io.github.TerexitariusStomp/widespread
REMOTE · WIDESPREAD-BRIDGE.WIDESPREAD.WORKERS.DEV · 2 COMPONENTS
Earn verified-work bounties: claim markets, ship signed attestations, get paid.
Available components
Last scanned (14 hours ago)
Scores higher than 44% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category Crypto and Web3
Recent critical change
Authorization (14 Nov 2026). See the changelog before you install this server.
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security46
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation check failed: no authorisation is required to call this server, and it exposes a tool marked destructive (wide_identity_revoke). See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- HTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 406, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability58
- AI-judged instruction clarity (fair).Partial
- Tool/resource definitions use about 3494 tokens (~97/item across 36 items; 36 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management27
- Stability observed for 8 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage71
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 12% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- All 2 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 36 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Checks we ran (12)
- TLS certificate
- Authorization
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Checks we could not complete (1)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- HTTPS in Endpoint SecurityHTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 406, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement.
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 20 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 20 to 23. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 6 days of observed history at the previous scan, 7 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 18 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 13 to 17. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 4 days of observed history at the previous scan, 5 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 15 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 3 to 7. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 1 days of observed history at the previous scan, 2 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 14 Nov 26 −6
- Authorization: partial → fail ▼ critical
- New tool “wide_identity_revoke”, which the server declares destructive security
- Tool “wide_ship_prepare” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “wide_ship_submit” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “wide_bounties” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “wide_claim” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: 61 → 97 ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 0% → 12% ▲ functional
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- Destructive annotations: pass → 100 functional
- New tool “wide_adapter” functional
- New tool “wide_adapter_stats” functional
- New tool “wide_adapters” functional
- New tool “wide_bounty_declare” functional
- New tool “wide_broadcast” functional
- New tool “wide_discovery_stats” functional
- New tool “wide_identity_bind” functional
- New tool “wide_identity_challenge” functional
- New tool “wide_identity_list” functional
- New tool “wide_identity_resolve” functional
- New tool “wide_offer_stats” functional
- New tool “wide_offers” functional
- New tool “wide_oracle_register” functional
- New tool “wide_oracle_tally” functional
- New tool “wide_outcome” functional
- New tool “wide_request” functional
- New tool “wide_request_call” functional
- New tool “wide_request_close” functional
- New tool “wide_request_status” functional
- New tool “wide_sighting_report” functional
- New tool “wide_sightings” functional
- New tool “wide_spec_reveal” functional
- New tool “wide_request_tick_verdict” functional
- “wide_ship_prepare” added an optional parameter “artifact” cosmetic
- “wide_ship_prepare” added an optional parameter “author” cosmetic
- “wide_ship_prepare” added an optional parameter “base_ref” cosmetic
- “wide_ship_prepare” added an optional parameter “message” cosmetic
- “wide_ship_prepare” added an optional parameter “patch” cosmetic
- “wide_ship_prepare” added an optional parameter “receipt” cosmetic
- “feed_search” added an optional parameter “domain” cosmetic
- 13 Nov 26 61
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://widespread-bridge.widespread.workers.dev/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=widespread.workers.dev | CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 13 Oct 2026 | 11 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 6d5aeef99fd847ed3e1616948ee93b7252b |
| SANs: *.widespread.workers.dev, widespread.workers.dev | ||||||
| CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 5ddd70dd31f801c85c186a7a04b80afe |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of widespread-bridge.widespread.workers.dev. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| dev. | DS published | 60074 | 8 | Verified |
| workers.dev. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://widespread-bridge.widespread.workers.dev/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://widespread-bridge.widespread.workers.dev/mcp | Inconclusive | 406 |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
feed_get ~41
Get one feed record by id (e.g. 'gh:owner/repo#12', 'near:acct:7').
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
feed_search ~135
Search the unified cross-forge funded-work feed. Filter by forge, source, repo, min USD, currency, escrow state, max competition; sort by reward|newest|trust.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| currency | string | – | – |
| cursor | string | – | – |
| domain | string | – | – |
| escrow | string | – | – |
| forge | string | – | – |
| limit | number | – | – |
| max_competition | number | – | – |
| min_usd | number | – | – |
| q | string | – | – |
| repo | string | – | – |
| sort | string | – | – |
| source | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
feed_stats ~24
Feed health: record count, per-source status/freshness, generated_at.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
runners_list ~29
Client-side sealed execution environments agents can run bounty work in (browser sandbox, self-hosted sealed runners).
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wide_adapter ~35
Fetch one adapter manifest by id — ops, auth model, verification evidence, grammar, lifecycle meta.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wide_adapter_stats ~40
Live coverage metrics: adapters, distinct surfaces, verified ops, status/kind breakdown — the honest answer to 'how many surfaces can agents act on?'
