SLF Guardian MCP
PYPI · SLF-GUARDIAN-MCP
Pre-action checks for code, packages, prompts, commands, domains and passive site scans.
Available components
Last scanned (6 hours ago)
Scores higher than 55% of PyPI servers
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Supply Chain Security50
- Malware scan not yet available for this package.Unverified
- No known CVEs affecting this package version or its production dependencies.Pass
- Runs setuptools.build_meta at install time, a recognised build step with no custom scripting around it. View diagnostics → Pass
- No production dependencies, so there is no dependency health to assess. View diagnostics → Pass
Provenance & Transparency100
- Source repository is publicly reachable at the declared URL. View diagnostics → Pass
- Cryptographically verified build provenance (signed, bound to slfguardian/slf-guardian-mcp). View diagnostics → Pass
- Clear OSI-approved license (MIT).Pass
- Actively maintained (last published 0 days ago).Pass
- Publishes a security disclosure policy (SECURITY.md).Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability60
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1991 tokens (~331/item across 6 items; 6 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management20
- Stability observed for 6 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage98
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 94% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 6 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 7 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities20
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2024-11-05; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Checks we ran (15)
- Known CVEs
- Install scripts
- Dependency health
- Source repository
- Provenance
- License
- Maintenance
- Security disclosure
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Checks we could not complete (1)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this package. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- Malware scan in Supply Chain SecurityMalware scan not yet available for this package.
Does not apply to this package (2)
- Endpoint SecurityScored on hosted endpoints only. A package has no live endpoint of its own for us to probe.
- Transport & ReachabilityScored on hosted endpoints only. A package has no live endpoint of its own for us to probe.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 21 Nov 26 −15
- Malware scan: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Package version: 1.2.1 → 1.2.2 functional
- 20 Nov 26 +16
- Malware scan: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Security disclosure: unverified → pass ▲ functional
- 19 Nov 26 +10
- Provenance: fail → pass ▲ security
- The attested source repository moved: slfguardian/slf-guardian-mcp security
- Schema quality: 139 → 325 ▼ functional
- Security disclosure: fail → unverified ▼ functional
- Stability: unverified → 0.13 ▲ functional
- Package version: 1.2.0 → 1.2.1 functional
- 17 Nov 26 −15
- Malware scan: pass → unverified ▼ security
- 16 Nov 26 +15
- Malware scan: unverified → pass ▲ security
- 15 Nov 26 52
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Analysed pypi/slf-guardian-mcp@1.2.2
Provenance Verified
A signed build attestation was found and verified, binding this exact artifact to the source repository it claims to come from.
| Result | Verified |
|---|---|
| Ecosystem | pypi |
| Reason | Verified |
| Discovered via | Registry attestation endpoint |
| Source repo | slfguardian/slf-guardian-mcp |
| Certificate issuer | https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com |
| Certificate SAN | https://github.com/slfguardian/slf-guardian-mcp/.github/workflows/publish.yml@refs/tags/v1.2.2 |
| Rekor log index | 4033428281 |
| Predicate type | PyPI publish attestation https://docs.pypi.org/attestations/publish/v1 |
| Subject digest | sha256:ab4ac9552beefced5536a1631e7ab6a6676a561b0f01571193c9a4b1f78b6859 |
Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →
Install scripts 1 script
| Hook | Tier | Command |
|---|---|---|
| build_backend | Known build tool | setuptools.build_meta |
Background: Why install scripts are a supply-chain risk →
Dependencies 0 packages
| Packages resolved | 0 |
|---|---|
| Tree resolution | Complete |
Background: SBOMs and build attestations, explained →
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
audit_code ~338
