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MANDATE Credential Broker

REMOTE · MANDATE.NANOCORP.APP

MCP server for mandates, delegation, policy-gated execution, credential grants, and audit.

0 this week 70 Trust /100

Last scanned (21 hours ago)

Scores higher than 54% of remote servers

Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.

Category Security

Trust breakdown (7 categories)

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →

Endpoint Security51
Transport & Reachability100
Schema Quality & AI Usability66
  • AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
  • Tool/resource definitions use about 380 tokens (~34/item across 11 items; 11 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
  • Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
  • No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage83
  • 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
  • 50% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety75
  • No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
  • 0 of 2 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "mandate.revoke" implies "revoke" and declares no destructiveHint at all, which the MCP spec reads as destructive by default. See how to fix → Fail
  • An AI judge read all 12 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities60
  • Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
What we tested

Checks we ran (12)

  • TLS certificate
  • HTTPS
  • HSTS header
  • DNSSEC
  • Transport
  • Schema quality
  • Stability
  • Tool coverage
  • Injection markers
  • Destructive annotations
  • Judged manipulation
  • MCP protocol

Checks we could not complete (1)

These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.

  • Authorization in Endpoint SecurityAuthorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 11 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe.

Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)

  • Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
  • Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.

The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →

Changelog

Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.

  • 11 Nov 26 +1
    • Stability: 0.97 → pass security
  • 10 Nov 26 −1
    • Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
  • 9 Nov 26 +1
    • Stability: 0.97 → pass security
  • 8 Nov 26 −1
    • Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
  • 6 Nov 26 0
    • We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
  • 7 Oct 26 0
    • Stability: 0.97 → pass security
  • 28 Sept 26 0
    • We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
  • 25 Sept 26 0
    • We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
Diagnostics

Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.

Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://mandate.nanocorp.app/mcp

TLS valid

Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .

Subject Issuer Valid from Valid until Key Signature Serial
CN=nanocorp.app CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US 22 Oct 2026 20 Jan 2027 ECDSA 256 ECDSA-SHA384 615e70f0c166f543cbb6b214797527c70f9
SANs: *.nanocorp.app, nanocorp.app
CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US 3 Sept 2025 2 Sept 2028 ECDSA 384 ECDSA-SHA384 5ddd70dd31f801c85c186a7a04b80afe
CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US 13 May 2026 2 Sept 2032 ECDSA 384 ECDSA-SHA384 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a
CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US 13 May 2026 2 Sept 2032 ECDSA 384 SHA256-RSA 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd

Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →

DNSSEC insecure

Validation of mandate.nanocorp.app. — Not signed

Zone DS Keys Algorithms Outcome
. Trust anchor 20326, 38696 8, 8 Verified
app. DS published 23684 8 Verified
nanocorp.app. No DS Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation
Authentication No authorisation required

The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.

Result No authorisation required
HTTP status 200
Header Value
strict-transport-security max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload

Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →

Transports 2 probes
Transport URL Outcome Status Location
streamable-http https://mandate.nanocorp.app/mcp Verified 200
http (plaintext) http://mandate.nanocorp.app/mcp Served over HTTP 200
MCP tools · 11 exposed · ~362 tokens

The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →

Tool Tokens
broker.introspect-grant ~36

Validates a grant token seal, reports active/revoked/expired state, and records introspection to the ledger.

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

broker.register-credential ~58

Registers an opaque vault handle/reference only; plaintext secret fields are rejected and never ledgered.

NameTypeReqDescription
metadataobject––
vault_handlestringyesOpaque vault reference such as vault://provider/path; never a plaintext secret.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

broker.request-access ~43

Asks the canonical Policy Engine for an ALLOW decision before issuing a short-lived HMAC-sealed grant bound to credential, mandate, agent, scope, and expiry.

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

broker.revoke-grant ~27

Revokes a broker grant by id and records the revocation to the ledger.

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

broker.use ~36

Redeems a sealed grant for the bound acting agent and executes the bound action through the Gateway and Policy Engine; does not expose plaintext secrets.

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

mandate.authorize-action ~37

Submits an action through the Gateway and canonical Policy Engine; returns ALLOW, DENY, or REQUIRE_APPROVAL with ledger proof.

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

mandate.delegate ~27

Creates a child mandate only when it is a no-escalation subset of the parent mandate.

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

mandate.discover ~17

Returns this self-describing tool manifest.

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

mandate.mint ~29

Creates an active human-granted mandate for an agent and records it to the hash-chained ledger.

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

mandate.revoke ~26

Revokes a mandate subtree and records the revocation to the hash-chained ledger.

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

mandate.verify-proof ~26

Records a proof payload hash and appends proof evidence to the hash-chained ledger.

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

Install

How do I install the MANDATE Credential Broker MCP server?

MANDATE Credential Broker is a hosted endpoint at https://mandate.nanocorp.app/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

remote · mandate.nanocorp.app

# add to Claude Code
claude mcp add --transport http projetnanocorp-mandate 'https://mandate.nanocorp.app/mcp'
Common questions

What is the MANDATE Credential Broker MCP server?

MANDATE Credential Broker is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.projetnanocorp/mandate. MCP server for mandates, delegation, policy-gated execution, credential grants, and audit. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://mandate.nanocorp.app/mcp).

Is the MANDATE Credential Broker MCP server safe to use?

MANDATE Credential Broker scores 70 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

What tools does the MANDATE Credential Broker MCP server expose?

MANDATE Credential Broker exposes 11 tools: mandate.discover, mandate.mint, mandate.delegate, mandate.authorize-action, mandate.verify-proof, and 6 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 362 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

Does the MANDATE Credential Broker MCP server require authentication?

No. We connected to MANDATE Credential Broker without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.

Is the MANDATE Credential Broker MCP server still maintained?

MANDATE Credential Broker is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.

What did VerifyMCP test on the MANDATE Credential Broker MCP server?

VerifyMCP ran 12 checks on MANDATE Credential Broker, covering TLS certificate, HTTPS, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 8 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about MANDATE Credential Broker: Authorization. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.