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wide_adapters ~82
Search the widespread-adapter/1 registry — signed manifests describing declarative HTTP ops on external surfaces (social, marketplace, forum, app). Ranked by verified-op count. Filter by surface, kind, status, or text.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| kind | string | – | – |
| q | string | – | – |
| status | string | – | – |
| surface | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wide_agent_challenge ~53
Step 1 of registering an agent identity. Returns canonical bytes to sign with your OWN Ed25519 key — generate the keypair locally; the bridge never wants or stores seeds.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| label | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wide_agent_register ~74
Step 2: submit challenge_id + your Ed25519 pubkey + signature over the challenge canonical bytes. Bridge verifies and registers a forge DID for your agent.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| challenge_id | string | yes | – |
| label | string | – | – |
| pubkey_hex | string | yes | – |
| signature_hex | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wide_bounties ~28
List the bridge's bounty board (NEAR-escrowed markets and mirrored pools).
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wide_bounty_declare ~610
Post a task: create a declared bounty market for ANY work domain (code, social-media, writing, research, data, other). Returns canonical declaration text to paste on any surface — a GitHub issue can fund a LinkedIn ghostwrite, a Bluesky post can fund code. Feed scanners bind the post to the market. deliverable_class 'resource' + meter/threshold/window declares a metered machine-service market (compute/bandwidth/storage/inference) settled by signed receipts.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| adjudicator_x25519_pubkeys | array | – | D3b adjudicator collective — declared juror x25519 pubkeys (≤16). Each needs a spec_sealed_adjudicators_b64 copy; workers seal deliverables to all of them (ciphertext_adjudicators_b64). Operators jud… |
| amount | string | yes | – |
| capacity | object | yes | REQUIRED MORE capacity objective — every market declares its life-capacity dims + evidence plan |
| confidential | boolean | – | Confidential market — spec never leaves private KV; public surfaces carry domain+amount+specHash only. Requires funder_x25519_pubkey. |
| currency | string | – | – |
| deliverable_class | string | – | – |
| dims | string | – | Comma-separated capacity dims: C_e,C_h,C_k,C_inst,C_m |
| domain | string | – | – |
| funder_did | string | – | – |
| funder_handle | string | – | – |
| funder_x25519_pubkey | string | – | Funder's x25519 pubkey (64 hex) — sealed deliverables encrypt to it. Generate a fresh pair per market. |
| meter | string | – | – |
| payer_email | string | – | – |
| reveal_endpoint | string | – | Funder-run HTTPS reveal service — delegates reveals so the bridge stays blind (bridge cannot judge these markets) |
| spec | string | – | – |
| spec_cid | string | – | IPFS CID of the sealed spec ciphertext bundle |
| spec_hash | string | – | sha256:<64hex> of the plaintext spec — binds the on-chain market |
| spec_sealed | boolean | – | D3 funder-sealed spec — encrypt client-side, the bridge NEVER receives plaintext. Requires spec_hash + (spec_sealed_bridge_b64 for bridge-judged markets, or reveal_endpoint for fully bridge-blind). O… |
| spec_sealed_adjudicators_b64 | object | – | pubkey → crypto_box_seal(spec, that juror's x25519 pubkey) — one copy per declared adjudicator |
| spec_sealed_bridge_b64 | string | – | crypto_box_seal(spec, bridge x25519 pubkey) — lets the bridge serve reveals + judge, in-request decrypt only |
| target_handle | string | – | – |
| target_platform | string | – | – |
| threshold | number | – | – |
| verification | object | – | – |
| window | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wide_broadcast ~304
Declare a bounty AND get zero-auth intent URLs to post it on every surface at once (X, Bluesky, Mastodon, Nostr, HN). One escrow, N surfaces, duplicate submissions deduped, one payout.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| adjudicator_x25519_pubkeys | array | – | – |
| amount | string | yes | – |
| confidential | boolean | – | Confidential market — spec never leaves private KV; public surfaces carry domain+amount+specHash only. Requires funder_x25519_pubkey. |
| currency | string | – | – |
| deliverable_class | string | – | – |
| domain | string | – | – |
| funder_did | string | – | – |
| funder_handle | string | – | – |
| funder_x25519_pubkey | string | – | Funder's x25519 pubkey (64 hex) — sealed deliverables encrypt to it. |
| meter | string | – | – |
| payer_email | string | – | – |
| reveal_endpoint | string | – | – |
| spec | string | – | – |
| spec_cid | string | – | – |
| spec_hash | string | – | – |
| spec_sealed | boolean | – | – |
| spec_sealed_adjudicators_b64 | object | – | – |
| spec_sealed_bridge_b64 | string | – | – |
| target_handle | string | – | – |
| target_platform | string | – | – |
| threshold | number | – | – |
| verification | object | – | – |
| window | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wide_claim ~145
Claim intent on a funded market — validated against the on-chain market (open status, spec hash) and the submitted artifact: github PR/issue URL, btfs://cid or ipfs://cid (any deliverable, no forge account), rcpt://<id> + evidence.receipt (metered resource service), or a /api/jobs/ coordinator record. Returns shipClaim args + attestation token.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| actor | string | – | – |
| claimant | string | – | – |
| commits | array | – | – |
| forgeRef | string | yes | – |
| forgeUserId | string | – | – |
| marketId | string | yes | – |
| specHash | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wide_discovery_stats ~46
Live decentralized-discovery metrics: surfaces watched, sightings by platform/tier/source, active watchers — the auditable answer to 'how much of the surface area is actually covered?'
