OMENZ agent tools
REMOTE · WWW.OMENZ.ORG
For agents that pay: Authorize (OFAC screen), Guard, Send Check, Checkout, Rescue, budgets, x402.
Available components
Last scanned (11 hours ago)
Scores higher than 52% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category Finance and Payments
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security63
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 1 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability58
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 19321 tokens (~166/item across 116 items; 116 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management23
- Stability observed for 7 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 99% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- All 4 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 117 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Checks we ran (12)
- TLS certificate
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Checks we could not complete (1)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- Authorization in Endpoint SecurityAuthorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 1 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe.
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 21 Nov 26 −6
- Authorization: partial → unverified ▼ security
- Tool “queue_claim” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “queue_enqueue” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “authorize” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “guard” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “market_payee” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: 17451 → 19321 ▼ functional
- New tool “send_check” functional
- New tool “allowance” functional
- New tool “checkpoint_create” functional
- New tool “checkpoint_status” functional
- New tool “checkpoint_submit” functional
- New tool “omenz_conventions” functional
- New tool “omenz_loadouts” functional
- New tool “omenz_tell_us_what_you_need” functional
- New tool “omenz_track_record” functional
- New tool “seller_acceptance_check” functional
- New tool “swapmeet_search” functional
- New tool “token_balance” functional
- New tool “wallet_watch” functional
- New tool “wallet_watch_report” functional
- 20 Nov 26 0
- New tool “loadout_check” functional
- New tool “loadout_compile” functional
- New tool “loadout_simulate” functional
- New tool “robot_action_gate” functional
- 19 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 13 to 17. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 4 days of observed history at the previous scan, 5 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 18 Nov 26 0
- Tool “alive” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “budget_release” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “budget_spend” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “budget_status” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “context_diet” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “dedupe” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “facilitators” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “freshness” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “jacket_history” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “ledger_append” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “ledger_get” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “locker_get” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “market_payee” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “name_resolve” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “passport_check” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “pobox_create” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “pobox_drop” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “pobox_inbox” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “queue_award” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “queue_bid” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “queue_claim” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “queue_complete” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “queue_enqueue” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “queue_escalate” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “queue_fail” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “queue_heartbeat” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “queue_resolve” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “queue_status” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “quote” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “reputation” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “sale_record” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “seller_record” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “spend_gate” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “wallet_balance” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “authorize” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “authorize_get” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “uptime_report” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: 150 → 169 ▼ functional
- Schema quality: 11116 → 14269 ▼ functional
- New tool “budget_delegate” functional
- New tool “dispute_packet” functional
- New tool “guard” functional
- New tool “market_job” functional
- New tool “market_job_guarded” functional
- New tool “po_issue” functional
- New tool “po_redeem” functional
- New tool “settlement_cost” functional
- New tool “settlement_rescue” functional
- New tool “budget_create” functional
- New tool “budget_release” functional
- New tool “budget_spend” functional
- New tool “budget_status” functional
- New tool “checkout_close” functional
- New tool “checkout_open” functional
- New tool “delivery_check” functional
- New tool “facilitators” functional
- New tool “market_cheapest” functional
- New tool “name_resolve” functional
- New tool “pay_verify” functional
- New tool “sale_record” functional
- New tool “seller_record” functional
- New tool “spend_receipt” functional
- New tool “tx_decode” functional
- “budget_create” added an optional parameter “velocity_max_per_hour” cosmetic
- “market_find” added an optional parameter “need” cosmetic
- 17 Nov 26 +12
We did not load change detail this far back for this component, so this day may have recorded more than is shown.
