Diogenes Agent Guardrails & Sandbox MCP
REMOTE · DIOGENES-MICRO-GATEWAY.CORINTH.WORKERS.DEV
Autonomous agent guardrails, bash sandboxing, MCP rugpull diffing & prompt firewalls.
Available components
Last scanned (22 hours ago)
Scores higher than 45% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 4 Nov 2026.
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security74
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- No authorisation is required to call this server. Every tool declares its destructiveHint and none is destructive, so open access doesn't expose one. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Partial
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability65
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 2424 tokens (~202/item across 12 items; 12 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management0
- Stability check failed: schema churn in the 15 days we've observed: 9 tool removals, 0 breaking changes, 0 auth/transport breaks, 12 additions. See how to fix → Fail
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
- Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety75
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- 0 of 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "execute_python_sandbox" implies "execute" and declares readOnlyHint instead, contradicting what its own name says it does. See how to fix → Fail
- An AI judge read all 13 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities20
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2024-11-05; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 3 Nov 26 +47
- Stability: unverified → fail ▼ security
- Authorization: unverified → partial ▲ security
- HTTPS: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Transport: fail → pass ▲ security
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- MCP protocol: unverified → fail ▼ functional
- Endpoint reachability: not serving MCP → reachable ▲ functional
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- 2 Nov 26 −43
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → not serving MCP ▼ security
- Stability: fail → unverified ▼ security
- HTTPS: fail → unverified ▼ security
- Authorization: partial → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Transport: pass → fail ▼ security
- Capabilities: fail → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- First check of Schema quality: unverified functional
- 26 Oct 26 0
- Tool “audit_mcp_server_manifest” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “audit_outbound_egress_url” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “audit_response_factuality” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “detect_agent_action_loop” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “detect_mcp_schema_rugpull” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “execute_python_sandbox” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “redact_sensitive_pii” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “sanitize_tool_output_stream” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “validate_mcp_sampling_request” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “validate_sql_query_ast” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “verify_a2a_agent_card” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “verify_agent_command_safety” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- 21 Oct 26 +4
- Stability: unverified → fail ▼ security
- A breaking change shipped without a version bump: still 2.5.0 ▼ security
- Tool “agent_loop_circuit_breaker” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “agent_mcp_manifest_auditor” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “agent_sql_guard” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “code_sandbox” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “guardrail_verify” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “mcp_rugpull_diff” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “mcp_sampling_guard” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “scrub_pii” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “tool_output_firewall” was removed ▼ security
- Schema quality: pass → fail ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 27% → 100% ▲ functional
- First check of Tool coverage: 100 functional
- Schema quality: fair → excellent functional
- Destructive annotations: pass → 0 functional
- New tool “audit_mcp_server_manifest” functional
- New tool “audit_outbound_egress_url” functional
- New tool “audit_response_factuality” functional
- New tool “detect_agent_action_loop” functional
- New tool “detect_mcp_schema_rugpull” functional
- New tool “execute_python_sandbox” functional
- New tool “redact_sensitive_pii” functional
- New tool “sanitize_tool_output_stream” functional
- New tool “validate_mcp_sampling_request” functional
- New tool “validate_sql_query_ast” functional
- New tool “verify_a2a_agent_card” functional
- New tool “verify_agent_command_safety” functional
- 20 Oct 26 57
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 4 Nov 2026 · Probed https://diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev/mcp/agent-guardrails
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=corinth.workers.dev | CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 17 Oct 2026 | 15 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 633c3321385182b27c585c86398dc860724 |
| SANs: *.corinth.workers.dev, corinth.workers.dev | ||||||
| CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 4df3b15dd6c0784c507cd37b58e6f115 |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| dev. | present | 60074 | 8 | Verified |
| workers.dev. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-frame-options | DENY |
| referrer-policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev/mcp/agent-guardrails | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev/mcp/agent-guardrails | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev/mcp/agent-guardrails |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
audit_mcp_server_manifest External MCP Server Manifest & Tool-Poisoning Security Auditor ~186
Scans an external MCP server's initial tools/list manifest to detect tool-name shadowing (read_file, bash) and hidden prompt-injection directives in descriptions. Use when vetting a newly discovered third-party MCP server before mounting it into an agent session; for comparing a previously pinned MCP baseline against a live mid-session tools/list response, use detect_mcp_schema_rugpull instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'manifest_json' ('audit_profile' defaults to 'strict'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (25 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| audit_profile | string | – | Sensitivity level for flagging system-tool name shadowing; defaults to 'strict' when omitted. |
| manifest_json | string | yes | JSON string or object containing the external MCP server's tools array to audit. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| manifest_safe | boolean | yes | True if zero shadowed tools or description injections are found. |
| security_grade | string | yes | Overall manifest safety grade ('A+', 'C', or 'F'). |
| shadowed_tools | array | yes | Tool names attempting to shadow host privileges (e.g. 'bash', 'read_file'). |
| suspicious_tools | array | yes | Tools containing covert prompt-injection or exfiltration instructions. |
No examples provided.
