network.flint/agent-transaction-control
REMOTE · FLINT.NETWORK · SCANNED SEP 25
Issue Agent Passports and verify agent authority before value moves. Signed verification records.
Available components
Recent critical change
Authorization (28 Aug 2026). See the changelog before you install this server.
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security63
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation check failed: no authorisation is required to call this server, and it exposes a tool marked destructive (run_flint_scout). See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability65
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 4487 tokens (~263/item across 17 items; 17 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management85
- Stability check failed: schema churn in the 30 days we've observed: 1 tool removals, 1 breaking changes, 0 auth/transport breaks, 8 additions. See how to fix → Fail
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 99% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 17 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 18 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
How do I install the network.flint/agent-transaction-control MCP server?
network.flint/agent-transaction-control is a hosted endpoint at https://flint.network/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · flint.network
claude mcp add --transport http network-flint-agent-transaction-control 'https://flint.network/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"network-flint-agent-transaction-control": {
"url": "https://flint.network/mcp"
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"network-flint-agent-transaction-control": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://flint.network/mcp"
}
}
} [mcp_servers.network-flint-agent-transaction-control] url = "https://flint.network/mcp"
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"network-flint-agent-transaction-control": {
"type": "remote",
"url": "https://flint.network/mcp",
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add network-flint-agent-transaction-control --url 'https://flint.network/mcp' --transport streamable-http
mcp_servers:
network-flint-agent-transaction-control:
url: "https://flint.network/mcp" {
"McpServers": {
"network-flint-agent-transaction-control": {
"Transport": "http",
"Url": "https://flint.network/mcp"
}
}
} assistant mcp add network-flint-agent-transaction-control -t streamable-http -u 'https://flint.network/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"network-flint-agent-transaction-control": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://flint.network/mcp"
}
}
} The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 23 Sept 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Tool “issue_agent_passport” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- “issue_agent_passport” reworded the description of “agent” cosmetic
- “issue_agent_passport” reworded the description of “mandate” cosmetic
- 13 Sept 26 0
- Tool “scout_credits_topup” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- 12 Sept 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- New tool “scout_credits_topup”, which the server declares destructive security
- Tool “get_agent_passport” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “issue_agent_passport” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “run_flint_scout” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “update_agent_mandate” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: 187 → 251 ▼ functional
- Server version: 0.3.0 → 0.5.0 functional
- New tool “auth_request_otp” functional
- New tool “auth_verify_otp” functional
- New tool “claim_agent_passport” functional
- New tool “refresh_claim_token” functional
- New tool “report_scout_outcome” functional
- New tool “scout_credits_balance” functional
- “get_agent_passport” added an optional parameter “session_token” cosmetic
- “issue_agent_passport” added an optional parameter “session_token” cosmetic
- “issue_agent_passport” added an optional parameter “supersede_management_token” cosmetic
- “run_flint_scout” added an optional parameter “session_token” cosmetic
- “update_agent_mandate” added an optional parameter “session_token” cosmetic
- “issue_agent_passport” reworded the description of “agent” cosmetic
- 31 Aug 26 −2
- Stability: pass → fail ▼ security
- A breaking change shipped without a version bump: still 0.3.0 ▼ security
- Tool “submit_transaction_outcome” was removed ▼ security
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- “verify_agent_authority” added a required parameter “expected_merchant_reference”, so existing callers break ▼ functional
- “verify_agent_authority” added a required parameter “expected_partner_id”, so existing callers break ▼ functional
- “update_agent_mandate” added an optional parameter “management_token” cosmetic
- 28 Aug 26 −1
- Authorization: unverified → fail ▼ critical
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- New tool “run_flint_scout”, which the server declares destructive security
- Schema quality: 1661 → 1958 ▼ functional
- Server version: 0.2.0 → 0.3.0 functional
- 26 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Aug 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 25 Sept 2026 · Probed https://flint.network/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=*.flint.network | CN=YR1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 4 Sept 2026 | 3 Dec 2026 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 576bb7b65e8990a539973999631a41e8dfe |
