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io.github.jump4jump/eatmeprint-ordering

REMOTE · EATMEPRINT-MCP.EATMEPRINT.WORKERS.DEV

EatMePrint agent ordering: get_pricing, preview_set, place_order, check_order.

+1 this week 57 Trust /100

Last scanned (13 hours ago)

Scores higher than 43% of remote servers

Reachable. Last reached 5 Nov 2026.

Category E-commerce

Trust breakdown (7 categories)

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →

Endpoint Security46
Transport & Reachability100
Schema Quality & AI Usability63
  • AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
  • Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 978 tokens (~244/item across 4 items; 4 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
  • Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management11
  • Stability check failed: schema churn in the 7 days we've observed: 0 tool removals, 1 breaking changes, 0 auth/transport breaks, 0 additions. See how to fix → Fail
Tool Coverage96
  • 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
  • 88% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
  • No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
  • We read all 4 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
  • An AI judge read all 5 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities60
  • Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
What we tested

Checks we ran (12)

  • TLS certificate
  • Authorization
  • HSTS header
  • DNSSEC
  • Transport
  • Schema quality
  • Stability
  • Tool coverage
  • Injection markers
  • Destructive annotations
  • Judged manipulation
  • MCP protocol

Checks we could not complete (1)

These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.

  • HTTPS in Endpoint SecurityHTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 405, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement.

Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)

  • Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
  • Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.

The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →

Changelog

Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.

  • 4 Nov 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 4 to 8.

  • 30 Oct 26 0
    • Stability: unverified → fail ▼ security
    • “preview_set” dropped the required parameter “email” ▼ functional
    • Server version: 1.10.0 → 1.10.1 functional
    • Tool “place_order” changed its title: Place a real order (spends money, ships a physical product) → Place an order cosmetic
  • 29 Oct 26 56

    First indexed and scored.

Diagnostics

Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.

Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Probed https://eatmeprint-mcp.eatmeprint.workers.dev/mcp

TLS valid

Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .

Subject Issuer Valid from Valid until Key Signature Serial
CN=eatmeprint.workers.dev CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US 19 Oct 2026 17 Jan 2027 ECDSA 256 ECDSA-SHA384 6c5c5150dd3501c0adb143c274fcf593808
SANs: *.eatmeprint.workers.dev, eatmeprint.workers.dev
CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US 3 Sept 2025 2 Sept 2028 ECDSA 384 ECDSA-SHA384 4df3b15dd6c0784c507cd37b58e6f115
CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US 13 May 2026 2 Sept 2032 ECDSA 384 ECDSA-SHA384 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a
CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US 13 May 2026 2 Sept 2032 ECDSA 384 SHA256-RSA 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd

Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →

DNSSEC insecure

Validation of eatmeprint-mcp.eatmeprint.workers.dev. — Not signed

Zone DS Keys Algorithms Outcome
. Trust anchor 20326, 38696 8, 8 Verified
dev. DS published 60074 8 Verified
workers.dev. No DS Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation
Authentication No authorisation required

The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.

Result No authorisation required
HTTP status 200

Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →

Transports 2 probes
Transport URL Outcome Status Location
streamable-http https://eatmeprint-mcp.eatmeprint.workers.dev/mcp Verified 200
http (plaintext) http://eatmeprint-mcp.eatmeprint.workers.dev/mcp Inconclusive 405
MCP tools · 4 exposed · ~874 tokens

The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →

Tool Tokens
check_order ~60

Look up the current state of an order using the id and code from the status link. Needs no account and no password. Use this to report progress back to the person who asked.

NameTypeReqDescription
codestringyes–
order_idstringyes–

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

get_pricing ~140

Price, shipping cost, lead time and allergen information for an edible photo macaron set. Call this before ordering so you can tell the person what it costs and what is in it. Pass the delivery ZIP to get a firm shipping cost and total: it is the same live carrier rate place_order will book for that ZIP. Without a ZIP the reply is "$67 plus shipping".