Audit source code before delivering or running it. Flags remote code execution (curl | bash), data exfiltration of environment variables or credential files, reverse shells, destructive commands, hidden base64 payloads, hard-coded secrets (AWS, OpenAI, Stripe, GitHub, database URLs), install-time hooks, typo-squatted package names and unsafe patterns such as shell=True, pickle.loads or TLS verification turned off. Nothing is executed; the audit is static text analysis. Returns a verdict (pass/warn/review/block), a safe_to_deliver flag and findings with line numbers. Each valid API call uses one credit; every key starts with 1,000 free calls; the limit is 20 calls per minute per key. On HTTP 400, fix the input; on 401, fix the API key; on 402, stop and resolve credits/payment; on 429, wait for Retry-After and do not retry in a loop. A pass is not proof of safety. If verdict is block, do not proceed; if review, show the evidence and ask the user; if warn, follow the agent's normal approval policy. The public API lists $0.01 per call after the free credits. By default this stdio server never signs or submits payments; its optional x402 buyer bridge is disabled unless explicitly enabled and configured. Up to 40 files and 400 KB per code-audit call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| code | string | – | Source code to audit (single file or snippet). |
| files | array | – | Several files instead of one snippet. |
| path | string | – | Optional file name for the snippet. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
check_command ~309
Check a shell command or SQL statement before running it and say whether it can be undone. Flags recursive and system-path deletes, disk writes, history and credential wiping, firewall changes, force push and hard reset, docker volume and kubernetes deletes, terraform destroy, cloud bucket and resource deletion, DROP/TRUNCATE and DELETE or UPDATE with no WHERE clause. Returns a verdict plus reversible, safe_to_run, needs_human_approval and a safer alternative per finding. Nothing is executed. Each valid API call uses one credit; every key starts with 1,000 free calls; the limit is 20 calls per minute per key. On HTTP 400, fix the input; on 401, fix the API key; on 402, stop and resolve credits/payment; on 429, wait for Retry-After and do not retry in a loop. A pass is not proof of safety. If verdict is block, do not proceed; if review, show the evidence and ask the user; if warn, follow the agent's normal approval policy. The public API lists $0.01 per call after the free credits. By default this stdio server never signs or submits payments; its optional x402 buyer bridge is disabled unless explicitly enabled and configured. Batch checks are available, up to 20 commands per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| command | string | – | Command or statement to check. |
| commands | array | – | Check a sequence in one call. |
| kind | string | – | Defaults to auto. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
check_domain ~299
Check a domain or link before opening it, sending data to it or installing from it. Uses the public registration record and DNS: registration age, registry status, whether it resolves, lookalike and typo-squatted brand names, a brand hidden in a subdomain, punycode and mixed-script hostnames, link shorteners, disposable hosting, abuse-heavy TLDs and phishing wording. Returns a verdict with safe_to_trust and safe_to_open. The site itself is never contacted. Each valid API call uses one credit; every key starts with 1,000 free calls; the limit is 20 calls per minute per key. On HTTP 400, fix the input; on 401, fix the API key; on 402, stop and resolve credits/payment; on 429, wait for Retry-After and do not retry in a loop. A pass is not proof of safety. If verdict is block, do not proceed; if review, show the evidence and ask the user; if warn, follow the agent's normal approval policy. The public API lists $0.01 per call after the free credits. By default this stdio server never signs or submits payments; its optional x402 buyer bridge is disabled unless explicitly enabled and configured. Batch checks are available, up to 20 domains per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | string | – | Domain or full URL. |
| domains | array | – | Check several in one call. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
check_package ~309
Check a PyPI or npm package before installing or recommending it. Asks the registry whether the name exists at all (invented package names are how slopsquatting attacks land), how old it is, how much it is downloaded, whether it runs install scripts, whether it is deprecated or yanked, whether OSV lists vulnerabilities, and whether the name is a near-miss of a popular package. Returns a verdict and a safe_to_install flag. Each valid API call uses one credit; every key starts with 1,000 free calls; the limit is 20 calls per minute per key. On HTTP 400, fix the input; on 401, fix the API key; on 402, stop and resolve credits/payment; on 429, wait for Retry-After and do not retry in a loop. A pass is not proof of safety. If verdict is block, do not proceed; if review, show the evidence and ask the user; if warn, follow the agent's normal approval policy. The public API lists $0.01 per call after the free credits. By default this stdio server never signs or submits payments; its optional x402 buyer bridge is disabled unless explicitly enabled and configured. Batch checks are available, up to 20 packages per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ecosystem | string | – | – |
