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io.github.mzizi-dev/mzizi-mcp

REMOTE · MCP.MZIZI.DEV · 2 COMPONENTS

Mzizi design system MCP: search and execute over components, tokens, crates, skills and docs. Free.

−14 this week 61 Trust /100

Last scanned (21 hours ago)

Scores higher than 45% of remote servers

Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.

Category Developer Tools

Trust breakdown (7 categories)

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →

Endpoint Security46
Transport & Reachability100
Schema Quality & AI Usability80
  • 100% of prompts and resources have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the item's name).Pass
  • AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
  • Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 5090 tokens (~124/item across 41 items; 3 tools + 38 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
  • Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management7
  • Stability check failed: schema churn in the 30 days we've observed: 13 tool removals, 0 breaking changes, 0 auth/transport breaks, 2 additions. See how to fix → Fail
Tool Coverage96
  • 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
  • 87% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
  • Structured output schemas are declared (33% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
  • No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
  • All 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation.Pass
  • An AI judge read all 5 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
  • Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).Pass
What we tested

Checks we ran (12)

  • TLS certificate
  • Authorization
  • HSTS header
  • DNSSEC
  • Transport
  • Schema quality
  • Stability
  • Tool coverage
  • Injection markers
  • Destructive annotations
  • Judged manipulation
  • MCP protocol

Checks we could not complete (1)

These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.

  • HTTPS in Endpoint SecurityHTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 405, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement.

Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)

  • Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
  • Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.

The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →

Changelog

Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.

  • 20 Nov 26 0
    • Server version: 0.25.0 → 0.26.0 functional
  • 19 Nov 26 0
    • The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
    • Server version: 0.24.0 → 0.25.0 functional
  • 17 Nov 26 −14
    • Stability: pass → fail ▼ security
    • Tool “mzizi_report_issue” was removed ▼ security
    • Tool “mzizi_mcp_describe” was removed ▼ security
    • Tool “mzizi_list_components” was removed ▼ security
    • Tool “mzizi_get_tokens” was removed ▼ security
    • Tool “mzizi_get_skills” was removed ▼ security
    • Tool “mzizi_get_doctrine” was removed ▼ security
    • Tool “mzizi_get_component” was removed ▼ security
    • Tool “mzizi_get_architecture” was removed ▼ security
    • Tool “mzizi_fundi” was removed ▼ security
    • Tool “mzizi_check_accessibility” was removed ▼ security
    • Tool “docs_submit_feedback” was removed ▼ security
    • Tool “docs_search_mzizi” was removed ▼ security
    • Tool “docs_query_docs_filesystem_mzizi” was removed ▼ security
    • The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
    • New tool “mzizi_execute”, which the server declares destructive security
    • Tool “mzizi_search” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool coverage: 93% → 87% ▼ functional
    • Schema quality: 151 → 123 ▲ functional
    • Schema quality: 151 → 122 ▲ functional
    • Tool coverage: 21% → 33% ▲ functional
    • Schema quality: excellent → good functional
    • Destructive annotations: pass → 100 functional
    • Server version: 0.22.1 → 0.24.0 functional
    • Server version: 0.21.0 → 0.22.1 functional
    • New tool “mzizi_feedback” functional
    • “mzizi_search” reworded the description of “query” cosmetic
    • “mzizi_search” reworded the description of “offset” cosmetic
  • 14 Nov 26 0
    • The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
    • Tool “mzizi_check_accessibility” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “mzizi_get_tokens” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “docs_query_docs_filesystem_mzizi” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Server version: 0.20.0 → 0.21.0 functional
    • “mzizi_check_accessibility” added an optional parameter “hitRegionPx” cosmetic
    • “mzizi_check_accessibility” added an optional parameter “context” cosmetic
  • 13 Nov 26 0
    • Server version: 0.19.0 → 0.20.0 functional
  • 12 Nov 26 0
    • Server version: 0.18.0 → 0.19.0 functional
    • Server version: 0.17.0 → 0.18.0 functional
  • 9 Nov 26 +1
    • Stability: 0.97 → pass security
  • 8 Nov 26 −1
    • Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
Diagnostics

Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.

Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://mcp.mzizi.dev/mcp

TLS valid

Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .

Subject Issuer Valid from Valid until Key Signature Serial
CN=mzizi.dev CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US 18 Nov 2026 16 Feb 2027 ECDSA 256 ECDSA-SHA256 42d28e6c4ccb03221333690a2232157a
SANs: mzizi.dev, mcp.mzizi.dev, *.mcp.mzizi.dev
CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US 13 Dec 2023 20 Feb 2029 ECDSA 256 ECDSA-SHA384 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3
CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE 15 Nov 2023 28 Jan 2028 ECDSA 384 SHA256-RSA 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b

Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →

DNSSEC insecure

Validation of mcp.mzizi.dev. — Not signed

Zone DS Keys Algorithms Outcome
. Trust anchor 20326, 38696 8, 8 Verified
dev. DS published 60074 8 Verified
mzizi.dev. No DS Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation
Authentication No authorisation required

The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.