NameTypeReqDescription
statestring–Two-letter US state code, e.g. "CA" or "NY". Optional; wording only.
zipstring–Five-digit US delivery ZIP, e.g. "90028". Optional; gives a firm shipping quote.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

place_order ~574

Places a REAL order for physical macarons shipped to a real address, and returns a crypto deposit address to send funds to. Confirm the total, the delivery address and the allergen warning with the person you are acting for BEFORE calling this. Pass either `images` (nine URLs, simplest — the set is built for you) or the `set_hash` and `add_to_cart_fields` returned by a previous preview_set call. Returns an order id, a crypto deposit address and amount, and a status link that needs no account or password. The order only reaches the bakery after the payment confirms. A recipient phone number is REQUIRED - carriers need it to generate a label, so collect it before calling.

NameTypeReqDescription
add_to_cart_fieldsobject–The `add_to_cart.fields` object exactly as returned by preview_set. Required when using set_hash instead of images.
confirm_total_usdnumber–Confirm a total your human has approved. Use this to RESUME an order that already exists: after an over-ceiling result, or when a repeat call matched an existing order and the payment instruction was…
emailstringyesAn address a human actually reads.
idempotency_keystring–Optional explicit key. If omitted, one is derived from the order details, so retrying the identical request is safe and will not create a duplicate.
imagesarray–Nine public https image URLs in grid order. Simplest route: the set is built and carted for you. Omit if passing set_hash + add_to_cart_fields instead.
max_total_usdnumber–Optional safety ceiling in USD. The shipping cost is only known once the order exists, so set this to the most your human agreed to pay. If the real total is higher, the order is still created but NO…
notestring–Optional short message for the card in the box.
pay_currencystring–Crypto ticker to pay in, e.g. "usdttrc20". Optional; a default is chosen.
recipientobjectyesWho receives the box, and where.
reorder_noncestring–Set this ONLY to deliberately place a second, separate order with identical details (same set, same recipient). Any distinct value works. Without it, an identical repeat is treated as a retry and ret…
set_hashstring–From preview_set. Requires add_to_cart_fields too.
shipping_idstring–Optional: force a specific shipping-method instance id. Normally omit.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

preview_set ~100

Build a printable set from exactly nine public image URLs, in grid order (left to right, top to bottom). Returns thumbnail previews, the price, and a set_hash to pass to place_order. Images must be JPEG or PNG, up to 10 MB each, reachable over plain https with no redirect. Private or internal addresses are refused. Nothing is charged and no order is created.

NameTypeReqDescription
imagesarrayyesExactly nine image URLs in grid order.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

Install

How do I install the io.github.jump4jump/eatmeprint-ordering MCP server?

io.github.jump4jump/eatmeprint-ordering is a hosted endpoint at https://eatmeprint-mcp.eatmeprint.workers.dev/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

remote · eatmeprint-mcp.eatmeprint.workers.dev

# add to Claude Code
claude mcp add --transport http jump4jump-eatmeprint-ordering 'https://eatmeprint-mcp.eatmeprint.workers.dev/mcp'
Common questions

What is the io.github.jump4jump/eatmeprint-ordering MCP server?

io.github.jump4jump/eatmeprint-ordering is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.jump4jump/eatmeprint-ordering. EatMePrint agent ordering: get_pricing, preview_set, place_order, check_order. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://eatmeprint-mcp.eatmeprint.workers.dev/mcp).

Is the io.github.jump4jump/eatmeprint-ordering MCP server safe to use?

io.github.jump4jump/eatmeprint-ordering scores 57 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

What tools does the io.github.jump4jump/eatmeprint-ordering MCP server expose?

io.github.jump4jump/eatmeprint-ordering exposes 4 tools: get_pricing, preview_set, place_order, check_order. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 874 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

Does the io.github.jump4jump/eatmeprint-ordering MCP server require authentication?

No. We connected to io.github.jump4jump/eatmeprint-ordering without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.

Is the io.github.jump4jump/eatmeprint-ordering MCP server still maintained?

io.github.jump4jump/eatmeprint-ordering is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.

What did VerifyMCP test on the io.github.jump4jump/eatmeprint-ordering MCP server?

VerifyMCP ran 12 checks on io.github.jump4jump/eatmeprint-ordering, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 8 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about io.github.jump4jump/eatmeprint-ordering: HTTPS. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.