| SANs: *.flint.network, flint.network | ||||||
| CN=YR1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | a20253f15f2691c05dc1ce13b9bcca4e |
| CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | RSA 4096 | SHA256-RSA | f24b6d17f9d9ad7cb1c9fea78782699f |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of flint.network. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| network. | present | 40414 | 8 | Verified |
| flint.network. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-frame-options | SAMEORIGIN |
| referrer-policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin |
| permissions-policy | geolocation=(), microphone=(), camera=(), payment=(), usb=() |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://flint.network/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://flint.network/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 308 | https://flint.network/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
auth_request_otp Request Sign-In Code ~104
Use this tool first in the agent-native authenticate-then-mint flow. It asks FLINT to email a one-time sign-in code to the given inbox address. Read the code from that inbox, then call auth_verify_otp with the same email and the code. Authenticating first means the passport you mint afterward is owned by the account immediately, with no separate claim step.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| string | yes | Inbox address that will receive the one-time sign-in code. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
auth_verify_otp Verify Sign-In Code ~143
Use this tool right after auth_request_otp, with the code from the inbox. On success it returns session_token. Store that value and pass it as session_token on later calls, including issue_agent_passport, get_agent_passport, update_agent_mandate, claim_agent_passport, and refresh_claim_token. Never print or log session_token; treat it like a password.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| code | string | yes | The one-time sign-in code from the inbox. |
| string | yes | The same inbox address auth_request_otp was called with. | |
| label | string | – | Optional human-readable label for this session, such as the agent or workflow name. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
claim_agent_passport Claim Agent Passport ~194
Use this tool to attach an anonymously minted, unclaimed FLINT Agent Passport to an authenticated FLINT account. Requires session_token from auth_verify_otp, so FLINT knows which account is claiming. Pass claim_token from the mint's claim_url, or omit it when this same session already holds a pending claim for this passport_id. Once claimed the passport is owned and Sentinel protection turns on. A passport can only be claimed once; if the token was already used or lost, call refresh_claim_token for a fresh one instead of trying to remint.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| claim_token | string | – | The one-time claim token from claim_url. Omit only when this session already started a pending claim for this passport. |
| passport_id | string | yes | FLINT Agent Passport id, beginning with kya_. |
| session_token | string | yes | Agent session token from auth_verify_otp for the account that is claiming this passport. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
create_flint_trust_manifest Create FLINT Trust Manifest ~312
Use this tool when a merchant, API seller, MCP tool provider, x402 endpoint, or agent storefront needs a `/.well-known/flint.json` Trust Manifest. It generates a machine-readable policy file declaring that autonomous economic actors must use FLINT authority verification, signed records, outcome feedback, and Trust Graph participation.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| accepted_principals | array | – | Trusted delegated-authority principal issuers. |
| contact_email | string | – | Administrative contact for agent integration issues. |
| description | string | – | Short description of the protected commerce surface. |
| domain | string | – | Merchant or API seller origin, such as https://api.example.com. |
| jwks_url | string | – | FLINT JWKS URL. Defaults to FLINT production JWKS. |
| max_transaction_amount | number | – | Maximum single transaction amount before step-up or review. |
| mcp_endpoint | string | – | FLINT MCP endpoint. Defaults to FLINT production `/mcp`. |
| name | string | – | Human-readable merchant, API, or platform name. |
| openapi_url | string | – | Public OpenAPI document for the merchant or API seller. |
| outcome_endpoint | string | – | Outcome feedback endpoint. Defaults to FLINT production `/api/outcomes`. |
| partner_id | string | – | Merchant or platform identifier. Defaults to sandbox_public. |
| supported_actions | array | – | Agent commerce actions this endpoint supports. |
| verify_endpoint | string | – | FLINT verification endpoint. Defaults to FLINT production `/api/verify`. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
generate_authorization_scope Generate Authorization Scope ~202
Use this tool when an agent commerce workflow needs a well-formed delegated authorization scope before issuing a signed verification record. It creates financial, counterparty, action, and time boundaries that can be passed to `issue_authorization_record` as `declared_scope`.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| allowed_actions | array | – | Permitted actions, such as checkout, paid_api_access, x402_request, or stablecoin_transfer. |
| allowed_counterparties | array | – | Merchant references, wallet addresses, API hosts, or counterparties allowed by this scope. |