Result No authorisation required
HTTP status 200

Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →

Transports 2 probes
Transport URL Outcome Status Location
streamable-http https://mcp.mzizi.dev/mcp Verified 200
http (plaintext) http://mcp.mzizi.dev/mcp Inconclusive 405
MCP tools · 3 exposed · ~891 tokens

The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →

Tool Tokens
mzizi_execute ~195

Run one operation by name with its arguments. mzizi_search lists operations with their arguments, the permission each needs and whether you may run it. Operations: get_component, list_components, get_tokens, get_architecture, get_doctrine, get_skills, check_accessibility, list_crates, fundi, describe, docs_search_mzizi, docs_query_docs_filesystem_mzizi, docs_submit_feedback. Reads need no account; the fundi operation needs sign-in, and a refusal names the permission it needs and how to sign in. The result is the operation's own answer. The earlier tool names (mzizi_get_component and the rest) are accepted as operation names.

NameTypeReqDescription
argumentsobject–The operation's arguments, as its `arguments` schema in mzizi_search states them. Omit for none.
operationstringyesThe operation's name, e.g. 'get_component'.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

mzizi_feedback ~399

Your issue desk (was mzizi_report_issue): report a problem with a component or the registry. It goes to your own desk, which reproduces it via fundi, drafts an issue body with what the reproduction returned and logs it to fundi; fundi files the GitHub issue and tracks it, so action 'get' shows where yours got to. 'list' shows your reports, 'retry' re-attempts one that drafted but could not be logged. Needs sign-in: the desk belongs to your Mzizi console user; without it, the answer carries the report as a pre-filled GitHub issue for mzizi-dev/mzizi-registry, so it is never lost, and over HTTP the server answers with an OAuth challenge so your client can offer sign-in. With target 'docs', it instead reports a problem with a documentation page on docs.mzizi.dev (give `path` and `message`); that needs no account.

NameTypeReqDescription
actionstring–What to do. Defaults to filing a new report.
componentstring–Component the report concerns.
kindstring–Report kind. Required for action 'file'.
limitinteger––
messagestring–What happened. Required for action 'file'.
pathstring–For target 'docs': the page's URL path, without .mdx, e.g. /toolchain/cli.
reportIdstring–Report id. Required for actions 'get' and 'retry'.
severitystring––
skillstring–fundi skill to run for the reproduction. fundi never infers a skill from text, so omit this to let the report kind choose one.
targetstring–Where it goes: 'issue-desk' (default; sign-in) or 'docs' (a docs.mzizi.dev page; free).

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

mzizi_search ~297

Find anything this server can answer, and the operations that act on it. Searches components, conventions, engineering constraints, AI instruction sets, releases, the Rust crates, the agent skills, the toolchain (the CLI, how to install anything, this server) and, when docs.mzizi.dev answers, the documentation. Returns `results` (hits, paged), `docs` (documentation matches), and `operations`: each with its `arguments` (JSON Schema), the `permission` it needs (free, or sign-in) and `mayRun`, whether you may run it now. Run one with mzizi_execute {operation, arguments}. `allOperations` lists every operation. A component hit with `rustCrate` has a Mzizi Roots (Rust) implementation, which is the lead; at an equal score it ranks first. Paged: up to 50 hits per call and at most 25000 characters; results.meta.has_more and results.meta.next_offset say how to get the rest.

NameTypeReqDescription
limitinteger–Hits per call (default 50, at most 200).
offsetinteger–Hits to skip, for paging. Use results.meta.next_offset from the previous call.
querystringyesFree-text search, e.g. 'button', 'install', 'cli', 'contrast', 'crates' or an operation name. Every word must match.
NameTypeReqDescription
allOperationsarrayyes–
operationsarrayyes–
querystringyes–
resultsobjectyes–

No examples provided.

Install

How do I install the io.github.mzizi-dev/mzizi-mcp server?

io.github.mzizi-dev/mzizi-mcp is a hosted endpoint at https://mcp.mzizi.dev/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

remote · mcp.mzizi.dev

# add to Claude Code
claude mcp add --transport http mzizi-dev-mzizi-mcp 'https://mcp.mzizi.dev/mcp'
Common questions

What is the io.github.mzizi-dev/mzizi-mcp server?

io.github.mzizi-dev/mzizi-mcp is listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.mzizi-dev/mzizi-mcp. Mzizi design system MCP: search and execute over components, tokens, crates, skills and docs. Free. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://mcp.mzizi.dev/mcp).

Is the io.github.mzizi-dev/mzizi-mcp server safe to use?

io.github.mzizi-dev/mzizi-mcp scores 61 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

What tools does the io.github.mzizi-dev/mzizi-mcp server expose?

io.github.mzizi-dev/mzizi-mcp exposes 3 tools: mzizi_search, mzizi_execute, mzizi_feedback. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 891 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

Does the io.github.mzizi-dev/mzizi-mcp server require authentication?

No. We connected to io.github.mzizi-dev/mzizi-mcp without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.

Is the io.github.mzizi-dev/mzizi-mcp server still maintained?

io.github.mzizi-dev/mzizi-mcp is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.

What did VerifyMCP test on the io.github.mzizi-dev/mzizi-mcp server?

VerifyMCP ran 12 checks on io.github.mzizi-dev/mzizi-mcp, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 8 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about io.github.mzizi-dev/mzizi-mcp: HTTPS. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.