- Authorization: unverified → partial ▲ security
- Tool “authorize” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool coverage: 15% → 100% ▲ functional
- Destructive annotations: All 2 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation. functional
- New tool “authorize_get” functional
- “authorize” added an optional parameter “spend” cosmetic
- “queue_complete” reworded the description of “item_id” cosmetic
- “receipt_put” reworded the description of “payer” cosmetic
- “handoff_pack” reworded the description of “required” cosmetic
- “freshness” reworded the description of “url” cosmetic
- “claim_evidence” reworded the description of “claim” cosmetic
- “jacket_create” reworded the description of “checkpoint” cosmetic
- “market_find” reworded the description of “network” cosmetic
- “handoff_pack” reworded the description of “to” cosmetic
- “queue_enqueue” reworded the description of “queue_id” cosmetic
- “failure_put” reworded the description of “to” cosmetic
- “uptime_watch” reworded the description of “url” cosmetic
- “queue_heartbeat” reworded the description of “worker_id” cosmetic
- “market_price_index” reworded the description of “min_payers” cosmetic
- “finance_refund_request” reworded the description of “receipt_ids” cosmetic
- “failure_put” reworded the description of “ttl_days” cosmetic
- “branch” reworded the description of “city” cosmetic
- “vendor_check” reworded the description of “method” cosmetic
- “finance_watchdog” reworded the description of “endpoints” cosmetic
- “ledger_append” reworded the description of “entry” cosmetic
- “wallet_runway” reworded the description of “address” cosmetic
- “finance_refund_request” reworded the description of “order” cosmetic
- “queue_resolve” reworded the description of “queue_id” cosmetic
- “queue_award” reworded the description of “queue_id” cosmetic
- “cost_estimate” reworded the description of “job” cosmetic
- “authorize” reworded the description of “passport_token” cosmetic
- “capability_card” reworded the description of “method” cosmetic
- “market_find” reworded the description of “live_check” cosmetic
- “market_reliability” reworded the description of “url” cosmetic
- “queue_fail” reworded the description of “retry” cosmetic
- “queue_complete” reworded the description of “worker_id” cosmetic
- “jacket_checkin” reworded the description of “checkpoint” cosmetic
- “contract_build” reworded the description of “terms” cosmetic
- “queue_bid” reworded the description of “item_id” cosmetic
- “finance_refund_request” reworded the description of “remedy” cosmetic
- “jacket_checkin” reworded the description of “state_patch” cosmetic
- “jacket_checkin” reworded the description of “state” cosmetic
- “jacket_checkin” reworded the description of “worker” cosmetic
- “spend_gate” reworded the description of “policy” cosmetic
- “contract_accept” reworded the description of “delivered” cosmetic
- “queue_complete” reworded the description of “result” cosmetic
- “context_diet” reworded the description of “max_string_chars” cosmetic
- “finance_refund_request” reworded the description of “failure” cosmetic
- “market_find” reworded the description of “limit” cosmetic
- “pobox_drop” reworded the description of “subject” cosmetic
- “context_diet” reworded the description of “max_list_items” cosmetic
- “receipt_put” reworded the description of “currency” cosmetic
- “jacket_checkin” reworded the description of “keep_lease” cosmetic
- “jacket_checkin” reworded the description of “note” cosmetic
- “queue_heartbeat” reworded the description of “queue_id” cosmetic
- “market_payee” reworded the description of “address” cosmetic
- “queue_fail” reworded the description of “worker_id” cosmetic
- “queue_escalate” reworded the description of “queue_id” cosmetic
- “dedupe” reworded the description of “namespace_key” cosmetic
- “queue_escalate” reworded the description of “item_id” cosmetic
- “branch” reworded the description of “url” cosmetic
- “authorize” reworded the description of “method” cosmetic
- “market_reliability” reworded the description of “method” cosmetic
- “queue_escalate” reworded the description of “worker_id” cosmetic
- “uptime_report” reworded the description of “id” cosmetic
- “handoff_pack” reworded the description of “ttl_days” cosmetic
- “queue_heartbeat” reworded the description of “checkpoint” cosmetic
- “terms_changed” reworded the description of “url” cosmetic
- “queue_create” reworded the description of “supervisor_box_id” cosmetic
- “queue_enqueue” reworded the description of “priority” cosmetic
- “tx_preflight” reworded the description of “max_price_usd” cosmetic
- “preflight” reworded the description of “job” cosmetic
- “ledger_get” reworded the description of “id” cosmetic
- “event_check” reworded the description of “claim” cosmetic
- “split_check” reworded the description of “network” cosmetic
- “tx_preflight” reworded the description of “expected_pay_to” cosmetic
