Conduit Router — Governed MCP Routing
REMOTE · ROUTER.PIPAVIA.COM
Governed MCP routing: every agent call spend-capped, metered, sealed with a verifiable receipt.
Available components
Last scanned (17 hours ago)
Scores higher than 74% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security89
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation is enforced on tool calls, but the challenge carries no valid RFC 9728 metadata, so a client cannot discover where to get a token. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability72
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 428 tokens (~71/item across 6 items; 6 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management30
- Stability observed for 9 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- All 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 6 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities60
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Checks we ran (13)
- TLS certificate
- Authorization
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 20 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 23 to 27. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 7 days of observed history at the previous scan, 8 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 18 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 17 to 20. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 5 days of observed history at the previous scan, 6 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 16 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 10 to 13. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 3 days of observed history at the previous scan, 4 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 14 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 3 to 7. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 1 days of observed history at the previous scan, 2 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 13 Nov 26 0
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 12 Nov 26 +39
- Transport: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
- First check of Judged manipulation: pass security
- Authorization: Authorisation is enforced on tool calls, but the challenge carries no valid RFC 9728 metadata, so a client cannot discover where to get a token. security
- MCP protocol: unverified → fail ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- First check of Schema quality: fail functional
- First check of Destructive annotations: 100 functional
- First check of Schema quality: pass functional
- First check of Schema quality: good functional
- First check of Tool coverage: 100 functional
- 11 Nov 26 36
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://router.pipavia.com/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=pipavia.com | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 13 Oct 2026 | 11 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | 875d9e456bedb44d0ecdd76ceb49de6d |
| SANs: pipavia.com, router.pipavia.com, *.router.pipavia.com | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of router.pipavia.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | DS published | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| pipavia.com. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication Challenged, unverified
The endpoint asked for a token, but we could not retrieve and validate the RFC 9728 metadata that tells a client how to obtain one.
| Result | Challenged, unverified |
|---|---|
| Enforced | On tool calls |
| HTTP status | 200 |
WWW-Authenticate challenge Bearer resource_metadata="https://router.pipavia.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource"
Bearer resource_metadata="https://router.pipavia.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource" | Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains |
Protected resource metadata
| Document | https://router.pipavia.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource |
|---|---|
| Retrieved | Yes |
| Problem | Metadata incomplete |
| Resource | https://router.pipavia.com/mcp |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://router.pipavia.com/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://router.pipavia.com/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://router.pipavia.com/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
get_policy Read your standing terms ~40
Your key's standing terms (mandate): task profile, per-request and daily budgets, model allowlist, fallback chain, region — plus kill-switch state.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_receipt Fetch a call receipt ~68
One of your calls' audit receipts (id like "rcpt_12") with its hash-chain proof: record hash validity, successor linkage, and the current chain head.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| receipt_id | string | yes | The receipt id from a routed call, e.g. "rcpt_12". |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_usage Check usage and budget headroom ~38
Your cumulative meter (requests, tokens, provider cost, router charge), today's spend against your daily budget, and which providers you have keys stored for.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_models List routable models ~36
The public model catalog: every model the router can serve, with provider, free-tier flag, task profiles, and pricing source/as-of.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
route_chat Route a chat completion ~186
Send a chat completion through Conduit Router: policy-checked, budget-checked, metered, and audit-receipted. Uses your own stored provider keys (BYOK). Pin a model as "provider:model" or let your standing terms choose.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| max_tokens | number | – | Optional cap on the completion's output tokens. |
| messages | array | yes | OpenAI-shaped messages: [{role, content}] with role system|user|assistant|tool. |
| model | string | – | Optional pin: "provider:model" (e.g. "groq:llama-3.3-70b-versatile"), "custom:<endpoint_id>:<model>", or a bare catalog model id. |
| task_profile | string | – | Optional routing profile: reasoning (deepest models), tool-use, or bulk (cheapest/fastest). Defaults to your standing terms. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_receipt Verify a receipt record ~60
Cryptographically verify a receipt record (yours or anyone's) against the router's audit chain: the record hash must recompute and the stored record at that sequence must match.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| receipt | object | yes | The full audit record object from a receipt. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Conduit Router — Governed MCP Routing server?
Conduit Router — Governed MCP Routing is a hosted endpoint at https://router.pipavia.com/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · router.pipavia.com
claude mcp add --transport http org-aimlds-conduit-router 'https://router.pipavia.com/mcp'
What is the Conduit Router — Governed MCP Routing server?
Conduit Router — Governed MCP Routing is listed in the public MCP registry as org.aimlds/conduit-router. Governed MCP routing: every agent call spend-capped, metered, sealed with a verifiable receipt. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://router.pipavia.com/mcp).
Is the Conduit Router — Governed MCP Routing server safe to use?
Conduit Router — Governed MCP Routing scores 79 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Conduit Router — Governed MCP Routing server expose?
Conduit Router — Governed MCP Routing exposes 6 tools: route_chat, list_models, get_usage, get_receipt, verify_receipt, get_policy. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 428 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Conduit Router — Governed MCP Routing server require authentication?
Yes. Conduit Router — Governed MCP Routing asked us for credentials when we connected, so you will need to authorise it in your MCP client before it can do anything.
Is the Conduit Router — Governed MCP Routing server still maintained?
Conduit Router — Governed MCP Routing is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the Conduit Router — Governed MCP Routing server?
VerifyMCP ran 13 checks on Conduit Router — Governed MCP Routing, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HTTPS, HSTS header and 9 more. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.