NOTIFY
REMOTE · API.N0T1FY.DEV
SMS verification codes for Georgia (+995), sent and checked. Try test codes with a free test key.
Available components
Last scanned (36 minutes ago)
Scores higher than 76% of remote servers
Unreachable for 1 day in a row. Last reached 4 Nov 2026.
Category Communication
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security11
- TLS not yet verified: we couldn't open a connection to check the certificate. View diagnostics → Unverified
- Authorisation not yet verified: we couldn't confirm whether this endpoint requires it. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS not yet verified: we couldn't read the response headers to check for it. View diagnostics → Unverified
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability0
- Transport check failed: declared streamable-http, but we couldn't connect to verify it. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Schema Quality & AI Usability0
- Schema not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's schema, or could read only part of its tool list.Unverified
Stability & Change Management0
- Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).Unverified
Tool Coverage0
- Tool coverage not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.Unverified
Tool Safety0
- Tool safety not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.Unverified
Capabilities0
- Capabilities not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's capabilities.Unverified
Unverified: 5 categories
Categories scored 0 because we could not verify them: authentication we do not have, an unreachable endpoint, or not enough scan history. We only credit what we can confirm.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 5 Nov 26 0
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → unreachable ▼ security
- HSTS header: fail → unverified ▼ security
- Authorization: partial → unverified ▼ security
- Stability: 0.70 → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- TLS certificate: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Transport: pass → fail ▼ security
- Capabilities: pass → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- First check of Schema quality: unverified functional
- 3 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 63 to 67. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 19 days of observed history at the previous scan, 20 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 31 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 53 to 57. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 16 days of observed history at the previous scan, 17 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 30 Oct 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Tool “send_message” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: 409 → 494 ▼ functional
- “send_message” reworded the description of “template” cosmetic
- “send_message” reworded the description of “variables” cosmetic
- 28 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 43 to 47. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 13 days of observed history at the previous scan, 14 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 26 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 37 to 40. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 11 days of observed history at the previous scan, 12 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 24 Oct 26 0
- DNSSEC: pass → fail ▼ security
- 22 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 23 to 27. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 7 days of observed history at the previous scan, 8 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Probed https://api.n0t1fy.dev/mcp
TLS unreached
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of api.n0t1fy.dev. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| dev. | present | 60074 | 8 | Verified |
| n0t1fy.dev. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication Inconclusive
We could not reach the endpoint well enough to judge its authorisation posture.
| Result | Inconclusive |
|---|
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://api.n0t1fy.dev/mcp | Unreachable | ||
| http (plaintext) | http://api.n0t1fy.dev/mcp | HTTPS enforced |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
check_verification Check a verification code ~296
Check the code the human typed, for the number the code was sent to. The result is the verification only when it is approved; every other outcome is a tool error with an `error.code`. Let the user in only when a check answers `200` with status `approved`; treat every other answer, a timeout and a network error as not approved. Errors: `incorrect_code` (attempts remain), `too_many_attempts` (start a new verification), `recipient_mismatch` (`to` is not the number the code was sent to), `verification_expired`, `verification_closed` (already approved or replaced), `verification_not_found`. A wrong code costs an attempt, and five close the verification: do not retry a check by yourself; ask the human for the code again.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| api_key | string | – | An sk_test_ key, for example from create_test_key. Leave it out to use the key in this MCP server's Authorization header. A live key (sk_live_) is refused here: tool arguments are kept in the convers… |
| code | string | yes | The six digits the human typed, as a string. |
| to | string | yes | The number the code was sent to, which your application is about to mark as verified. |
| verification_id | string | yes | The verification `id` from start_verification (ver_…). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
create_test_key Get a NOTIFY test key ~192
Get an sk_test_ API key instantly, with no account and no human. A test key never sends a real SMS and never spends credits, so a whole integration can be built and verified with it. Pass it as `api_key` to send_message and get_message, and keep it in the application's configuration (for example NOTIFY_API_KEY), never in source code. The result also has a `claim_url` for a human: opening it lets them sign in and take over the project. Anyone who opens it, signs in and confirms becomes the owner: give it only to the person who will own the project, and do not paste it into shared logs or tickets. Real SMS need an sk_live_ key that the human creates on the dashboard (https://n0t1fy.dev/dashboard). Limited to a few keys per minute and per day for each address: reuse a key you already have.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_message Read a message's status ~203
Read the current state of a message sent with a key of the same project. Poll only while `status` is `queued` or `submitted`: `delivered`, `undeliverable` and `failed` are final, and `unknown` never changes. Wait about 2 seconds before the first read and double the wait each time, up to 30 seconds. Always set a time limit (two minutes is generous for a test message); when it passes, treat the message as unconfirmed and do not send it again.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| api_key | string | – | An sk_test_ key, for example from create_test_key. Leave it out to use the key in this MCP server's Authorization header. A live key (sk_live_) is refused here: tool arguments are kept in the convers… |
