VibeScale
REMOTE · VIBE.ELYA-STUDIO.COM
For app builders in Israel: pre-launch checks for leaked keys, Supabase RLS, exposed env vars.
Available components
Last scanned (14 hours ago)
Scores higher than 67% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security80
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- No authorisation is required to call this server. Nothing on it is marked destructive, but we can't show that an anonymous caller can only read: full credit needs the server to list at least one tool and every tool to be verifiably read-only. We use a best-effort check of tool names and descriptions to tell read-only tools from tools that change things, so some genuinely read-only tools may not get full credit. Names that start with a read verb (get, list, read, search and similar) and accurate readOnlyHint annotations help. Meet that to earn full credit, or require authorisation. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Partial
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability71
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 598 tokens (~199/item across 3 items; 3 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management30
- Stability observed for 9 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 3 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 4 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Checks we ran (13)
- TLS certificate
- Authorization
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 20 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 23 to 27. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 7 days of observed history at the previous scan, 8 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 18 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 17 to 20. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 5 days of observed history at the previous scan, 6 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 16 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 10 to 13. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 3 days of observed history at the previous scan, 4 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 14 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 3 to 7. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 1 days of observed history at the previous scan, 2 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 13 Nov 26 0
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 12 Nov 26 73
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://vibe.elya-studio.com/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=vibe.elya-studio.com | CN=YR1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 9 Oct 2026 | 7 Jan 2027 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 527855683bee3d28457654aa4a24f808808 |
| SANs: vibe.elya-studio.com | ||||||
| CN=YR1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | a20253f15f2691c05dc1ce13b9bcca4e |
| CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | RSA 4096 | SHA256-RSA | f24b6d17f9d9ad7cb1c9fea78782699f |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of vibe.elya-studio.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | DS published | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| elya-studio.com. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload |
| content-security-policy | default-src 'self'; base-uri 'self'; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; form-action 'self'; script-src 'self' https://plausible.io https://www.clarity.ms https://scripts.clarity.ms https://www.googletagmanager.com 'sha256-/6SBPqW+GW+//4nlXX6Y1nR9dWlh0gsQJ6KK71djH6A='; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com; font-src 'self' data: https://fonts.gstatic.com; img-src 'self' data: https:; connect-src 'self' https://plausible.io https://*.clarity.ms https://c.bing.com https://*.google-analytics.com https://*.analytics.google.com https://*.googletagmanager.com |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-frame-options | SAMEORIGIN |
| referrer-policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin |
| permissions-policy | camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), interest-cohort=() |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://vibe.elya-studio.com/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://vibe.elya-studio.com/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 308 | https://vibe.elya-studio.com/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
check_env_exposure Check which environment variables reach the browser ~157
Takes environment variable NAMES (never values) and says, for each one, whether the build tool ships it to every visitor (VITE_, NEXT_PUBLIC_, EXPO_PUBLIC_, REACT_APP_, PUBLIC_, GATSBY_, NUXT_PUBLIC_) and whether its name looks like a server secret that must not be there. Use when someone asks whether their .env or API keys are exposed in a Lovable, Bolt, Vite, Next.js or Expo app. Send names only; if a value is included it is dropped and not stored. Explanations are in Hebrew.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| names | array | yes | Variable names, e.g. ["VITE_SUPABASE_URL", "VITE_OPENAI_API_KEY"] |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
lint_supabase_rls Check Supabase SQL for row level security gaps ~154
Reads Supabase SQL (migrations or a schema dump) as text and lists tables in exposed schemas without row level security, RLS with no policy, policies that allow everything or read user_metadata, policies without a role, write grants to anon, SECURITY DEFINER functions and views, new tables without a grant, and public storage buckets, each with SQL that fixes it. Use when someone asks whether their Supabase database is locked down, or before launching an app that uses Supabase. The SQL is never executed or stored; policy logic (who should see what) is not judged. Findings are in Hebrew.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| sql | string | yes | The SQL text: one or more migration files or a schema dump |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
scan_app_launch_readiness Scan a live web app for leaked keys and missing protections ~187
Reads one public web app the way a browser does (its HTML, the same-site scripts it loads and any source maps they point to) and reports what any visitor can already see: server secret keys shipped to the browser (Supabase service_role, OpenAI, Anthropic, Stripe, AWS, GitHub, SendGrid, Resend; shown masked), a published source map, no HTTPS, and missing Content-Security-Policy, HSTS or frame protection. Use when someone built an app with Lovable, Base44, Bolt, Cursor, Replit or similar and asks whether it is safe to launch or whether a key leaked. It does not sign in, guess paths or query the app's database. Findings are in Hebrew.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| url | string | yes | The public address of the app, e.g. my-app.lovable.app or https://example.com |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the VibeScale MCP server?
VibeScale is a hosted endpoint at https://vibe.elya-studio.com/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · vibe.elya-studio.com
claude mcp add --transport http ranqint-vibescale 'https://vibe.elya-studio.com/mcp'
What is the VibeScale MCP server?
VibeScale is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.Ranqint/vibescale. For app builders in Israel: pre-launch checks for leaked keys, Supabase RLS, exposed env vars. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://vibe.elya-studio.com/mcp).
Is the VibeScale MCP server safe to use?
VibeScale scores 77 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the VibeScale MCP server expose?
VibeScale exposes 3 tools: scan_app_launch_readiness, lint_supabase_rls, check_env_exposure. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 498 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the VibeScale MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to VibeScale without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the VibeScale MCP server still maintained?
VibeScale is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the VibeScale MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 13 checks on VibeScale, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HTTPS, HSTS header and 9 more. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.