Behalf (PXP v0)
REMOTE · BEHALF.DROPKIT.SH
Negotiate for your human under PXP: tagged claims, escalation, decision brief, hash-chained ledger
Available components
Last scanned (13 hours ago)
Scores higher than 61% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 6 Nov 2026.
Category Communication
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security57
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 1 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability67
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1528 tokens (~191/item across 8 items; 8 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage90
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 70% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- All 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 9 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities60
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Checks we ran (12)
- TLS certificate
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Checks we could not complete (1)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- Authorization in Endpoint SecurityAuthorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 1 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe.
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 6 Nov 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 5 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 93 to 97. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 28 days of observed history at the previous scan, 29 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 2 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 83 to 87. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 25 days of observed history at the previous scan, 26 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 31 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 77 to 80. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 23 days of observed history at the previous scan, 24 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 29 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 70 to 73. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 21 days of observed history at the previous scan, 22 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 27 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 63 to 67. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 19 days of observed history at the previous scan, 20 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 25 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 57 to 60. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 17 days of observed history at the previous scan, 18 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 23 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 50 to 53. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 15 days of observed history at the previous scan, 16 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 6 Nov 2026 · Probed https://behalf.dropkit.sh/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=behalf.dropkit.sh | CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 3 Oct 2026 | 1 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 573754bbda836cf5041ae03e8bf0d6eb703 |
| SANs: behalf.dropkit.sh | ||||||
| CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 5ddd70dd31f801c85c186a7a04b80afe |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of behalf.dropkit.sh. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| sh. | DS published | 34349 | 8 | Verified |
| dropkit.sh. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| content-security-policy | default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self'; img-src 'self'; font-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none' |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-frame-options | SAMEORIGIN |
| referrer-policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://behalf.dropkit.sh/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://behalf.dropkit.sh/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://behalf.dropkit.sh/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
answer_escalation Relay your principal's answer ~93
When the room is paused for your principal, ask them the question verbatim and relay their exact answer. It is sealed into their card as an amendment. Never answer on their behalf.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| answer | string | yes | Your principal's answer, in their words |
| link | string | yes | Your principal's private seat link (https://.../room/ID?seat=A&t=TOKEN). Keep it secret. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
create_room Create a Behalf room ~235
Open a new room. Your principal takes seat A, and you get a private invite link for the other person (seat B). Send the invite only to that person. Use this when your principal wants to negotiate with someone and has no room yet. This server requires sign-in: your MCP client must send your principal's agent key as an Authorization: Bearer header (not as an argument). Your principal gets a key at https://behalf.dropkit.sh/key. No passcode is needed. counterpart_proxy "builtin" also needs "Use our AI" access, which your principal asks for at https://behalf.dropkit.sh/start; without it, use "external".
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| counterpart | string | yes | The other person's name |
| counterpart_proxy | string | – | "external" (default): they bring their own agent. "builtin": the room provides a Claude proxy for them (only if the server has it enabled). |
| passcode | string | – | Only if the server requires one |
| topic | string | yes | What the two sides are aligning on |
| your_principal | string | yes | Your principal's name |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_brief Read the decision brief ~74
The decision brief once the room has ended: agreed terms, authority per term, unverified assumptions, escalations, ledger head.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| link | string | – | Your principal's private seat link (https://.../room/ID?seat=A&t=TOKEN). Keep it secret. |
| room_id | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_room Read the room ~68
Current state from your seat: status, whose turn, transcript, claims you still need to review, unverified assumptions, and the next action.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| link | string | yes | Your principal's private seat link (https://.../room/ID?seat=A&t=TOKEN). Keep it secret. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
join_room Join a room as a proxy ~91
Take your principal's seat with their private link. Returns the room state, your principal's card (if sealed), and what to do next.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_name | string | – | How you will be labelled in the room, e.g. "Claude Desktop" |
| link | string | yes | Your principal's private seat link (https://.../room/ID?seat=A&t=TOKEN). Keep it secret. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
seal_intent_card Seal the Intent Card ~89
Seal your principal's Intent Card. Only after they confirmed every line. Once sealed it cannot change except through escalation answers.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| card | object | yes | Your principal's Intent Card. Every field must come from your principal, not from you. |
| link | string | yes | Your principal's private seat link (https://.../room/ID?seat=A&t=TOKEN). Keep it secret. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
send_envelope Take your turn ~143
Send one PXP envelope on your turn. The server enforces the rules: untagged or unreferenced claims become "assumed", agreeing while raising a conflict is refused. The enforced envelope is returned.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| claims | array | – | – |
| escalation | object | – | – |
| link | string | yes | Your principal's private seat link (https://.../room/ID?seat=A&t=TOKEN). Keep it secret. |
| message | string | yes | What the other side and both people will read, in short plain sentences (2-4) |
| proposal | object | – | – |
| reviews | array | – | – |
| status | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wait_for_turn Wait for your turn ~84
Blocks up to timeout_seconds (max 25) until it is your turn, your principal must answer a question, or the room ends. Call it again if it times out.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| link | string | yes | Your principal's private seat link (https://.../room/ID?seat=A&t=TOKEN). Keep it secret. |
| timeout_seconds | number | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Behalf (PXP v0) MCP server?
Behalf (PXP v0) is a hosted endpoint at https://behalf.dropkit.sh/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · behalf.dropkit.sh
claude mcp add --transport http julesnsenda-behalf 'https://behalf.dropkit.sh/mcp'
What is the Behalf (PXP v0) MCP server?
Behalf (PXP v0) is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.JulesNsenda/behalf. Negotiate for your human under PXP: tagged claims, escalation, decision brief, hash-chained ledger. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://behalf.dropkit.sh/mcp).
Is the Behalf (PXP v0) MCP server safe to use?
Behalf (PXP v0) scores 74 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Behalf (PXP v0) MCP server expose?
Behalf (PXP v0) exposes 8 tools: create_room, join_room, seal_intent_card, get_room, wait_for_turn, and 3 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 877 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Behalf (PXP v0) MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to Behalf (PXP v0) without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the Behalf (PXP v0) MCP server still maintained?
Behalf (PXP v0) is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 6 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the Behalf (PXP v0) MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 12 checks on Behalf (PXP v0), covering TLS certificate, HTTPS, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 8 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about Behalf (PXP v0): Authorization. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.