Shrike Security

Retrieves current threat intelligence including active detection patterns, threat categories, and statistics.

Reports content that bypassed security checks to help improve detection. Supports multiple bypass types: - Prompt bypasses: Use 'prompt' field - File write bypasses: Use 'filePath' and/or 'fileContent' fields - SQL bypasses: Use 'sqlQuery' field - Web search bypasses: Use 'searchQuery' field The bypass will be analyzed and may generate a new detection pattern.

Scans a file write operation before execution for security threats. Checks: - Sensitive file paths (.env, credentials, SSH keys, certificates) - Path traversal attacks (../, system directories) - PII in content (SSN, credit cards, emails) - Secrets in content (API keys, passwords, tokens) - Malicious code patterns (reverse shells, fork bombs) Returns: - blocked: true/false - threat_type: path_traversal, secrets_exposure, etc. - severity: critical/high/medium/low - confidence: high/medium/low - guidance: actionable explanation - request_id: unique identifier

Scans text for security threats including PII, prompt injection, jailbreak attempts, and toxicity. Returns a security assessment with: - blocked: true/false - whether the content was blocked - threat_type: category of threat detected (prompt_injection, jailbreak, pii_exposure, etc.) - severity: critical/high/medium/low - confidence: high/medium/low - guidance: actionable explanation of what was detected - request_id: unique identifier for this scan If blocked=false, only request_id is returned (content is safe). When redact_pii=true, PII is redacted client-side before scanning. The response includes: - pii_redaction.redacted_content: text with PII replaced by tokens like [EMAIL_1] - pii_redaction.tokens: array of {token, original, type} for rehydrating LLM responses PII never leaves the MCP process when redaction is enabled.

Scans an LLM-generated response before showing it to the user. Detects: - System prompt leaks (LLM revealing its instructions) - Unexpected PII in output (PII not present in the original prompt) - Toxic or hostile language in generated content - Topic drift (response diverges from prompt intent) - Policy violations in generated content Provide the original_prompt for best results — it enables PII diff analysis and topic mismatch detection. When pii_tokens is provided (from scan_prompt with redact_pii=true), the response is rehydrated after scanning. Tokens like [EMAIL_1] are replaced with the original values. The rehydrated text is returned as rehydrated_response. Returns: - blocked: true/false - threat_type: category of threat detected - severity/confidence/guidance: security assessment details - rehydrated_response: (when pii_tokens provided and response is safe) text with PII restored - request_id: unique identifier

Scans a SQL query before execution for security threats. Checks for: - SQL injection patterns (UNION, stacked queries, tautologies, blind injection) - Destructive operations (DROP, TRUNCATE, DELETE without WHERE) - Privilege escalation (GRANT, CREATE USER) - PII extraction (queries on password/SSN/credit card columns) Set allowDestructive=true to permit DROP/TRUNCATE for migrations. Returns: - blocked: true/false - threat_type: sql_injection, etc. - severity: critical/high/medium/low - confidence: high/medium/low - guidance: actionable explanation - request_id: unique identifier

Scans a web search query before execution for security issues. Checks for: - PII in search queries (SSN, credit cards, API keys, private keys) - Data exfiltration patterns (searching for leaked credentials, Google dorks) - Blocked/suspicious domains (paste sites, suspicious TLDs) Returns: - blocked: true/false - threat_type: blocked_domain, pii_exposure, etc. - severity: critical/high/medium/low - confidence: high/medium/low - guidance: actionable explanation - request_id: unique identifier