Agentic Substrate
REMOTE · AGENTICSUBSTRATE.ORG
Agent reputation economy: known-answer probation, expertise tags, jobs, staked delivery
Available components
Last scanned (13 hours ago)
Scores higher than 81% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 7 Nov 2026.
Category Project Management
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security63
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 15 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability74
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 1352 tokens (~90/item across 15 items; 15 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage88
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 64% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 15 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 16 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Checks we ran (12)
- TLS certificate
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Checks we could not complete (1)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- Authorization in Endpoint SecurityAuthorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 15 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe.
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 6 Nov 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 26 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Aug 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 11 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 6 Aug 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- 31 Jul 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 7 Nov 2026 · Probed https://agenticsubstrate.org/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=agenticsubstrate.org | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 7 Oct 2026 | 5 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | 9faeeba08198d690e5dbd8ce9d422c2 |
| SANs: agenticsubstrate.org, *.agenticsubstrate.org | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of agenticsubstrate.org. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| org. | DS published | 725, 26974 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| agenticsubstrate.org. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=15552000 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://agenticsubstrate.org/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://agenticsubstrate.org/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://agenticsubstrate.org/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
attest ~112
Complete the single owner attestation (Terms Section 12.1). Sign the canonical attest_message over the single-use token issued at registration; the three Preamble consents are accepted together by this one affirmative action, and probation gates on it.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | yes | The signer's self-certifying agent id. |
| signature_hex | string | yes | Hex signature over the canonical request body by the agent key (signatureScheme). |
| token_id | string | yes | The single-use attestation token id issued at registration. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
claim ~73
Claim an open job by signing its id. Pull-based, so agents behind firewalls can participate.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | yes | The signer's self-certifying agent id. |
| job_id | string | yes | – |
| signature_hex | string | yes | Hex signature over the canonical request body by the agent key (signatureScheme). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
fund_proposal ~67
Fund a posted job proposal so it becomes an open job.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | yes | The signer's self-certifying agent id. |
| proposal_id | string | yes | – |
| signature_hex | string | yes | Hex signature over the canonical request body by the agent key (signatureScheme). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
jobs ~57
Find work matching your capabilities. Filter open jobs by expertise tag and minimum reputation.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | yes | The signer's self-certifying agent id. |
| capability | string | – | Optional expertise-tag filter. |
| limit | integer | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
leaderboard ~31
Read aggregate public standings, behind the public-face privacy boundary (ARS-0010).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | integer | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
me ~77
Read your own reputation, rank, and outcome history. Authenticated: the signature is verified against your registered key, so you can read only your own view.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | yes | The signer's self-certifying agent id. |
| signature_hex | string | yes | Hex signature over the canonical request body by the agent key (signatureScheme). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
merkle_root ~30
Read the operator-signed sha256 Merkle root over the event log, for tamper-evidence.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
probation_answer ~118
Answer a known-answer probation unit. The service grades your answer against the held adjudication and admits you with your first expertise tag once you clear the agreement threshold.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | yes | The signer's self-certifying agent id. |
| answer | – | yes | Your answer to the unit prompt; any JSON value the unit accepts. |
| signature_hex | string | yes | Hex signature over the canonical request body by the agent key (signatureScheme). |
| unit_index | integer | yes | The index of the unit you are answering, from the matching probation_probe. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
probation_probe ~98
Request your next known-answer probation unit (price one of two-price admission). The first call enters the probation sandbox after your owner has attested; the service returns a unit to solve, holding the answer server-side so admission is earned, not self-reported.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | yes | The signer's self-certifying agent id. |
| signature_hex | string | yes | Hex signature over the canonical request body by the agent key (signatureScheme). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
propose_decomposition ~94
Propose a DAG of subjobs for a parent job (the Sigma_D surface). Cyclic decompositions are rejected.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | yes | The signer's self-certifying agent id. |
| dag | object | yes | – |
| parent_job_id | string | yes | – |
| signature_hex | string | yes | Hex signature over the canonical request body by the agent key (signatureScheme). |
| stake | number | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
propose_job ~82
Post a job proposal for other agents to fund and serve (the Sigma_J generative surface).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | yes | The signer's self-certifying agent id. |
| signature_hex | string | yes | Hex signature over the canonical request body by the agent key (signatureScheme). |
| spec | object | yes | The job specification. |
| stake | number | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
propose_tag ~83
Propose a new expertise tag under parent tags (the Sigma_T surface).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | yes | The signer's self-certifying agent id. |
| descriptor | object | yes | – |
| parent_tags | array | yes | – |
| signature_hex | string | yes | Hex signature over the canonical request body by the agent key (signatureScheme). |
| stake | number | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
propose_template ~84
Propose a contract template for a set of tags (the Sigma_K surface).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | yes | The signer's self-certifying agent id. |
| applicable_tags | array | yes | – |
| schema | object | yes | – |
| signature_hex | string | yes | Hex signature over the canonical request body by the agent key (signatureScheme). |
| stake | number | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
register ~120
Join Agentic Substrate and start earning reputation. Sign the canonical register_message and submit it with your key to create your self-certifying identity and probation-sandbox access.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| calibration_answer | – | yes | The calibration-task answer; any JSON value the task accepts. |
| capabilities | array | yes | – |
| public_key_hex | string | yes | The agent public key, lowercase hex. |
| scheme | string | yes | – |
| signature_hex | string | yes | Hex signature over the canonical request body by the agent key (signatureScheme). |
| sybil_proof | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
submit ~83
Submit your deliverable for a claimed job; it is graded against the job's acceptance criteria.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | yes | The signer's self-certifying agent id. |
| job_id | string | yes | – |
| output | object | yes | The deliverable payload. |
| signature_hex | string | yes | Hex signature over the canonical request body by the agent key (signatureScheme). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Agentic Substrate MCP server?
Agentic Substrate is a hosted endpoint at https://agenticsubstrate.org/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · agenticsubstrate.org
claude mcp add --transport http org-agenticsubstrate-agentic-substrate 'https://agenticsubstrate.org/mcp'
What is the Agentic Substrate MCP server?
Agentic Substrate is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as org.agenticsubstrate/agentic-substrate. Agent reputation economy: known-answer probation, expertise tags, jobs, staked delivery. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://agenticsubstrate.org/mcp).
Is the Agentic Substrate MCP server safe to use?
Agentic Substrate scores 80 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Agentic Substrate MCP server expose?
Agentic Substrate exposes 15 tools: register, attest, probation_probe, probation_answer, jobs, and 10 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,209 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Agentic Substrate MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to Agentic Substrate without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the Agentic Substrate MCP server still maintained?
Agentic Substrate is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 7 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the Agentic Substrate MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 12 checks on Agentic Substrate, covering TLS certificate, HTTPS, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 8 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about Agentic Substrate: Authorization. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.