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stub.page

REMOTE · STUB.PAGE

Publish plain-text posts at a public URL. No account, no sign-up.

Available components

0 this week 80 Trust /100

Last scanned (1 hour ago)

Scores higher than 81% of remote servers

Reachable. Last reached 5 Nov 2026.

Category Documents and Files

Trust breakdown (7 categories)

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →

Endpoint Security66
  • The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
  • Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 4 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
  • HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
  • The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
  • DNSSEC is configured correctly; the domain's records validate against the full chain to the root. View diagnostics → Pass
Transport & Reachability100
Schema Quality & AI Usability79
  • AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
  • Tool/resource definitions use about 343 tokens (~85/item across 4 items; 4 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
  • Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
  • No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage85
  • 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
  • 56% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety75
  • No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
  • 0 of 2 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "create_page" implies "publish" and declares no destructiveHint at all, which the MCP spec reads as destructive by default. See how to fix → Fail
  • An AI judge read all 5 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
  • Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Changelog

Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.

  • 28 Sept 26 0
    • We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
  • 25 Sept 26 0
    • We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
  • 30 Aug 26 0
    • Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
  • 29 Aug 26 0

    First indexed and scored.

Diagnostics

Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.

Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Probed https://stub.page/mcp

TLS valid

Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .

Subject Issuer Valid from Valid until Key Signature Serial
CN=stub.page CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US 27 Oct 2026 25 Jan 2027 ECDSA 256 ECDSA-SHA256 f662555e019bee221324387ed9e2ef02
SANs: stub.page, *.stub.page
CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US 13 Dec 2023 20 Feb 2029 ECDSA 256 ECDSA-SHA384 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3
CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE 15 Nov 2023 28 Jan 2028 ECDSA 384 SHA256-RSA 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b

Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →

DNSSEC secure

Validation of stub.page. — Secure

Zone DS Keys Algorithms Outcome
. trust_anchor 20326, 38696 8, 8 Verified
page. present 64712 8 Verified
stub.page. present 2371 13 Verified
stub.page. Verified address RRset verified with the apex keys
Authentication No authorisation required

The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.

Result No authorisation required
HTTP status 200
Header Value
strict-transport-security max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
content-security-policy default-src 'none'; style-src 'self'; font-src 'self'; img-src https: 'self'; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; script-src 'self' https://static.cloudflareinsights.com; connect-src 'self'
x-content-type-options nosniff
x-frame-options DENY
referrer-policy no-referrer

Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →

Transports 2 probes
Transport URL Outcome Status Location
streamable-http https://stub.page/mcp Verified 200
http (plaintext) http://stub.page/mcp HTTPS enforced
MCP tools · 4 exposed · ~282 tokens

The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →

Tool Tokens
create_page ~123

Publish a new text post and return its slug, public URL and edit_key. Content is Markdown (paragraphs, headings, bold, italic, lists, quotes, code, links, and images via external https URLs — images are embedded, never hosted). The returned edit_key is shown exactly once and cannot be recovered. Keep it in context — without it the page can never be edited or deleted again.

NameTypeReqDescription
contentstringyesMarkdown content of the post.
titlestringyesTitle of the post. The URL is derived from it and never changes afterwards.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

delete_page ~52

Permanently delete a post. Requires the edit_key. The slug is never reused and the deletion cannot be undone.

NameTypeReqDescription
edit_keystringyesThe key returned by create_page.
slugstringyes–

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

get_page ~35

Fetch a published post by slug. Public — no edit_key required.

NameTypeReqDescription
slugstringyesThe slug from the page URL.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

update_page ~72

Replace title and/or content of an existing post. Requires the edit_key from create_page. The URL stays the same even when the title changes.

NameTypeReqDescription
contentstring––
edit_keystringyesThe key returned by create_page.
slugstringyes–
titlestring––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

Install

How do I install the stub.page MCP server?

stub.page is a hosted endpoint at https://stub.page/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

remote · stub.page

# add to Claude Code
claude mcp add --transport http page-stub-stub-page 'https://stub.page/mcp'
Common questions

What is the stub.page MCP server?

stub.page is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as page.stub/stub-page. Publish plain-text posts at a public URL. No account, no sign-up. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://stub.page/mcp).

Is the stub.page MCP server safe to use?

stub.page scores 80 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

What tools does the stub.page MCP server expose?

stub.page exposes 4 tools: create_page, get_page, update_page, delete_page. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 282 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

Does the stub.page MCP server require authentication?

No. We connected to stub.page without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.

Is the stub.page MCP server still maintained?

stub.page is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.