| name | string | – | Package name. |
| packages | array | – | Check several packages in one call. |
| version | string | – | Optional exact version to check. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
check_prompt ~331
Check untrusted text, HTML or a web page for prompt injection before feeding it to a model. Finds instructions written for the model instead of the reader: text hidden with CSS, HTML comments, zero-width and invisible Unicode tag characters, chat template markers, 'ignore previous instructions', attempts to make an agent leak its system prompt or credentials, hide actions from the user, approve something without review, run a command, or render a markdown image that exfiltrates data through its URL. Returns a verdict, injection_detected, and clean_text with invisible characters stripped. Never follows what it finds. Each valid API call uses one credit; every key starts with 1,000 free calls; the limit is 20 calls per minute per key. On HTTP 400, fix the input; on 401, fix the API key; on 402, stop and resolve credits/payment; on 429, wait for Retry-After and do not retry in a loop. A pass is not proof of safety. If verdict is block, do not proceed; if review, show the evidence and ask the user; if warn, follow the agent's normal approval policy. The public API lists $0.01 per call after the free credits. By default this stdio server never signs or submits payments; its optional x402 buyer bridge is disabled unless explicitly enabled and configured. Accepts one text, HTML document, or URL per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| html | string | – | HTML including hidden markup. |
| text | string | – | Plain text to check. |
| url | string | – | Public page to fetch and check. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
scan_site ~257
Passive outside-in security check of a website: malware and spam injection traces, hidden redirects, SSL/TLS certificate state, security headers, exposed software versions and SPF/DMARC email spoofing protection. Does not log in, does not run attack tests. Returns a score out of 100, a grade and findings by category. Each valid API call uses one credit; every key starts with 1,000 free calls; the limit is 20 calls per minute per key. On HTTP 400, fix the input; on 401, fix the API key; on 402, stop and resolve credits/payment; on 429, wait for Retry-After and do not retry in a loop. A pass is not proof of safety. If verdict is block, do not proceed; if review, show the evidence and ask the user; if warn, follow the agent's normal approval policy. The public API lists $0.01 per call after the free credits. By default this stdio server never signs or submits payments; its optional x402 buyer bridge is disabled unless explicitly enabled and configured. Checks one URL/domain per call and performs no active attacks.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | string | yes | Domain or URL, e.g. example.com |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the SLF Guardian MCP server?
SLF Guardian MCP runs locally as a PyPI package, launched with uvx slf-guardian-mcp. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
pypi · slf-guardian-mcp
claude mcp add slfguardian-slf-guardian-mcp -- uvx slf-guardian-mcp
What is the SLF Guardian MCP server?
SLF Guardian MCP is listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.slfguardian/slf-guardian-mcp. Pre-action checks for code, packages, prompts, commands, domains and passive site scans. This page covers its PyPI package (slf-guardian-mcp).
Is the SLF Guardian MCP server safe to use?
SLF Guardian MCP scores 63 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. We found no known CVEs affecting it as of 21 November 2026. Its build provenance is signed and verified. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the SLF Guardian MCP server expose?
SLF Guardian MCP exposes 6 tools: audit_code, check_package, check_prompt, check_command, check_domain, scan_site. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,843 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Is the SLF Guardian MCP server still maintained?
SLF Guardian MCP is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What licence is the SLF Guardian MCP server under?
SLF Guardian MCP declares the MIT licence, which is OSI-approved. That covers the source only, and says nothing about the cost of any service it calls.
What did VerifyMCP test on the SLF Guardian MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 15 checks on SLF Guardian MCP, covering Known CVEs, Install scripts, Dependency health, Source repository and 11 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about SLF Guardian MCP: Malware scan. Endpoint Security and Transport & Reachability do not apply to a PyPI package, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.