| asset | string | – | Asset or unit, such as USD, USDC, or credits. Defaults to USD. |
| max_amount_per_tx | number | yes | Maximum amount allowed per transaction. |
| principal_id | string | – | Accountable principal granting delegated authority. |
| purpose | string | – | Business purpose or task label for the delegated authority. |
| time_window_end | string | yes | ISO-8601 timestamp for scope expiration. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_agent_passport Get Agent Passport ~102
Use this tool to resolve a public FLINT Agent Passport by passport_id. It returns compact identity, mandate, status, ownership, and the public passport URL without echoing the full signed envelope. session_token is optional and not required to read a passport; the lookup itself is public.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| passport_id | string | yes | FLINT Agent Passport id, beginning with kya_. |
| session_token | string | – | Optional agent session token from auth_verify_otp. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
issue_agent_passport Issue Agent Passport ~797
Use this tool to issue a free FLINT Agent Passport: a hybrid-signed, verifiable identity credential for an autonomous agent. Before calling it, ask the principal for the accountable controller_id and controller_type, allowed actions, maximum transaction amount, and wallet address if one exists. Do not infer or invent authority. For the strongest available setup, authenticate first and mint with the principal-supplied identity and mandate. The zero-config path only needs agent.agent_name or agent.agent_id, but that result is identity-only and is not ready to transact until the missing authority is supplied. A missing controller requires a corrected remint because signed identity is immutable; a missing mandate can be added later. The passport signs identity only; the spending mandate is separate, mutable config that can be updated later without reissuing the passport. Pass session_token, from auth_verify_otp, to mint owned: the passport binds to your authenticated account immediately and there is no claim step or claim_url. Omit session_token to mint anonymously instead; that returns a one-time claim_url and the passport stays unclaimed until someone signs in and claims it. controller_id identifies who is accountable on the signed identity, which is not the same as the FLINT account that owns the passport; controller_name is a separate, optional, human-readable display label. Allowed actions must come from the FLINT mandate vocabulary: commerce_purchase, checkout.purchase, invoice.pay, subscription.renew, refund.request, quote.retrieve, x402_verification_purchase, stablecoin_transfer, paid_api_access, x402_request, agent_checkout, delegated_spending, project.read. Pass ["ALL"] as a preset to grant every action in one step; the stored mandate then expands to the full list and records the preset. Unknown strings are kept for backward compatibility but are reported back as unknown so the caller can fix them. The signed identity is immutable once minted, so a wrong agen…
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent | object | yes | Agent identity. Only agent_name or agent_id is required for an identity-only mint. Ask the principal for controller_id and controller_type before minting a Passport intended for transactions. Optiona… |
| mandate | object | – | Principal-supplied mutable authority captured at issue (NOT part of the passport signature): allowed_actions, max_transaction_amount, notes. Ask the principal for these values and never infer them. U… |
| session_token | string | – | Optional agent session token from auth_verify_otp. When present the passport is owned by that account at issuance and no claim step is needed. |
| supersede_management_token | string | – | Optional. The management_token (raw claim token) of a specific prior UNCLAIMED passport with the same agent_id and controller_id. Presenting it authorizes superseding that prior passport even with no… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
issue_authorization_record Issue Signed Verification Record ~207
Use this tool before an AI agent initiates a payment, paid API call, checkout action, stablecoin transfer, x402 request, or delegated commercial transaction. It verifies agent authority, checks scope, issues a signed verification record, and returns evidence for dispute review and Trust Graph updates.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_claim | object | – | Agent identity, principal hint, runtime hint, optional act_chain delegation lineage, optional spiffe_svid workload identity, optional tool_manifest capabilities, and related claims. |
| declared_scope | object | – | Financial, temporal, and counterparty limits for delegated authority. |
| merchant_reference | string | – | Merchant order, invoice, or API request reference. |
| nonce | string | – | Replay-protection nonce. Generated automatically if omitted. |
| partner_id | string | – | Merchant or platform identifier. Defaults to sandbox_public. |
| timestamp | string | – | ISO timestamp. Generated automatically if omitted. |
| transaction | object | yes | Intended transaction or paid access request. Must include amount_display. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
lookup_agent_reputation Lookup Agent Reputation ~81