audit_outbound_egress_url Outbound Agent URL SSRF, Metadata & Secret Exfiltration Firewall ~198
Static validation firewall for outbound network destination URIs against cloud metadata IP addresses (169.254.169.254), RFC 1918 private IP blocks, and query-string secret exfiltration before agent dispatch. Use when validating a user-supplied or tool-supplied URI destination before network dispatch; for auditing local shell commands or general prompts, use verify_agent_command_safety instead. Read-only edge call (32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'destination_uri' ('egress_policy' defaults to 'block_private_and_metadata'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (15 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| destination_uri | string | yes | Outbound HTTP/HTTPS destination URI to inspect before fetching (e.g. 'https://api.example.com/v1/webhook'). |
| egress_policy | string | – | Network egress policy; defaults to 'block_private_and_metadata' when omitted. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| egress_allowed | boolean | yes | True if the URL targets a safe public endpoint with no exfiltration tokens. |
| exfiltration_query_params | array | yes | Query parameters suspected of carrying leaked secrets or base64 payloads. |
| ssrf_risk_detected | boolean | yes | True if loopback, RFC1918 private IP, or cloud metadata IP is targeted. |
| verdict | string | yes | Firewall decision ('ALLOW_EGRESS_REQUEST' or 'BLOCK_SSRF_OR_EXFIL'). |
No examples provided.
audit_response_factuality Draft Agent Response Groundedness & Hallucination Auditor ~197
Cross-references factual claims, numbers, and citations in a draft agent response against retrieved source passages to flag unsupported hallucinations before delivery. Use when verifying that a generated answer is 100% grounded in source evidence before returning it to the user; for scrubbing inbound tool outputs for prompt-injection and invisible Unicode, use sanitize_tool_output_stream instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'claim' ('context' defaults to 'standard'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (25 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| claim | string | yes | Draft agent response or factual statement to verify for hallucinations. |
| context | string | yes | Authoritative source text or retrieved RAG passages that the claim must be grounded in. |
| strictness | string | – | Entailment threshold required for numbers and dates; defaults to 'exact_entailment' when omitted. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| groundedness_score | number | yes | Factual support ratio from 0.0 (fabricated) to 1.0 (fully entailed). |
| unverified_claims | array | yes | Hallucinated or unsupported assertions flagged for removal. |
| verdict | string | yes | Audit outcome ('PASS', 'SUSPICIOUS', or 'FAIL'). |
| verified_claims | array | yes | Assertions directly entailed by the provided source context. |
No examples provided.
