three.ws Provenance
NPM · @THREE-WS/PROVENANCE-MCP · SCANNED AUG 3
Append-only, signed, on-chain-verifiable agent action log — record and audit what agents did.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score →
Supply Chain Security87
- No malware found by supply-chain analysis.Pass
- Only part of the dependency tree could be resolved (104 of 108), so this covers what we could see, not the whole tree.Partial
- No install/post-install scripts declared.Pass
- Only part of the dependency tree could be resolved (104 of 108), so this covers what we could see, not the whole tree. View diagnostics → Partial
Provenance & Transparency45
- Source repository is publicly reachable at the declared URL. View diagnostics → Pass
- Provenance check failed: no build-provenance attestation is published. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- Clear OSI-approved license (Apache-2.0).Pass
- Actively maintained (last published 29 days ago).Pass
- Disclosure check failed: no security disclosure policy was found in the source repository. See how to fix → Fail
Schema Quality & AI Usability60
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1013 tokens (~337/item across 3 items; 3 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management0
- Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).Unverified
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Unverified: 1 category
A category scored 0 because we could not verify it: a data source with nothing on this package, evidence we could not reach, or a check we could not run. We only credit what we can confirm.
Add this component to your MCP client. Where a client-specific snippet is available, pick your client below and copy it straight into your config; otherwise use the connection detail shown.
npm · @three-ws/provenance-mcp
claude mcp add nirholas-provenance-mcp -- npx -y @three-ws/provenance-mcp
codex mcp add nirholas-provenance-mcp -- npx -y @three-ws/provenance-mcp
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"nirholas-provenance-mcp": {
"type": "local",
"command": [
"npx",
"-y",
"@three-ws/provenance-mcp"
],
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add nirholas-provenance-mcp --command npx --arg -y --arg @three-ws/provenance-mcp
mcp_servers:
nirholas-provenance-mcp:
command: "npx"
args: ["-y", "@three-ws/provenance-mcp"] {
"mcpServers": {
"nirholas-provenance-mcp": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@three-ws/provenance-mcp"
]
}
}
} Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 2 Aug 26 +25
- Provenance: unverified → fail ▼ security
- Install scripts: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Known CVEs: unverified → partial ▲ security
- Stability: Stability not yet verified: we do not have a sandbox capture of the MCP schema this version of the package serves yet. security
- Capabilities: pass → unverified ▼ functional
- Maintenance: unverified → pass ▲ functional
- Dependency health: unverified → partial ▲ functional
- License: unverified → pass ▲ functional
- Schema quality: unverified → excellent ▲ functional
- Licence: Apache-2.0 functional
- 1 Aug 26 +20
- Malware scan: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Stability: Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window). security
- MCP protocol: unverified → pass ▲ functional
- 31 Jul 26 −7
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 30 Jul 26 −18
- Malware scan: pass → unverified ▼ security
- 27 Jul 26 42
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 3 Aug 2026 · Analysed npm/@three-ws/[email protected]
Provenance none
Ecosystem: npm · Outcome: none
Dependencies 104 packages
104 packages in the resolved dependency tree · 102 deprecated · 30 stale.
The dependency tree was only partially resolved, so these counts may be incomplete.
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability.
append_agent_action Append a signed action to the provenance ledger ~361
Record an action in an agent's append-only provenance ledger — the permanent, auditable trail of what the agent did. Provide `agent_id` (THREE_WS_TOKEN must own it), a short `type` (≤64 chars, e.g. launch, buy, post, reflect), an optional structured `payload`, and an optional `source_skill`. WRITE ACTION: this APPENDS a new immutable record — it can never be edited or deleted, and calling it twice records two distinct actions, so don't retry blindly. When an EVM signer is configured (THREE_WS_SIGNER_KEY env or the `signer_key` arg) the action is ERC-191-signed before sending, making its authorship publicly verifiable; with no key it is appended unsigned. Returns the stored record (with id + created_at) and a `signing` block reporting whether it was signed and by which address.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | yes | The agent identity id to record the action under. Your token must own it. |
| payload | object | — | Structured details of the action (any JSON object) — e.g. { mint, amount_sol, signature }. Stored verbatim and covered by the signature. |
| signer_key | string | — | Optional 0x-prefixed EVM private key to ERC-191-sign this action. Overrides THREE_WS_SIGNER_KEY for this call. Omit to use the env key, or sign nothing if none is set. |
| source_skill | string | — | Identifier of the skill/tool that produced this action, for attribution in the trail. |
| type | string | yes | Short action type, e.g. launch, buy, sell, post, reflect, follow. Truncated to 64 chars server-side. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_agent_actions List an agent's action-provenance trail ~253
Read an agent's append-only action log, newest-first, cursor-paginated. Returns each action's id, type (e.g. launch, buy, post, reflect), payload, source_skill, created_at, and — when the action was signed — its ERC-191 signature + signer_address. Each record is checked against its own signature: `verification.reason` is `ok` (recovered signer matches the claimed address), `unsigned`, `signer_mismatch` (recovered a different address — tampering OR an action signed under a different canonical scheme; treat as unverified, not trusted), or `malformed_signature`. Pass the returned `next_cursor` back as `cursor` to page further. The ledger is owner-scoped: THREE_WS_TOKEN must own `agent_id`. Read-only; the log is immutable so older pages never change.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | yes | The agent identity id whose provenance trail to read. Your token must own it. |
| cursor | string | — | Pagination cursor — pass the `next_cursor` from a previous call to fetch the next (older) page. |
| limit | integer | — | Max actions to return (1–200, default 50). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
query_action Fetch + verify one provenance action ~218
Fetch a single action from an agent's append-only log by its id, then verify it. Returns the action (type, payload, source_skill, created_at, signature, signer_address) plus a `verification` block: `signed`, `valid`, `reason` (`ok` | `unsigned` | `signer_mismatch` | `malformed_signature`), the `recovered` signer address, and the recomputed `digest`. `valid:true` means the ERC-191 signature recovers to the claimed signer over the canonical action form — cryptographic proof the named agent authored this exact action and it was not altered. The ledger is owner-scoped: THREE_WS_TOKEN must own `agent_id`. Returns ok:false / not_found when the id is absent from this agent's log. Read-only.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | yes | The agent identity id that owns the action. Your token must own this agent. |
| id | string | yes | The numeric action id to fetch (the `id` field from list_agent_actions). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.