io.github.SPAZIO-GENESI/attest-mcp-remote
REMOTE · ATTEST-MCP-REMOTE.IT-E3F.WORKERS.DEV
Zero-install remote MCP server for proof-of-existence file attestation.
Available components
Last scanned (1 hour ago)
Scores higher than 4% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 5 Nov 2026.
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security46
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not yet verified: we couldn't confirm whether this endpoint requires it. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 406, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability0
- Transport check failed: declared streamable-http, but the endpoint returned HTTP 500. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Schema Quality & AI Usability0
- Schema not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's schema, or could read only part of its tool list.Unverified
Stability & Change Management0
- Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).Unverified
Tool Coverage0
- Tool coverage not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.Unverified
Tool Safety0
- Tool safety not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.Unverified
Capabilities0
- Capabilities not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's capabilities.Unverified
Unverified: 5 categories
Categories scored 0 because we could not verify them: authentication we do not have, an unreachable endpoint, or not enough scan history. We only credit what we can confirm.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 19 Oct 26 −55
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → not serving MCP ▼ security
- Stability: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Transport: pass → fail ▼ security
- Authorization: Authorisation not yet verified: we couldn't confirm whether this endpoint requires it. security
- Capabilities: pass → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- First check of Schema quality: unverified functional
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 26 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Aug 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 11 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 31 Jul 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 30 Jul 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Probed https://attest-mcp-remote.it-e3f.workers.dev/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=it-e3f.workers.dev | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 20 Sept 2026 | 19 Dec 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | 2a29e9dce94a309613cfa293222cb5c6 |
| SANs: it-e3f.workers.dev, *.it-e3f.workers.dev | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of attest-mcp-remote.it-e3f.workers.dev. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| dev. | present | 60074 | 8 | Verified |
| workers.dev. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication Inconclusive
We could not reach the endpoint well enough to judge its authorisation posture.
| Result | Inconclusive |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 500 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| x-frame-options | SAMEORIGIN |
| referrer-policy | same-origin |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://attest-mcp-remote.it-e3f.workers.dev/mcp | HTTP error | 500 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://attest-mcp-remote.it-e3f.workers.dev/mcp | Inconclusive | 406 |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
attest_hash ~426
Attest a work: the service binds the SHA-256 fingerprint to a server-side timestamp and signs it (HMAC). Requires a credential (device flow via `authorize`, or an API key header). Optional declared metadata (title/author/year/notes) are normalized and BOUND by the signature — immutable after issuance, but they remain self-declared (they don't prove authorship). Compute the SHA-256 locally if you have code execution (`sha256sum <file>` / `shasum -a 256 <file>` / `certutil -hashfile <file> SHA256`). NEVER send file bytes or base64 through tool arguments: this server never receives files. If you cannot compute a hash locally, point the user to the website (https://attestazione.spaziogenesi.org, full privacy: hashing happens in the browser) or the Telegram bot @SGAttestBot.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| anno | string | – | Declared year/version (bound by the signature). |
| autore | string | – | Declared author (bound by the signature). |
| name | string | – | File name (descriptive only, shown on the certificate). |
| note | string | – | Declared notes (bound by the signature). |
| sha256 | string | yes | SHA-256 fingerprint of the work: 64 hexadecimal characters. Compute the SHA-256 locally if you have code execution (`sha256sum <file>` / `shasum -a 256 <file>` / `certutil -hashfile <file> SHA256`).… |
| size | integer | – | File size in bytes (descriptive only). |
| titolo | string | – | Declared title of the work (bound by the signature). |
| type | string | – | MIME type (descriptive only). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
authorize ~77
Start the device-flow authorization to attest works in this session (up to 20 attestations, 24h). Returns a link the USER must open in a browser and approve (anti-bot check included). After the user approves, call `complete_authorization`. Not needed if the connection already carries an API key header, or for verification tools.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
check_anchor ~175