detect_agent_action_loop Autonomous Agent Action-Trace Loop & Token-Burn Circuit Breaker ~187
Analyzes an agent's recent tool-call trace to detect identical retry spins, A/B state oscillation, and runaway token burn. Use when monitoring autonomous agent execution loops to decide whether to continue or trip a token-burn breaker; for inspecting a single command payload for security threats before execution, use verify_agent_command_safety instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'action_trace_json' ('sensitivity' defaults to 'strict_2_repeats'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (15 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action_trace_json | string | yes | JSON-serialized array of recent agent actions (e.g. '[{"tool":"search","status":"err"}]'). |
| sensitivity | string | – | Cycle detection threshold; defaults to 'standard_3_repeats' when omitted. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| circuit_breaker_action | string | yes | Recommended control action ('CONTINUE_EXECUTION' or 'HALT_AND_ESCALATE_OR_SWITCH_TOOL'). |
| estimated_tokens_saved | integer | yes | Projected token burn prevented by tripping the circuit breaker. |
| loop_detected | boolean | yes | True if a repetitive retry spin or A/B oscillation cycle is active. |
| loop_pattern | string | yes | Detected cycle topology ('NONE', 'IDENTICAL_RETRY_SPIN', or 'ABAB_STATE_OSCILLATION'). |
No examples provided.
detect_mcp_schema_rugpull Mid-Session MCP tools/list Rug-Pull & Schema Mutation Detector ~209
Computes structural diffs between a pinned baseline MCP tools/list snapshot and a live server response to catch mid-session description or schema tampering. Use when verifying that a connected MCP server has not mutated its tool definitions mid-session; for performing a first-time static security audit on a single MCP manifest, use audit_mcp_server_manifest instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'baseline_tools_json' ('current_tools_json' defaults to 'standard'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (20 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| baseline_tools_json | string | yes | JSON-serialized baseline tools/list array captured when the MCP server was first trusted. |
| current_tools_json | string | – | JSON-serialized live tools/list array to compare against the baseline; defaults to '[]' when omitted. |
| diff_mode | string | – | Comparison strictness across descriptions and inputSchema; defaults to 'full_structural' when omitted. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| mutated_tools | array | yes | Detailed list of modified tools and their exact mutation type. |
| rugpull_detected | boolean | yes | True if any tool was surreptitiously added or had its description/schema altered. |
| timestamp_utc | string | yes | ISO-8601 UTC timestamp of the diff audit. |
| verdict | string | yes | Connection verdict ('SCHEMA_INTEGRITY_VERIFIED' or 'REVOKE_MCP_SERVER_IMMEDIATELY'). |
No examples provided.
execute_python_sandbox AST-Audited Ephemeral Python Code Execution Sandbox ~183
Audits Python source code for forbidden syscalls (os, subprocess, socket, open, eval) inside an AST-governed WebAssembly sandbox with no host filesystem access. Use when executing LLM-generated Python snippets safely; for checking shell commands without executing code, use verify_agent_command_safety instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'python_script' ('timeout_profile' defaults to 'fast_1s'), supports '?demo=true' or MPP (250 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| python_script | string | yes | Python 3 source script to audit and execute strictly inside an isolated AST-governed, non-privileged WebAssembly sandbox with no host filesystem access. |
| timeout_profile | string | – | Execution resource ceiling; defaults to 'standard_5s' when omitted. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ast_security_audit | object | yes | Static syscall audit summary including flagged_calls and safety_verdict. |
| exit_code | integer | yes | Process exit status (0 on clean execution, 1 on security block). |
| simulated_stdout | string | yes | Captured standard output from the isolated execution. |
| syntax_valid | boolean | yes | True if the Python source parses without syntax errors. |
No examples provided.
redact_sensitive_pii Zero-PII & Secret Credential Redaction Engine ~169
Redacts emails, phone numbers, SSNs, credit cards, API keys, and crypto private keys from text before logging or external transmission. Use when stripping personal data or secret credentials from prompts, logs, or outbound messages; for neutralizing indirect prompt injections and invisible Unicode in inbound tool responses, use sanitize_tool_output_stream instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'text' ('redaction_style' defaults to 'typed_token'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (25 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| redaction_style | string | – | Placeholder format used for redacted spans; defaults to 'typed_token' when omitted. |
| text | string | yes | Input text containing potential PII or secret keys to redact. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| categories_redacted | array | yes | Types of sensitive data detected (e.g. 'EMAIL', 'SSN', 'PRIVATE_KEY'). |
| redactions_count | integer | yes | Total number of sensitive entities redacted. |
| scrubbed_text | string | yes | Sanitized text with all sensitive entities replaced by redaction tokens. |
| zero_pii_certified | boolean | yes | True when post-scan verification confirms zero residual PII patterns. |
No examples provided.