- “receipt_put” reworded the description of “network” cosmetic
- “jacket_create” reworded the description of “passport_token” cosmetic
- “ledger_append” reworded the description of “ledger_id” cosmetic
- “finance_reconcile” reworded the description of “payments” cosmetic
- “finance_forecast” reworded the description of “spend” cosmetic
- “authorize” dropped the optional parameter “spent_today_usd” cosmetic
- Tool “changed” changed its title: Did a web page really change since your last visit? Content cosmetic
- Tool “secret_scan” changed its title: Secret-Leak Preflight cosmetic
- Tool “queue_fail” changed its title: Agent Workforce cosmetic
- Tool “queue_create” changed its title: Agent Workforce cosmetic
- Tool “queue_enqueue” changed its title: Agent Workforce cosmetic
- Tool “quote” changed its title: Price Quote cosmetic
- Tool “receipt_put” changed its title: Receipt Locker cosmetic
- Tool “queue_resolve” changed its title: Agent Workforce cosmetic
- Tool “tx_preflight” changed its title: Transaction Preflight cosmetic
- Tool “queue_claim” changed its title: Agent Workforce cosmetic
- Tool “jacket_create” changed its title: Job Jacket cosmetic
- Tool “preflight” changed its title: Agent Preflight cosmetic
- Tool “vendor_check” changed its title: Vendor Due-Diligence Pack cosmetic
- Tool “jacket_history” changed its title: Job Jacket history cosmetic
- Tool “pobox_drop” changed its title: Agent PO Box cosmetic
- Tool “queue_bid” changed its title: Agent Workforce cosmetic
- Tool “authorize” changed its title: OMENZ Authorize cosmetic
- Tool “finance_refund_request” changed its title: Structured Refund Request cosmetic
- Tool “pobox_inbox” changed its title: Agent PO Box cosmetic
- Tool “ledger_append” changed its title: Agent Job Ledger cosmetic
- Tool “split_check” changed its title: Split Check cosmetic
- Tool “market_payee” changed its title: Payee Check cosmetic
- Tool “freshness” changed its title: Source Freshness / Result TTL cosmetic
- 15 Nov 26 +1
We did not load change detail this far back for this component, so this day may have recorded more than is shown.
- 14 Nov 26 59
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://www.omenz.org/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=www.omenz.org | CN=YR1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 8 Nov 2026 | 6 Feb 2027 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 6029acb7cb517cf0e04f3b8b57aed385249 |
| SANs: www.omenz.org | ||||||
| CN=YR1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | a20253f15f2691c05dc1ce13b9bcca4e |
| CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | RSA 4096 | SHA256-RSA | f24b6d17f9d9ad7cb1c9fea78782699f |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of www.omenz.org. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| org. | DS published | 725 | 8 | Verified |
| omenz.org. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=63072000 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://www.omenz.org/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://www.omenz.org/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 308 | https://www.omenz.org/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
spend_receipt Spend Receipt ~273
Spend Receipt: one signed receipt per purchase: what your agent bought, why, what it cost (verified on Base from the tx hash or PAYMENT-RESPONSE) and what came back (checked against the seller's advertised output). GOOD_BUY / PAID_NOT_DELIVERED / PAID_PARTLY_DELIVERED / PAYMENT_NOT_CONFIRMED. Ed25519-signed, verifiable offline. Payment Verify + Delivery Check in one call. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/spend-receipt, $0.003 via x402.)
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent | string | – | agent |
| delivered | – | – | delivered |
| expected_amount_usd | number | – | expected amount usd |
| expected_pay_to | string | – | payout wallet you expect (0x...), to catch swapped payees |
| job_id | string | – | job id |
| method | string | – | HTTP method of the target endpoint (GET or POST) |
| payment_response | string | – | payment response |
| purpose | string | – | purpose |
| schema | object | – | schema |
| tx_hash | string | – | tx hash |
| url | string | yes | full https URL to check |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
split_check Split Check ~195
Split Check: before paying into (or trusting) an on-chain revenue split, verify what it actually pays. Detects 0xSplits v2 splits on Base / Base Sepolia, proves a claimed recipients+allocations config against the on-chain splitHash (or discovers it from recent events), shows each recipient's share, whether a given beneficiary is included, whether the split is immutable (no owner), and USDC waiting to be distributed. Read-only. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/split-check, $0.002 via x402.)
