DenialPath
REMOTE · DENIALPATH.VERCEL.APP
Deterministic CMS NCCI/MUE claim scrubbing and CARC/RARC denial explanations, cited to source.
Available components
Last scanned (7 hours ago)
Scores higher than 10% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 5 Nov 2026.
Category Health and Science
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security63
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not yet verified: we couldn't confirm whether this endpoint requires it. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability0
- Transport check failed: declared streamable-http, but the endpoint returned HTTP 404. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Schema Quality & AI Usability0
- Schema not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's schema, or could read only part of its tool list.Unverified
Stability & Change Management0
- Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).Unverified
Tool Coverage0
- Tool coverage not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.Unverified
Tool Safety0
- Tool safety not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.Unverified
Capabilities0
- Capabilities not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's capabilities.Unverified
Unverified: 5 categories
Categories scored 0 because we could not verify them: authentication we do not have, an unreachable endpoint, or not enough scan history. We only credit what we can confirm.
Checks we ran (5)
- TLS certificate
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
Checks we could not complete (6)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- Authorization in Endpoint SecurityAuthorisation not yet verified: we couldn't confirm whether this endpoint requires it.
- Schema quality in Schema Quality & AI Usability (scores 0 for this)Schema not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's schema, or could read only part of its tool list.
- Stability in Stability & Change Management (scores 0 for this)Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).
- Tool coverage in Tool Coverage (scores 0 for this)Tool coverage not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.
- Tool safety in Tool Safety (scores 0 for this)Tool safety not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.
- Capabilities in Capabilities (scores 0 for this)Capabilities not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's capabilities.
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 30 Sept 26 0
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → not serving MCP ▼ security
- Stability: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Authorization: partial → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Transport: pass → fail ▼ security
- Capabilities: pass → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- First check of Schema quality: unverified functional
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 26 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Aug 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 12 Aug 26 0
- Authorization: unverified → partial ▲ security
- The server changed its declared name: denialpath → denial7 security
- “check_claim” reworded the description of “dateOfService” cosmetic
- “draft_appeal” reworded the description of “dateOfService” cosmetic
- “get_ncci_edits” reworded the description of “code” cosmetic
- “get_ncci_edits” reworded the description of “column1” cosmetic
- “get_ncci_edits” reworded the description of “column2” cosmetic
- “get_ncci_edits” reworded the description of “dateOfService” cosmetic
- “get_timely_filing” reworded the description of “dateOfService” cosmetic
- Tool “check_claim” changed its title: Scrub a claim against NCCI PTP and MUE edits cosmetic
- Tool “draft_appeal” changed its title: Draft an appeal letter (Pro or Scale plan) cosmetic
- Tool “explain_denial” changed its title: Explain a CARC/RARC denial from a remittance cosmetic
- Tool “get_mue” changed its title: Look up an MUE unit limit for one code cosmetic
- Tool “get_ncci_edits” changed its title: Look up NCCI PTP edits for a pair or a code cosmetic
- Tool “get_timely_filing” changed its title: Days left to file a claim for a payer cosmetic
- 11 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 31 Jul 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Probed https://denialpath.vercel.app/api/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=*.vercel.app | CN=WR1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 31 Oct 2026 | 29 Jan 2027 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 9c5f0e6a35c955e113044c86848e4cd5 |
| SANs: *.vercel.app | ||||||
| CN=WR1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R1,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 7fd9e2c2d2048a0474b627a26d0868a7 |
| CN=GTS Root R1,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 19 Jun 2020 | 28 Jan 2028 | RSA 4096 | SHA256-RSA | 77bd0d6cdb36f91aea210fc4f058d30d |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of denialpath.vercel.app. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| app. | DS published | 23684 | 8 | Verified |
| vercel.app. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication Inconclusive
We could not reach the endpoint well enough to judge its authorisation posture.
| Result | Inconclusive |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 404 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://denialpath.vercel.app/api/mcp | HTTP error | 404 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://denialpath.vercel.app/api/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 308 | https://denialpath.vercel.app/api/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
check_claim Scrub a claim against NCCI PTP and MUE edits ~296
Scrub a claim against the NCCI procedure-to-procedure (PTP) edits and medically unlikely edits (MUE) in force on its date of service. Deterministic: no model, so identical input always returns an identical verdict. Every finding.status is one of pass (checked against a real edit and clean), fail (an edit fires), bypassed (an edit fires but a modifier already on the line legitimately resolves it), or no_data (we hold no edit for this code or pair in our dataset). no_data is NOT a pass: treat it as unchecked, since CMS may still deny the line under an edit outside our loaded subset. summary.clean is true only when every finding is pass and none are no_data - never report a claim clean because nothing failed if some lines were never checked. The response echoes editQuarter (the CMS quarter version the verdict was computed against) and coverage (how many PTP pairs and MUE codes are loaded), so you can tell a caller exactly what was checked. Free, no API key needed; a key only raises the rate limit.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| dateOfService | string | yes | ISO yyyy-mm-dd, e.g. "2026-07-01". Selects which CMS edit quarter applies. |
| lines | array | yes | The billed lines on this claim. |
| payerSlug | string | – | Optional payer slug for context. Does not change the PTP/MUE verdict. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
draft_appeal Draft an appeal letter (Pro or Scale plan) ~366
