YieldSignal
REMOTE · YIELDSIGNAL.VERCEL.APP
Yield & risk for agents: signal, decision, durability, capacity, sensitivity, exposure, persistence
Available components
Last scanned (12 hours ago)
Scores higher than 10% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category Finance and Payments
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security63
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not yet verified: we couldn't confirm whether this endpoint requires it. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability0
- Transport check failed: declared streamable-http, but the endpoint returned HTTP 402. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Schema Quality & AI Usability0
- Schema not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's schema, or could read only part of its tool list.Unverified
Stability & Change Management0
- Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).Unverified
Tool Coverage0
- Tool coverage not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.Unverified
Tool Safety0
- Tool safety not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.Unverified
Capabilities0
- Capabilities not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's capabilities.Unverified
Unverified: 5 categories
Categories scored 0 because we could not verify them: authentication we do not have, an unreachable endpoint, or not enough scan history. We only credit what we can confirm.
Checks we ran (5)
- TLS certificate
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
Checks we could not complete (6)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- Authorization in Endpoint SecurityAuthorisation not yet verified: we couldn't confirm whether this endpoint requires it.
- Schema quality in Schema Quality & AI Usability (scores 0 for this)Schema not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's schema, or could read only part of its tool list.
- Stability in Stability & Change Management (scores 0 for this)Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).
- Tool coverage in Tool Coverage (scores 0 for this)Tool coverage not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.
- Tool safety in Tool Safety (scores 0 for this)Tool safety not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.
- Capabilities in Capabilities (scores 0 for this)Capabilities not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's capabilities.
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 6 Nov 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 31 Oct 26 −54
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → not serving MCP ▼ security
- Stability: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Transport: pass → fail ▼ security
- Authorization: Authorisation not yet verified: we couldn't confirm whether this endpoint requires it. security
- Capabilities: pass → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- First check of Schema quality: unverified functional
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 26 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Aug 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 11 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 10 Aug 26 0
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → not serving MCP ▼ security
- Stability: 0.47 → unverified ▼ security
- Authorization: Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to connect, but we couldn't read the whole tool list to see what that exposes. security
- Schema quality: 1389 → 1669 ▼ functional
- Capabilities: pass → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- Endpoint reachability: not serving MCP → reachable ▲ functional
- First check of Schema quality: unverified functional
- Schema quality: excellent → good functional
- New tool “get_leadership_persistence” functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://yieldsignal.vercel.app/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=*.vercel.app | CN=WR1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 31 Oct 2026 | 29 Jan 2027 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 9c5f0e6a35c955e113044c86848e4cd5 |
| SANs: *.vercel.app | ||||||
| CN=WR1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R1,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 7fd9e2c2d2048a0474b627a26d0868a7 |
| CN=GTS Root R1,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 19 Jun 2020 | 28 Jan 2028 | RSA 4096 | SHA256-RSA | 77bd0d6cdb36f91aea210fc4f058d30d |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of yieldsignal.vercel.app. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| app. | DS published | 23684 | 8 | Verified |
| vercel.app. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication Inconclusive
We could not reach the endpoint well enough to judge its authorisation posture.
| Result | Inconclusive |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 402 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://yieldsignal.vercel.app/mcp | HTTP error | 402 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://yieldsignal.vercel.app/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 308 | https://yieldsignal.vercel.app/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
get_exit_capacity ~196
Exit capacity for a Base lending market: per-protocol utilization and withdrawable liquidity read from the protocol's own books (Aave, Compound), plus — if you pass amountUsd — whether that size can be withdrawn right now and what share of the market it would be. High APY at high utilization means the market pays well and will not let you out; this tool separates the two. Protocols that do not expose borrowed-vs-supplied are marked unmeasured and are never recommended as executable. USDC only for USD figures; WETH returns utilization without USD (no price oracle in the paid path).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| amountUsd | number | – | Position size in USD to test for exit. Omit to get utilization and free liquidity without an exit verdict. |
| asset | string | – | Which Base lending market to measure: USDC (full USD figures) or WETH (utilization only). Defaults to USDC. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_leadership_persistence ~280
How long this service's own leadership calls actually hold, measured from its hourly on-chain attestations (EAS on Base). Returns the median duration a protocol stayed the best pick, survival rates at 6/24/72h, how much of the rotation is the same two protocols trading places, and what chasing the leader is worth per $10k before gas. Measured over 24 days: the WETH leader never changed once, the ETH staking leader changed every ~26h, the USDC leader every ~2h with half the switches being a round trip between the same pair — three assets sold at one price with wildly different reliability. Also answers, empirically, whether a wider lead lasts longer: it does not (Spearman -0.04 over 177 completed spells), so gap size is not a usable proxy for confidence. Every input is a public attestation UID: recompute it yourself from base.easscan.org and get the same number. Observed history with sample sizes attached, never a forecast — assets whose lead has not changed in the window are reported as a floor with a censoring flag, never as a median.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| asset | string | – | Which market's leadership durability to measure: USDC/WETH lending on Base, or ETH_STAKING liquid staking. Defaults to USDC. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_rate_sensitivity ~192