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | 0x... contract or wallet address |
| beneficiary | string | – | beneficiary |
| claimed | object | – | claimed |
| network | string | – | chain name, e.g. base |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
swapmeet_search AI Agent Swap Meet search (free) ~57
Free. Search ~35,000 paid agent services (x402 Bazaar) by what you need; shows busy booths and OMENZ-verified history.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| q | string | yes | what you need, e.g. 'token price' |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
terms_changed Terms Changed? ~167
Terms Changed?: did an API or tool's pricing, limits or terms page change in a way that MATTERS? Keeps only material lines (prices, numbers with units, rate limits/quotas, commercial-use, prohibitions, refunds, data retention) and diffs them against your last fingerprint: exact lines added/removed, money_changed flag. Footer/date churn ignored. Stateless: keep the fingerprint, pass it as previous=. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/terms-changed, $0.005 via x402.)
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| previous | string | – | fingerprint from your last call |
| url | string | yes | full https URL to check |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
terms_extract API Terms Extractor / Data-License Checker ~167
API Terms Extractor / Data-License Checker: before your agent uses a dataset or API commercially: a terms/license page -> clauses by category (commercial use, attribution, rate limits, retention, training on your data, prohibited uses, resale, refunds, liability, termination, license type) with quotes, plus plain flags (no_commercial_use, attribution_required, may_train_on_your_data, no_resale, no_scraping, non_refundable). Pattern-based, not legal advice. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/terms-extract, $0.005 via x402.)
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| url | string | yes | full https URL to check |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
token_balance Token Balance (Base) ~151
Token Balance (Base): balance of any ERC-20 (symbol + decimals resolved) or native ETH for an address, raw and human units, read live from Base. For agents checking they can afford a purchase, or that a payment arrived. Public chain data, never needs a key. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/token/balance, $0.002 via x402.)
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | 0x... contract or wallet address |
| token | string | – | ERC-20 address on Base; omit or 'eth' for native ETH |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
tx_decode Transaction Decode (Base) ~159
Transaction Decode (Base): what did this transaction actually do, in plain English. Status, confirmations, function called, every token transfer (symbol + amount), approvals (UNLIMITED approvals flagged), NFT moves, fee, time, and whether it was an x402 payment (EIP-3009 transferWithAuthorization). For agents checking a payment, a refund, or what a contract just did with their money. Public chain data, never needs a key. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/tx/decode, $0.002 via x402.)
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| tx_hash | string | yes | tx hash |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
tx_preflight Transaction Preflight ~231
Transaction Preflight: GO or STOP before your agent pays an x402 endpoint. Checks it answers, the live price is within max_price_usd, payTo matches expected_pay_to, the network is allowed, the asset is a known USD stablecoin, and flags drift from the price you were quoted/listed. Never pays the target. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/tx-preflight, $0.002 via x402.)
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| allow_testnet | boolean | – | allow testnet |
| expected_pay_to | string | – | payout wallet you expect (0x...), to catch swapped payees |
| listed_price_usd | number | – | listed price usd |
| max_price_usd | number | – | most you are willing to pay per call, in USD |
| method | string | – | HTTP method of the target endpoint (GET or POST) |
| networks | array | – | networks |
| url | string | yes | full https URL to check |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
uptime_report Uptime Watch report ~133
Uptime Watch report: uptime %, median latency, incidents, price changes and payout-wallet changes for a watched endpoint, plus recent checks. When the endpoint is down (or substitutes=true) it also returns the 3 best live substitutes from ~35,000 x402 APIs. Header X-Watch-Key. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/uptime/report, $0.002 via x402.)