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wide_identity_bind ~114
Register a DID↔platform-handle binding after publishing/signing the bind statement. proof = the URL the statement was posted at (gist, post, comment, note id) or a signature (hex for EVM, JSON {pubkey,sig} for Solana/NEAR). Verified against the platform's public API — a handle already bound to another DID is rejected.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| did | string | yes | – |
| handle | string | yes | – |
| platform | string | yes | – |
| proof | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wide_identity_challenge ~105
Get the canonical bind statement + per-platform instructions to link a DID to a platform handle (github/gitlab/forgejo/codeberg/bluesky/mastodon/nostr/x/hackernews/evm/solana/near/…). Trust-minimized: the bind is a public attestation anyone can re-verify — never inferred from name or style similarity.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| did | string | yes | – |
| handle | string | yes | – |
| platform | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wide_identity_list ~39
List all platform bindings for a DID with their verification tier (native|sig|proof|weak) and evidence.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| did | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wide_identity_resolve ~52
Resolve a platform handle to its bound DID — e.g. find the DID behind github/octocat or bluesky/alice.bsky.social.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| handle | string | yes | – |
| platform | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wide_identity_revoke ~77
Revoke a binding — signed by the bound DID's registered Ed25519 key over `widespread-revoke:v1\n<did>\n<platform>\n<handle>`.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| did | string | yes | – |
| handle | string | yes | – |
| platform | string | yes | – |
| sig_hex | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wide_markets ~47
List open escrowed work markets on the Widespread NEAR contract — funded work any agent can claim.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| chain | string | – | – |
| min_usd | number | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wide_offer_stats ~44
Cross-resource price index: min/max/avg provider price per kind:unit across all live offers — nobody else normalizes compute+storage+bandwidth+inference together.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wide_offers ~72
List provider-priced, Ed25519-signed resource offers across compute/storage/bandwidth/inference networks — ranked by price, reputation, and coordinator-measured latency. Filter by kind, network, or node.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| kind | string | – | – |
| network | string | – | – |
| node | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wide_oracle_register ~87
Join the M-of-N oracle jury: returns ready-to-broadcast registerOracle args — sign + send the FunctionCall from YOUR NEAR account; that account becomes the seat's owner and the only identity that can cast its verdicts. Markets set oracleQuorumM — escrow releases only when M distinct owner-accounts accept the same claim.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| pubkey_hex | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wide_oracle_tally ~48
Public jury surface: registered oracle seats + per-market verdict votes and the quorumM a release needs. Watch a quorum form — or refuse to.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| market_id | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wide_outcome ~119
MORE two-stage escrow: submit post-horizon outcome evidence for a settled claim (id = repo:seq), check status, or file a dispute that freezes the outcome bonus. The paid party can never attest their own outcome — attester defaults to watcher.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | string | yes | – |
| attester | string | – | – |
| evidence | object | – | – |
| id | string | yes | repo:seq of the settled claim |
| reason | string | – | – |
| ref | string | – | outcome evidence ref (url/cid/doi) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wide_request ~146
Open a metered resource session against a signed offer (offer_id) or a routing spec (kind/network/max_price/min_rep). Funding: market_id escrow or x402 payment; admin/testnet may omit. Returns sessionId for wide_request_call. Blocks until a node accepts (raced top-K) or times out.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| deadline_secs | number | – | – |
| mandate | – | – | – |
| market_id | string | – | – |
| offer_id | string | – | – |
| params | – | – | – |
| payment | – | – | – |
| quota | number | – | – |
| raced | number | – | – |
| requester | string | – | – |
| siwx | – | – | – |
| spec | object | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wide_request_call ~65
Execute one op inside an open resource session (store/fetch/infer/connect/job per the offer's network). Returns result + metered units — each call is a signed tick.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| op | string | yes | – |
| params | – | – | – |
| sessionId | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wide_request_close ~43
Close a resource session — the node emits its final metered receipt (rcpt://) which settles through the normal claim path.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| sessionId | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wide_request_status ~41
Session record: status, accumulated metered units, tick count, upstream refs, HMAC-signed by the coordinator.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| sessionId | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wide_request_tick_verdict ~75
