Hunter-Seeker
REMOTE · HUNTER-SEEKER.NET · SCANNED SEP 20
Rank rows by outcome likelihood: deterministic pattern-detection and top-k prediction for agents
Available components
Deprecated
This server is marked deprecated in the MCP registry.
The registry records this reason: Superseded by io.hunter-seeker/hunter-seeker; the service moved to hunter-seeker.io.
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security63
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to connect, but we couldn't read the tool list to see what that exposes. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability0
- Transport check failed: declared streamable-http, but the endpoint redirected instead of responding directly. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Schema Quality & AI Usability0
- Schema not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's schema.Unverified
Stability & Change Management0
- Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).Unverified
Tool Coverage0
- Tool coverage not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools.Unverified
Tool Safety0
- Tool safety not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools.Unverified
Capabilities0
- Capabilities not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's capabilities.Unverified
Unverified: 5 categories
Categories scored 0 because we could not verify them: authentication we do not have, an unreachable endpoint, or not enough scan history. We only credit what we can confirm.
How do I install the Hunter-Seeker MCP server?
Hunter-Seeker is a hosted endpoint at https://hunter-seeker.net/api/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · hunter-seeker.net
claude mcp add --transport http net-hunter-seeker-hunter-seeker 'https://hunter-seeker.net/api/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"net-hunter-seeker-hunter-seeker": {
"url": "https://hunter-seeker.net/api/mcp"
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"net-hunter-seeker-hunter-seeker": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://hunter-seeker.net/api/mcp"
}
}
} [mcp_servers.net-hunter-seeker-hunter-seeker] url = "https://hunter-seeker.net/api/mcp"
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"net-hunter-seeker-hunter-seeker": {
"type": "remote",
"url": "https://hunter-seeker.net/api/mcp",
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add net-hunter-seeker-hunter-seeker --url 'https://hunter-seeker.net/api/mcp' --transport streamable-http
mcp_servers:
net-hunter-seeker-hunter-seeker:
url: "https://hunter-seeker.net/api/mcp" {
"McpServers": {
"net-hunter-seeker-hunter-seeker": {
"Transport": "http",
"Url": "https://hunter-seeker.net/api/mcp"
}
}
} assistant mcp add net-hunter-seeker-hunter-seeker -t streamable-http -u 'https://hunter-seeker.net/api/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"net-hunter-seeker-hunter-seeker": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://hunter-seeker.net/api/mcp"
}
}
} The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 5 Sept 26 −13
- Endpoint reachability: behind authorisation → not serving MCP ▼ security
- Transport: unverified → fail ▼ security
- Authorization: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: Tool safety not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools. security
- Tool coverage: Tool coverage not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools. functional
- Capabilities: Capabilities not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's capabilities. functional
- Schema quality: Schema not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's schema. functional
- 31 Aug 26 −45
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → behind authorisation ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Transport: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Stability: 0.50 → unverified ▼ security
- Authorization: The endpoint enforces authorisation, advertised via RFC 9728 protected-resource metadata. security
- Capabilities: pass → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- 29 Aug 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 43 to 47. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 13 days of observed history at the previous scan, 14 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 26 Aug 26 +2
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Aug 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 30 to 33. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 9 days of observed history at the previous scan, 10 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 23 Aug 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 23 to 27. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 7 days of observed history at the previous scan, 8 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 16 Aug 26 0
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 15 Aug 26 0
- Transport: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Authorization: Authorisation is enforced on tool calls, advertised via RFC 9728 protected-resource metadata. Discovery is public, which costs nothing: no tool can be invoked without a token. security
- MCP protocol: unverified → pass ▲ functional
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- First check of Schema quality: fail functional
- First check of Schema quality: excellent functional
- First check of Schema quality: fail functional
- First check of Tool coverage: 94 functional
- First check of Tool coverage: 13 functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 20 Sept 2026 · Probed https://hunter-seeker.net/api/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=hunter-seeker.net | CN=YR1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 4 Sept 2026 | 3 Dec 2026 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 57fd09f7d8e46ae76b14b7d68defcbd5f7c |
