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harald

PYPI · HARALD

helps coding agents work out the bluetooth le and classic protocol of gadgets you own

Available components

65 Trust /100

Last scanned (20 hours ago)

Scores higher than 61% of PyPI servers

Category IoT and Hardware

Trust breakdown (7 categories)

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →

Supply Chain Security100
  • No malware found by supply-chain analysis.Pass
  • No known CVEs affecting this package version or its production dependencies.Pass
  • Runs hatchling.build at install time, a recognised build step with no custom scripting around it. View diagnostics → Pass
  • 1 of 48 dependencies flagged as unhealthy. View diagnostics → Partial
Provenance & Transparency45
Schema Quality & AI Usability65
  • AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
  • Tool/resource definitions use about 1801 tokens (~100/item across 18 items; 18 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
  • Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management0
  • Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).Unverified
Tool Coverage71
  • 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
  • 0% of tool parameters carry a description.Fail
  • Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety75
  • No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
  • 0 of 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "classic_send" implies "send" and declares no destructiveHint at all, which the MCP spec reads as destructive by default. See how to fix → Fail
  • An AI judge read all 19 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
  • Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).Pass

Unverified: 1 category

A category scored 0 because we could not verify it: a data source with nothing on this package, evidence we could not reach, or a check we could not run. We only credit what we can confirm.

Changelog

Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.

  • 3 Nov 26 +15
    • Malware scan: unverified → pass ▲ security
    • Known CVEs: partial → pass ▲ security
    • Dependency health: partial → 1.00 functional
  • 2 Nov 26 50

    First indexed and scored.

Diagnostics

Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.

Captured 4 Nov 2026 · Analysed pypi/harald@0.2.2

Provenance No attestation

The registry publishes no build provenance for this version, so there is nothing to verify.

Result No attestation
Ecosystem pypi
Reason No attestation published

Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →

Install scripts 1 script
Hook Tier Command
build_backend allowlisted hatchling.build

Background: Why install scripts are a supply-chain risk →

Dependencies 48 packages
Packages resolved 48
No linked repository 1
Tree resolution Complete

Background: SBOMs and build attestations, explained →

MCP tools · 18 exposed · ~1,686 tokens

The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →

Tool Tokens
analyze_apk ~172

statically analyze a vendor android app (.apk, .xapk or .apks) already on disk. detects the framework. for a native app it runs jadx and lists the uuids (gatt and rfcomm) in gatt_uuids and file:line candidates (uuids, aes keys, base64 blobs, command builders, rfcomm socket calls) to open under jadx_dir, the app's own package first and third-party libraries skipped. each list keeps at most 50 per kind; totals has the full counts, and when anything was cut a warning names the file under jadx_dir that lists them all. flutter and react-native apps keep their ble code compiled, so the warnings point to capture analysis instead. harald never downloads apps.

NameTypeReqDescription
pathstringyes–
NameTypeReqDescription
result–yes–

No examples provided.

classic_devices ~46

list the bluetooth classic devices paired with this computer. connected says whether each is linked to this computer now. use an address from here with classic_services, classic_send and classic_listen.

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

NameTypeReqDescription
result–yes–

No examples provided.

classic_listen ~101

open a classic device's rfcomm channel, send nothing, and collect `seconds` (at most 30) of what it says. needs no arm, but standard profiles are still refused. service is an rfcomm service uuid or channel number from classic_services. returns one entry per chunk: seconds since the channel opened and the value as hex.

NameTypeReqDescription
addressstringyes–
secondsnumberyes–
servicestringyes–
NameTypeReqDescription
result–yes–

No examples provided.

classic_send ~226

send hex messages to a classic device's rfcomm channel and collect its answers. refused unless the human armed this device by running `harald arm <address>` in their own terminal. each message spends one armed write, a query included, because classic has no read. all messages go over one connection, in order, with `listen` seconds (at most 30) of listening after each, so handshakes and acks can be sent as messages. service is an rfcomm service uuid or channel number from classic_services; standard profiles and channels missing from classic_services are refused, and firmware-update channels stay blocked. received holds each chunk with the message number it followed (0 = before the first), seconds since the channel opened and the value as hex. stopped explains a budget that ran out partway, or a link that failed after the first message; it is empty when every message was sent.

NameTypeReqDescription
addressstringyes–
listennumber––
messages_hexarrayyes–
servicestringyes–
NameTypeReqDescription
result–yes–

No examples provided.

classic_services ~103

list a paired classic device's service records from this computer's cache. each record has a name, service-class uuids and an rfcomm channel (null when rfcomm cannot reach it). protected channels are standard profiles such as hands-free and headset, which harald never opens; firmware_update channels stay blocked for writes. refresh=true asks the device again instead of trusting the cache.

NameTypeReqDescription
addressstringyes–
refreshboolean––
NameTypeReqDescription
result–yes–

No examples provided.

connect ~44

connect to a device and list its gatt services and their characteristics. use the characteristic uuids listed here with read_char, write_char and subscribe.

NameTypeReqDescription
addressstringyes–
NameTypeReqDescription
result–yes–

No examples provided.

diff ~69

compare hex payloads byte by byte. returns how many payloads have each length, the byte at every position that is the same in all of them (over the shortest), the positions that vary, and whether the set looks like block-cipher output.