| message_id | string | yes | The message `id` from send_message, such as msg_01J8…. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
send_message Send a code by SMS ~974
Send one transactional SMS to a Georgian mobile number. The text comes from a built-in template; there is no free text (every template: https://n0t1fy.dev/templates). Team templates (`service_down`, `service_up`, `incident_opened`, `support_ticket_urgent`, `job_failed`, `agent_alert`) go only to numbers the project's owner confirmed on the dashboard's team page; with a test key, use the test numbers +995512345670 to +995512345679. A `recipient_not_on_team` error means the number is not confirmed on the team: ask the human to add it on the dashboard, and never retry by yourself. With a live key, a `service` or `job` must be a name on the owner's list there. With a test key (sk_test_) nothing is really sent: a simulator answers. These recipients simulate outcomes: +995512345671 rejected (status `failed`); +995512345672 provider unreachable (error `provider_unavailable`: nothing was sent, retry with the same idempotency_key); +995512345673 ambiguous (status `unknown`); +995512345674 accepted, then `undeliverable`. Any other valid number is accepted, then `delivered`, within about 30 seconds. With a live key it sends a real SMS and spends one credit per segment. Read `message.status` in the result. `submitted`: the provider accepted it, which is not yet delivery to the phone. `failed`: refused; `message.error` says why. `unknown`: it may or may not have been sent, so do not send it again automatically. `replayed: true`: this idempotency_key and request were already processed, and no second SMS was sent. Call get_message to learn the final outcome.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| api_key | string | – | An sk_test_ key, for example from create_test_key. Leave it out to use the key in this MCP server's Authorization header. A live key (sk_live_) is refused here: tool arguments are kept in the convers… |
| idempotency_key | string | yes | A new unique value (a UUID) for each logical message. Reuse it only to retry the identical request: the retry then returns the original message instead of sending a second SMS. |
| locale | string | – | Language of the message: `ka` (Georgian, the default) or `en`. |
| template | string | yes | Which message to send. Message text is never free-form: every message is rendered from one of these templates. - `verification_code` (`code`): Your verification code is {code}. Do not share it with… |
| to | string | yes | Recipient in E.164 format: `+9955` followed by eight digits. No other country or format is accepted, and numbers are never normalized on your behalf. |
| variables | object | yes | Values for the template's placeholders, all as JSON strings. A `code` is 4 to 8 digits; `minutes` is 1 to 999; an `incident` or `ticket` 1 to 8 digits; a `count` 1 to 99; an `agent` `your_agent` or `… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
start_verification Send a verification code that NOTIFY makes ~536
Verify a Georgian mobile number: NOTIFY makes a random six-digit code and sends it by SMS with a built-in template. The code is never shown to you: ask the human for the code they received, then call check_verification. A code works for 10 minutes and 5 checks, once; a new start for the same number replaces it. With a test key (sk_test_), only the test numbers +995512345670 to +995512345679 are accepted and their code is always 000000; nothing is sent. At most 5 starts a minute go to one number, so spread test starts over the ten test numbers. +995512345671 simulates a refused SMS (status `failed`), +995512345672 an unreachable provider (error `provider_unavailable`: nothing was sent, retry with the same idempotency_key), +995512345673 an SMS that may or may not have arrived (still `pending`). With a live key it sends a real SMS and spends one credit. `replayed: true` means this idempotency_key and request were already processed and no second SMS was sent; the verification it shows may say `approved` by then, which is not a check result. On `too_many_verifications` (5 an hour or 10 in a rolling 24 hours to one number), tell the human when they can try again (`retry_at`), and never retry by yourself.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| api_key | string | – | An sk_test_ key, for example from create_test_key. Leave it out to use the key in this MCP server's Authorization header. A live key (sk_live_) is refused here: tool arguments are kept in the convers… |
| idempotency_key | string | yes | A new unique value (a UUID) for each code you want sent. Reuse it only to retry the identical request: the retry then returns the original verification instead of sending a second SMS. |
| locale | string | – | Language of the message: `ka` (Georgian, the default) or `en`. |
| template | string | – | Which message carries the code. NOTIFY fills in the code, and the minutes where the template names them (10). |
| to | string | yes | The phone number to verify, in E.164 format: `+9955` followed by eight digits. With a test key (`sk_test_`), only the test numbers +995512345670 to +995512345679 are accepted, and their code is alway… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the NOTIFY MCP server?
NOTIFY is a hosted endpoint at https://api.n0t1fy.dev/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · api.n0t1fy.dev
claude mcp add --transport http n0t1fy-notify-sms-georgia 'https://api.n0t1fy.dev/mcp'
What is the NOTIFY MCP server?
NOTIFY is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.n0t1fy/notify-sms-georgia. SMS verification codes for Georgia (+995), sent and checked. Try test codes with a free test key. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://api.n0t1fy.dev/mcp).
Is the NOTIFY MCP server safe to use?
NOTIFY scores 78 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the NOTIFY MCP server expose?
NOTIFY exposes 5 tools: create_test_key, send_message, start_verification, check_verification, get_message. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 2,201 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the NOTIFY MCP server require authentication?
Its publisher declares no required credentials for NOTIFY. We have not been able to confirm that against the live endpoint, and a server can require authorisation without declaring it here.
Is the NOTIFY MCP server still maintained?
NOTIFY is still listed in the MCP registry, though our most recent checks did not reach this channel. We last reached this channel on 4 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.