Generate an appeal letter for a denial, assembled deterministically from cited facts. REQUIRES A PRO OR SCALE PLAN. Called by an anonymous caller or a key on the free plan, this returns an upgrade_required error naming the pricing page - it never fabricates or partially generates a letter for a caller who cannot access the feature. The letter argues the billing question only: it never asserts anything about the patient's clinical condition. Any fact only the practice holds (providerName, claimNumber, dateOfService, codes, the signature) that is not supplied is rendered as an explicit "[TO BE COMPLETED BY PRACTICE]" placeholder in the letter body and listed by name in placeholders, never invented. grounded is true only when we hold the CARC supplied and could argue it with our own corrective-action data; when false, the letter still assembles around payer/claim details and any practiceNote given, but the substantive grounds section is left as a placeholder for the practice to write.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| carc | string | yes | CARC code from the remittance, e.g. "CO-45" or "45". |
| claimNumber | string | – | Optional. Rendered as a placeholder if omitted. |
| codes | array | – | Optional procedure codes at issue, numeric reference only. |
| dateOfService | string | – | Optional, ISO yyyy-mm-dd. Rendered as a placeholder if omitted. |
| payerSlug | string | – | Optional payer slug, to cite that payer's appeal policy and window. |
| practiceNote | string | – | Optional free-text detail from the practice, appended to the argument section. |
| providerName | string | – | Optional. Rendered as a placeholder if omitted. |
| rarc | array | – | Optional RARC codes on the same remittance line. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
explain_denial Explain a CARC/RARC denial from a remittance ~220
Explain a CARC (Claim Adjustment Reason Code) and any RARCs (Remittance Advice Remark Codes) from a remittance: plain meaning, ranked corrective actions, and whether an appeal is worth filing. found:false means we do not hold that CARC in our dataset (X12 publishes far more codes than we have curated) - the response still returns the group-code meaning when a group prefix (CO/PR/OA/PI) was supplied, and note explains the gap rather than leaving it silent. unknownRarc reports, rather than silently drops, any RARC you passed that we do not hold. Passing payer additionally attaches that payer's appeal deadline where we hold one. Free, no API key needed.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| carc | string | yes | CARC code, with or without a group prefix, e.g. "CO-45" or "45". |
| payer | string | – | Optional payer slug, to attach a timely-filing appeal deadline. |
| rarc | array | – | Optional RARC codes on the same remittance line. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_mue Look up an MUE unit limit for one code ~171
Look up the medically unlikely edit (MUE) unit limit for a single CPT/HCPCS code. status is found or no_data; no_data means we hold no MUE value for this code in our dataset, not that CMS publishes none. When found, the returned limit.mai (adjudication indicator: "1" line edit - denies the excess units on the line; "2" date-of-service absolute - never payable above the limit on that date, not even on appeal; "3" date-of-service clinical - may be allowed above the limit with supporting documentation) governs what a biller can do above the limit, explained in limit.maiMeaning. Free, no API key needed.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| code | string | yes | CPT/HCPCS code, e.g. "36415". |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_ncci_edits Look up NCCI PTP edits for a pair or a code ~327
Look up NCCI procedure-to-procedure (PTP) edits, in two modes. Pair mode: pass column1, column2 (either order) and dateOfService to check whether that specific pair bundles on that date; status is no_data (we hold no edit for this pair in our dataset - NOT confirmation CMS has none), not_applicable (we hold the edit but it does not apply on this date, either outside its effective/deletion window or modifierIndicator "9" meaning the edit is deleted or never applicable), or applies. List mode: pass code alone to get every pair in the dataset involving that code, in either column, with no date filtering. modifierIndicator "0" means no modifier may ever bypass the edit; "1" means a modifier may bypass it, but only where the services were genuinely distinct. Free, no API key needed.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| code | string | – | List mode: a single code. Returns every pair in the dataset involving it, in either column, with no date filtering. |
| column1 | string | – | Pair mode: a CPT/HCPCS code. Send with column2 and dateOfService. Column order does not matter; the response reports the pair in CMS column order. |
| column2 | string | – | Pair mode: the other code in the pair. |
| dateOfService | string | – | Pair mode, required: ISO yyyy-mm-dd, e.g. "2026-07-01". NCCI PTP edits are versioned quarterly, so a pair lookup cannot be answered without a date. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_timely_filing Days left to file a claim for a payer ~125
Days remaining to file an initial claim (or, if already past, how far over) for a payer given a date of service. daysRemaining and expired are null when we hold no published timely filing limit for that payer, which is common since many limits are contract-specific - check note before treating the result as an actual deadline. Free, no API key needed.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| dateOfService | string | yes | ISO yyyy-mm-dd, e.g. "2026-01-15". |
| payer | string | yes | Payer slug, e.g. "aetna". |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the DenialPath MCP server?
DenialPath is a hosted endpoint at https://denialpath.vercel.app/api/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · denialpath.vercel.app
claude mcp add --transport http maxbeech-denialpath 'https://denialpath.vercel.app/api/mcp'
What is the DenialPath MCP server?
DenialPath is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.maxbeech/denialpath. Deterministic CMS NCCI/MUE claim scrubbing and CARC/RARC denial explanations, cited to source. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://denialpath.vercel.app/api/mcp).
Is the DenialPath MCP server safe to use?
DenialPath scores 25 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the DenialPath MCP server expose?
DenialPath exposes 6 tools: check_claim, explain_denial, get_ncci_edits, get_mue, draft_appeal, get_timely_filing. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,505 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the DenialPath MCP server require authentication?
Its publisher declares no required credentials for DenialPath. We have not been able to confirm that against the live endpoint, and a server can require authorisation without declaring it here.
Is the DenialPath MCP server still maintained?
DenialPath is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the DenialPath MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 5 checks on DenialPath, covering TLS certificate, HTTPS, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 1 more. 6 items could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about DenialPath: Authorization, Schema quality, Stability, Tool coverage and 2 more. 5 categories score 0 for that reason, because we only credit what we can confirm. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.