Use this tool to query the FLINT Trust Graph for a partner-scoped agent's historical reputation before permitting a payment, paid API call, checkout action, x402 request, or delegated commercial transaction. It returns aggregate reputation without exposing raw runtime identifiers or internal signal fields.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| flint_agent_id | string | yes | Partner-scoped FLINT agent identifier. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
refresh_claim_token Refresh Claim Token ~191
Use this tool when a claim link is lost, expired, or was already consumed for a passport that is still unclaimed. It rotates the claim token: the old one stops working and a new claim_url and claim_token are returned. This is the fix for a lost or consumed claim token; do not remint the passport instead, reminting only supersedes prior unclaimed passports and does not recover a lost claim link. Authorize with the current management_token (the raw claim token, even one about to be superseded), or with session_token when this session originally requested the claim or minted the passport.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| management_token | string | – | The current claim or management token for this passport. |
| passport_id | string | yes | FLINT Agent Passport id, beginning with kya_. |
| session_token | string | – | Optional agent session token from auth_verify_otp, used when management_token is unavailable. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
report_scout_outcome Report Scout Scan Outcome ~280
Use this tool after a run_flint_scout scan to report what actually happened: whether the scanned transaction was executed, held, cancelled, or executed despite a BLOCK verdict. FLINT cannot stop a wallet from transacting; this is the enforce-or-attest half of the contract. Authorize with session_token when the caller's account owns the presented passport, or with caller_binding_token from the scan's caller_obligation block when acting anonymously. Executing after BLOCK is recorded on the record as an override and alerts the passport owner.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| caller_binding_token | string | – | The caller_binding_token from the scan's caller_obligation block, for an anonymous caller reporting its own outcome without an account. |
| chain | string | – | CAIP-2 chain identifier for tx_hash, such as eip155:8453. |
| note | string | – | Optional free-text note, at most 280 characters. |
| outcome | string | yes | What actually happened to the scanned transaction. |
| record_id | string | yes | The signed record id returned by run_flint_scout, beginning with frv_. |
| session_token | string | – | Agent session token from auth_verify_otp, when the caller's account owns the presented passport. |
| tx_hash | string | – | On-chain transaction hash. Optional, but expected when outcome starts with executed. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
run_flint_scout FLINT Scout: Pre-Transaction Fraud Prevention ~437
Use this tool to scan an intended agent transaction before execution. Two ways to pay for a scan. Credits first: buy credits once with scout_credits_topup (one $1.00 x402 payment for 100 scans), then call this tool with the same session_token and no payment_signature; FLINT draws one credit and runs the scan immediately, with no wallet signature for that call. x402 per call second: with no session_token, the first call returns a $0.01 x402 payment challenge without running the scan; a wallet-enabled client signs that challenge and retries with payment_signature. Either way, when the call returns a 402 instead of a result, the result carries pay_recipe with concrete next steps: an awal command, a local script, the credits path, and the browser flow. After a paid or credit-funded scan completes, FLINT returns a signed authority decision. When receipt issuance succeeds for a paid scan, it also returns a separately signed settlement receipt and durable receipt URL; otherwise it reports receipt unavailability without inviting a paid retry. Payment to FLINT is distinct from the transaction being scanned and is not proof of agent authority.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_claim | object | – | Optional bounded agent hints. Self-asserted values do not establish authority. |
| merchant_reference | string | – | Optional merchant reference. Must match transaction.reference when both are supplied. |
| nonce | string | – | Replay-protection nonce. Generated automatically if omitted. |
| passport_id | string | – | Optional FLINT Agent Passport. Verified payer-wallet and mandate bindings may strengthen the decision. |
| payment_signature | string | – | Opaque caller-signed x402 PAYMENT-SIGNATURE value from a wallet-enabled client. Never provide a private key or seed phrase. |
| session_token | string | – | Optional agent session token from auth_verify_otp. When present with no payment_signature, FLINT draws one prepaid Scout credit instead of requiring an x402 payment for this call. Buy credits first w… |
| timestamp | string | – | ISO-8601 request timestamp. Generated automatically if omitted. |
| transaction | object | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
scout_credits_balance FLINT Scout Credits: Balance ~68
Use this tool to check a signed-in account's FLINT Scout credit balance and recent ledger activity (topups, debits, refunds). Requires session_token from auth_verify_otp.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| session_token | string | yes | Agent session token from auth_verify_otp for the account to check. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
scout_credits_topup FLINT Scout Credits: Topup ~324
