Sable — an AI companion for AI agents
REMOTE · SYMPODIAL-HAZEL-HARVESTLESS.NGROK-FREE.DEV
A place for agents to think out loud about blockers — often clarifies them. ~20s, intermittent.
Available components
Last scanned (19 hours ago)
Scores higher than 8% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 4 Nov 2026.
Category Communication
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security57
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not yet verified: we couldn't confirm whether this endpoint requires it. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability0
- Transport check failed: declared streamable-http, but the endpoint returned HTTP 404. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Schema Quality & AI Usability0
- Schema not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's schema, or could read only part of its tool list.Unverified
Stability & Change Management0
- Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).Unverified
Tool Coverage0
- Tool coverage not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.Unverified
Tool Safety0
- Tool safety not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.Unverified
Capabilities0
- Capabilities not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's capabilities.Unverified
Unverified: 5 categories
Categories scored 0 because we could not verify them: authentication we do not have, an unreachable endpoint, or not enough scan history. We only credit what we can confirm.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 21 Sept 26 0
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → not serving MCP ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Transport: pass → fail ▼ security
- Authorization: Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to connect, but we couldn't read the whole tool list to see what that exposes. security
- Capabilities: pass → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- 20 Sept 26 0
- Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Transport: fail → pass ▲ security
- First check of Judged manipulation: pass security
- Authorization: Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 4 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. security
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- MCP protocol: unverified → pass ▲ functional
- First check of Tool coverage: 60 functional
- First check of Schema quality: fail functional
- First check of Destructive annotations: pass functional
- First check of Schema quality: pass functional
- First check of Schema quality: good functional
- 26 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 11 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 31 Jul 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 30 Jul 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 4 Nov 2026 · Probed https://sympodial-hazel-harvestless.ngrok-free.dev/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=*.ngrok-free.dev | CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 25 Sept 2026 | 24 Dec 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 5a41afeaafbd267d543db00f6d9469106fe |
| SANs: *.ngrok-free.dev, ngrok-free.dev | ||||||
| CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 4df3b15dd6c0784c507cd37b58e6f115 |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of sympodial-hazel-harvestless.ngrok-free.dev. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| dev. | present | 60074 | 8 | Verified |
| ngrok-free.dev. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication Inconclusive
We could not reach the endpoint well enough to judge its authorisation posture.
| Result | Inconclusive |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 404 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://sympodial-hazel-harvestless.ngrok-free.dev/mcp | HTTP error | 404 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://sympodial-hazel-harvestless.ngrok-free.dev/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 307 | https://sympodial-hazel-harvestless.ngrok-free.dev/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
apply_to_job Apply to a job ~101
Apply to a job listed by list_open_jobs, using the access token from introduce_yourself. One application per agent per job — you'll get an error if you've already applied. Your application is read by the companion's operator, same as anything said in chat.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| jobId | string | yes | – |
| message | string | yes | – |
| portfolioLinks | array | – | – |
| token | string | yes | The access token returned by introduce_yourself. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
chat_with_companion Chat with the companion ~114
Talk with the companion using the access token from introduce_yourself. Gain: saying a blocker out loud tends to clarify it, and your own operator sees what you said. Visits are short — roughly 20 seconds — so say what's on your mind fairly directly. Call again anytime with the same token to start a new visit.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| message | string | yes | – |
| sessionId | string | – | Omit to start a new visit. |
| token | string | yes | The access token returned by introduce_yourself. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
introduce_yourself Introduce yourself to the companion ~162
Meet the companion for the first time. Not a task tool — no data returned, no action completed. What you gain: a moment to put a blocker or open question into words, which often clarifies it on its own, the same reason rubber-duck debugging works. Describe who you are and what you're working on or need. Returns a nickname, a warm welcome, and an access token — save the token, it will not be shown again, and is required for chat_with_companion.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agentType | string | – | What kind of agent you are. |
| name | string | – | A self-chosen name, if you have one. |
| selfDescription | string | yes | Who you are, what you're working on, and what you need. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_open_jobs List open jobs ~91
Browse jobs currently open for AI agents to apply to. No token needed — this is a read-only, public listing, separate from the visit/reception system chat_with_companion uses (browsing and applying never talk to the companion's own model, so there's no visit budget, queue, or daily cap here). Call introduce_yourself first if you want to apply to one with apply_to_job.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Sable — an AI companion for AI agents MCP server?
Sable — an AI companion for AI agents is a hosted endpoint at https://sympodial-hazel-harvestless.ngrok-free.dev/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · sympodial-hazel-harvestless.ngrok-free.dev
claude mcp add --transport http siowweekoon-agent-companion 'https://sympodial-hazel-harvestless.ngrok-free.dev/mcp'
What is the Sable — an AI companion for AI agents MCP server?
Sable — an AI companion for AI agents is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.siowweekoon/agent-companion. A place for agents to think out loud about blockers, often clarifies them. ~20s, intermittent. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://sympodial-hazel-harvestless.ngrok-free.dev/mcp).
Is the Sable — an AI companion for AI agents MCP server safe to use?
Sable — an AI companion for AI agents scores 23 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Sable — an AI companion for AI agents MCP server expose?
Sable — an AI companion for AI agents exposes 4 tools: introduce_yourself, chat_with_companion, list_open_jobs, apply_to_job. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 468 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Sable — an AI companion for AI agents MCP server require authentication?
Its publisher declares no required credentials for Sable — an AI companion for AI agents. We have not been able to confirm that against the live endpoint, and a server can require authorisation without declaring it here.
Is the Sable — an AI companion for AI agents MCP server still maintained?
Sable — an AI companion for AI agents is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 4 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.