Content
PYPI · CONTENT-MCP
Turn URLs, files and text into media, transcripts, summaries, translations and PDF.
Available components
Last scanned (18 hours ago)
Scores higher than 67% of PyPI servers
Category Design and Media
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Supply Chain Security50
- Malware scan not yet available for this package.Unverified
- No known CVEs affecting this package version or its production dependencies.Pass
- Runs hatchling.build at install time, a recognised build step with no custom scripting around it. View diagnostics → Pass
- 1 of 32 dependencies flagged as unhealthy. View diagnostics → Partial
Provenance & Transparency87
- Source repository is publicly reachable at the declared URL. View diagnostics → Pass
- Cryptographically verified build provenance (signed, bound to LatentNoise/content). View diagnostics → Pass
- License check failed: the license (FSL-1.1-ALv2) isn't a recognized OSI-approved license. See how to fix → Fail
- Actively maintained (last published 42 days ago).Pass
- Publishes a security disclosure policy (SECURITY.md).Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability72
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1296 tokens (~117/item across 11 items; 11 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management80
- Stability observed for 24 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage71
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 0% of tool parameters carry a description.Fail
- Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety75
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- 0 of 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "delete_upload" implies "delete" and declares no destructiveHint at all, which the MCP spec reads as destructive by default. See how to fix → Fail
- An AI judge read all 12 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).Pass
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 4 Nov 26 −3
- Stability: pass → 0.80 functional
- 2 Nov 26 −15
- Malware scan: pass → unverified ▼ security
- 31 Oct 26 +15
- Malware scan: unverified → pass ▲ security
- 30 Oct 26 −15
- Malware scan: pass → unverified ▼ security
- 29 Oct 26 +1
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 28 Oct 26 −1
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 19 Oct 26 +1
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 17 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 90 to 93. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 27 days of observed history at the previous scan, 28 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 4 Nov 2026 · Analysed pypi/content-mcp@0.8.5
Provenance Verified
A signed build attestation was found and verified, binding this exact artifact to the source repository it claims to come from.
| Result | Verified |
|---|---|
| Ecosystem | pypi |
| Reason | Verified |
| Discovered via | Registry attestation endpoint |
| Source repo | LatentNoise/content |
| Certificate issuer | https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com |
| Certificate SAN | https://github.com/LatentNoise/content/.github/workflows/publish-pypi.yml@refs/tags/v0.8.5 |
| Rekor log index | 2909547863 |
| Predicate type | PyPI publish attestation https://docs.pypi.org/attestations/publish/v1 |
| Subject digest | sha256:67a46802f0dc1d87b877286f33966db04a7729362f316be33c82886d28489b17 |
Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →
Install scripts 1 script
| Hook | Tier | Command |
|---|---|---|
| build_backend | allowlisted | hatchling.build |
Background: Why install scripts are a supply-chain risk →
Dependencies 32 packages
| Packages resolved | 32 |
|---|---|
| No linked repository | 1 |
| Tree resolution | Complete |
Background: SBOMs and build attestations, explained →
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
analyze_source ~150
Analyze a source and report what can be produced from it. Accepts a URL, or **a path to a file on this machine** — the one this MCP server runs on. A local file is read and uploaded to the engine, which is the only way a file here becomes usable by an engine running elsewhere; the path is never assumed to exist on the engine's side. Over a network transport (streamable-http) local paths are refused outright rather than resolved: "this machine" would be the server's host, not the caller's, which is not what a path in a request means.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| credential | – | – | – |
| url | string | yes | – |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
cancel_job ~24
Request cooperative cancellation of a running job.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| job_id | string | yes | – |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
delete_upload ~72
Delete bytes uploaded from this machine, before the TTL expires. `analyze_source` uploads a local file to the engine; the id it returns under `upload` is what this takes. Removes only that upload — never an artifact, never a file in the library.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| upload_id | string | yes | – |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
download_artifact ~106
Save an artifact onto the machine running this MCP server. Use this when the user wants the file *here* rather than only in the engine's library — typically when the engine runs on another machine. `destination` is optional: omitted, the artifact keeps its own name in the server's download directory (CONTENT_MCP_DOWNLOAD_DIR, default ~/Downloads/Content). A path outside that directory is refused.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| artifact_id | string | yes | – |
| destination | – | – | – |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
generate ~166
Start a job producing the requested outputs from an analyzed source. Each output is either a type string — ["video", "subtitles"] — or an object. Per-output settings go under "options", never beside "type": {"type": "subtitles", "options": {"languages": ["es"]}} {"type": "video", "options": {"selection": {"max_height": 1080}}, "delivery": {"mode": "deliver", "folder": "Talks"}} Other keys of an output object: id, from_sources, from_outputs, scope ("single" or "each_item" for a collection), required. An unknown key is refused rather than ignored.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| analysis_id | string | yes | – |
| outputs | array | yes | – |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
get_artifact ~43
Artifact metadata; small text artifacts are inlined, larger/binary ones return a download reference (never raw bytes over MCP).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| artifact_id | string | yes | – |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
get_config ~36
Server-side context for building requests: credential ids for authenticated sources, whether delivery-by-default is on, and the existing library folders.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
get_job ~79
Get a job's status and, once terminal, its produced artifacts. Carries `poll_after`: seconds to wait before calling this again — a heuristic (grows with elapsed time and the kind of work the job is doing), not a promise, and `null` once the job is terminal.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| job_id | string | yes | – |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
list_capabilities ~27
Resolve the public capabilities available for an analyzed source.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| analysis_id | string | yes | – |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
list_jobs ~23
List recent jobs (most recent first).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | integer | – | – |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
retry_job ~76
Run a finished job's request again, as a new job. Re-runs the *whole* request: a playlist where one member failed re-downloads every member. Worth it for a transient failure, wasteful for a large collection — read the failure in `get_job` first.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| job_id | string | yes | – |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Content MCP server?
Content runs locally as a PyPI package, launched with uvx content-mcp. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
pypi · content-mcp
claude mcp add latentnoise-content -- uvx content-mcp
What is the Content MCP server?
Content is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.LatentNoise/content. Turn URLs, files and text into media, transcripts, summaries, translations and PDF. This page covers its PyPI package (content-mcp).
Is the Content MCP server safe to use?
Content scores 71 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. We found no known CVEs affecting it as of 4 November 2026. Its build provenance is signed and verified. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Content MCP server expose?
Content exposes 11 tools: analyze_source, list_capabilities, generate, get_job, cancel_job, and 6 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 802 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Is the Content MCP server still maintained?
Content is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 4 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What licence is the Content MCP server under?
Content declares the FSL-1.1-ALv2 licence, which is not on the OSI-approved list. Read the terms before using it at work, and note this covers the source only, not the cost of any service it calls.