How close a Base lending market is to the kink where borrow rates explode. Returns, per protocol, the current utilization, the kink read from the protocol's own interest rate curve, the headroom in bps, and the borrow APY at points around the kink — plus how many times the borrow cost multiplies just past it. Measured on a live reading: Compound USDC sat 0.17 points below its kink, where borrow cost goes from ~4% to ~16%. Aave and Compound only: Morpho's adaptive IRM has no static curve to read and DefiLlama-sourced protocols expose none, so they are marked unmeasured and never assumed stable. Describes the current state of the curve, not a prediction that utilization will move.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| asset | string | – | Which Base lending market to stress-test: USDC or WETH. Defaults to USDC. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_shared_exposure ~302
Shared risk exposure across a declared portfolio. Give it your positions (protocol:usd pairs) and it returns, per factor, how much of your capital sits behind the same collateral, price oracle or vault curator — and through which venues it gets there. This is the question the market does not answer: depeg and hack alerts tell you an event happened, not whether you are two hops from it. In the Stream Finance collapse only 1 of ~320 MetaMorpho vaults held the broken asset directly, yet $93M of loss became $285M of contagion. Measured live: a Morpho USDC vault sits 93.7% behind cbBTC while Compound's USDC market is 43.1% — holding both is one risk in two wrappers. Morpho is attributed per isolated market and Compound by its real posted-collateral basket; Aave is reported unattributed, because a v3 supplier is exposed to the entire pool and splitting that across assets would imply diversification that does not exist. Structural shared exposure, not a correlation estimate.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| asset | string | – | Which Base lending market the positions are in: USDC or WETH. Defaults to USDC. |
| positions | string | yes | Your positions as comma-separated protocol:usd pairs, e.g. "aave:200000,morpho:150000". Known protocols: aave, morpho, compound, moonwell, euler, fluid. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_yield_decision ~306
Buyer-side MOVE/HOLD decision (Layer 1 premium — sells the decision, not the raw datapoint). Given your current position, size, move cost and horizon, returns whether moving your capital to the best risk-adjusted protocol pays for itself now — with expected net gain, break-even days and a confidence tier. Deterministic from the underlying signal, which is EIP-712 signed and returned in a sibling content block (re-run the decision locally to reproduce it). Priced above the plain signal tool.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| amountUsd | number | – | Position size in USD. Scales the absolute gain and break-even. Defaults to 1000. |
| asset | string | – | Which market the decision is for: USDC/WETH lending on Base, or ETH_STAKING liquid staking on Ethereum mainnet. Defaults to USDC. |
| horizonDays | number | – | How many days you expect to hold before re-evaluating. Gain only counts up to here. Defaults to 30. |
| moveCostUsd | number | – | Your estimated cost to move (gas + slippage) in USD. Defaults to 0.5. |
| position | string | – | Protocol where your capital sits now (aave/morpho/compound/moonwell/euler/fluid/lido/rocket-pool/coinbase-wrapped-staked-eth/frax-ether/binance-staked-eth). Omit or use 'idle' if uninvested. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_yield_durability ~156
How much of the current APY survives if incentives stop. Splits each protocol's yield into base interest vs reward/incentive, reports the post-incentive floor, and says whether the leader changes without incentives. Only protocols whose source itemizes the reward component are decomposed — the rest are listed as undecomposable and NEVER assumed incentive-free, and no ranking claim is made when the current leader is one of them. Also returns bestVerifiableFloor: the highest yield provably independent of incentives. A stress test of readings taken now, not a forecast of when a campaign ends.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| asset | string | – | Which Base lending market to stress-test: USDC or WETH. Defaults to USDC. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_yield_signal ~237
Real-time risk-weighted yield signal. USDC/WETH: lending APY on Base (Aave/Compound/Morpho read onchain, Moonwell/Euler/Fluid via DefiLlama). ETH_STAKING: liquid staking APY on Ethereum mainnet (Lido/Rocket Pool/Coinbase Wrapped Staked ETH/Frax Ether/Binance Staked ETH, all via DefiLlama) — a different chain and category from the lending signals, not a Base lending market. Source tagged per reading (never estimated). Result is signed (EIP-712 typed data) by the payment-receiving address, returned as a sibling content block for offline verification. That same address is registered on-chain as an ERC-8004 agent identity (agent-card.json) and periodically publishes EAS attestations of past readings (Base mainnet) — a public track record independent of this server's uptime.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| asset | string | – | Which yield signal to fetch: USDC/WETH lending APY on Base, or ETH_STAKING liquid staking APY on Ethereum mainnet. Defaults to USDC. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the YieldSignal MCP server?
YieldSignal is a hosted endpoint at https://yieldsignal.vercel.app/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · yieldsignal.vercel.app
claude mcp add --transport http stakemate369-yieldsignal 'https://yieldsignal.vercel.app/mcp'
What is the YieldSignal MCP server?
YieldSignal is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.Stakemate369/yieldsignal. Yield & risk for agents: signal, decision, durability, capacity, sensitivity, exposure, persistence. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://yieldsignal.vercel.app/mcp).
Is the YieldSignal MCP server safe to use?
YieldSignal scores 25 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the YieldSignal MCP server expose?
YieldSignal exposes 7 tools: get_yield_signal, get_yield_decision, get_yield_durability, get_exit_capacity, get_rate_sensitivity, and 2 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,669 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the YieldSignal MCP server require authentication?
Its publisher declares no required credentials for YieldSignal. We have not been able to confirm that against the live endpoint, and a server can require authorisation without declaring it here.
Is the YieldSignal MCP server still maintained?
YieldSignal is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the YieldSignal MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 5 checks on YieldSignal, covering TLS certificate, HTTPS, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 1 more. 6 items could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about YieldSignal: Authorization, Schema quality, Stability, Tool coverage and 2 more. 5 categories score 0 for that reason, because we only credit what we can confirm. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.