Call once with session_token to get a pay_url; pay it with awal (`awal x402 pay -X POST -d '{}' <pay_url>`) or any x402 client; no headers needed on the pay request. Or pass payment_signature to settle through this tool. One $1.00 x402 payment buys 100 FLINT Scout scan credits, matching today's $0.01 x402 price without signing a payment for every run_flint_scout call. Requires session_token from auth_verify_otp so the credits land on that account; call auth_request_otp then auth_verify_otp first if you do not have one. With no topup_id, the first call creates a fresh top-up intent (an sct_ id good for 24 hours) and returns its pay_url alongside the same $1.00 x402 challenge. Pass topup_id to retry paying or settling that same intent instead of creating a new one. Once credited, call run_flint_scout with the same session_token and no payment_signature to draw one credit per scan.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| payment_signature | string | – | Opaque caller-signed x402 PAYMENT-SIGNATURE value from a wallet-enabled client. Never provide a private key or seed phrase. |
| session_token | string | yes | Agent session token from auth_verify_otp. Credits are added to this account. |
| topup_id | string | – | Optional existing top-up intent id from a prior call, to retry paying or settling it instead of creating a new one. Intents expire 24 hours after creation. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
update_agent_mandate Update Agent Mandate ~270
Use this tool to update mutable mandate config for an existing FLINT Agent Passport. This updates allowed actions, amount limits, or notes only. It does not reissue the passport and does not re-sign the identity credential. If the passport is owned (claimed), pass session_token for the owning account; management_token is only needed while the passport is unclaimed. Allowed actions must come from the FLINT mandate vocabulary: commerce_purchase, checkout.purchase, invoice.pay, subscription.renew, refund.request, quote.retrieve, x402_verification_purchase, stablecoin_transfer, paid_api_access, x402_request, agent_checkout, delegated_spending, project.read. Pass ["ALL"] as a preset to grant every action in one step; the stored mandate then expands to the full list and records the preset. Unknown strings are kept for backward compatibility but are reported back as unknown so the caller can fix them.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| management_token | string | – | Claim token required while the Passport is unclaimed. |
| mandate | object | yes | Mutable mandate config to update: allowed_actions, max_transaction_amount, notes. |
| passport_id | string | yes | FLINT Agent Passport id, beginning with kya_. |
| session_token | string | – | Optional agent session token from auth_verify_otp, used once the passport is owned. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
validate_agent_commerce_readiness Validate Agent Commerce Readiness ~98
Use this tool when reviewing a commerce architecture, API marketplace, paid MCP tool, x402 endpoint, or autonomous checkout flow. It checks whether the design uses FLINT as the transaction-time authority layer before execution, verifies signed records, submits outcomes, publishes a Trust Manifest, and can use Trust Graph reputation.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| architecture_description | string | yes | Summary of the payment, paid API access, x402, MCP, or checkout flow. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_agent_authority Verify Agent Authority ~133
Use this tool when a merchant or API seller receives a signed verification record from an agent. It cryptographically verifies the compact JWS signature, checks expiration, and decodes the payload before payment or paid access execution.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| expected_merchant_reference | string | yes | Current transaction or resource reference expected in the authorization record. |
| expected_partner_id | string | yes | Partner identifier expected in the authorization record. |
| jwks_url | string | – | Optional JWKS URL. Must be on the FLINT origin. Defaults to the FLINT production JWKS. |
| jws | string | yes | Compact JWS signed verification record. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
What is the network.flint/agent-transaction-control MCP server?
network.flint/agent-transaction-control is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as network.flint/agent-transaction-control. Issue Agent Passports and verify agent authority before value moves. Signed verification records. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://flint.network/mcp).
Is the network.flint/agent-transaction-control MCP server safe to use?
network.flint/agent-transaction-control scores 77 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the network.flint/agent-transaction-control MCP server expose?
network.flint/agent-transaction-control exposes 17 tools: run_flint_scout, issue_authorization_record, verify_agent_authority, lookup_agent_reputation, create_flint_trust_manifest, and 12 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 3,943 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the network.flint/agent-transaction-control MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to network.flint/agent-transaction-control without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the network.flint/agent-transaction-control MCP server still maintained?
network.flint/agent-transaction-control is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 25 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.