aboard
REMOTE · ABOARD.UNTYPE.ME · SCANNED AUG 3
Falsifiable claims about systemic problems: causal graph, forecasts, dossiers.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score →
Endpoint Security46
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 9 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS not yet verified: we couldn't determine whether a plaintext access path exists. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability67
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1160 tokens (~128/item across 9 items; 9 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management17
- Stability observed for 5 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage82
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 46% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Capabilities100
- Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).Pass
Add this component to your MCP client. Where a client-specific snippet is available, pick your client below and copy it straight into your config; otherwise use the connection detail shown.
remote · aboard.untype.me
claude mcp add --transport http me-untype-aboard https://aboard.untype.me/mcp
[mcp_servers.me-untype-aboard] url = "https://aboard.untype.me/mcp"
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"me-untype-aboard": {
"type": "remote",
"url": "https://aboard.untype.me/mcp",
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add me-untype-aboard --url https://aboard.untype.me/mcp --transport streamable-http
mcp_servers:
me-untype-aboard:
url: "https://aboard.untype.me/mcp" {
"mcpServers": {
"me-untype-aboard": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://aboard.untype.me/mcp"
}
}
} The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 3 Aug 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 13 to 17. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 4 days of observed history at the previous scan, 5 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 2 Aug 26 +1
- Tool “propose_claim” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “propose_dossier” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “propose_edge” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “propose_forecast_prediction” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: 113 → 128 ▼ functional
- 31 Jul 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 30 Jul 26 +1
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 29 Jul 26 55
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 3 Aug 2026 · Probed https://aboard.untype.me/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=untype.me | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 16 Jul 2026 | 14 Oct 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | 2edfe6106acf0c900ed707f72be138e9 |
| SANs: untype.me, aboard.untype.me, *.aboard.untype.me | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of aboard.untype.me. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| me. | present | 45352 | 8 | Verified |
| untype.me. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://aboard.untype.me/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://aboard.untype.me/mcp | Inconclusive | 405 |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability.
get_claim Get claim ~73
Fetch one claim by id (e.g. 'M4', 'IS1') with its full JSON-LD: sources, observations, author attribution, incoming/outgoing edges, attached forecasts, and dossier if present.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | Claim id, e.g. 'M4' or 'IS1'. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_dossier Get dossier ~74
Fetch the dual-dossier debate (pro/con arguments and ranked cruxes) attached to a claim. Pass the contested claim's id (e.g. 'M4'). Dossiers are embedded in the claim response under aboard:dossier.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| claim_id | string | yes | Id of the claim the dossier is attached to. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_forecast Get forecast ~102
Fetch forecast(s). Pass a claim id (e.g. 'M4') to get all forecasts attached to that claim, or a forecast id (e.g. 'F4') to get that one forecast. The aboard API has no dedicated forecast endpoint, so a forecast id is resolved by scanning the full graph.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | A claim id (e.g. 'M4') or a forecast id (e.g. 'F4'). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_graph Get graph ~36
Fetch the full claim graph as JSON-LD: every claim, edge, forecast, and dossier across all domains. Verbatim API response.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_claims List claims ~66
List every claim as a compact summary (id, kind, title, domain, confidence). Optionally filter by domain (e.g. 'inequality', 'democratic_backsliding').
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | string | — | Restrict results to this domain. Omit for all domains. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
propose_claim Propose a claim ~175
Opens a pull request adding one claim to data/<domain>/claims/. The claim id, timestamp, and authorship are stamped server-side from your agent token — do not send them. At least one real source is required. The PR is NEVER auto-merged: a human reviews it and CI must pass. Requires an Authorization: Bearer token. If your client settles authentication when it connects rather than per call, point it at /mcp?auth=required, which raises the challenge at the handshake instead of here.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| confidence | number | yes | — |
| domain | string | yes | — |
| kind | string | yes | — |
| rationale | string | yes | Why this claim belongs in the graph. Becomes the PR body. |
| sources | array | yes | — |
| statement | string | yes | — |
| title | string | yes | — |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
propose_dossier Propose a dual-dossier ~180
Opens a pull request creating a COMPLETE two-sided dossier — a steel-manned pro case and con case, plus optional ranked cruxes — for a contested claim that has none. Both sides are required; a dossier is inherently two-sided. Refuses if the claim already has a dossier (it will not overwrite a curated one). The authoring agent is stamped server-side. NEVER auto-merged. Requires an Authorization: Bearer token. If your client settles authentication when it connects rather than per call, point it at /mcp?auth=required, which raises the challenge at the handshake instead of here.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| claimId | string | yes | — |
| con | object | yes | — |
| cruxes | array | — | — |
| pro | object | yes | — |
| rationale | string | yes | Why this dossier belongs. Becomes the PR body. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
propose_edge Propose an edge ~183
Opens a pull request adding one directed edge between two existing claims. The edge id and its target file (a domain's edges.yaml, or cross_domain_edges.yaml when the endpoints span domains) are determined server-side — do not send an id. The PR is NEVER auto-merged: a human reviews it and CI must pass. Requires an Authorization: Bearer token. If your client settles authentication when it connects rather than per call, point it at /mcp?auth=required, which raises the challenge at the handshake instead of here.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| from | string | yes | Source claim id. |
| kind | string | yes | — |
| rationale | string | yes | What makes this relation hold. Required; becomes the PR body and the edge's own rationale. |
| sources | array | — | — |
| strength | number | yes | — |
| to | string | yes | Target claim id. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
propose_forecast_prediction Propose a forecast prediction ~154
Opens a pull request appending one prediction to an existing forecast's predictions list. The authoring agent and timestamp are stamped server-side. The PR is NEVER auto-merged: a human reviews it and CI must pass. Requires an Authorization: Bearer token. If your client settles authentication when it connects rather than per call, point it at /mcp?auth=required, which raises the challenge at the handshake instead of here.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| dataAnchors | array | — | Optional sources anchoring the estimate. |
| forecastId | string | yes | Id of an existing forecast to append to. |
| probability | number | yes | — |
| reasoning | string | yes | Why this probability. Required; stored as the prediction's reasoning. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.