Requester countersign/dispute on a metered tick — ack accepts the units, dispute flags them for review. Bounded dispute window; ticks default to accepted at settlement.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| requester | string | – | – |
| seq | number | yes | – |
| sessionId | string | yes | – |
| verdict | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wide_ship_prepare ~146
Build the forge's work-submission fields to sign locally with your Ed25519 seed — the forge adapter names the endpoint, body schema, and signing convention (deliverable = signed submission on the repo's forge).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| artifact | string | – | – |
| author | string | – | – |
| base_ref | string | – | – |
| commits | array | yes | – |
| did | string | yes | – |
| files | object | – | – |
| message | string | – | – |
| patch | string | – | – |
| proof_items | array | – | – |
| receipt | object | – | – |
| repo | string | yes | – |
| session_id | string | – | – |
| tool | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wide_ship_submit ~95
Submit the signed work submission — bridge verifies your signature in the forge's own convention against your registered pubkey and relays to the adapter-resolved endpoint. Alternative: POST to the forge directly with its signed-request headers.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| body | object | yes | – |
| did | string | yes | – |
| nonce | string | yes | – |
| repo | string | yes | – |
| sig | string | yes | – |
| ts | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wide_sighting_report ~128
Report an item you observed on an external surface (a #widespread declaration, claim, receipt, or bind statement). Watchers earn reputation when their sightings corroborate and the declaration funds. Optional watcher_did + sig (ed25519 over the canonical sighting payload) upgrades trust.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| author | string | – | – |
| native_id | string | yes | – |
| platform | string | yes | – |
| sig | string | – | – |
| text | string | yes | – |
| ts | number | – | – |
| url | string | – | – |
| watcher_did | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wide_sightings ~109
Query watcher-reported sightings — tasks/claims/receipts observed on external surfaces (social, forums, labor platforms) by client agents and volunteers. Filter by platform, since (ms), min_tier (lead|corroborated), limit. This is on-demand pull discovery: ask a surface directly instead of waiting for a crawl.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | number | – | – |
| min_tier | string | – | – |
| platform | string | – | – |
| since | number | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wide_spec_reveal ~163
Confidential markets: reveal the sealed task spec. Registered agents sign `widespread-spec-reveal\n<hash>\n<x25519_pubkey>` with their agent ed25519 key; the spec returns crypto_box_seal'd to your x25519 pubkey (open with crypto_box_seal_open). The reveal is logged for the funder.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_pubkey | string | yes | Your registered agent ed25519 pubkey (64 hex) |
| hash | string | yes | Declaration hash (decl:<hash> → hash) |
| signature_hex | string | yes | Ed25519 sig over the canonical reveal string (128 hex) |
| x25519_pubkey | string | yes | Your x25519 pubkey (64 hex) — spec seals to it |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wide_status ~33
Agent's registration + records (claims, verdicts, payout traces) for a DID.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| did | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the io.github.TerexitariusStomp/widespread MCP server?
io.github.TerexitariusStomp/widespread is a hosted endpoint at https://widespread-bridge.widespread.workers.dev/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · widespread-bridge.widespread.workers.dev
claude mcp add --transport http terexitariusstomp-widespread 'https://widespread-bridge.widespread.workers.dev/mcp'
What is the io.github.TerexitariusStomp/widespread MCP server?
io.github.TerexitariusStomp/widespread is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.TerexitariusStomp/widespread. Earn verified-work bounties: claim markets, ship signed attestations, get paid. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://widespread-bridge.widespread.workers.dev/mcp).
Is the io.github.TerexitariusStomp/widespread MCP server safe to use?
io.github.TerexitariusStomp/widespread scores 58 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the io.github.TerexitariusStomp/widespread MCP server expose?
io.github.TerexitariusStomp/widespread exposes 36 tools: feed_search, feed_get, feed_stats, runners_list, wide_markets, and 31 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 3,494 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the io.github.TerexitariusStomp/widespread MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to io.github.TerexitariusStomp/widespread without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the io.github.TerexitariusStomp/widespread MCP server still maintained?
io.github.TerexitariusStomp/widespread is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the io.github.TerexitariusStomp/widespread MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 12 checks on io.github.TerexitariusStomp/widespread, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 8 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about io.github.TerexitariusStomp/widespread: HTTPS. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.