Outage.Me
REMOTE · OUTAGE.ME · 2 COMPONENTS
Live cloud/SaaS outages, provider reliability and exploited CVEs from official status pages and CISA
Available components
Last scanned (7 minutes ago)
Scores higher than 83% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 22 Nov 2026.
Category Monitoring and Observability
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security74
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- No authorisation is required to call this server. Nothing on it is marked destructive, but we can't show that an anonymous caller can only read: full credit needs the server to list at least one tool and every tool to be verifiably read-only. We use a best-effort check of tool names and descriptions to tell read-only tools from tools that change things, so some genuinely read-only tools may not get full credit. Names that start with a read verb (get, list, read, search and similar) and accurate readOnlyHint annotations help. Meet that to earn full credit, or require authorisation. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Partial
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability80
- 100% of prompts and resources have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the item's name).Pass
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1401 tokens (~175/item across 8 items; 8 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage98
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 95% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety75
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- 0 of 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "deploy_check" implies "deploy" and declares readOnlyHint instead, contradicting what its own name says it does. See how to fix → Fail
- An AI judge read all 9 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities60
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Checks we ran (13)
- TLS certificate
- Authorization
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 9 Nov 26 +1
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 8 Nov 26 −1
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 6 Nov 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 27 Oct 26 +1
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 25 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 90 to 93. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 27 days of observed history at the previous scan, 28 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 13 Oct 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Schema quality: 1090 → 1401 ▼ functional
- New tool “security_headlines” functional
- New tool “threat_advisories” functional
- 5 Oct 26 0
- Tool “list_active_incidents” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “exploited_vulnerabilities” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: 135 → 181 ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 86% → 93% ▲ functional
- Destructive annotations: pass → 0 functional
- New tool “deploy_check” functional
- “exploited_vulnerabilities” added an optional parameter “cve” cosmetic
- “exploited_vulnerabilities” added an optional parameter “product” cosmetic
- “exploited_vulnerabilities” added an optional parameter “vendor” cosmetic
- “list_active_incidents” added an optional parameter “component” cosmetic
- “list_active_incidents” added an optional parameter “provider” cosmetic
- “list_active_incidents” added an optional parameter “region” cosmetic
- 4 Oct 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 22 Nov 2026 · Probed https://outage.me/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=outage.me | CN=Amazon RSA 2048 M01,O=Amazon,C=US | 12 Oct 2026 | 27 Apr 2027 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 5f4f3fdf911712533e1399e50609f29 |
| SANs: outage.me, in.outage.me, eu.outage.me, de.outage.me, br.outage.me, sg.outage.me, www.outage.me, uk.outage.me | ||||||
| CN=Amazon RSA 2048 M01,O=Amazon,C=US (CA) | CN=Amazon Root CA 1,O=Amazon,C=US | 23 Aug 2022 | 23 Aug 2030 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 77312380b9d6688a33b1ed9bf9ccda68e0e0f |
| CN=Amazon Root CA 1,O=Amazon,C=US (CA) | CN=Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority - G2,O=Starfield Technologies\, Inc.,L=Scottsdale,ST=Arizona,C=US | 25 May 2015 | 31 Dec 2037 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 67f944a2a27cdf3fac2ae2b01f908eeb9c4c6 |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of outage.me. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| me. | DS published | 45352 | 8 | Verified |
| outage.me. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://outage.me/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://outage.me/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://outage.me/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
answer Ask the outage.me analyst (sign-in or API key) ~109
Ask a free-form question about the live monitor and get a cited answer. This is a LANGUAGE MODEL call and CAN BE WRONG — it returns `confidence` and `citations`; check them. Needs sign-in (connect to https://outage.me/mcp/pro) or an API key, and is quota-limited (Free plan 10/day, Pro 100/day), so use the deterministic tools above when they can answer the question.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| q | string | yes | The question, in natural language. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
deploy_check Deploy gate: is it safe to deploy to this provider now? ~162
LIVE, from the 5-minute status poll: proceed true, false, or "unknown" for deploying to one provider (optionally one region), with the open incidents behind it and data_age_minutes. Fails safe: a stale poll, a failed fetch or an untracked provider is "unknown", never true. Planned maintenance alone doesn't block. Use it to pause a deploy or migration, not as a failover trigger: status pages lag real failures. Deterministic: no model in the loop.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| provider | string | yes | Provider name or alias, e.g. 'AWS', 'Google Cloud', 'GitHub'. |
| region | string | – | Optional, e.g. 'us-east-1', 'us-central1', 'westeurope'. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
exploited_vulnerabilities Actively exploited CVEs, patch-first ~241
