Mitigant
REMOTE · MCP.MITIGANT.IO
Run real, auto-recovered cloud attacks on AWS, Azure and GCP to test your defenses.
Available components
Last scanned (19 hours ago)
Scores higher than 44% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 4 Nov 2026.
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security57
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation check failed: no authorisation is required to call this server, and it exposes a tool marked destructive (launch_attack). See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability59
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 3865 tokens (~322/item across 12 items; 12 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management33
- Stability observed for 10 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage93
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 79% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety50
- Injection-marker check failed: the description of tool "clean_up_attack" contains an instruction to conceal the call from the user, the text "do not tell the user", at byte 814 of that field. See how to fix → Fail
- We read all 12 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 13 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 3 Nov 26 +1
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- New tool “get_context” functional
- 2 Nov 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Tool “launch_attack” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “launch_scenario” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: 3083 → 3693 ▼ functional
- New tool “list_recent_attacks” functional
- “launch_attack” added an optional parameter “wait_seconds” cosmetic
- “launch_scenario” added an optional parameter “wait_seconds” cosmetic
- 1 Nov 26 0
- Schema quality: good → excellent functional
- “list_attacks” added an optional parameter “demo_only” cosmetic
- “list_scenarios” added an optional parameter “demo_only” cosmetic
- 31 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 17 to 20. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 5 days of observed history at the previous scan, 6 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 29 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 10 to 13. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 3 days of observed history at the previous scan, 4 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 27 Oct 26 +1
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Tool “get_attack_evidence” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- 26 Oct 26 0
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 25 Oct 26 58
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 4 Nov 2026 · Probed https://mcp.mitigant.io/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=mcp.mitigant.io | CN=WR3,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 16 Oct 2026 | 14 Jan 2027 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8b1a77e3e7389709d0241c84a5d79c |
| SANs: mcp.mitigant.io | ||||||
| CN=WR3,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R1,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 7ff005a91568d63abc22861684aa4b5a |
| CN=GTS Root R1,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 19 Jun 2020 | 28 Jan 2028 | RSA 4096 | SHA256-RSA | 77bd0d6cdb36f91aea210fc4f058d30d |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of mcp.mitigant.io. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| io. | present | 38690 | 8 | Verified |
| mitigant.io. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://mcp.mitigant.io/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://mcp.mitigant.io/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 302 | https://mcp.mitigant.io/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
clean_up_attack ~208
Clean up a previously launched attack, restoring the cloud resources it changed back to their pre-attack state. Clean-up is normally AUTOMATIC after a short, deliberate inspection window (so the team can verify the attack and collect evidence first); calling this kicks it off immediately rather than waiting out that window. It is NOT a fix for a stall, and it ends that window early -- removing the attack's artifacts before the team may have finished inspecting them -- so only use it when the user explicitly wants the account restored now. This triggers clean-up and returns immediately -- clean-up runs in the background, so a success here means the request was accepted, not that clean-up is done. Confirm the account is actually restored by polling get_attack_status until cleanup.cleanUpComplete is true; do not tell the user it is restored based on this call alone.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| attack_id | string | yes | The attackId returned by a previous launch_attack / launch_scenario call |
| cloud_service | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_attack_details ~164
Full description, impact, MITRE mapping, and orchestration type (PROVISIONED or INLINE -- PROVISIONED attacks create and destroy their own target rather than targeting your existing infrastructure (they may still read or use existing resources along the way), so they're the lower-risk, production-viable choice; INLINE attacks find and attack an existing resource in the account) for one attack, by the action key from list_attacks. Result includes attackName (show this to the user) alongside the attackType you passed in (an opaque id, not for display).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action_key | string | yes | The attack's attackType value (an opaque id, e.g. IAM_CREATE_USER -- not attackName) from list_attacks |
| cloud_service | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_attack_evidence ~204