sanitize_tool_output_stream Indirect Prompt-Injection, Invisible Unicode & Beacon Output Scrubber ~186
Sanitizes untrusted external tool or web-scrape outputs by stripping invisible Unicode Tag characters (U+E0000), neutralizing Markdown tracking image beacons, and defusing indirect prompt overrides. Use when cleaning raw third-party tool outputs or scraped web text before inserting it into the LLM context window; for redacting personal identifiable information (emails, SSNs, keys) from outbound text, use redact_sensitive_pii instead. Read-only edge call (32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'raw_tool_output' (with enum defaults), uses '?demo=true' or L402 (15 sats); HTTP 400 if invalid.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| raw_tool_output | string | yes | Untrusted text returned by an external tool, webhook, or web scraper. |
| wrap_tag | string | – | XML isolation wrapper applied around the sanitized text; defaults to 'tool_data' when omitted. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| injection_risk_score | number | yes | Threat score from 0.0 to 0.99 prior to sanitization. |
| safe_for_context_ingestion | boolean | yes | True once the sanitized payload is safe to feed to the LLM. |
| sanitized_output | string | yes | Cleaned text with invisible Unicode, tracking beacons, and overrides neutralized. |
| threats_neutralized | array | yes | List of smuggling or injection vectors stripped from the input. |
No examples provided.
validate_mcp_sampling_request Inbound MCP sampling/createMessage Reverse-Injection Firewall ~179
Audits inbound MCP sampling/createMessage callbacks from connected servers to block cross-server context snooping (includeContext='allServers') and token quota hijacking. Use when filtering a connected MCP server's request to sample the host LLM; for scrubbing text returned from a standard synchronous tools/call response, use sanitize_tool_output_stream instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'sampling_request_json' ('max_tokens_ceiling' defaults to '512'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (20 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| max_tokens_ceiling | string | – | Maximum completion token quota allowed for server callbacks; defaults to '2048' when omitted. |
| sampling_request_json | string | yes | JSON string or object representing the inbound MCP sampling/createMessage payload. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| recommended_action | string | yes | Host enforcement action ('APPROVE_SAMPLING_REQUEST' or 'REJECT_SAMPLING_REQUEST'). |
| sampling_safe | boolean | yes | True if the sampling request respects context isolation and token caps. |
| timestamp_utc | string | yes | ISO-8601 UTC timestamp of the inspection. |
| violations_detected | array | yes | Specific policy violations found in the sampling request. |
No examples provided.
validate_sql_query_ast AST-Level Read-Only SQL Query & Injection Safety Validator ~190
Performs static AST syntax tree parsing on SQL statements to verify strictly read-only SELECT clauses and reject mutations, stacked queries, or comment bypasses. Use when verifying that an agent-authored SQL statement is strictly read-only before running it on a database; for screening non-SQL bash commands or general agent prompts, use verify_agent_command_safety instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'sql_statement' ('dialect' defaults to 'postgres'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (15 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| dialect | string | – | SQL dialect ruleset used for AST token inspection; defaults to 'postgres' when omitted. |
| sql_statement | string | yes | SQL statement string to statically parse and audit for read-only SELECT compliance (e.g. 'SELECT id, email FROM users WHERE active = 1'). |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| blocked_clauses | array | yes | List of destructive or injection SQL tokens detected. |
| safe_read_only | boolean | yes | True when the query is a pure SELECT statement with zero injection clauses. |
| tables_accessed | array | yes | Table identifiers referenced in FROM and JOIN clauses. |
| verdict | string | yes | Execution decision ('ALLOW_EXECUTION' or 'BLOCK_EXECUTION'). |
No examples provided.