| SANs: hunter-seeker.net | ||||||
| CN=YR1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | a20253f15f2691c05dc1ce13b9bcca4e |
| CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | RSA 4096 | SHA256-RSA | f24b6d17f9d9ad7cb1c9fea78782699f |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of hunter-seeker.net. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| net. | present | 37331 | 13 | Verified |
| hunter-seeker.net. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 308 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=63072000 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://hunter-seeker.net/api/mcp | Redirected | 308 | https://hunter-seeker.io/api/mcp |
| http (plaintext) | http://hunter-seeker.net/api/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 308 | https://hunter-seeker.net/api/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
hs_context_brief ~426
Free; no engine run. For a ranking already produced by hs_rank_topk (pass its ranking_ref), return a PORTABLE BRIEF you can drop straight into your own agent's context - the whole analysis as one compact artifact instead of three separate calls. Returns: provenance (engine version, core hash, the ranking_ref, the analysis identity, and when the analysis was computed), outcome.label, trust (top-decile lift, calibration error, validation scheme, and any columns the leak guard quarantined), driver_group (the drivers the engine found, each with a direction, to be read as ONE combination), and limits. Best for: handing an analysis to another agent, filing an analysis in your own store so you can recognise the same analysis later, or building a domain expert on top of Hunter-Seeker - we supply the governed prediction, you supply the domain. Set format to "markdown" for prose instead of JSON; both carry identical numbers. It reuses the analysis behind the ranking_ref, so it costs nothing and can be called as often as you like - only hs_rank_topk consumes a run. Drivers are ASSOCIATIONS, not causes, and are only meaningful together: never re-order them, never rank one above another, never report one on its own. Common mistakes: passing a ranking_ref older than an hour (the analysis is cached for one hour, then you must re-run hs_rank_topk); treating a null statistic as zero - null means the engine did not report it; and inventing drivers when the brief returns an empty driver group, which is a real result and not a gap. Never restate a number this brief does not contain, and never compute change over time by comparing two briefs - that is you authoring a direction the engine never gave. If change over time matters, re-run.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| format | string | – | Output format. Both carry identical numbers; markdown is prose for a human or for a prompt. Default json. |
| ranking_ref | string | yes | The ranking_ref from a prior hs_rank_topk result. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| driver_group | object | yes | – |
| honest_empty_note | string | – | – |
| limits | object | yes | – |
| outcome | object | yes | – |
| provenance | object | yes | – |
| schema | string | yes | – |
| trust | object | yes | – |
No examples provided.
hs_describe_capabilities ~155
Free; no engine run. Return Hunter-Seeker's input contract, supported problem shapes, the trust guarantees (determinism, provenance, honest-empty; plus leak-guard, which is LIVE as of engine 0.1.1: it quarantines columns that predict the outcome too well (likely target leakage), each named with a plain-English reason, and is null on a non-finding (honest-null), not "pending"), limits (inline row/column/byte caps, k max), and worked examples across several domains (customer churn, machine failure, sports prospects, job applications). Call this first if you are unsure whether a user's problem is a top-k prediction problem or how to format inputs.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
hs_explain_drivers ~691
Free; no engine run. For a ranking already produced by hs_rank_topk (pass its ranking_ref), return THE PATTERN the engine found - the core of what Hunter-Seeker does: it discovers a COMBINATION of feature-conditions that, TOGETHER, predict the outcome (not independent per-feature effects). Returns pattern.conditions[] - read as ONE joint profile - plus pattern.coverage (exact share of entities matching the full pattern) and pattern.lift. A NUMERIC condition is a feature + direction (higher / lower) + the threshold where it turns (e.g. months_supply lower than 2.1), and it carries the exact predicate alongside: operator ("<=" or ">") and missing_values ("included" or "excluded"). BUILD YOUR FILTER FROM operator AND missing_values, NOT FROM THE DIRECTION WORD - the boundary is ASYMMETRIC and the English reading of "lower" is wrong. "lower" means operator "<=" with missing_values "included": it holds AT the threshold as well as below it, and also covers rows where that value is MISSING. "higher" means operator ">" with missing_values "excluded": strictly above, missing rows out. So "lower than t" names a WIDER cohort than a naive "< t" filter, and coverage counts those extra rows. This is not a rounding detail: on a dataset whose threshold lands on a common value, reading "lower than 168" as "< 168" selects ZERO rows while coverage reports 0.279 - a gate that fires on nothing while the envelope looks healthy. Both fields are absent on a categorical condition, whose cohort is defined by the set below instead. A CATEGORICAL condition has direction "different" (set membership has no high/low) and instead carries categories (the values involved) plus category_match, either "is_one_of" or "is_not_one_of" - take it LITERALLY and never drop the negation, because "is_not_one_of" ["annual"] is the opposite cohort from "is_one_of" ["annual"]. Both fields are absent on numeric conditions. This is what takes your agent from generalist to expert on THIS dataset - the structured pa…