Get the evidence Mitigant collected for a previously launched attack -- what the account's own logging (CloudTrail, GuardDuty) recorded about it. Returns an 'evidence' summary (counts, sources, and a plain-language statement) plus the raw records, each with an evidenceUrl that opens the matching console entry. Use it to show the user what their defenses saw, especially during the clean-up inspection window. Important: an empty or pending result shortly after an attack is normal -- logging delivery lags by minutes, and evidence usually appears within a few minutes -- and an attack whose purpose is to disable logging is expected to leave none, so never report an empty result as the attack leaving no trace; re-check about every minute or two, for up to 30 minutes after the attack, and not more often. Read evidence.statement and relay it.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| attack_id | string | yes | The attackId returned by a previous launch_attack / launch_scenario call |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_attack_status ~159
Get the current report for a previously launched attack, including its clean-up state. Returns the attack report plus a 'cleanup' summary with cleanUpComplete and a plain-language statement. Only tell the user the account is back to its pre-attack state when cleanup.cleanUpComplete is true -- while anything is pending or failed, clean-up is not done, so report it as in progress and check again rather than implying all-clear. A pending clean-up is usually the DELIBERATE inspection window, not a stall: read cleanup.statement and relay it, and poll no faster than that -- a few minutes -- rather than reporting a fault.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| attack_id | string | yes | The attackId returned by a previous launch_attack / launch_scenario call |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_context ~118
Check this account's context before planning or launching: whether it is a Mitigant DEMO account and what that allows. Call this first on a new connection. If isDemo is true, every attack or scenario with allowedOnDemo=false WILL be rejected at launch -- treat those as not runnable and don't attempt them; use list_attacks' allowedOnDemo field (or list_scenarios demo_only:true) to pick ones that run. Returns no account/org identity, just the demo status, what you can do, and how to upgrade.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_scenario_details ~113
Full details for one attack scenario -- description, impact, and the step-by-step composition, by the scenario key from list_scenarios. A scenario runs several attacks in sequence; this returns every step, not just the first. Result includes scenarioName (show this to the user) alongside the scenarioKey you passed in (an opaque id, not for display).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| cloud_service | string | yes | – |
| scenario_key | string | yes | The scenario's key (an opaque id) from list_scenarios |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
launch_attack ~363
Run an attack against a cloud account connected to Mitigant. Returns the result if it finishes within wait_seconds (default 20); otherwise it returns at once with the attackId and status RUNNING while the attack keeps running -- then poll get_attack_status with that attackId, and never launch it again (that would start a second attack). This performs real actions on real cloud infrastructure -- it is not a simulation. Confirm with the user before calling: if their request could match more than one attack in list_attacks (similar names, or an underspecified description like "the security group attack"), show them the matching candidates with their names and descriptions and have them pick one -- don't guess which attack they meant.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| account_no | string | yes | Target account identifier -- AWS account number, Azure subscription ID, or GCP project ID |
| action_key | string | yes | The attack's attackType value to launch (an opaque id, not attackName) -- from list_attacks or get_attack_details |
| cloud_service | string | yes | – |
| region | string | – | Optional: the region to run the attack in (e.g. us-east-1, eu-west-3). Omit to use the account's default region (the defaultRegion from list_cloud_accounts); passing a region here does not change the… |
| wait_seconds | integer | – | Optional: how many seconds to wait for it to finish before returning (default 20). If it has not finished by then the call returns immediately with the attackId and status RUNNING while it keeps runn… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
launch_scenario ~367
Run a multi-step attack chain against a cloud account connected to Mitigant. Returns the result if every step finishes within wait_seconds (default 20); a multi-step scenario usually takes longer, so expect it to return at once with the attackId and status RUNNING while it keeps running -- then poll get_attack_status with that attackId, and never launch it again (that would start a second scenario). This performs real actions on real cloud infrastructure, as several attacks in sequence -- it is not a simulation, and its blast radius is the combined blast radius of every step. Confirm with the user before calling: if their request could match more than one scenario in list_scenarios, show them the matching candidates with their names and descriptions and have them pick one -- don't guess which scenario they meant.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| account_no | string | yes | Target account identifier -- AWS account number, Azure subscription ID, or GCP project ID |
| cloud_service | string | yes | – |
| region | string | – | Optional: the region to run the scenario in (e.g. us-east-1, eu-west-3). Omit to use the account's default region (the defaultRegion from list_cloud_accounts); passing a region here does not change t… |
| scenario_key | string | yes | The scenario's key to launch (an opaque id) -- from list_scenarios or get_scenario_details |
| wait_seconds | integer | – | Optional: how many seconds to wait for it to finish before returning (default 20). If it has not finished by then the call returns immediately with the attackId and status RUNNING while it keeps runn… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_attacks ~582
