OMX for Hyperliquid
PYPI · OMX-HYPERLIQUID
Hyperliquid execution for AI agents: limits, human approval, kill switch. Keyless demo + live paper.
Available components
Last scanned (11 hours ago)
Scores higher than 60% of PyPI servers
Category Finance and Payments
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Supply Chain Security50
- Malware scan not yet available for this package.Unverified
- No known CVEs affecting this package version or its production dependencies.Pass
- Runs setuptools.build_meta at install time, a recognised build step with no custom scripting around it. View diagnostics → Pass
- 1 of 56 dependencies flagged as unhealthy. View diagnostics → Partial
Provenance & Transparency100
- Source repository is publicly reachable at the declared URL. View diagnostics → Pass
- Cryptographically verified build provenance (signed, bound to Lumen-Founder/omx-hyperliquid-mcp). View diagnostics → Pass
- Clear OSI-approved license (MIT).Pass
- Actively maintained (last published 15 days ago).Pass
- Publishes a security disclosure policy (SECURITY.md).Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability59
- AI-judged instruction clarity (fair).Partial
- Tool/resource definitions use about 895 tokens (~89/item across 10 items; 10 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management53
- Stability observed for 16 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage71
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 0% of tool parameters carry a description.Fail
- Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety75
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- 0 of 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "kill_switch" implies "kill" and declares no destructiveHint at all, which the MCP spec reads as destructive by default. See how to fix → Fail
- An AI judge read all 11 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).Pass
Checks we ran (15)
- Known CVEs
- Install scripts
- Dependency health
- Source repository
- Provenance
- License
- Maintenance
- Security disclosure
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Checks we could not complete (1)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this package. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- Malware scan in Supply Chain SecurityMalware scan not yet available for this package.
Does not apply to this package (2)
- Endpoint SecurityScored on hosted endpoints only. A package has no live endpoint of its own for us to probe.
- Transport & ReachabilityScored on hosted endpoints only. A package has no live endpoint of its own for us to probe.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 21 Nov 26 −15
- Malware scan: pass → unverified ▼ security
- 20 Nov 26 +16
- Malware scan: unverified → pass ▲ security
- 19 Nov 26 −15
- Malware scan: pass → unverified ▼ security
- 18 Nov 26 +16
- Malware scan: unverified → pass ▲ security
- 16 Nov 26 −14
- Malware scan: pass → unverified ▼ security
- 13 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 23 to 27. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 7 days of observed history at the previous scan, 8 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 12 Nov 26 +15
- Malware scan: unverified → pass ▲ security
- 11 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 17 to 20. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 5 days of observed history at the previous scan, 6 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Analysed pypi/omx-hyperliquid@0.1.8
Provenance Verified
A signed build attestation was found and verified, binding this exact artifact to the source repository it claims to come from.