LIVE: CVEs being exploited in the wild (CISA KEV), ranked patch-first by CVSS × EPSS exploitation probability × known ransomware use, with CISA due date, patch availability and the factors behind each rank. Use for 'what should we patch first', 'is CVE-X exploited', or recent vulnerabilities your training data can't know. `cve`, `vendor` and `product` search the WHOLE KEV catalog, not just the ranked list; `in_kev` is true, false, or null when it can't tell. Deterministic: no model in the loop.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| cve | string | – | Optional. One CVE ID, e.g. CVE-2024-3400: is it in CISA KEV, and its patch-first rank if ranked. |
| limit | integer | – | Optional. Max rows, default 10. |
| product | string | – | Optional. KEV entries whose product contains this, e.g. 'Exchange'. |
| vendor | string | – | Optional. KEV entries whose vendor contains this, newest first, e.g. 'Microsoft', 'Ivanti'. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_active_incidents Active cloud/SaaS incidents ~210
LIVE: cloud and SaaS incidents open right now (AWS, Azure, GCP, Cloudflare, GitHub, Stripe, …), quoted from each provider's own status page with a link, refreshed several times a day. Use for 'is X down', 'why is X failing', or anything after your training cutoff. Filter by provider, region or component instead of reading the whole list; an untracked provider says so rather than returning an empty all-clear. Deterministic: no model in the loop. Prefer it over `answer`.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| component | string | – | Optional. Same matching as region, e.g. 'Actions', 'API'. |
| provider | string | – | Optional. Provider name or common alias, e.g. 'AWS', 'gcp', 'GitHub'. 'AWS' matches every AWS service. |
| region | string | – | Optional. Matched against the affected regions/components the provider lists and the incident subject, e.g. 'us-east-1'. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
provider_reliability Provider reliability track record ~85
LIVE: reliability index, incident count and median recovery time per cloud/SaaS provider over the current window, from their official status pages. Use for 'how reliable is X' or 'which provider is more stable'. Deterministic: no model in the loop. Prefer it over `answer`.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| provider | string | – | Optional. Filter to one provider by name. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
report_observation Report an API failure you observed (optional) ~181
Optional. If a request you made to an external service failed with a 5xx, a timeout, a refused connection, a DNS failure or a TLS error in the last 15 minutes, report the hostname and error class here. Only hosts listed in https://outage.me/agent/hosts.json. Do not report 401/403/429 (your own key or rate limit), and never include URLs, paths or request data. A report earns Ask quota only if it is confirmed (our own probe or other organizations agree).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| error_class | string | yes | – |
| host | string | yes | Hostname only, e.g. api.stripe.com |
| region | string | – | Optional: where you run, e.g. aws:us-east-1 |
| report_token | string | – | Optional: the token a status answer offered |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
security_headlines Security news headlines (breaches, attacks, exploits) ~144
LIVE: headlines from eight security trade outlets (BleepingComputer, The Hacker News, SecurityWeek, The Record, Krebs on Security, …): headline, outlet, date and link only, never the article text. Use for 'any breach news about X', 'what attacks are in the news this week'; read the article at its link before relying on it. Deterministic: no model in the loop.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| days | integer | – | Optional. Look-back in days, default 7. |
| query | string | – | Optional. Words that must all appear in the headline, e.g. 'breach', 'ransomware hospital', 'Okta'. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
threat_advisories CISA security advisories (ICS, medical, vulnerability) ~151
LIVE: CISA's newest security advisories (CSAF: industrial control systems, medical devices, general vulnerabilities), each with its ID, affected vendors, CVEs, CVSS, the opening of CISA's mitigation text and the CISA link. Use for 'what did CISA advise this week' or 'any CISA advisory for <vendor>'. A vendor with no advisory says so, which is not a statement that it is unaffected. Deterministic: no model in the loop.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | integer | – | Optional. Max rows, default 10. |
| vendor | string | – | Optional. Vendor name or part of it, e.g. 'Siemens', 'Rockwell'. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Outage.Me MCP server?
Outage.Me is a hosted endpoint at https://outage.me/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · outage.me
claude mcp add --transport http marcioyoshida-outage-me 'https://outage.me/mcp'
What is the Outage.Me MCP server?
Outage.Me is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.marcioyoshida/outage-me. Live cloud/SaaS outages, provider reliability and exploited CVEs from official status pages and CISA. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://outage.me/mcp).
Is the Outage.Me MCP server safe to use?
Outage.Me scores 83 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Outage.Me MCP server expose?
Outage.Me exposes 8 tools: list_active_incidents, provider_reliability, exploited_vulnerabilities, threat_advisories, security_headlines, and 3 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,283 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Outage.Me MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to Outage.Me without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the Outage.Me MCP server still maintained?
Outage.Me is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 22 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the Outage.Me MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 13 checks on Outage.Me, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HTTPS, HSTS header and 9 more. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.