Skip to content
verify mcp Beta VerifyMCP is currently in beta. If you notice any issues, get in touch and we’ll put it right.

io.github.lucaslubi/fidacy-mcp

NPM · @FIDACY/MCP · SCANNED OCT 4

AI Agent Firewall. Enforce signed authority before consequential actions. Free API key required.

Available components

+3 this week 78 Trust /100
Trust breakdown (7 categories)

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →

Supply Chain Security86
  • No malware found by supply-chain analysis.Pass
  • No known CVEs affecting this package version or its production dependencies.Pass
  • Install-script check failed: the install command fetches or executes arbitrary code (inline_eval). An install hook runs on every machine, in CI, and on transitive installs, whether or not you ever run the server. View diagnostics → Fail
  • 31 of 93 dependencies flagged as unhealthy. View diagnostics → Partial
Provenance & Transparency45
Schema Quality & AI Usability70
  • AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
  • Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1894 tokens (~157/item across 12 items; 12 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
  • Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
  • No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage86
  • 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
  • 52% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
  • Structured output schemas are declared (17% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
  • No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
  • We read all 12 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
  • An AI judge read all 13 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
  • Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Install

How do I install the io.github.lucaslubi/fidacy-mcp server?

io.github.lucaslubi/fidacy-mcp runs locally as an npm package, launched with npx -y @fidacy/mcp. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

npm · @fidacy/mcp

# add to Claude Code
claude mcp add lucaslubi-fidacy-mcp -- npx -y @fidacy/mcp
// .cursor/mcp.json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "lucaslubi-fidacy-mcp": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "@fidacy/mcp"
      ]
    }
  }
}
// .vscode/mcp.json
{
  "servers": {
    "lucaslubi-fidacy-mcp": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "@fidacy/mcp"
      ]
    }
  }
}
# add to Codex CLI
codex mcp add lucaslubi-fidacy-mcp -- npx -y @fidacy/mcp
// opencode.json
{
  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
  "mcp": {
    "lucaslubi-fidacy-mcp": {
      "type": "local",
      "command": [
        "npx",
        "-y",
        "@fidacy/mcp"
      ],
      "enabled": true
    }
  }
}
# add to OpenClaw
openclaw mcp add lucaslubi-fidacy-mcp --command npx --arg -y --arg @fidacy/mcp
# ~/.hermes/config.yaml
mcp_servers:
  lucaslubi-fidacy-mcp:
    command: "npx"
    args: ["-y", "@fidacy/mcp"]
// ~/.netclaw/config/netclaw.json
{
  "McpServers": {
    "lucaslubi-fidacy-mcp": {
      "Transport": "stdio",
      "Command": "npx",
      "Arguments": [
        "-y",
        "@fidacy/mcp"
      ]
    }
  }
}
# add to Vellum
assistant mcp add lucaslubi-fidacy-mcp -t stdio -c npx -a -y @fidacy/mcp
// mcp.json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "lucaslubi-fidacy-mcp": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "@fidacy/mcp"
      ]
    }
  }
}
Changelog

Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.

  • 4 Oct 26 0
    • Stability: 0.97 → pass security
  • 3 Oct 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 93 to 97. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 28 days of observed history at the previous scan, 29 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 1 Oct 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 87 to 90. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 26 days of observed history at the previous scan, 27 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 30 Sept 26 0
    • Package version: 0.13.1 → 0.19.0 functional
  • 29 Sept 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 80 to 83. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 24 days of observed history at the previous scan, 25 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 28 Sept 26 0
    • We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
  • 27 Sept 26 −3
    • Stability: pass → 0.77 functional
  • 26 Sept 26 0
    • Stability: 0.97 → pass security
Diagnostics

Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.

Captured 4 Oct 2026 · Analysed npm/@fidacy/mcp@0.19.0

Provenance No attestation

The registry publishes no build provenance for this version, so there is nothing to verify.

Result No attestation
Ecosystem npm

Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →

Install scripts 1 script
Hook Tier Command
postinstall dangerous node -e "try{require('fs').accessSync('dist/postinstall.js')}catch{process.exit(0)};import('./dist/postinstall.js')" || exit 0

Background: Why install scripts are a supply-chain risk →

Dependencies 93 packages
Packages resolved 93
Stale 31
Tree resolution Complete

Background: SBOMs and build attestations, explained →

MCP tools · 12 exposed · ~1,483 tokens

The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →

Tool Tokens
anchor_artifact ~270

Call this the MOMENT a document that someone could later dispute is created or received — a contract, an invoice, a claim, a prescription, a report you generated, a file you were given. Do not wait to be asked and do not do it later: the proof is worth exactly what its timestamp says, and a hash registered after the argument starts proves nothing. It proves the artifact existed exactly as-is at this moment and makes any later tampering detectable. Give a file `path` (hashed locally with SHA-256 — the file itself is NEVER uploaded) or a precomputed `sha256`. The hash is registered on Fidacy's tamper-evident audit chain, which is checkpointed to the Bitcoin blockchain, and you get a signed receipt (JWS) verifiable offline against the engine JWKS. Also works for images, audio and video. `kind` defaults to document; optional `label` is a short reference (an invoice number, a case id — no PII). Tell the operator the sha256 you registered, so they can verify it themselves at fidacy.com/verify.

