SEAL
NPM · SEALNET-MCP · SCANNED SEP 26
Large files and secrets between people and agents, never through the chat or the model.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Supply Chain Security98
- No malware found by supply-chain analysis.Pass
- No known CVEs affecting this package version or its production dependencies.Pass
- No install/post-install scripts declared.Pass
- 58 of 160 dependencies flagged as unhealthy. View diagnostics → Partial
Provenance & Transparency6
- Repository check failed: no source repository is declared. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- Provenance check failed: no build-provenance attestation is published. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- License check failed: the license (UNLICENSED) isn't a recognized OSI-approved license. See how to fix → Fail
- Actively maintained (last published 0 days ago).Pass
- Security-disclosure policy not yet verified: we couldn't inspect the source repository.Unverified
Schema Quality & AI Usability65
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1765 tokens (~220/item across 8 items; 8 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management10
- Stability observed for 3 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- All 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 9 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
How do I install the SEAL MCP server?
SEAL runs locally as an npm package, launched with npx -y sealnet-mcp. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
npm · sealnet-mcp
claude mcp add net-seal-mcp -- npx -y sealnet-mcp
{
"mcpServers": {
"net-seal-mcp": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"sealnet-mcp"
]
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"net-seal-mcp": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"sealnet-mcp"
]
}
}
} codex mcp add net-seal-mcp -- npx -y sealnet-mcp
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"net-seal-mcp": {
"type": "local",
"command": [
"npx",
"-y",
"sealnet-mcp"
],
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add net-seal-mcp --command npx --arg -y --arg sealnet-mcp
mcp_servers:
net-seal-mcp:
command: "npx"
args: ["-y", "sealnet-mcp"] {
"McpServers": {
"net-seal-mcp": {
"Transport": "stdio",
"Command": "npx",
"Arguments": [
"-y",
"sealnet-mcp"
]
}
}
} assistant mcp add net-seal-mcp -t stdio -c npx -a -y sealnet-mcp
{
"mcpServers": {
"net-seal-mcp": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"sealnet-mcp"
]
}
}
} Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 26 Sept 26 0
- Stability: 0.07 → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Known CVEs: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Schema quality: 1115 → 1765 ▼ functional
- Schema quality: 1115 → 1446 ▼ functional
- Schema quality: 1115 → 1268 ▼ functional
- Capabilities: pass → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- Dependency health: 0.85 → unverified ▼ functional
- First check of Schema quality: unverified functional
- Package version: 0.2.4 → 0.6.0 functional
- Package version: 0.2.4 → 0.5.0 functional
- Package version: 0.2.4 → 0.4.0 functional
- Package version: 0.2.4 → 0.3.0 functional
- Package version: 0.2.4 → 0.2.5 functional
- 25 Sept 26 +16
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 24 Sept 26 +10
- Known CVEs: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Schema quality: 198 → 223 ▼ functional
- Dependency health: unverified → 0.85 ▲ functional
- Dependency health: unverified → 0.80 ▲ functional
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- Package version: 0.2.2 → 0.2.4 functional
- Package version: 0.2.2 → 0.2.3 functional
- 23 Sept 26 36
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 26 Sept 2026 · Analysed npm/sealnet-mcp@0.6.0
Provenance No attestation
The registry publishes no build provenance for this version, so there is nothing to verify.
| Result | No attestation |
|---|---|
| Ecosystem | npm |
Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →
Dependencies 160 packages
| Packages resolved | 160 |
|---|---|
| Stale | 58 |
| Tree resolution | Complete |
Background: SBOMs and build attestations, explained →
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
seal_inbox Check the inbox ~85
What other agents or people sent to you: seals addressed to your key (your address), no link needed. Returns handles; open one with seal_open item=<handle>. `wait`: seconds to wait for something new, 0 to 300.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| wait | integer | – | Seconds to wait for an item this server has not seen yet; 0 returns the inbox now. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
seal_list List SEALs created via THIS MCP server ~59
Seals you created through this server: opaque handles with status and expiry. Seals made with the CLI or the desktop client live elsewhere and are not listed.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| include_expired | boolean | – | Also include expired/revoked entries. Default false. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
seal_open Open a SEAL link ~181
Open a SEAL link. `metadata` shows name, size and expiry without consuming a read. `file` streams the content to disk and returns the path — use it for large files, secrets and anything you pass to a program. `inline` returns small JSON/CSV/plain text into the conversation and refuses secrets and HTML/PDF.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| dir | string | – | mode=file: directory to save into; default ~/Downloads, created if missing. An existing file is never overwritten: the new one becomes `name (1).ext`. |
| item | string | – | An inbox handle from seal_inbox (`in_…`), instead of a URL. |
| mode | string | – | `metadata` reads nothing; `file` saves to disk; `inline` returns small text. |
| url | string | – | Full SEAL share URL including fragment. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
seal_pair Connect to the user's inbox ~110
Connect this agent to the user's SEAL inbox, once. After that seal_share sends to the inbox by default and seal_request can ask there. The user compares three pictures on the page with the ones you show.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| name | string | – | How the inbox names this agent; default the MCP client's name. |
| wait | boolean | – | Wait until the user connects. Where your client cannot show links itself, the link comes back first: show it and the three emoji, then call again with wait:true. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
seal_request Ask the user for a file or a secret ~350
Ask the user for a file or a secret (API key, token, password) WITHOUT them pasting it into the chat. On their computer a system dialog appears; you can pass `where_url` (the page where that key is created) so they find it in one click. With `wait:true` you get the path of the saved 0600 file, never the value. Use this instead of "paste your key here" or "upload the file here".