NameTypeReqDescription
payloads_hexarrayyes–
NameTypeReqDescription
result–yes–

No examples provided.

guess_checks ~83

name the checksums and length fields one hex payload is consistent with. checks sum8 and xor8 in the last byte, and the byte before a trailing end marker, over the bytes after a leading start marker; crc16-ccitt in the last two; and a length byte at position 0 or 1.

NameTypeReqDescription
payload_hexstringyes–
NameTypeReqDescription
result–yes–

No examples provided.

list_devices ~23

list the gadgets in harald's device library, with status and summary.

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

NameTypeReqDescription
result–yes–

No examples provided.

load_device ~31

the device library entry for one slug, including any app-wide key and cipher.

NameTypeReqDescription
slugstringyes–
NameTypeReqDescription
result–yes–

No examples provided.

open_capture ~292

show the att and rfcomm timeline of a phone capture (.pklg or btsnoop log). one line per event with time, acl connection, direction, op and value hex. att events show their handle and uuid; rfcomm events (rfcomm data, rfcomm_open and rfcomm_close) show their server channel, e.g. ch=9. any warnings come first and a `showing a–b of n events` footer comes last. a capture can hold several connections, each with its own handles. page with limit and offset. handle (an integer, e.g. 18 for h=0x0012) keeps only att events on that handle, channel (e.g. 9) only rfcomm events on that channel, conn (e.g. 64 for c=0x0040) only events on that connection, and offset then counts those filtered events. for a bluetooth classic gadget, capture its android app in a btsnoop log: an iphone app reaches classic gadgets only through apple iap2, which harald shows as rfcomm data but can't unwrap yet. relative paths resolve against the server's working directory.

NameTypeReqDescription
channel–––
conn–––
handle–––
limitinteger––
offsetinteger––
pathstringyes–
NameTypeReqDescription
result–yes–

No examples provided.

read_char ~34

read a characteristic once; returns its value as hex.

NameTypeReqDescription
addressstringyes–
char_uuidstringyes–
NameTypeReqDescription
result–yes–

No examples provided.

read_notes ~52

the working notes for a device, or an empty string when there are none. notes live in harald-work/<slug>/notes.md, relative to the server's working directory.

NameTypeReqDescription
slugstringyes–
NameTypeReqDescription
result–yes–

No examples provided.

save_note ~68

append a timestamped note to harald-work/<slug>/notes.md. the path is relative to the server's working directory. slugs use lowercase letters, digits and hyphens, e.g. demo-lamp.

NameTypeReqDescription
slugstringyes–
textstringyes–
NameTypeReqDescription
result–yes–

No examples provided.

scan ~48

scan for bluetooth le devices for `timeout` seconds, strongest signal first. manufacturer_data maps each company id (as 0x-hex) to its payload hex.

NameTypeReqDescription
timeoutnumber––
NameTypeReqDescription
result–yes–

No examples provided.

subscribe ~54

collect notifications from a characteristic for `seconds`. returns one entry per notification: seconds since the start and the value as hex.

NameTypeReqDescription
addressstringyes–
char_uuidstringyes–
secondsnumberyes–
NameTypeReqDescription
result–yes–

No examples provided.

try_keys ~120

decrypt hex payloads with each candidate aes key, in ecb and in cbc with a zero iv, best-scoring first. samples holds the first plaintexts as hex. the score only tells keys apart across several distinct payloads: with one payload, or identical copies, every key scores 1.0. keys that are not 16, 24 or 32 bytes and payloads that are not a multiple of 16 bytes are skipped.

NameTypeReqDescription
keys_hexarrayyes–
payloads_hexarrayyes–
NameTypeReqDescription
result–yes–

No examples provided.

write_char ~120

write hex bytes to a characteristic; returns the writes left. refused unless the human armed this device by running `harald arm <address>` in their own terminal. each write spends one from that budget, and firmware-update services stay blocked. by default it writes without response when the characteristic allows that, and with response otherwise. response=true waits for the device to acknowledge the write; false does not.

NameTypeReqDescription
addressstringyes–
char_uuidstringyes–
data_hexstringyes–
response–––
NameTypeReqDescription
result–yes–

No examples provided.

Install

How do I install the harald MCP server?

harald runs locally as a PyPI package, launched with uvx harald. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

pypi · harald

# add to Claude Code
claude mcp add k0nnect-harald -- uvx harald
Common questions

What is the harald MCP server?

harald is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.k0nnect/harald. helps coding agents work out the bluetooth le and classic protocol of gadgets you own. This page covers its PyPI package (harald).

Is the harald MCP server safe to use?

harald scores 65 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. We found no known CVEs affecting it as of 4 November 2026. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

What tools does the harald MCP server expose?

harald exposes 18 tools: scan, connect, read_char, write_char, subscribe, and 13 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,686 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

Is the harald MCP server still maintained?

harald is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 4 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.

What licence is the harald MCP server under?

harald declares the MIT licence, which is OSI-approved. That covers the source only, and says nothing about the cost of any service it calls.