Verify API
PYPI · VERIFY-API-MCP
Evidence-backed verification for citations, packages, repos, cases, filings, drugs, x402 sellers.
Available components
Last scanned (7 hours ago)
Scores higher than 58% of PyPI servers
Recent critical change
GHSA-6q48-6c7w-9gw2 affects this package (21 Oct 2026). See the changelog before you install this server.
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Supply Chain Security50
- Malware scan not yet available for this package.Unverified
- No known CVEs affecting this package version or its production dependencies.Pass
- Runs hatchling.build at install time, a recognised build step with no custom scripting around it. View diagnostics → Pass
- 1 of 31 dependencies flagged as unhealthy. View diagnostics → Partial
Provenance & Transparency19
- Repository check failed: the declared repository URL returned HTTP 404. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- Provenance check failed: no build-provenance attestation is published. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- Clear OSI-approved license (MIT).Pass
- Actively maintained (last published 62 days ago).Pass
- Security-disclosure policy not yet verified: we couldn't inspect the source repository.Unverified
Schema Quality & AI Usability66
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 747 tokens (~93/item across 8 items; 8 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage67
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 0% of tool parameters carry a description.Fail
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 8 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 8 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).Pass
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 5 Nov 26 −15
- Malware scan: pass → unverified ▼ security
- 1 Nov 26 +15
- Malware scan: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 31 Oct 26 −15
- Malware scan: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 29 Oct 26 +15
- Malware scan: unverified → pass ▲ security
- 25 Oct 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 24 Oct 26 0
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 22 Oct 26 +60
- Malware scan: pass → unverified ▼ security
- GHSA-6q48-6c7w-9gw2 no longer affects this package ▲ security
- Known CVEs: fail → pass ▲ security
- Score status: failed → scored ▲ functional
- 21 Oct 26 −75
- GHSA-6q48-6c7w-9gw2 affects this package: none ▼ critical
- Known CVEs: pass → fail ▼ critical
- Score status: scored → failed ▼ critical
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Analysed pypi/verify-api-mcp@0.6.0
Provenance No attestation
The registry publishes no build provenance for this version, so there is nothing to verify.
| Result | No attestation |
|---|---|
| Ecosystem | pypi |
| Reason | No attestation published |
Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →
Install scripts 1 script
| Hook | Tier | Command |
|---|---|---|
| build_backend | allowlisted | hatchling.build |
Background: Why install scripts are a supply-chain risk →
Dependencies 31 packages
| Packages resolved | 31 |
|---|---|
| No linked repository | 1 |
| Tree resolution | Complete |
Background: SBOMs and build attestations, explained →
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
verify_case ~78
Verify a legal case citation: does it exist, and does the given case name match the canonical record? Catches a fabricated case citation, including a real-looking citation number paired with an invented case name. Checked against CourtListener. Does not check whether a case is still good law.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| case_name | – | – | – |
| citation | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_citation ~93
Verify a citation: does it exist, is it retracted, and do the given title/authors/year/journal match the canonical record? Checked against Crossref (includes Retraction Watch data) with OpenAlex as a fallback when no DOI is given. Provide a doi and/or a title.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| authors | – | – | – |
| doi | – | – | – |
| journal | – | – | – |
| title | – | – | – |
| year | – | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_drug ~105
Verify an FDA drug record: given a claim_type ('approval', 'ndc', or 'recall') and its identifier, does that record actually exist, and does the given name match the canonical record? Checked against openFDA. Catches a fabricated or misattributed drug approval, NDC listing, or recall citation. Existence/status only, not medical advice.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| claim_type | string | yes | – |
| expected_name | – | – | – |
| identifier | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_filing ~107
Verify an SEC filing: given a filer's CIK and a claimed accession number, does that filing actually exist, and does its form type/filing date match what's claimed? Checked against SEC EDGAR's submissions API. Catches a fabricated or misattributed filing citation, including a real-looking accession number paired with an invented form type or date.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| accession_number | string | yes | – |
| cik | string | yes | – |
| filed_date | – | – | – |
| form_type | – | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_package ~95
Verify a package: does it exist, is it deprecated or yanked, and does it have known vulnerabilities? Checked against the npm/PyPI/crates.io registry plus OSV.dev advisories. Catches an agent installing a hallucinated or squatted package name. ecosystem must be one of: npm, pypi, crates.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ecosystem | string | yes | – |
| name | string | yes | – |
| version | – | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_repo ~66
Verify a GitHub repo: does it exist, is it archived or disabled? Catches an agent recommending or depending on a repo that's been renamed, taken down, or abandoned. Checked against the GitHub REST API.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| owner | string | yes | – |
| repo | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_seller ~129
Verify an x402 seller before paying it: does it exist and respond with a well-formed 402 challenge, is its own declared input/output schema internally consistent, and is its payout address sanctioned? Checked live against the seller itself plus a sanctions oracle and on-chain wallet history (Base payTo addresses only). Confirms the checkable things about a seller check out -- not a guarantee of trustworthiness, which no free source can promise. method defaults to POST; set it to GET if that's what triggers the seller's 402.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| method | – | – | – |
| resource_url | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_url ~74
Verify a URL: does it resolve, what's the final status and redirect chain, is it archived on the Wayback Machine, and (optionally) does expected text appear on the page. Checked via direct fetch and the Internet Archive.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| expected_content | – | – | – |
| expected_date | – | – | – |
| url | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Verify API MCP server?
Verify API runs locally as a PyPI package, launched with uvx verify-api-mcp. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
pypi · verify-api-mcp
claude mcp add mgdsn-verify-api-mcp -- uvx verify-api-mcp
What is the Verify API MCP server?
Verify API is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.mgdsn/verify-api-mcp. Evidence-backed verification for citations, packages, repos, cases, filings, drugs, x402 sellers. This page covers its PyPI package (verify-api-mcp).
Is the Verify API MCP server safe to use?
Verify API scores 60 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. We found no known CVEs affecting it as of 5 November 2026. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Verify API MCP server expose?
Verify API exposes 8 tools: verify_citation, verify_url, verify_package, verify_repo, verify_case, and 3 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 747 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Is the Verify API MCP server still maintained?
Verify API is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What licence is the Verify API MCP server under?
Verify API declares the MIT licence, which is OSI-approved. That covers the source only, and says nothing about the cost of any service it calls.