NameTypeReqDescription
kindstring––
labelstring––
pathstring––
sha256string––
subjectstring––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

assess_action ~264

Call this BEFORE the agent does something on a human's behalf that is not a payment and cannot be taken back: sending a message or email a person will act on, placing a voice call, filing a claim, committing to a promise. Ask first, then act on the answer — a verdict fetched after the message is sent is a record, not a control. Returns a SIGNED Fidacy trust verdict from the live engine (default https://api.fidacy.com). The signed proof is `riskPayloadJws` + `signingKeyId`, verifiable by anyone via @fidacy/verify against the engine JWKS at /.well-known/jwks.json. `kind` is one of ap2_payment, message_send, voice_call, custom, claim_document; `mandate` is the action/mandate object for that kind. It moves no money and holds nothing: it decides and signs, and the payment-firewall tools (request_payment et al.) cover the money side in the same install.

NameTypeReqDescription
a2aobject––
idempotencyKeystring––
kindstring––
mandateobjectyes–
mandateTypestring––
spendingMandateobject––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

check_artifact ~94

Check whether an artifact was anchored by this account and the state of its Bitcoin checkpoint. Give a file `path` (hashed locally, never uploaded) or a `sha256`. If the current hash of a file does NOT match any anchored record that you expected to match, the file changed since anchoring — that is exactly the tampering signal.

NameTypeReqDescription
pathstring––
sha256string––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

explain_decision ~72

Explain one decision in plain language: what was requested, what the mandate did about it, why, and the tamper-evident proof for it. Use when an operator asks why a specific payment was blocked.

NameTypeReqDescription
decisionIdstringyesDecision id from request_payment, list_decisions or spend_summary

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

get_audit_proof ~56

Return the tamper-evident, hash-chained proof for a decision id, including whether the chain is intact and the public key it verifies against.

NameTypeReqDescription
decisionIdstringyesDecision id returned by request_payment

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

list_decisions ~87

List recent agent payment decisions, newest first, with payee, amount, the agent's stated reason, and for blocked ones the rule that stopped it. Filter by status to answer 'what got blocked' directly. Read-only, works offline.

NameTypeReqDescription
limitinteger–How many decisions to return. Default 20.
statusstring–Filter by outcome. Default all.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

register_email ~83

Register the operator's email so their agent's protection history can attach to a real Fidacy account and Fidacy can reach them. ONLY call this when the human operator has explicitly given their email and agreed to be contacted — it is consent-based. Does not create an account or move money.

NameTypeReqDescription
emailstringyesThe operator's email, exactly as they gave it.
NameTypeReqDescription
messagestringyes–
registeredbooleanyes–

No examples provided.

request_payment ~272

Authorize a payment action against the active Fidacy mandate. Returns an ALLOW with a signed grant, or a DENY with the violated rule. The downstream executor MUST require the grant. Call this before any payment; never pay without it.

NameTypeReqDescription
amountnumberyesAmount in the mandate currency
categorystringyesPurpose category (must be allowed by the mandate)
currencystringyesISO 4217 currency code
idempotencyKeystring–Optional. Your own key for this payment, if you have one (an order id, a job id). Leave it out and Fidacy derives one from the payment itself, which is the safer default: a retry of the SAME payment…
invoiceRefstring–Optional invoice identity. When set, Fidacy enforces one payment per invoice: a second request for the same invoiceRef is DENIED, at any amount.
payeestringyesPayee identifier
purposestringyesYour stated reason for this payment, in your own words. It is persisted readably on the tamper-evident audit record (ALLOW and DENY alike) and becomes part of the after-the-fact proof, so write the r…
NameTypeReqDescription
decisionIdstringyes–
grantstring––
messagestringyes–
statusstringyes–
violatedRulestring––

No examples provided.

sentinel_alerts ~98

Predictive pattern alerts from the local audit chain: first-ever payee, amount spikes vs this agent's own history, velocity bursts, payments riding the mandate ceiling, and retries after a denial (the behavior our Model Watch benchmark measures). Deterministic and explainable, no model. Use to answer 'has anything unusual happened' before it becomes a loss.

NameTypeReqDescription
limitinteger–How many flagged decisions to return. Default 20.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

spend_summary ~97

Operator report over a time window: how many payment decisions were made, how much was paid and to whom, how much was blocked before executing, and which mandate rules did the blocking. Read-only, works offline against the local audit chain. Use this to answer questions like 'what did my agents spend this week' or 'has anything been blocked'.

NameTypeReqDescription
daysinteger–Window in days, counting back from now. Default 7.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

upgrade ~49

Start upgrading this local install to a real Fidacy account (server-backed signed verdicts, anchored proof, higher volume). Returns a link to open; your anonymous usage is preserved and migrated to the new account.

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

verify_mandate ~41

Return the active mandate envelope (caps, allowed payees/categories, window, revocation) and Fidacy's Ed25519 public key for grant verification.

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

Common questions

What is the io.github.lucaslubi/fidacy-mcp server?

io.github.lucaslubi/fidacy-mcp is listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.lucaslubi/fidacy-mcp. AI Agent Firewall. Enforce signed authority before consequential actions. Free API key required. This page covers its npm package (@fidacy/mcp).

Is the io.github.lucaslubi/fidacy-mcp server safe to use?

io.github.lucaslubi/fidacy-mcp scores 78 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. We found no known CVEs affecting it as of 4 October 2026. It declares an install script we flagged as high risk. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

What tools does the io.github.lucaslubi/fidacy-mcp server expose?

io.github.lucaslubi/fidacy-mcp exposes 12 tools: request_payment, verify_mandate, get_audit_proof, spend_summary, list_decisions, and 7 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,483 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

Is the io.github.lucaslubi/fidacy-mcp server still maintained?

io.github.lucaslubi/fidacy-mcp is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 4 October 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.

What licence is the io.github.lucaslubi/fidacy-mcp server under?

io.github.lucaslubi/fidacy-mcp declares the Apache-2.0 licence, which is OSI-approved. That covers the source only, and says nothing about the cost of any service it calls.