Check whether a work's SHA-256 fingerprint has an OpenTimestamps proof anchored in Bitcoin. The proof is created at attestation time and matures (pending → Bitcoin-confirmed) within a few hours.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| sha256 | string | yes | SHA-256 fingerprint of the work: 64 hexadecimal characters. Compute the SHA-256 locally if you have code execution (`sha256sum <file>` / `shasum -a 256 <file>` / `certutil -hashfile <file> SHA256`).… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
complete_authorization ~40
Complete the device-flow authorization after the user approved in the browser. Polls the service briefly; if approval hasn't happened yet, just call this tool again.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
create_certificate_pdf ~197
Generate and archive the certificate PDF for a fingerprint attested in this session with `attest_hash`. The PDF is cryptographically signed, anchored in Bitcoin (OpenTimestamps) and archived server-side; this tool returns the permanent links (the PDF itself is downloadable from its URL — it is never inlined here).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| sha256 | string | yes | SHA-256 fingerprint of the work: 64 hexadecimal characters. Compute the SHA-256 locally if you have code execution (`sha256sum <file>` / `shasum -a 256 <file>` / `certutil -hashfile <file> SHA256`).… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
lookup_certificate ~188
Look up whether a work's SHA-256 fingerprint has an attestation certificate in the public archive, and get its permanent links (public certificate page, PDF download, OpenTimestamps proof, browser verification). Trust model: this information is reachable only by whoever knows the fingerprint.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| sha256 | string | yes | SHA-256 fingerprint of the work: 64 hexadecimal characters. Compute the SHA-256 locally if you have code execution (`sha256sum <file>` / `shasum -a 256 <file>` / `certutil -hashfile <file> SHA256`).… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
service_status ~57
Health of the Spazio Genesi attestation service components: worker (attestation engine), archive (certificate storage), signer (PDF cryptographic signature), anchor (Bitcoin/OpenTimestamps calendars). Values: ok | degraded | down | n/d.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_attestation ~376
Verify the server HMAC signature of an attestation issued by the Spazio Genesi service. Confirms that the attestation string (fingerprint + timestamp) and any declared metadata are authentic and untampered. Note: this checks the SIGNATURE only. Whether a given file matches the fingerprint must be checked locally by re-hashing the file. If the certificate carried declared metadata (title/author/year/notes), they must be provided EXACTLY as printed for the signature to verify.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| anno | string | – | Declared year/version, exactly as printed (only if the certificate shows it). |
| attestazione | string | yes | The attestation string exactly as printed on the certificate: "SHA-256:<hash>@<ISO timestamp>Z" |
| autore | string | – | Declared author, exactly as printed (only if the certificate shows it). |
| hmac | string | yes | The server HMAC signature exactly as printed on the certificate (base64, 44 characters ending with '='). |
| note | string | – | Declared notes, exactly as printed (only if the certificate shows them). |
| sha256 | string | yes | SHA-256 fingerprint of the work: 64 hexadecimal characters. Compute the SHA-256 locally if you have code execution (`sha256sum <file>` / `shasum -a 256 <file>` / `certutil -hashfile <file> SHA256`).… |
| titolo | string | – | Declared title, exactly as printed (only if the certificate shows it). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the io.github.SPAZIO-GENESI/attest-mcp-remote server?
io.github.SPAZIO-GENESI/attest-mcp-remote is a hosted endpoint at https://attest-mcp-remote.it-e3f.workers.dev/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · attest-mcp-remote.it-e3f.workers.dev
claude mcp add --transport http spazio-genesi-attest-mcp-remote 'https://attest-mcp-remote.it-e3f.workers.dev/mcp'
What is the io.github.SPAZIO-GENESI/attest-mcp-remote server?
io.github.SPAZIO-GENESI/attest-mcp-remote is listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.SPAZIO-GENESI/attest-mcp-remote. Zero-install remote MCP server for proof-of-existence file attestation. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://attest-mcp-remote.it-e3f.workers.dev/mcp).
Is the io.github.SPAZIO-GENESI/attest-mcp-remote server safe to use?
io.github.SPAZIO-GENESI/attest-mcp-remote scores 18 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the io.github.SPAZIO-GENESI/attest-mcp-remote server expose?
io.github.SPAZIO-GENESI/attest-mcp-remote exposes 8 tools: service_status, check_anchor, verify_attestation, lookup_certificate, authorize, and 3 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,536 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the io.github.SPAZIO-GENESI/attest-mcp-remote server require authentication?
Its publisher declares no required credentials for io.github.SPAZIO-GENESI/attest-mcp-remote. We have not been able to confirm that against the live endpoint, and a server can require authorisation without declaring it here.
Is the io.github.SPAZIO-GENESI/attest-mcp-remote server still maintained?
io.github.SPAZIO-GENESI/attest-mcp-remote is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.