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ranking_ref | string | yes | The ranking_ref from a prior hs_rank_topk result. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
hs_explain_levers ~480
Free; no engine run. For one or more entities already ranked by hs_rank_topk, compute the minimal set of feature changes (counterfactual levers) that would move the entity out of the high-risk / high-likelihood pattern. Best for: "what would have to change for this customer not to churn", "what's driving this risk", "how do I intervene". Not recommended for: entities not present in a prior ranking; guarantees of real-world causal effect (these are minimal model-based flips, not proven interventions). Returns: per-entity minimal feature changes (each a feature label + a direction: increase / decrease / change), a coarse magnitude (substantial / notable / slight), and likelihood_direction (lower / higher / unchanged) - which way the change moves PREDICTED LIKELIHOOD of the outcome - plus provenance; every lever is labeled association_not_causal. likelihood_direction is a FACT, not a recommendation, and it is NOT fixed to "lower" - READ IT PER LEVER. Which way it reads follows the polarity the engine resolved for this outcome: on an ADVERSE outcome (churn, default, failure) the levers move an entity OUT of the high-likelihood pattern and read "lower"; on a DESIRABLE outcome (converted, renewed, closed) the engine returns COMPLETION levers that move an entity INTO it, and those read "higher". Assuming "lower" on a desirable outcome inverts every lever you present. Whether the direction you get is the direction you want depends on whether the outcome is desirable (converted, renewed, closed) or adverse (churn, default, failure) - you know which, and Hunter-Seeker does not infer it. Decide the good/bad reading yourself, or ask the user, before presenting a lever as an improvement. No raw scores, score deltas, thresholds, or weights are returned - these are coarse, model-associated flips, not causal guarantees. Common mistakes: interpreting levers as causal guarantees - present them as "what the model associates with a different outcome", especially in regulated or person…
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| entity_ids | array | yes | Entities from that ranking to explain (max 20 per call). |
| ranking_ref | string | yes | The ranking_ref from a prior hs_rank_topk result. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
hs_model_quality ~285
Free; no engine run. For a ranking already produced by hs_rank_topk (pass its ranking_ref), return the model DIAGNOSTICS so you can judge how much to trust it BEFORE acting on it. Returns: top_decile_lift (how concentrated the outcome is in the top-ranked group), calibration_error (ECE - lower is better-calibrated), validation (scheme: out-of-time, holdout, or none when no rows could be held back; n_holdout is null when nothing was held back; plus n_train and a plain-English reason), lift_curve (relative cumulative lift per decile), and leak_guard (columns quarantined as likely target leakage, each with a plain-English reason). These are validation statistics - never a threshold, weight, score, or arm. Best for: due diligence before acting, a governance / trust check, or a model-quality section in a report. A low top_decile_lift, a high calibration_error, or a populated leak_guard is a signal to be cautious. It reuses the analysis behind the ranking_ref - no new engine run. Common mistakes: passing an expired or never-cleared ranking_ref (call hs_rank_topk first); treating a null field as zero - it means there was no finding.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ranking_ref | string | yes | The ranking_ref from a prior hs_rank_topk result. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
hs_poll_task ~167
Free to call; the run it polls is the billable one. Check a long-running ranking started by hs_rank_topk in an async mode (a dataset_id or fetch_url run). Returns status "pending" (poll again after the suggested interval; do not tight-loop) or the completed ranking envelope. A pending response may also carry a stage + append-only facts_so_far (leak-firewalled progress — never a partial ranking) and an optional status_url: a short-TTL signed link to a live status page a human can open to watch staged progress in real time. Common mistakes: polling in a tight loop - respect retry_after_ms; treating "pending" as failure.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| task_id | string | yes | Task id returned by hs_rank_topk (dataset mode). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
hs_provide_dataset ~602
Free; no engine run. Register a dataset too large to inline in hs_rank_topk, then run it by dataset_id. RECOMMENDED for any real dataset (bigger than a small paste). Two ways to get the bytes in, no manual step needed from the user: - upload (best for a file you have): call it with no arguments to receive { dataset_id, upload_url, method: "PUT" }, then upload the file YOURSELF with a shell/code tool: curl -X PUT --data-binary @<file.csv> "<upload_url>" - the bytes stream straight to object storage, so there is NO size or row cap on this path (~1M rows is routine). Then hs_rank_topk({ data: { dataset_id } }). Send CSV: the engine reads the object as-is. - fetch_url (best when the data is already at a public https URL): call with { fetch_url: "https://..." } and the SERVER downloads it - no upload on your side. A comma-delimited CSV goes to storage byte-for-byte, so it has no row cap either. Then hs_rank_topk({ data: { dataset_id } }). (direct_upload: false opts back into a proxied upload_url, which converts a JSON body to CSV for you but is capped at the ~4.5MB serverless body limit. Only worth it for JSON you cannot convert.) Dataset runs are ASYNC: hs_rank_topk returns { status: "pending", task_id } - poll hs_poll_task. This tool stays useful for reuse (register once, rank many times) and for the direct_upload path, but you no longer NEED it as a separate step for the common cases: hs_rank_topk now accepts data.csv (inline CSV text, synchronous) and data.fetch_url (a public https URL the server fetches + ranks) directly, collapsing provide + rank into ONE call. Not recommended for: genuinely small tables (inline them in hs_rank_topk as data.rows or data.csv instead); non-https or private/internal URLs (blocked). Returns: dataset_id (+ upload_url in the upload modes). Common mistakes: passing localhost / private-network / cloud-metadata URLs (refused for safety); forgetting to actually PUT the file after direct_upload (the run has no data until you do); tig…
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| direct_upload | boolean | – | Direct-to-storage upload is now the DEFAULT (no size or row cap), so you rarely need this. Set false to instead receive a proxied upload_url, which normalizes a JSON body to CSV but is capped at the… |
| fetch_url | string | – | Public https URL to retrieve the dataset from. Omit to receive an upload_url instead. |
| name | string | – | Human-readable dataset name. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
hs_rank_topk ~818
Costs one run from your monthly quota - the only tool that does. The run is refunded on honest-empty or error, so you are billed only for a ranking you actually received. Rank the rows of a table by their likelihood of a binary (yes/no) outcome, and return the top-k highest-likelihood entities with calibrated scores. Best for: any "which of these are most likely to [convert / churn / fail / default / win / succeed / respond / be approved]" or "who should I prioritize" question where the user has tabular data and one column represents a yes/no result. Works across any domain - business, operations, health-adjacent, education, sports, research, personal. Not recommended for: continuous-value forecasting (predicting a number, not a yes/no); questions with no historical outcome column to learn from; time-series-only problems; or when the user wants a causal guarantee rather than a ranked prediction. Returns: top-k ranked entities with per-entity calibrated scores; top-decile lift; calibration + validation records; provenance (engine version + core-hash); gate_verdicts with recorded reasons; and leak_guard results naming any quarantined post-outcome columns. Honest-null: top_decile_lift, validation, leak_guard, and top_factors are LIVE as of engine 0.1.1 - they populate on a cleared finding and are returned as null on a non-finding (never fabricated) - so a null means no finding, NOT that the field is pending. top_factors are human-readable strings ("higher/lower/different <feature>"); validation is { scheme, split_fraction, n_train, n_holdout, reason? }; scheme is "holdout", "out_of_time", or "none" when the dataset was too small to hold rows back - in which case n_holdout is null (not 0) and reason states why and what would fix it; leak_guard is a list of quarantined likely-leakage columns, each with a plain-English reason. If the data cannot clear the lift >= 1.5 bar, returns a structured honest-empty result with reasons instead of weak rankings. Common mistakes: cho…
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| acknowledge_decision_support | boolean | – | Required true when subject_kind is "person" and the outcome is in a regulated domain (hiring, credit, education, insurance, benefits, justice). Confirms results are decision-support with human review. |
| data | object | yes | Exactly one data source: rows or csv (small, inline, synchronous) | fetch_url or dataset_id (async, poll hs_poll_task) | direct_upload:true (get an upload URL — no run starts). |
| entity_column | string | yes | What each row represents, e.g. customer_id, machine_id, application_id. |
| horizon | string | – | The time window the prediction is about, e.g. "30 days". |
| idempotency_key | string | – | For dataset_id runs: reuse to dedupe retried submissions onto the same task. |
| outcome_column | string | yes | The column holding the yes/no result to learn to predict. Must be known historically - not derived after the outcome (that is leakage). |
| page | object | – | – |
| subject_kind | string | yes | What kind of thing each entity is. "person" enables decision-support safeguards. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
What is the Hunter-Seeker MCP server?
Hunter-Seeker is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as net.hunter-seeker/hunter-seeker. Rank rows by outcome likelihood: deterministic pattern-detection and top-k prediction for agents. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://hunter-seeker.net/api/mcp).
Is the Hunter-Seeker MCP server safe to use?
Hunter-Seeker scores 25 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Hunter-Seeker MCP server expose?
Hunter-Seeker exposes 8 tools: hs_describe_capabilities, hs_provide_dataset, hs_rank_topk, hs_poll_task, hs_explain_levers, and 3 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 3,624 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Hunter-Seeker MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to Hunter-Seeker without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the Hunter-Seeker MCP server still maintained?
Hunter-Seeker is marked deprecated in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 20 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.