| Result | Verified |
|---|---|
| Ecosystem | pypi |
| Reason | Verified |
| Discovered via | Registry attestation endpoint |
| Source repo | Lumen-Founder/omx-hyperliquid-mcp |
| Certificate issuer | https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com |
| Certificate SAN | https://github.com/Lumen-Founder/omx-hyperliquid-mcp/.github/workflows/publish.yml@refs/heads/main |
| Rekor log index | 3695354704 |
| Predicate type | PyPI publish attestation https://docs.pypi.org/attestations/publish/v1 |
| Subject digest | sha256:998531ed4b4216b72413affa44443e464d851ef2b956551f10161806a077fa1f |
Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →
Install scripts 1 script
| Hook | Tier | Command |
|---|---|---|
| build_backend | Known build tool | setuptools.build_meta |
Background: Why install scripts are a supply-chain risk →
Dependencies 56 packages
| Packages resolved | 56 |
|---|---|
| No linked repository | 1 |
| Tree resolution | Complete |
Background: SBOMs and build attestations, explained →
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
account_summary ~27
Equity, day P&L (flows excluded), positions, open orders and remaining agent budget.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
approval_status ~34
State of a queued approval: pending, approved, rejected, expired, executed or failed.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| approval_id | string | yes | – |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
cancel_order ~33
Cancel an intent this agent (same client name) created, and its resting children.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| intent_id | string | yes | – |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
get_quote ~36
Top of book, mid, data age and depth within the policy band for an agent-allowed coin.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| coin | string | yes | – |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
get_receipt ~65
Execution receipt of an intent: every child order and fill (venue ids), exchange and builder fees, cost vs arrival mid, self-checks and a sha256 receipt_hash; a finished intent's receipt is anchored in the audit log.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| intent_id | string | yes | – |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
kill_switch ~33
Stop all new orders and cancel resting ones. Agents can turn it on, never off.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| reason | string | yes | – |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
order_status ~35
Fill progress, average price, cost vs arrival mid, fees and block reasons of an intent.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| intent_id | string | yes | – |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
policy_limits ~22
Read-only view of the policy limits, agent thresholds and builder fee.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
preview_order ~152
Dry run: planned child orders, policy decisions, fee bound, and whether a human must approve. side: buy|sell. algo: market|limit|twap|pov|chase|native_twap. size in base units. Sends nothing.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| algo | string | – | – |
| coin | string | yes | – |
| duration_s | integer | – | – |
| limit_px | – | – | – |
| max_slippage_bps | number | – | – |
| note | string | – | – |
| post_only | boolean | – | – |
| pov_rate | number | – | – |
| reduce_only | boolean | – | – |
| side | string | yes | – |
| size | number | yes | – |
| slices | integer | – | – |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
submit_order ~212
Submit an intent. Above the approval threshold or the daily agent budget it is queued for a human and an approval_id is returned instead; check it with approval_status. ALWAYS pass a fresh client_intent_id (8..40 chars, A-Z a-z 0-9 _ -) and REUSE it when you retry after a timeout or error: a repeated id returns the existing intent (status "duplicate", intent_id "ag-<client_intent_id>") and never sends a second order.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| algo | string | – | – |
| client_intent_id | – | – | – |
| coin | string | yes | – |
| duration_s | integer | – | – |
| limit_px | – | – | – |
| max_slippage_bps | number | – | – |
| note | string | – | – |
| post_only | boolean | – | – |
| pov_rate | number | – | – |
| reduce_only | boolean | – | – |
| side | string | yes | – |
| size | number | yes | – |
| slices | integer | – | – |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
How do I install the OMX for Hyperliquid MCP server?
OMX for Hyperliquid runs locally as a PyPI package, launched with uvx omx-hyperliquid. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
pypi · omx-hyperliquid
claude mcp add lumen-founder-omx-hyperliquid-trading -- uvx omx-hyperliquid
What is the OMX for Hyperliquid MCP server?
OMX for Hyperliquid is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.Lumen-Founder/omx-hyperliquid-trading. Hyperliquid execution for AI agents: limits, human approval, kill switch. Keyless demo + live paper. This page covers its PyPI package (omx-hyperliquid).
Is the OMX for Hyperliquid MCP server safe to use?
OMX for Hyperliquid scores 67 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. We found no known CVEs affecting it as of 21 November 2026. Its build provenance is signed and verified. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the OMX for Hyperliquid MCP server expose?
OMX for Hyperliquid exposes 10 tools: get_quote, preview_order, submit_order, approval_status, order_status, and 5 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 649 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Is the OMX for Hyperliquid MCP server still maintained?
OMX for Hyperliquid is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What licence is the OMX for Hyperliquid MCP server under?
OMX for Hyperliquid declares the MIT licence, which is OSI-approved. That covers the source only, and says nothing about the cost of any service it calls.
What did VerifyMCP test on the OMX for Hyperliquid MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 15 checks on OMX for Hyperliquid, covering Known CVEs, Install scripts, Dependency health, Source repository and 11 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about OMX for Hyperliquid: Malware scan. Endpoint Security and Transport & Reachability do not apply to a PyPI package, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.