temporal-mcp
REMOTE · TEMPORAL-MCP.DEV · 2 COMPONENTS
Wall-clock awareness for LLM agents. Two tools: elapsed-time-between-turns + day rollover detection.
Available components
Last scanned (35 minutes ago)
Scores higher than 78% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 6 Nov 2026.
Category Productivity and Notes
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security71
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation is enforced on tool calls, but the challenge carries no valid RFC 9728 metadata, so a client cannot discover where to get a token. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- HTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 405, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability69
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 297 tokens (~148/item across 2 items; 2 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management97
- Stability observed for 29 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage83
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 50% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 2 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 2 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities60
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Checks we ran (12)
- TLS certificate
- Authorization
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Checks we could not complete (1)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- HTTPS in Endpoint SecurityHTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 405, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement.
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 6 Nov 26 −1
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 5 Nov 26 +1
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 4 Nov 26 −1
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 26 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Aug 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 11 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 6 Nov 2026 · Probed https://temporal-mcp.dev/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=temporal-mcp.dev | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 8 Sept 2026 | 7 Dec 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | 5dd1719a1b41606c13bc79df3b977ce3 |
| SANs: temporal-mcp.dev, *.temporal-mcp.dev | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of temporal-mcp.dev. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| dev. | DS published | 60074 | 8 | Verified |
| temporal-mcp.dev. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication Challenged, unverified
The endpoint asked for a token, but we could not retrieve and validate the RFC 9728 metadata that tells a client how to obtain one.
| Result | Challenged, unverified |
|---|---|
| Enforced | On tool calls |
| HTTP status | 200 |
Protected resource metadata
| Retrieved | No |
|---|---|
| Problem | No resource metadata |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://temporal-mcp.dev/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://temporal-mcp.dev/mcp | Inconclusive | 405 |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
temporal_peek ~73
Read the current temporal snapshot for a thread WITHOUT advancing state. Use this when you want the gap delta but the call is not the canonical per-turn event.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| client_id | string | – | – |
| thread_key | string | – | – |
| tz_name | string | – | – |
| tz_offset_minutes | integer | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
temporal_tick ~224
Advance the temporal clock for a thread and return a snapshot (now / prev / gap / day_rollover / fresh_thread). Call once per user turn. Pass a stable `thread_key` (e.g. the conversation ID) so gap deltas remain meaningful across page reloads.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| client_id | string | – | Namespace tag (e.g. 'caweb', 'cursor'). Defaults to 'mcp'. |
| thread_key | string | – | Stable thread identifier within this client. For claude.ai web use the conversation ID; for other MCP clients any caller-stable string. If omitted, falls back to the Mcp-Session-Id header. |
| tz_name | string | – | Display name for the timezone (e.g. 'MDT'). Cosmetic; appears in the rendered header. |
| tz_offset_minutes | integer | – | Caller's UTC offset in minutes (e.g. -360 for MDT). Used for day_rollover detection and header formatting. Defaults to 0 (UTC) so day rollover is always honest even if the caller forgets to pass one. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the temporal-mcp server?
temporal-mcp is a hosted endpoint at https://temporal-mcp.dev/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · temporal-mcp.dev
claude mcp add --transport http mirrorethic-temporal-mcp 'https://temporal-mcp.dev/mcp'
What is the temporal-mcp server?
temporal-mcp is listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.MirrorEthic/temporal-mcp. Wall-clock awareness for LLM agents. Two tools: elapsed-time-between-turns + day rollover detection. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://temporal-mcp.dev/mcp).
Is the temporal-mcp server safe to use?
temporal-mcp scores 79 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the temporal-mcp server expose?
temporal-mcp exposes 2 tools: temporal_tick, temporal_peek. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 297 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the temporal-mcp server require authentication?
Yes. temporal-mcp asked us for credentials when we connected, so you will need to authorise it in your MCP client before it can do anything.
Is the temporal-mcp server still maintained?
temporal-mcp is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 6 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the temporal-mcp server?
VerifyMCP ran 12 checks on temporal-mcp, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 8 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about temporal-mcp: HTTPS. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.