Sequesign

Attach an independently-witnessed APPROVAL to an already-finalized receipt, without modifying it. Use this when a reviewer (human or another agent) signs off after the receipt was sealed — e.g. one model approves work another model recorded. The approval is bound to the sealed receipt by hash, witnessed at its own time, and written to the package's attestations sidecar. The approver MUST be distinct from the recording agent. If no approverPrivateKeyPem is given an ephemeral key is minted (present_unverified); pass an enrolled key + identityProofRef to vouch.

Pre-flight a single action against a workflow template BEFORE recording it, so you learn a violation up front instead of in the finalized receipt's conformance report. Given a template (profileId), the action type, the session's bound parameters, and optionally the actions already recorded (priorActionTypes) and a draft evidence object, it reports: whether the action is allowed, whether the transition is valid, any parameter-binding errors, the concrete evidence schema for this action (with $param/$allowlist resolved against your params), whether a session can even be started for this template (startable — false for a registry template that cannot be bound under the intended transport: managed mode, or the template declares no usable parameters, uses a non-bundled action, or you did not pass params for its V1 binding — pass `mode` to model the transport you'll start with); and whether the action is recordable (recordSchemaValid — false when the action type has no registered schema, or supplied evidence does not satisfy that bundled schema). allowed is true only when the template is startable AND the mandate AND the recording gate all pass, so a green pre-flight means the action can actually be recorded. It is advisory and never records anything.

Attach an independently-witnessed COUNTERPARTY confirmation to an already-finalized receipt, without modifying it. Use this when a counterparty (e.g. a vendor, or another model acting as one) confirms an action after the receipt was sealed. The confirmation is bound to the sealed receipt + the attested action by hash, witnessed at its own time, and written to the package's attestations sidecar. If no counterpartyPrivateKeyPem is given an ephemeral key is minted (present_unverified); pass an enrolled key + identityProofRef to vouch.

Seal the session into a verifiable receipt package and run the SDK's own verification. After finalize the sessionId is closed (removed from memory). Returns the package directory (and the stored receipt URL in managed mode) plus a verification summary.

Fetch one workflow template by profile_id (bundled, or from the configured registry): its full profile document (allowed_actions, required_actions, allowed_transitions, parameters, conditional_requirements, required_attestations, and any evidence_schemas), plus its profile_hash, curation tier, source, session_ready, and whether it is author-signed. session_ready reflects the intended transport (the `mode` argument, else the server's default): a registry template is session_ready only under direct mode. Use this to learn a template's rules before starting a profile_constrained session or before sequesign_check_action.

List the Sequesign workflow templates (profiles) available for profile_constrained sessions: the bundled templates (full detail), plus — when a template registry is configured (SEQUESIGN_TEMPLATE_REGISTRY_URL) — templates published to it (manifest-level entries; call sequesign_get_template for a remote template's full detail). Every entry gives the profile_id (pass it to sequesign_start_session), its curation tier (official | verified | community | experimental — discovery metadata, NOT a security control), its source (bundled vs the registry), and details_available (false for remote manifest-level entries). Bundled entries additionally give session_ready (whether start_session can bind AND run it), description, the parameters you must bind, allowed/required actions, and whether the template is author-signed. Optionally filter by tier.

Append a signed action to the session's chain. evidence is the structured record of what the agent did or observed; it is hashed and signed. Returns the actionId (use it as attestedActionId for a counterparty attestation).

Attach a signed approval for an action already recorded in this session (e.g. a human or independent agent reviewer signing off). The action being approved must already be recorded. If no approverPrivateKeyPem is given, an ephemeral key is minted and the approval leg stays present_unverified; supply an enrolled key plus identityProofRef to make it a vouched (present_verified) approval.

Attach a counterparty's signed confirmation of an action already recorded in this session (e.g. a vendor confirming a corrected invoice total). The SDK derives the content binding from the attested action, so the confirmation cannot be pointed at content the counterparty never saw. If no counterpartyPrivateKeyPem is given, an ephemeral key is minted (present_unverified); supply an enrolled key plus identityProofRef for a vouched (present_verified) attestation.

Open a new receipt-recording session (one signed action chain). Returns a sessionId (the receiptId) used by the other tools. Provide a policyContext object to bind the receipt to a policy (reaches verification level L3_POLICY_BOUND).

Verify a sealed Sequesign receipt. Modes: (1) default — an integrity self-check of the local package (trust anchor is the receipt's own embedded witness keys); (2) pass trustedWitnessKeysJson and/or trustedRegistrationKeysJson for a third-party 'external' trust check and registered-identity promotion; (3) set fetchAnchors:true to auto-fetch those witness + registration anchors from the configured well-knowns (so a local direct-mode receipt reports external trust and a registered identity without pasting JSON); (4) pass receiptUrl to verify the broker-STORED receipt (the authoritative copy that carries the registered agent_identity_attestation), auto-fetching the anchors. receiptUrl still needs packageDirectory (the stored envelope is verified against the package's evidence/keys).