b08a93ea2a353d6689a36a0a84d99; the commands to do that are on this page. If it does not match, do not open it.
mcpb · jfs-2.6.3.mcpb
Download bundleCheck the download matches the SHA-256 the MCP registry declares before you open it. If it does not match, do not open the file.
SHA-256
e8b25b92089832c11f6744c3f5ad9196be6b08a93ea2a353d6689a36a0a84d99
macOS / Linux
echo "e8b25b92089832c11f6744c3f5ad9196be6b08a93ea2a353d6689a36a0a84d99 jfs-2.6.3.mcpb" | shasum -a 256 -c
Windows (PowerShell)
(Get-FileHash -Algorithm SHA256 .\jfs-2.6.3.mcpb).Hash -eq "e8b25b92089832c11f6744c3f5ad9196be6b08a93ea2a353d6689a36a0a84d99"
Run it in the folder you saved the bundle to, then open the file with an MCPB-capable host such as Claude Desktop.
What is the JFSecure MCP server?
JFSecure is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.theone55/jfs. Let AI agents use secrets without seeing them: masked output, every use approved in JFSecure. This page covers its MCPB bundle (https://github.com/theone55/jfs/releases/download/v2.6.3/jfs-2.6.3.mcpb).
Is the JFSecure MCP server safe to use?
JFSecure scores 37 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the JFSecure MCP server expose?
JFSecure exposes 3 tools: list_secrets, run_with_secrets, render_template. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 721 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
What licence is the JFSecure MCP server under?
JFSecure declares the MIT licence, which is OSI-approved. That covers the source only, and says nothing about the cost of any service it calls.