Browse Mitigant's attack actions -- atomic tests that each emulate one attacker technique -- that you can launch on their own against AWS, Azure or GCP. Currently 111 attack actions (AWS 49, Azure 36, GCP 26). Returns each action's attackName (show this to the user) and attackType (an opaque id -- pass this, not attackName, to get_attack_details or launch_attack), what it does, its impact, the MITRE ATT&CK technique it maps to, and its orchestration type (PROVISIONED or INLINE -- see orchestration_filter for what these mean). Optionally filter by cloud service (S3, IAM, ...), category, or orchestration type. Some attack actions run only as steps inside a scenario and appear via list_scenarios / get_scenario_details, not here. Start here to find an attack action to run.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| category_filter | string | – | Optional: only show attacks in this category. Category names vary by cloud_service and the set is not fixed, so do NOT guess one -- a guessed category simply returns an empty list. Call this tool wit… |
| cloud_service | string | yes | Which cloud provider's attack catalog to list |
| demo_only | boolean | – | Optional: when true, only list attacks that can be launched on a demo account. Every returned attack carries an 'allowedOnDemo' field; on a demo account an attack with allowedOnDemo:false is rejected… |
| orchestration_filter | string | – | Optional: PROVISIONED attacks create their own target resources, attack them, and delete them -- they do not target your existing infrastructure (they may still read or use existing resources along t… |
| service_filter | string | – | Optional: only show attacks targeting this cloud service/resource type. Valid values are per cloud_service and not interchangeable (e.g. AWS object storage is 'S3', GCP's is 'CLOUDSTORAGE', Azure's i… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_cloud_accounts ~214
List the cloud accounts available for attack emulation -- any account not listed here cannot be attacked, so check this before guessing an account_no for launch_attack. An empty result means no accounts are onboarded for attack emulation (for that cloud, or at all), not a failure -- the account may still exist in Mitigant for other purposes (e.g. posture scanning) without being eligible here. Each result's accountNo is already the value launch_attack expects; accountName is for display to the user. defaultRegion is the region attacks against that account run in by default (and where their evidence is collected); it can be overridden per attack request, but unless you do, actions target that region. State it when telling the user where an attack will run.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| cloud_service | string | – | Optional: only list accounts for this cloud provider (AWS, AZURE, or GCP). Omit the field entirely to list accounts across all three; an empty string is tolerated and treated the same as omitting. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_recent_attacks ~174
List your own recent attack and scenario runs for a cloud account, most recent first, each with its attackId and status. Use this to recover an attackId you no longer have -- for example when a launch_attack / launch_scenario call's connection dropped before it returned, or to check whether a long-running scenario is still running or has failed -- then pass the attackId to get_attack_status, get_attack_evidence or recover_attack. Shows only your own runs, not other users' activity on the account.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| account_no | string | yes | Target account identifier -- AWS account number, Azure subscription ID, or GCP project ID |
| cloud_service | string | yes | – |
| limit | integer | – | Optional: how many recent runs to return (most recent first). Defaults to 20, max 100. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_scenarios ~238
List Mitigant's attack scenarios -- multi-step chains that combine several attack actions run in sequence, so treat a scenario as having the combined blast radius of every step. Currently 45 scenarios (AWS 26, Azure 12, GCP 7). Returns each scenario's scenarioName (show this to the user) and scenarioKey (an opaque id -- pass this, not scenarioName, to get_scenario_details or launch_scenario), plus description, impact, and the step-by-step composition (each attack action's name, service, MITRE mapping, and impact). Use this to find a multi-step chain to run; use list_attacks instead for a single attack action.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| cloud_service | string | yes | Which cloud provider's scenario catalog to list |
| demo_only | boolean | – | Optional: when true, only list scenarios that can be launched on a demo account. Each scenario carries an 'allowedOnDemo' field (a scenario is allowed only when every step is); on a demo account a sc… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Mitigant MCP server?
Mitigant is a hosted endpoint at https://mcp.mitigant.io/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · mcp.mitigant.io
claude mcp add --transport http mitigant-mitigant-mcp 'https://mcp.mitigant.io/mcp'
What is the Mitigant MCP server?
Mitigant is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.mitigant/mitigant-mcp. Run real, auto-recovered cloud attacks on AWS, Azure and GCP to test your defenses. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://mcp.mitigant.io/mcp).
Is the Mitigant MCP server safe to use?
Mitigant scores 62 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Mitigant MCP server expose?
Mitigant exposes 12 tools: list_attacks, get_attack_details, launch_attack, list_cloud_accounts, list_scenarios, and 7 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 2,904 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Mitigant MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to Mitigant without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the Mitigant MCP server still maintained?
Mitigant is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 4 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.