MANDATE Credential Broker
REMOTE · MANDATE.NANOCORP.APP · SCANNED SEP 29
MCP server for mandates, delegation, policy-gated execution, credential grants, and audit.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security51
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 11 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS check failed: the endpoint is reachable over plaintext HTTP. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability66
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 380 tokens (~34/item across 11 items; 11 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management80
- Stability observed for 24 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage83
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 50% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety75
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- 0 of 2 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "mandate.revoke" implies "revoke" and declares no destructiveHint at all, which the MCP spec reads as destructive by default. See how to fix → Fail
- An AI judge read all 12 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities60
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
How do I install the MANDATE Credential Broker MCP server?
MANDATE Credential Broker is a hosted endpoint at https://mandate.nanocorp.app/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · mandate.nanocorp.app
claude mcp add --transport http projetnanocorp-mandate 'https://mandate.nanocorp.app/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"projetnanocorp-mandate": {
"url": "https://mandate.nanocorp.app/mcp"
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"projetnanocorp-mandate": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://mandate.nanocorp.app/mcp"
}
}
} [mcp_servers.projetnanocorp-mandate] url = "https://mandate.nanocorp.app/mcp"
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"projetnanocorp-mandate": {
"type": "remote",
"url": "https://mandate.nanocorp.app/mcp",
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add projetnanocorp-mandate --url 'https://mandate.nanocorp.app/mcp' --transport streamable-http
mcp_servers:
projetnanocorp-mandate:
url: "https://mandate.nanocorp.app/mcp" {
"McpServers": {
"projetnanocorp-mandate": {
"Transport": "http",
"Url": "https://mandate.nanocorp.app/mcp"
}
}
} assistant mcp add projetnanocorp-mandate -t streamable-http -u 'https://mandate.nanocorp.app/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"projetnanocorp-mandate": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://mandate.nanocorp.app/mcp"
}
}
} The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 28 Sept 26 +1
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 26 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 67 to 70. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 20 days of observed history at the previous scan, 21 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 24 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 60 to 63. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 18 days of observed history at the previous scan, 19 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 22 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 53 to 57. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 16 days of observed history at the previous scan, 17 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 20 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 47 to 50. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 14 days of observed history at the previous scan, 15 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 18 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 40 to 43. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 12 days of observed history at the previous scan, 13 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 16 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 33 to 37. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 10 days of observed history at the previous scan, 11 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 29 Sept 2026 · Probed https://mandate.nanocorp.app/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=nanocorp.app | CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 24 Aug 2026 | 22 Nov 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 61e5e70982952e16445feaf16c245299dda |
| SANs: *.nanocorp.app, nanocorp.app | ||||||
| CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 5ddd70dd31f801c85c186a7a04b80afe |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of mandate.nanocorp.app. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| app. | present | 23684 | 8 | Verified |
| nanocorp.app. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://mandate.nanocorp.app/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://mandate.nanocorp.app/mcp | Served over HTTP | 200 |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
broker.introspect-grant Introspect credential grant ~36
Validates a grant token seal, reports active/revoked/expired state, and records introspection to the ledger.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
broker.register-credential Register credential handle ~58
Registers an opaque vault handle/reference only; plaintext secret fields are rejected and never ledgered.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| metadata | object | – | – |
| vault_handle | string | yes | Opaque vault reference such as vault://provider/path; never a plaintext secret. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
broker.request-access Request short-lived credential grant ~43
Asks the canonical Policy Engine for an ALLOW decision before issuing a short-lived HMAC-sealed grant bound to credential, mandate, agent, scope, and expiry.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
broker.revoke-grant Revoke credential grant ~27
Revokes a broker grant by id and records the revocation to the ledger.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
broker.use Use credential grant ~36
Redeems a sealed grant for the bound acting agent and executes the bound action through the Gateway and Policy Engine; does not expose plaintext secrets.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
mandate.authorize-action Authorize gateway action ~37
Submits an action through the Gateway and canonical Policy Engine; returns ALLOW, DENY, or REQUIRE_APPROVAL with ledger proof.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
mandate.delegate Delegate mandate ~27
Creates a child mandate only when it is a no-escalation subset of the parent mandate.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
mandate.discover Discover MANDATE agent tools ~17
Returns this self-describing tool manifest.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
mandate.mint Mint root mandate ~29
Creates an active human-granted mandate for an agent and records it to the hash-chained ledger.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
mandate.revoke Revoke mandate ~26
Revokes a mandate subtree and records the revocation to the hash-chained ledger.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
mandate.verify-proof Record or verify proof ~26
Records a proof payload hash and appends proof evidence to the hash-chained ledger.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
What is the MANDATE Credential Broker MCP server?
MANDATE Credential Broker is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.projetnanocorp/mandate. MCP server for mandates, delegation, policy-gated execution, credential grants, and audit. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://mandate.nanocorp.app/mcp).
Is the MANDATE Credential Broker MCP server safe to use?
MANDATE Credential Broker scores 67 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the MANDATE Credential Broker MCP server expose?
MANDATE Credential Broker exposes 11 tools: mandate.discover, mandate.mint, mandate.delegate, mandate.authorize-action, mandate.verify-proof, and 6 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 362 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the MANDATE Credential Broker MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to MANDATE Credential Broker without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the MANDATE Credential Broker MCP server still maintained?
MANDATE Credential Broker is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 29 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.