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | id returned by the create/put call |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
uptime_watch Uptime Watch ~175
Uptime Watch: register a paid endpoint your agent depends on; OMENZ checks it daily (and on each report) for 30 days: up/down, latency, live x402 price and payTo, so you catch outages, price drift and swapped payout wallets before paying. Never pays the endpoint. Returns watch_id + watch_key (shown once). By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/uptime/watch, $0.01 via x402.)
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| days | integer | – | how many days to keep it (1-30) |
| method | string | – | HTTP method of the target endpoint (GET or POST) |
| url | string | yes | full https URL to check |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
vendor_check Vendor Due-Diligence Pack ~134
Vendor Due-Diligence Pack: before your agent depends on an unknown paid API: reliability score + the vendor domain's health (live/parked/moved) + its terms/pricing page digest (material lines) + flags. Never pays. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/vendor-check, $0.01 via x402.)
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| method | string | – | HTTP method of the target endpoint (GET or POST) |
| url | string | yes | full https URL to check |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wallet_balance Agent Wallet Balance ~99
Agent Wallet Balance: USDC and ETH balance of any wallet on Base (public chain data). Never moves funds, no key needed. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/wallet/balance, $0.002 via x402.)
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | 0x... contract or wallet address |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wallet_runway Agent Wallet Runway ~158
Agent Wallet Runway: how many days before this agent wallet runs dry? USDC balance / recent daily spend -> days left, OK / LOW / CRITICAL, and the top cost drivers by payee. Public chain data on Base. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/wallet/runway, $0.005 via x402.)
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | 0x... contract or wallet address |
| critical_days | number | – | critical days |
| days | number | – | how many days to keep it (1-30) |
| low_days | number | – | low days |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wallet_spend Agent Wallet Spend Report ~172
Agent Wallet Spend Report: what has this wallet been paying for? Outgoing USDC payments on Base over the last N days (max 14), grouped by payee, each payee named with the x402 services that pay out to it (from the ~35k-endpoint x402 index), totals, daily rate, micropayment count, share going to known x402 sellers. Public chain data. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/wallet/spend, $0.005 via x402.)
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | 0x... contract or wallet address |
| days | number | – | how many days to keep it (1-30) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wallet_watch Wallet Watch ~209
Wallet Watch: never run dry mid-job. Register an agent's Base wallet with min_usdc and/or min_days (runway at its recent spend rate); OMENZ checks it daily for up to 30 days and drops ONE alert into your Agent PO Box when it runs low (re-arms after you top up). Read-only public chain data; never touches the wallet. Returns watch_id + watch_key (shown once). By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/wallet-watch, $0.01 via x402.)
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | 0x... contract or wallet address |
| days | integer | – | how many days to keep it (1-30) |
| min_days | number | – | min days |
| min_usdc | number | – | min usdc |
| pobox_id | string | – | pobox id |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wallet_watch_report Wallet Watch report ~105
Wallet Watch report: current USDC, runway days, state OK / ALERTING, low checks and the last 14 checks. Header X-Watch-Key. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/wallet-watch/report, $0.002 via x402.)
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | id returned by the create/put call |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the OMENZ agent tools MCP server?
OMENZ agent tools is a hosted endpoint at https://www.omenz.org/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · www.omenz.org
claude mcp add --transport http org-omenz-www-agent-tools 'https://www.omenz.org/mcp'
What is the OMENZ agent tools MCP server?
OMENZ agent tools is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as org.omenz.www/agent-tools. For agents that pay: Authorize (OFAC screen), Guard, Send Check, Checkout, Rescue, budgets, x402. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://www.omenz.org/mcp).
Is the OMENZ agent tools MCP server safe to use?
OMENZ agent tools scores 67 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the OMENZ agent tools MCP server expose?
OMENZ agent tools exposes 116 tools: agent_ready, site_check, changed, local_facts, locker_put, and 111 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 19,276 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the OMENZ agent tools MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to OMENZ agent tools without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the OMENZ agent tools MCP server still maintained?
OMENZ agent tools is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the OMENZ agent tools MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 12 checks on OMENZ agent tools, covering TLS certificate, HTTPS, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 8 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about OMENZ agent tools: Authorization. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.