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| from | string | – | `owner`: a card in the connected owner's inbox (`owner_not_paired` without one); `anyone`: a link any person can answer. Without it: the dialog on this machine, else a card for the owner when connect… |
| kind | string | – | `secret`: a password field; `file`: a file (on macOS also a folder); `any`: a secret, or a file when the field is left empty. |
| request | string | – | Handle of a request answered through a link: wait for it. |
| wait | boolean | – | Wait for the answer and return the saved path. Where the answer goes through a link and your client cannot show links itself, the link comes back first: show it and the three emoji to the user, then… |
| what | string | – | What you ask for, as the user reads it: 'Brave API key', 'the call recordings folder'. Required unless `request` is given. |
| where_url | string | – | https page where this key is created. The user sees its domain; known services are named, any other domain is marked as given by you. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
seal_revoke Revoke a SEAL by opaque handle ~60
Revoke a seal you created, by its handle: the link stops working and the ciphertext is deleted. Idempotent: an already revoked or expired handle returns {revoked:true}.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| handle | string | yes | Opaque handle returned by seal_share. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
seal_run Run a program with secrets ~136
Run a program with secrets from SEAL links or your inbox in its environment. The values never enter this conversation: they are removed from the output you get back. Use it instead of reading a secret file.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| command | array | yes | The program and its arguments, run without a shell. |
| cwd | string | – | Working directory of the program; default this server's. |
| secrets | array | yes | Each one is a link or an inbox item carrying one text file (up to 64 KiB), put into one variable of the program's environment. |
| timeout | integer | – | Seconds; after them the program is killed. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
seal_share Share a file via SEAL ~579
Give the user or another agent a file or a secret WITHOUT it passing through this chat. Works for large files (folders, dumps, exports, builds, videos — up to 1 GB free, more after one card payment by the user). Once the user's inbox is connected (seal_pair) the default mode is `inbox`: the file lands there and there is nothing to copy. Otherwise the default is `handoff`: the link goes to the user's clipboard and you get a handle. Where there is no clipboard it goes to a 0600 file and you get its path: do not read that file and do not print it. Mode `forward`: a link only the holder of the given X25519 key can open — use it for another agent. When the user is connected, every seal you create also appears in their inbox, where they can manage and revoke it. Never paste secrets or huge content into the chat instead.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| burn | boolean | – | Burn ciphertext after last read. |
| expire | string | – | How long the link lives. Default 5m; in handoff mode a file or folder over 100 MB defaults to 1d. Forward mode allows at most 30m. Over 1 GB (a paid tier): 1d or 7d, default 1d. |
| max_reads | integer | – | Maximum number of downloads. Forward mode locks this to 1. |
| mime | string | – | Override the auto-detected MIME type (encrypted into the metadata bundle; drives the recipient's inline-render whitelist). |
| mode | string | – | Where the link goes. Without it: `inbox` when this agent is connected to the user's inbox (seal_pair, or SEAL_OWNER), else `handoff`. `inbox` needs a connected owner (`owner_not_paired` otherwise) an… |
| path | string | – | Absolute path to the file or folder to share. A folder is sent as one `<folder>.zip` of its regular files (symlinks are skipped). The server streams it from disk; you never read the content yourself.… |
| payment | string | – | Handle of a share waiting for its payment: wait for it and finish the upload. |
| tier | string | – | Over 1 GB only: the tier the user pays for once by card (5gb $9 90 days, 50gb $29 180 days, 500gb $99 365 days). Default: the smallest that fits. |
| to | string | – | Recipient X25519 pubkey (base64url, 43 chars). REQUIRED for mode=forward. Optional for mode=handoff (anonymous handoff stays usable). Refused in mode=inbox: the address there is the connected owner. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
What is the SEAL MCP server?
SEAL is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as net.seal/mcp. Large files and secrets between people and agents, never through the chat or the model. This page covers its npm package (sealnet-mcp).
Is the SEAL MCP server safe to use?
SEAL scores 62 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. We found no known CVEs affecting it as of 26 September 2026. It declares no install or post-install scripts. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the SEAL MCP server expose?
SEAL exposes 8 tools: seal_share, seal_request, seal_pair, seal_open, seal_inbox, and 3 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,560 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Is the SEAL MCP server still maintained?
SEAL is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 26 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What licence is the SEAL MCP server under?
SEAL declares the UNLICENSED licence, which is not on the OSI-approved list. Read the terms before using it at work, and note this covers the source only, not the cost of any service it calls.