Share HTML
REMOTE · SHARE-HTML.ZHENJIAZHOU0127.WORKERS.DEV · SCANNED SEP 28
Create sandboxed public-unlisted or access-key-protected HTML previews through a remote MCP server.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security46
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 3 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 405, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability69
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 123 tokens (~41/item across 3 items; 3 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety75
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- 0 of 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "create_share" implies "publish" and declares no destructiveHint at all, which the MCP spec reads as destructive by default. See how to fix → Fail
- An AI judge read all 3 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
How do I install the Share HTML MCP server?
Share HTML is a hosted endpoint at https://share-html.zhenjiazhou0127.workers.dev/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · share-html.zhenjiazhou0127.workers.dev
claude mcp add --transport http lifeodyssey-share-html 'https://share-html.zhenjiazhou0127.workers.dev/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"lifeodyssey-share-html": {
"url": "https://share-html.zhenjiazhou0127.workers.dev/mcp"
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"lifeodyssey-share-html": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://share-html.zhenjiazhou0127.workers.dev/mcp"
}
}
} [mcp_servers.lifeodyssey-share-html] url = "https://share-html.zhenjiazhou0127.workers.dev/mcp"
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"lifeodyssey-share-html": {
"type": "remote",
"url": "https://share-html.zhenjiazhou0127.workers.dev/mcp",
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add lifeodyssey-share-html --url 'https://share-html.zhenjiazhou0127.workers.dev/mcp' --transport streamable-http
mcp_servers:
lifeodyssey-share-html:
url: "https://share-html.zhenjiazhou0127.workers.dev/mcp" {
"McpServers": {
"lifeodyssey-share-html": {
"Transport": "http",
"Url": "https://share-html.zhenjiazhou0127.workers.dev/mcp"
}
}
} assistant mcp add lifeodyssey-share-html -t streamable-http -u 'https://share-html.zhenjiazhou0127.workers.dev/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"lifeodyssey-share-html": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://share-html.zhenjiazhou0127.workers.dev/mcp"
}
}
} The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 26 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Aug 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 11 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 5 Aug 26 0
- HSTS header: unverified → fail ▼ security
- TLS certificate: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Authorization: Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 3 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. security
- 4 Aug 26 0
- HSTS header: fail → unverified ▼ security
- TLS certificate: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Authorization: Authorisation not yet verified: we couldn't confirm whether this endpoint requires it. security
- 31 Jul 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 28 Sept 2026 · Probed https://share-html.zhenjiazhou0127.workers.dev/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=zhenjiazhou0127.workers.dev | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 26 Sept 2026 | 25 Dec 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | b2701ee968a424a11357cfb74f62be3c |
| SANs: zhenjiazhou0127.workers.dev, *.zhenjiazhou0127.workers.dev | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of share-html.zhenjiazhou0127.workers.dev. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| dev. | present | 60074 | 8 | Verified |
| workers.dev. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://share-html.zhenjiazhou0127.workers.dev/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://share-html.zhenjiazhou0127.workers.dev/mcp | Inconclusive | 405 |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
create_share ~71
Publish one HTML page as either an unlisted or access-key protected sandboxed share.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| html | string | yes | The full HTML document to publish. |
| title | string | – | Optional title for the share. |
| visibility | string | – | Defaults to public_unlisted. private_link returns a one-time accessKey. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
describe_share_html ~23
Return the AI-readable Share HTML guide, including routes and safety model.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_public_share ~29
Fetch public metadata for a Share HTML slug.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| slug | string | yes | Public Share HTML slug |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
What is the Share HTML MCP server?
Share HTML is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.lifeodyssey/share-html. Create sandboxed public-unlisted or access-key-protected HTML previews through a remote MCP server. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://share-html.zhenjiazhou0127.workers.dev/mcp).
Is the Share HTML MCP server safe to use?
Share HTML scores 71 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Share HTML MCP server expose?
Share HTML exposes 3 tools: describe_share_html, get_public_share, create_share. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 123 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Share HTML MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to Share HTML without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the Share HTML MCP server still maintained?
Share HTML is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 28 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.