io.github.SoWhatI/vaultshell
OCI · GHCR.IO/SOWHATI/VAULTSHELL
Injects secrets into shell commands at exec time; plaintext never reaches the LLM context
Available components
Last scanned (3 hours ago)
Scores higher than 77% of OCI servers
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Supply Chain Security0
- No malware scan is available for this kind of package: the supply-chain vendors we use do not cover it. This is a permanent gap in our coverage, not a finding about the package.Unverified
- Known CVEs could not be checked: this artifact ships no SBOM or dependency manifest, so there is no dependency list to read.Unverified
- Install-script risk not yet assessed.Unverified
- Dependency health could not be checked: this artifact ships no SBOM or dependency manifest, so there is no dependency list to read.Unverified
Provenance & Transparency48
- Source repository is publicly reachable at the declared URL. View diagnostics → Pass
- Provenance check failed: no build-provenance attestation is published. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- Clear OSI-approved license (MIT).Pass
- Actively maintained (last published 35 days ago).Pass
- Publishes a security disclosure policy (SECURITY.md).Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability76
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 917 tokens (~57/item across 16 items; 16 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management83
- Stability observed for 25 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage88
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 65% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety75
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- 0 of 4 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "shell_exec" implies "exec" and declares no destructiveHint at all, which the MCP spec reads as destructive by default. See how to fix → Fail
- An AI judge read all 16 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Unverified: 1 category
A category scored 0 because we could not verify it: a data source with nothing on this package, evidence we could not reach, or a check we could not run. We only credit what we can confirm.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 5 Nov 26 −3
- Stability: pass → 0.83 functional
- 4 Nov 26 +1
- Security disclosure: unverified → pass ▲ functional
- 3 Nov 26 −1
- Security disclosure: pass → unverified ▼ functional
- 30 Oct 26 +1
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 28 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 90 to 93. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 27 days of observed history at the previous scan, 28 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 26 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 83 to 87. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 25 days of observed history at the previous scan, 26 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 25 Oct 26 0
- Provenance: unverified → fail ▼ security
- 24 Oct 26 0
- Provenance: fail → unverified ▼ security
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Analysed oci/ghcr.io/sowhati/vaultshell@0.1.2
Provenance No attestation
The registry publishes no build provenance for this version, so there is nothing to verify.
| Result | No attestation |
|---|---|
| Ecosystem | oci |
| Reason | No attestation published |
Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
audit_query ~42
Query recent audit entries (newest last). Entries contain names and redacted commands only, never values.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | integer | – | max entries, default 50 |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
rule_list ~28
List injection rules with static warnings (e.g. rules matching every directory → potential unintended full injection).
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
rule_validate ~50
Statically validate rules.yaml and return findings: unknown secret refs, unreachable rules (shadowed by earlier ones), inject-everywhere rules (high severity), requireConfirm capability notes, union mergeStrategy risk notes.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
secret_delete ~28
Delete a secret from the backend and unregister it from rules.yaml.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| name | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
secret_list ~26
List registered secret names with metadata (backend ref, resolvable). Never returns values.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
secret_probe ~44
Check whether a secret ref can be resolved. Returns only {ok, masked}; masked never contains value fragments unless defaults.maskTail > 0.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| name | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
secret_set ~93
Store a secret value into the configured backend. The value is persisted, never echoed back, and the name is registered in rules.yaml (ref only).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| name | string | yes | secret name, e.g. PROD_DB_URL |
| ref | string | – | optional explicit ref, e.g. keychain://svc/account; default: configured backend |
| value | string | yes | secret value; stored only, never returned |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
shell_exec ~140
Execute a one-shot shell command with secrets injected per matching rule. Output is redacted: injected secret values never appear in the response. Dangerous commands (env, printenv, export -p, /proc/*/environ, ...) are hard-blocked. There is no free-form env parameter; secrets are only injected by reference via rules.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| command | string | yes | shell command to execute |
| cwd | string | – | working directory (~ is expanded); default: server cwd |
| extraEnv | object | – | non-secret env vars, keys must be in defaults.extraEnvAllowlist |
| profile | string | – | optional profile name for rule matching |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
shell_proxy_list ~36
List running credential proxies (metadata only: id, port, upstreamHost, secret NAME, expiry, request count). Never includes values.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
shell_proxy_start ~127
Start a credential-injecting reverse proxy on 127.0.0.1 (random port) for a `proxies` entry in config.yaml. Point commands at http://127.0.0.1:<port> instead of the real API host; the proxy injects the secret into the configured header in memory only. Auto-stops after its TTL (default defaults.proxyTtlSeconds=300s). The secret value is never returned anywhere.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | proxies entry id from config.yaml |
| ttlSeconds | integer | – | TTL override (seconds) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
shell_proxy_stop ~23
Stop a running credential proxy.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| proxyId | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
shell_session_close ~31
Close a session: kill the process; injected secrets die with it.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| sessionId | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
shell_session_list ~30
List live sessions (metadata only: id, cwd, injected names, pty, ttl, timestamps).
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
shell_session_open ~109
Open a persistent shell session (PTY when node-pty is available, plain child_process otherwise — the response's `pty` field says which). Secrets are injected once at creation per matching rule; idle sessions are killed after ttlSeconds (rule ttlSeconds overrides defaults.sessionTtlSeconds).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| cwd | string | – | working directory (~ is expanded); default: server cwd |
| profile | string | – | optional profile name for rule matching |
| ttlSeconds | integer | – | idle TTL override (seconds) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
shell_session_revoke ~47
Immediately kill a session and rebuild a fresh one WITHOUT any injected secrets. Use when a session may have been compromised. Returns the new sessionId.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| sessionId | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
shell_session_send ~63
Send a command to a persistent session. Output (merged stdout/stderr) is redacted before returning. Dangerous commands are blocked per security.dangerousCommands. Returns {output, exitCode}.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| command | string | yes | – |
| sessionId | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the io.github.SoWhatI/vaultshell MCP server?
io.github.SoWhatI/vaultshell runs locally as a container image, launched with docker run --rm -i ghcr.io/sowhati/vaultshell:0.1.2. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 3 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
oci · ghcr.io/sowhati/vaultshell
claude mcp add sowhati-vaultshell -- docker run --rm -i ghcr.io/sowhati/vaultshell:0.1.2
What is the io.github.SoWhatI/vaultshell MCP server?
io.github.SoWhatI/vaultshell is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.SoWhatI/vaultshell. Injects secrets into shell commands at exec time; plaintext never reaches the LLM context. This page covers its container image (ghcr.io/sowhati/vaultshell).
Is the io.github.SoWhatI/vaultshell MCP server safe to use?
io.github.SoWhatI/vaultshell scores 50 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the io.github.SoWhatI/vaultshell MCP server expose?
io.github.SoWhatI/vaultshell exposes 16 tools: shell_exec, secret_list, secret_set, secret_delete, secret_probe, and 11 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 917 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Is the io.github.SoWhatI/vaultshell MCP server still maintained?
io.github.SoWhatI/vaultshell is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What licence is the io.github.SoWhatI/vaultshell MCP server under?
io.github.SoWhatI/vaultshell declares the MIT licence, which is OSI-approved. That covers the source only, and says nothing about the cost of any service it calls.