verify_a2a_agent_card A2A /.well-known/agent.json Identity & Capability Card Verifier ~200
Verifies a remote agent's A2A /.well-known/agent.json discovery card, checking JWS/DID signature binding, endpoint HTTPS enforcement, and capability spoofing. Use when authenticating a peer autonomous agent before delegating subtasks or exchanging payments over A2A; for auditing an MCP tool server's tools/list manifest rather than a peer agent's A2A card, use audit_mcp_server_manifest instead. Read-only edge call (32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'agent_card_json' ('trust_policy' defaults to 'require_https_and_did'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (15 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_card_json | string | yes | JSON string or object of the peer agent's /.well-known/agent.json descriptor. |
| trust_policy | string | – | Verification policy for DID/DNS binding; defaults to 'require_https_and_did' when omitted. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | yes | Canonical identifier of the verified peer agent. |
| card_valid | boolean | yes | True when the A2A agent card schema, transport, and identity claims pass verification. |
| delegation_verdict | string | yes | Handshake decision ('SAFE_TO_DELEGATE_A2A' or 'REJECT_UNVERIFIED_AGENT'). |
| spoofing_flags | array | yes | List of impersonation or downgrade anomalies detected. |
No examples provided.
verify_agent_command_safety Autonomous Agent Pre-Execution Command & Prompt Injection Gate ~168
Evaluates untrusted agent prompts, bash commands, and tool arguments to block prompt injection, destructive shell commands, and private-key exfiltration. Use when screening a general shell command or user prompt before autonomous agent execution; for statically validating SQL database queries at the AST level, use validate_sql_query_ast instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'payload' ('action_type' defaults to 'bash_command'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (20 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action_type | string | – | Execution context of the payload; defaults to 'bash_command' when omitted. |
| payload | string | yes | Raw command string, script snippet, or untrusted prompt to inspect for safety violations. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| risk_score | number | yes | Normalized threat probability from 0.0 (benign) to 1.0 (critical). |
| safe | boolean | yes | True when zero injection, exfiltration, or destructive patterns are found. |
| threats_detected | array | yes | List of specific threat categories triggered by the payload. |
| verdict | string | yes | Enforcement decision ('ALLOW', 'BLOCK', or 'QUARANTINE'). |
No examples provided.
How do I install the Diogenes Agent Guardrails & Sandbox MCP server?
Diogenes Agent Guardrails & Sandbox MCP is a hosted endpoint at https://diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev/mcp/agent-guardrails, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev
claude mcp add --transport http stand-out-of-my-sun-diogenes-agent-guardrails-mc 'https://diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev/mcp/agent-guardrails'
What is the Diogenes Agent Guardrails & Sandbox MCP server?
Diogenes Agent Guardrails & Sandbox MCP is listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.stand-out-of-my-sun/diogenes-agent-guardrails-mcp. Autonomous agent guardrails, bash sandboxing, MCP rugpull diffing & prompt firewalls. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev/mcp/agent-guardrails).
Is the Diogenes Agent Guardrails & Sandbox MCP server safe to use?
Diogenes Agent Guardrails & Sandbox MCP scores 65 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Diogenes Agent Guardrails & Sandbox MCP server expose?
Diogenes Agent Guardrails & Sandbox MCP exposes 12 tools: verify_agent_command_safety, validate_sql_query_ast, execute_python_sandbox, audit_mcp_server_manifest, detect_mcp_schema_rugpull, and 7 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 2,252 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Diogenes Agent Guardrails & Sandbox MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to Diogenes Agent Guardrails & Sandbox MCP without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the Diogenes Agent Guardrails & Sandbox MCP server still maintained?
Diogenes Agent Guardrails & Sandbox MCP is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 4 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.