FoxyInvoice
REMOTE · FOXYINVOICE.COM
Invoicing for AI assistants: clients, quotes, invoices with computed tax, email send, card payments.
Available components
Last scanned (19 hours ago)
Scores higher than 57% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category Finance and Payments
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security89
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation is enforced on tool calls, but the challenge carries no valid RFC 9728 metadata, so a client cannot discover where to get a token. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability65
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 703 tokens (~78/item across 9 items; 9 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management17
- Stability observed for 5 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage72
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 15% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety75
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- 0 of 2 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "send_invoice" implies "send" and declares no destructiveHint at all, which the MCP spec reads as destructive by default. See how to fix → Fail
- An AI judge read all 10 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities60
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Checks we ran (13)
- TLS certificate
- Authorization
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 20 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 10 to 13. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 3 days of observed history at the previous scan, 4 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 18 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 3 to 7. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 1 days of observed history at the previous scan, 2 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 17 Nov 26 0
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 16 Nov 26 +34
- Transport: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
- First check of Judged manipulation: pass security
- Authorization: Authorisation is enforced on tool calls, but the challenge carries no valid RFC 9728 metadata, so a client cannot discover where to get a token. security
- MCP protocol: unverified → fail ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- First check of Schema quality: fail functional
- First check of Destructive annotations: 0 functional
- First check of Schema quality: pass functional
- First check of Tool coverage: 15 functional
- First check of Schema quality: good functional
- 13 Nov 26 36
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://foxyinvoice.com/api/v1/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=foxyinvoice.com | CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 6 Nov 2026 | 4 Feb 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 6009c66570ce342ba392df685125a31d674 |
| SANs: foxyinvoice.com | ||||||
| CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 5ddd70dd31f801c85c186a7a04b80afe |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of foxyinvoice.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | DS published | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| foxyinvoice.com. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication Challenged, unverified
The endpoint asked for a token, but we could not retrieve and validate the RFC 9728 metadata that tells a client how to obtain one.
| Result | Challenged, unverified |
|---|---|
| Enforced | On tool calls |
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=31536000 |
| content-security-policy | default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://www.googletagmanager.com https://challenges.cloudflare.com; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' data:; img-src 'self' data: blob: https:; connect-src 'self' https://*.google-analytics.com https://*.analytics.google.com https://challenges.cloudflare.com; frame-src https://challenges.cloudflare.com; worker-src 'self' blob:; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; upgrade-insecure-requests; report-uri /api/v1/public/csp-report |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-frame-options | DENY |
| referrer-policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin |
| permissions-policy | camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=() |
Protected resource metadata
| Retrieved | No |
|---|---|
| Problem | No resource metadata |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://foxyinvoice.com/api/v1/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://foxyinvoice.com/api/v1/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 308 | https://foxyinvoice.com/api/v1/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
create_client ~85
Create a client so invoices can be billed to them. Returns the new client with its id. Name is required; email is needed later for send_invoice.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| billingAddress | string | – | – |
| string | – | – | |
| name | string | yes | – |
| phone | string | – | – |
| taxExempt | boolean | – | – |
| taxId | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
create_invoice ~175
Create a DRAFT invoice for a client; the server assigns the number (INV-YYYY-NNNN), computes taxes from the client's jurisdiction and rounds per invoice rules — never state amounts yourself. Lines need description, qty and unitPrice (decimal). Due date defaults to 14 days from today. Pass a stable requestId when retrying: the same requestId returns the same invoice instead of creating a duplicate. Use send_invoice to email it — do NOT send without the user's confirmation.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| clientId | string | yes | – |
| dueDate | string | – | Defaults to today + dueInDays |
| dueInDays | integer | – | – |
| issueDate | string | – | Defaults to today |
| lines | array | yes | – |
| notes | string | – | – |
| requestId | string | – | Idempotency key |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_invoice ~31
Fetch one invoice with all lines and computed totals (server-side tax math included).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_clients ~70
Search the workspace's clients by name or email. Returns id, name, email, billing address. Use this to find a clientId before creating an invoice.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| page | integer | – | – |
| pageSize | integer | – | – |
| search | string | – | Case-insensitive match on name or email |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_documents ~42
List the workspace's client documents (agreements, NDAs, terms) with their acceptance status. Filter by clientId.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| clientId | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_invoices ~65
List invoices, newest first. Filter by status (Draft, Sent, Paid, Overdue, Void) and/or clientId.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| clientId | string | – | – |
| page | integer | – | – |
| pageSize | integer | – | – |
| status | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_products ~56
List the workspace's catalog products (id, sku, name, unit price). A product's id can be attached to an invoice line; otherwise lines stand alone.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| page | integer | – | – |
| pageSize | integer | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
send_document ~68
Email a Draft document (agreement/NDA/terms) to its client for electronic acceptance — the client reviews it, types their name, and the acceptance is archived with a certificate. CONFIRM with the user before calling — this emails a real person.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
send_invoice ~57
Email a Draft/Sent/Overdue invoice to its client (requires the client to have an email; counts against the monthly send quota). CONFIRM with the user before calling — this emails a real person.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the FoxyInvoice MCP server?
FoxyInvoice is a hosted endpoint at https://foxyinvoice.com/api/v1/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · foxyinvoice.com
claude mcp add --transport http seolith-llc-foxyinvoice 'https://foxyinvoice.com/api/v1/mcp'
What is the FoxyInvoice MCP server?
FoxyInvoice is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.seolith-llc/foxyinvoice. Invoicing for AI assistants: clients, quotes, invoices with computed tax, email send, card payments. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://foxyinvoice.com/api/v1/mcp).
Is the FoxyInvoice MCP server safe to use?
FoxyInvoice scores 72 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the FoxyInvoice MCP server expose?
FoxyInvoice exposes 9 tools: list_clients, create_client, list_products, list_invoices, get_invoice, and 4 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 649 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the FoxyInvoice MCP server require authentication?
Yes. FoxyInvoice asked us for credentials when we connected, so you will need to authorise it in your MCP client before it can do anything.
Is the FoxyInvoice MCP server still maintained?
FoxyInvoice is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the FoxyInvoice MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 13 checks on FoxyInvoice, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HTTPS, HSTS header and 9 more. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.